CITY OF LOS ANGELES v. LYONS
No. 79-1995
Supreme Court of the United States
October 20, 1980
449 U.S. 934
I believe that, as in Coleman, the Court of Appeals may have unduly restrained the Secretary‘s authority to evaluate claims of mineral discoveries on public lands; its ruling appears to be based on the perception, possibly a misperception, that the Secretary‘s “excess reserves” analysis does violence to the statute. In light of that ruling, one now may expect the assertion of additional claims involving “valuable” mineral deposits not marketable in the foreseeable future. This can, and probably will, result in the withdrawal of vast acreage from the public domain for purposes unrelated to mining. Even if Congress later acts to implement the “excess reserves” concept, a prospect at best uncertain, such prospective legislation might not return to the public trust those claims already perfected pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ ruling. See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S. 334, 335-336 (1963).
The case thus raises a substantial question regarding administration of public lands, and surely is arguably in conflict with the rationale of United States v. Coleman. I therefore would grant certiorari and have the issue resolved only after plenary consideration.
No. 79-1995. CITY OF LOS ANGELES v. LYONS. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE POWELL and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
Respondent in this case seeks injunctive and declaratory relief under
In February 1977, respondent filed a seven-count complaint against the city of Los Angeles and four of its police officers. Respondent alleged that the four officers stopped his car for a minor traffic violation and that, without any provocation or reason to fear for their safety, they applied strangleholds around his neck, rendering him unconscious. He further alleged that the use of strangleholds in such non-life-threatening situations was a policy of the police department. Respondent sought damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that the use of strangleholds in non-life-threatening situations violates the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
The only issue before this Court is whether in seeking injunctive and declaratory relief respondent has stated a case or controversy within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Court of Appeals, reversing the District Court, held that respondent did have standing. The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from O‘Shea v. Littleton, supra, and Rizzo v. Goode, supra, on two grounds: First, there was a greater likelihood in this case that respondent would be subjected at some future date to the alleged illegal conduct; second, respondent did not seek “structural relief” requiring the federal courts to supervise the conduct of state officials, but only an injunction against the use of an established police practice.1
O‘Shea and Rizzo made clear that the federal courts are not the forum in which dissatisfied citizens may air their disagreements with government policy. The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by the case-or-controversy requirement of Art. III. Unless a party demonstrates a “personal stake in the outcome,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962), the disagreement may not be settled by the federal courts. For purposes of equitable relief, “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects” and if there is no “real and immediate threat of repeated injury” to the plaintiff. O‘Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 495-496. Here, the prospect of future injury rests on the likelihood that respondent will again be stopped or arrested and have the allegedly unconstitutional procedures applied to him. In O‘Shea, we held that this kind of possibility does not satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement.
There is no question that there is a case or controversy with respect to respondent‘s right to damages for an alleged past violation of his constitutional rights.2 However, with respect to a threat of future injury, respondent‘s position cannot be distinguished from that of any other person who may at some future date have a confrontation with the Los Angeles police. This is the kind of injury we have previously characterized as “abstract” and, therefore, insuf-
We could not conclude that respondent has standing to press his claims for equitable relief without re-examining our holdings in O‘Shea and Rizzo on the limits of the case-or-controversy requirement of Art. III. Of course, we cannot give plenary consideration to every misapplication of constitutional requirements, but the decision of the Court of Appeals appears so at odds with our precedents that I dissent from denial of certiorari.