KENNETH MCKENZIE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF MICHIGAN, and MACOMB CORRECTIONAL FACILITY WARDEN, Defendants-Appellants, and RANDALL HAAS, Defendant. FATIMA OLDEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF MICHIGAN, and MACOMB CORRECTIONAL FACILITY WARDEN, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 347061
No. 347798
Michigan Court of Appeals
May 7, 2020
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
KENNETH MCKENZIE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF MICHIGAN, and MACOMB CORRECTIONAL FACILITY WARDEN,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
RANDALL HAAS,
Defendant.
FATIMA OLDEN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF MICHIGAN, and MACOMB CORRECTIONAL FACILITY WARDEN,
Defendants-Appellants.
FOR PUBLICATION
May 7, 2020
9:00 a.m.
No. 347061
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 18-002451-CD
No. 347798
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 18-001424-CD
Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SERVITTO, JJ.
In Docket No. 347061, defendants appeal as of right the trial court’s denial of their motion for summary disposition premised upon MCR 2.116(C)(4). In Docket No. 347798, which this Court consolidated with Docket No. 347061, defendants appeal by leave granted the trial court’s order denying their motion for summary disposition, also brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4). Olden v Department of Corrections, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals entered April 23, 2019 (Docket No. 347798). We affirm in both cases.
I. FACTS
The facts in both cases are similar and largely undisputed. Plaintiffs, Kenneth McKenzie and Fatima Olden, (“plaintiffs”) are long-term employees of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) as corrections officers at the Macomb Correctional Facility (“the Facility”). In 2015, the Facility began a program where inmates trained dogs to become leader dogs for the blind. The program only took place in certain housing units in the facility. Plaintiffs were both assigned to one of those housing units and thus frequently had to come into contact with dogs. Plaintiffs alleged that they were allergic to dogs and would suffer allergic symptoms whenever they came into close contact with the dogs. Plaintiffs alleged that they informed their supervisors of the allergic reactions and then filed “Disability Accommodation Request and Medical Statements” with the MDOC, requesting that they be placed away from housing units that had dogs.
While the Facility warden allowed plaintiffs to briefly move to different housing units, plaintiffs were ultimately returned to the prior housing units with dogs. The MDOC denied plaintiffs’ requests for accommodation and the Facility warden also refused to accommodate their claimed allergies by moving them to any other housing units or positions. Plaintiffs thus each filed a charge of disability discrimination with the
Defendants moved for summary disposition of plaintiffs’ claims for violation of Title I of the ADA and violation of the Rehabilitation Act, asserting that plaintiffs’ claims of violation of the ADA and violation of the Rehabilitation Act arise under federal law and remedies for those claims may be available in the federal courts. Defendants claimed that no Michigan statute provides the circuit court with jurisdiction over claims arising from the ADA or Rehabilitation Act and that, lacking statutory authority and because the courts lacked jurisdiction for any claim against the state for which there is a remedy available in federal courts, the circuit courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ federal claims. The trial courts denied the motions, opining that they had subject matter jurisdiction to hear those claims under the Michigan Constitution and the Revised Judicature Act. These appeals followed.
II. LAW GOVERNING JURISDICTION
On appeal, defendants assert that because the state retains sovereign immunity from suit in its own courts, waiver of that immunity can be achieved only through the Legislature’s consent. They contend that while the Legislature has consented to the state being sued for certain things in the Court of Claims under the Court of Claims Act, it has not authorized the state to be sued in the Court of Claims or any other state court for federal Title I ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims. Defendants acknowledge that while states courts generally have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over federal claims, Michigan is without a court of competent jurisdiction to hear ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. According to defendants, the trial court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ federal claims and that summary disposition should thus have been granted in their favor with respect to plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. We disagree.
This Court reviews a motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) de novo. Weishuhn v Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 279 Mich App 150, 155; 756 NW2d 483 (2008). A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) tests the trial court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction. Braun v Ann Arbor Charter Tp, 262 Mich App 154, 157; 683 NW2d 755 (2004). “When viewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), this Court must determine whether the pleadings demonstrate
The singular issue for our resolution is whether the circuit courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to act and authority to hear and determine a case.” Forest Hills Co-operative v Ann Arbor, 305 Mich App 572, 617; 854 NW2d 172 (2014). Michigan’s circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and derive their power from the Michigan Constitution. Okrie v Michigan, 306 Mich App 445, 467; 857 NW2d 254 (2014). Specifically, Const. 1963, art. 6, § 13 provides:
The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals except as otherwise provided by law; power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial writs; supervisory and general control over inferior courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions in accordance with rules of the supreme court; and jurisdiction of other cases and matters as provided by rules of the supreme court.
The Revised Judicature Act (RJA) also provides that:
circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by
statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state.
[MCL 600.605]
Thus, a circuit court is presumed to have subject-matter jurisdiction over a civil action unless (1) Michigan’s Constitution or a statute expressly prohibits it from exercising jurisdiction or, (2) Michigan’s Constitution or a statute gives to another court exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Prime Time Intl Distrib, Inc v Dept of Treasury, 322 Mich App 46, 52; 910 NW2d 683 (2017). “ ‘[W]here this Court must examine certain statutory language to determine whether the Legislature intended to deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction,’ this Court has explained, ‘[t]he language must leave no doubt that the Legislature intended to deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction of a particular subject matter.’ ” Id., citation omitted.
There is no dispute that claims of ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations arise under federal law. With respect to claims sounding in federal law our Supreme Court has provided guidance concerning the circuit courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction:
It has long been established that, so long as Congress has not provided for exclusive federal-court jurisdiction, state courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over federal-law claims whenever, by their own constitution, they are competent to take it. State courts possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the federal government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause. Thus, state courts are presumptively competent to assume jurisdiction over a cause of action arising under
federal law. If concurrent jurisdiction otherwise exists, subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal-law claim is governed by state law. In determining whether our state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over a claim brought under federal law, it is necessary to determine whether Congress intended to limit jurisdiction to the federal courts.
In considering the propriety of state-court jurisdiction over any particular federal claim, the Court begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction. Congress, however, may confine jurisdiction to the federal courts either explicitly or implicitly. Thus, the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests. Office Planning Group, Inc v Baraga-Houghton-Keweenaw Child Dev Bd, 472 Mich 479, 493-494; 697 NW2d 871 (2005), quotation marks and citations omitted]
Our inquiry, then, is first “whether Congress intended to limit to federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over such a dispute” and, second, “if not, whether state law allows our courts to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the action.” Id. at 494.
III. ADA CLAIMS
According to our Supreme Court, federal ADA claims could properly be brought in state courts because state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over such claims. Peden v City of Detroit,
470 Mich 195, 201 n. 4; 680 NW2d 857 (2004), quoting Gulf Offshore Co v Mobil Oil Corp, 453 US 473, 478; 101 S Ct 2870; 69 L Ed 2d 784 (1981). Peden noted the same considerations set forth in Office Planning Group, Inc, 472 Mich at 493-494. Peden also noted that the ADA, at
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a State.
By providing that a state is not immune from an action “in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction . . . .” Congress has expressly acknowledged that actions against the state for violation of the ADA could lie in state courts.
However, in Bd of Trustees of Univ of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US 356, 364; 121 S Ct 955, 962; 148 L Ed 2d 866 (2001), the United States Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether, in enacting
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 US 123; 28 S Ct 441, 52 L Ed 714 (1908). In addition, state laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other aspects of life provide independent avenues of redress. [Id. at 374 n. 9]
Thus, while the Supreme Court determined that states’ sovereign immunity from suit could not be abrogated by
Applying the test set forth in Office Planning Group, Inc, 472 Mich at 494, we find that Congress did not intend to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ ADA claims which were brought against the warden, a state official, in his official capacity under the ADA and
which seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Such claims are pursuable in state courts according to Bd of Trustees of Univ of Alabama, 531 US at 374 n. 9. Moreover, there is no explicit or implicit indication that Congress affirmatively divested state courts of their presumptively concurrent jurisdiction over such claims. Our next inquiry, then, under Office Planning Group, Inc, 472 Mich at 494 is whether state law allows our courts to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ ADA claims.
As previously indicated, Const. 1963, art. 6, § 13 provides that circuit courts “have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law.” Defendants argue, however, that pursuant to Greenfield Const Co Inc v Michigan Dept of State Highways, 402 Mich 172, 193; 261 NW2d 718 (1978), is has long been recognized that a state cannot be sued without its consent granted through a legislative enactment and, that because neither the Court of Claims or the circuit court is statutorily granted the jurisdiction to hear and decide federal claims against the state or its’ actors, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed, Michigan courts have long recognized that the state, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, because the state created the courts and thus is not subject to them; any relinquishment of sovereign immunity must be strictly interpreted in favor of the sovereign. Co Rd Ass‘n of Michigan v Governor, 287 Mich App 95, 118; 782 NW2d 784 (2010). “Essentially, the state can only waive its immunity and, consequently, consent to be sued through an act of the Legislature or through the constitution.” Id. at 119.
Relevant to the instant matter, the state has waived its immunity and subjected itself to the authority of courts via the Court of Claims Act,
Except as provided in sections 6421 and 6440, the jurisdiction of the court of claims, as conferred upon it by this chapter, is exclusive. . . . Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court has the following power and jurisdiction:
(a) To hear and determine any claim or demand, statutory or constitutional, liquidated or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, or any demand for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief or any demand for an extraordinary writ against the state or any of its d0epartments or officers notwithstanding another law that confers jurisdiction of the case in the circuit court.
Notably,
However, we cannot ignore that prior to setting forth the above, the Court of Claims Act, at
(1) Nothing in this chapter eliminates or creates any right a party may have to a trial by jury, including any right that existed before November 12, 2013. Nothing in this chapter deprives the circuit, district, or probate court of jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim for which there is a right to a trial by jury as otherwise provided by law, including a claim against an individual employee of this state for which there is a right to a trial by jury as otherwise provided by law. Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a party has the right to a trial by jury and asserts that right as required by law, the claim may be heard and determined by a circuit, district, or probate court in the appropriate venue.
(2) For declaratory or equitable relief or a demand for extraordinary writ sought by a party within the jurisdiction of the court of claims described in section 6419(1) and arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions with a matter asserted for which a party has the right to a trial by jury under subsection (1), unless joined as provided in subsection (3), the court of claims shall retain exclusive jurisdiction over the matter of declaratory or equitable relief or a demand for extraordinary writ until a final judgment has been entered, and the matter asserted for which a party has the right to a trial by jury under subsection (1) shall be stayed until final judgment on the matter of declaratory or equitable relief or a demand for extraordinary writ.
Thus, the first exception dictates that the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over claims brought against the state, its departments, or its officers except where a party has the right to a trial by jury and asserts that right as required by law. In that case, “the claim may be heard and determined by a circuit, district, or probate court in the appropriate venue.”
Plaintiffs’ ADA claims are brought under Title 1. Title 1 is provided for in subchapter 1 of the ADA, at
(a) General rule
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
(b) Construction
As used in subsection (a), the term “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” includes--
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee;
***
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration--
(A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or
(B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control;
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association;
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant . . . .
This subchapter, like all of the subchapters in the ADA, contains its own remedies and enforcement provisions.
(a) The powers, remedies, and
procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning employment.
Plaintiffs do not claim that any referenced section in the above provides a right to a jury trial for a claim of violation of Title 1 of the ADA where injunctive and declaratory relief is requested. Plaintiffs also fail to direct this Court to any authority suggesting a right to a jury trial in these circumstances. Thus, unless the second exception set forth in the Court of Claims Act at
No claimant may be permitted to file claim in said court against the state nor any department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof who has an adequate remedy upon his claim in the federal courts, but it is not necessary in the complaint filed to allege that claimant has no such adequate remedy, but that fact may be put in issue by the answer or motion filed by the state or the department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof.
A review of the plain statutory language requires an interpretation that if a claimant has an adequate remedy upon his claims in the federal court, he cannot file the claim in the Court of Claims. All parties essentially agree that the above interpretation is correct. However, defendants contend that the statute also necessarily dictates that if a claimant has an adequate remedy in the federal court he must file the claim in the federal court, whereas plaintiffs contend that the circuit court’s concurrent jurisdiction applies. We agree with plaintiffs.
While
IV. REHABILITATION ACT CLAIMS
Defendants contend that the trial courts erred in denying their motions for summary disposition concerning plaintiffs’ claims of violations of § 504 the Rehabilitation Act,
(a) General provision
(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.
Thus, Congress has clearly and explicitly directed that a state does not enjoy sovereign immunity from suits for violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act—claims that were asserted by plaintiffs.
We note that
the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause. Under this system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States. [Burt v Titlow, 571 US 12, 19; 134 S Ct 10; 187 L Ed 2d 348 (2013)]
Moreover, in cases “arising under federal law” “there is a deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction, rebuttable if Congress affirmatively ousts the state courts of jurisdiction over a particular federal claim.” Mims v Arrow Fin Services, LLC, 565 US 368, 378; 132 S Ct 740; 181 L Ed 2d 881 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And, “the grant of jurisdiction to one
In Mims, the Supreme Court noted that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
The same holds true here. Had Congress intended that plaintiffs’ specific Rehabilitation Act claims be brought exclusively in the federal court, it was well aware how to do so. For example,
Here,
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
Stephens, P.J., did not participate because of her assignment to the Michigan Court of Claims.