CITIZENS UNITED RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE, d/b/a CURE AUTO INSURANCE, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellant, v CNMC INC, d/b/a GRAND SPORT MOTORING and GRAND SPORT COLLISION, Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellee, and AREA TOWING & RECOVERY INC, Defendant-Appellee, and GATEWAY TOWING LLC, 1 MILL TOWING & RECOVERY LLC, C&C TOWING SERVICE, NATIONWIDE RECOVERY, EARL’S TOWING AND RECOVERY, and TCC TOWING, Defendants.
No. 374903
STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
July 07, 2026
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 23-014266-NZ UNPUBLISHED
Before: YOUNG, P.J., and BORRELLO and TREBILCOCK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff sought to recover in circuit court what it considered excessive fees arising out of the post-accident towing and storage of a vehicle belonging to one of its insureds. The circuit court dismissed the lawsuit for want of jurisdiction, determining that the Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC),
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
For purposes of this opinion, we take the facts as alleged in the operative complaint. Plaintiff, Citizens United Reciprocal Exchange (CURE), is a reciprocal exchange that provides no-fault insurance. One of its insureds was involved in a motor-vehicle accident requiring towing of her vehicle in accordance with one of the MVC‘s special anti-theft provisions,
The responding towing company, defendant Area Towing & Recovery, Inc. (Area Towing), turned the vehicle over to a repair facility owned by defendant CNMC, Inc., d/b/a Grand Sport Motoring and Grand Sport Collision (Grand Sport), in exchange for payment of its towing and storage-related fees, which totaled $1,040. CURE sought release of the vehicle on behalf of its insured, but Grand Sport refused unless CURE reimbursed it for Area Towing‘s fees and paid thousands of dollars in additional charges related to Grand Sport‘s possession of the vehicle.
CURE paid the requested amounts and then sued Grand Sport and Area Towing in circuit court, alleging they participated in a scheme to unlawfully condition the vehicle‘s release on the payment of inflated or unjustified fees. On that basis, the operative complaint asserts common-law and statutory-conversion claims; violations of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA),
On Area Towing‘s subsequent motion for summary disposition, the circuit court determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over CURE‘s claims by virtue of
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(4) when the circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Maple Manor Rehab Ctr, LLC v. Dep‘t of Treasury, 333 Mich. App. 154, 162; 958 NW2d 894 (2020). A circuit court deciding whether to grant such a summary-disposition motion “must determine whether the affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence, demonstrate that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Doe v. Gen. Motors, 511 Mich. 1038, 1039 (2023). See also MCR 2.116(G)(5). This Court, in turn, reviews de novo the circuit court‘s resolution of a (C)(4) motion, Maple Manor, 333 Mich. App. at 162, as well as the underlying legal question of whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, id. To the extent those inquiries involve questions of statutory interpretation, this Court likewise reviews those de novo. Id. at 163.
III. ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court‘s authority “to exercise judicial power over a class or category of cases.” Mich. Farm Bureau v. Dep‘t of Environment, Great Lakes, & Energy, 515 Mich. 481, 512; 28 NW3d 629 (2024). Our Constitution and statutory schemes define the confines of such authority, Teddy 23, LLC v. Mich. Film Office, 313 Mich. App. 557, 564; 884 NW2d 799 (2015), which is a “prerequisite for a court to hear and decide” a party‘s claims, Mich. Farm Bureau, 515 Mich. at 512. Accordingly, courts are “duty-bound to recognize the limits of [their] subject-matter jurisdiction” and must dismiss actions over which it is lacking. Meisner Law Group PC v. Weston Downs Condo Ass‘n, 321 Mich. App. 702, 714; 909 NW2d 890 (2017).
Michigan‘s circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, Prime Time Int‘l Distrib, Inc. v. Dep‘t of Treasury, 322 Mich. App. 46, 51; 910 NW2d 683 (2017), having under our Constitution “original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law,”
A district court, on the other hand, is a legislatively created court of limited jurisdiction. Hodge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 499 Mich. 211, 216; 884 NW2d 238 (2016). Unless a different jurisdictional statute applies, its authority to decide civil actions under
B. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION AND MCL 257.252E
With these principles in mind, we turn to the twofold jurisdictional question before us: (1) whether
Resolution of these questions requires us to engage in statutory interpretation, the goal of which “is to give effect to the Legislature‘s intent, focusing first on the statute‘s plain language.” Batista v. Office of Retirement Servs., 515 Mich. 283, 297; 29 NW3d 115 (2024) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In so doing, we apply clear and unambiguous statutory language as written, McQueer v. Perfect Fence Co., 502 Mich. 276, 286; 917 NW2d 584 (2018), reading “nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself,” id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). But we do not do so “in a vacuum.” New Covert Generating Co, LLC v. Covert Twp., 334 Mich. App. 24, 51; 964 NW2d 378 (2020). Rather, “we examine the statute as a whole, reading individual words and phrases in the context of the entire legislative scheme.” Batista, 515 Mich. at 297-298 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, “[a] statute must be read in its entirety and the meaning given to one section arrived at after consideration of other sections so as to produce, if possible, a[] harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole.” In re Estate of Durbin, 205 Mich. App. 113, 118; 517 NW2d 261 (1994).
1. JURISDICTIONAL GRANT
CURE claims
Our review begins with the statutory language at issue. McQueer, 502 Mich. at 286. The operative language contained in
CURE does not identify, and we have not found, any statute likewise granting the circuit courts jurisdiction over such claims. Instead, in cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $25,000, such jurisdiction (if any) would arise under
Assuming without deciding that the amount in controversy here exceeds $25,000,
Where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular, and certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act, as the Legislature is not to be presumed to have intended a conflict. [Reynolds, 323 Mich. App. at 432 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
Because the applicable provision of Michigan‘s MVC—
Looking at the MVC‘s special anti-theft laws as a whole buttresses this conclusion. Batista, 515 Mich. at 297-298; Estate of Durbin, 205 Mich. App. at 118. Take
Finally, we reject CURE‘s jurisdictional arguments under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “a principle of statutory interpretation meaning the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” Mr Sunshine v. Delta College Bd. of Trustees, 343 Mich. App. 597, 607; 997 NW2d 755 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). That doctrine applies where “the items expressed are members of an associated group or series, justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Comm. for Marshall-Not Megasite v. City of Marshall (On Remand), ___ Mich. App. ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 369603); slip op at 13 (applying the doctrine to conclude that, “where the Legislature grants certain authority to a specific defined entity, this inclusion ‘operates to exclude’ the provision of such authority to other unnamed entities“). That is the case here. In
2. APPLICABILITY OF MCL 257.252E TO CURE‘S CLAIMS
CURE alternatively asserts that, even if
(1) The following courts have jurisdiction to determine if a police agency, towing agency or custodian, or private property owner has acted properly in reporting or processing a vehicle under section 252a, 252b(6) to (11), or 252d:
(a) The district court.
(b) A municipal court.
At issue is whether CURE‘s claims against defendants constitute challenges to the “processing” of the subject vehicle under that provision.4
Our Legislature chose not to define the term “processing,” so we first turn to dictionary definitions to ascertain its plain and ordinary meaning. Grand Rapids v. Brookstone Capital, LLC, 334 Mich. App. 452, 464; 965 NW2d 232 (2020). That term is relevantly defined as “[t]o put through the steps of a prescribed procedure,” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th Ed), p 1404, “to subject to a special process or treatment,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Processing <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/processing#dictionary-entry-2> (accessed May 29, 2026), and “to subject to or handle through an established usually routine set of procedures,” id. As applicable here, these definitions indicate that the term “processing” in
(2) Unless the vehicle is ordered to be towed by a police agency or a governmental agency designated by a police agency under subsection (1)(a), (d), (e), or (k), if the owner or other person that is legally entitled to possess a vehicle to be towed or removed arrives at the location where the vehicle is located before the actual towing or removal of the vehicle, the vehicle must be disconnected from the tow truck, and the owner or other person that is legally entitled to possess the vehicle may take possession of the vehicle and remove it without interference upon the payment of the reasonable service fee, for which a receipt must be provided.
(3) A police agency that authorizes the removal of a vehicle under subsection (1) shall do all of the following:
(a) Check to determine if the vehicle has been reported stolen before authorizing the removal of the vehicle.
(b) Enter the vehicle into the law enforcement information network as an impounded vehicle within 24 hours after ordering the impound of the vehicle. Except as provided in subsection (5), if the vehicle has not been redeemed by the owner within 7 days after the impound, the towing agency shall notify the police agency of that fact and the police agency shall deem the vehicle abandoned. The police agency shall enter the vehicle into the law enforcement information network as abandoned within 24 hours of notification by the towing agency, and follow the procedures set forth in section 252a.
(4) If an impounded vehicle is released before the police agency enters the vehicle into the law enforcement information network as abandoned, the towing agency or custodian shall notify the police agency that authorized the removal within 24 hours of releasing the impounded vehicle.
(5) A vehicle impounded under subsection (1)(d), (e), or (k) must first be released by the police agency that authorized the removal prior to the towing agency or custodian releasing the vehicle to the vehicle owner.
(6) Not less than 20 days but not more than 30 days after a vehicle has been released under subsection (5), the towing agency or custodian shall notify the police agency to enter the vehicle as abandoned and the police agency shall enter the vehicle into the law enforcement information network as abandoned within 24 hours of receiving notice and follow the procedures set forth in section 252a if the impounded vehicle has not been redeemed. [
MCL 257.252d(2) to (6).]
Indeed, nothing in
This stands in stark contrast to the procedures prescribed in
Because CURE‘s claims fall outside the scope of
For these reasons, we reverse the circuit court‘s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock