CHANPREET KAUR v. ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General
No. 18-73001
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
January 29, 2021
Agency No. A213-086-008
OPINION
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 22, 2021*
Pasadena, California
Filed January 29, 2021
Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Mary H. Murguia, and Eric D. Miller, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Wardlaw; Dissent by Judge Miller
Immigration
The panel granted Chanpreet Kaur‘s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of her applications for asylum and related relief, and remanded, holding that Kaur‘s credible testimony about an attempted gang rape was sufficient to establish past persecution, and that the Board erred in imposing evidentiary requirements of ongoing injury or treatment beyond the attempted sexual assault in order to show persecution.
The Board concluded that Kaur failed to establish past harm rising to the level of persecution, stating that although some forms of sexual assault short of rape can and do constitute persecution, Kaur‘s attempted gang rape could not rise to the level of persecution unless she produced evidence of treatment for psychological harm or further specific testimony regarding ongoing issues stemming from the attack. The panel held that the Board erred in requiring such additional evidence of harm, psychological or otherwise, explaining that attempted rape itself is a severe violation of bodily integrity and autonomy, and so is itself almost always a form of persecution. The panel noted that this court has consistently treated rape as one of the most severe forms of persecution, and explained that some forms of physical violence are so extreme that even attempts to commit them constitute persecution. The panel explained that in evaluating whether past treatment rises to the level of
The panel held that Kaur‘s credible testimony about her attempted rape by a gang of Congress Party agents, in broad daylight on a public street, which left her bloodied and bruised and in need of medical treatment, was sufficient to establish past persecution. The panel noted that although this attack alone was sufficient to establish persecution, Kaur also endured death threats and her parents were attacked on multiple occasions, which under the totality of the circumstances, established past persecution on account of her political opinion.
The panel concluded that the Board also appeared to conduct the wrong analysis by focusing on whether the Indian government was unwilling or unable to protect Kaur from persecution, where Kaur alleged that she was persecuted by the government itself, and government control is not required where the persecutor is the government. The panel noted that the Congress Party was already a part of the government when party agents attempted to rape Kaur, it became the ruling party mere months later, and was in power when further persecutory acts occurred against Kaur and her family. The panel noted that the distinction between an “opposition party” and conceptions of who represents the “government” is nuanced in a multi-party parliamentary system such as India‘s, and becomes further strained in cases of parliamentary minority governments, where no party commands a majority of seats. However, the panel
The panel stated that if on remand the Board concludes that Kaur‘s past persecution was at the hands of her government, the Board should apply the presumption of future persecution, and conduct an individualized analysis of whether the government can rebut this presumption by showing either a fundamental change in circumstances or that Kaur could avoid future persecution by relocating internally within India.
Dissenting, Judge Miller agreed with the panel that both rape and attempted rape can constitute persecution, that an asylum applicant should not bear a heightened evidentiary burden to show psychological harm resulting from sexual assault, including attempted rape, and that the harm Kaur suffered was sufficiently severe to be characterized as persecution. Agreeing that it can sometimes be difficult to identify which parties are part of the government in a multi-party parliamentary system, Judge Miller noted that at the time of her attempted rape, the Congress Party did not form the government either of India or of the state of Punjab, where Kaur lived, and that even if the Congress Party had been a part of the government at the time of the attack, the agency concluded there was no evidence that Kaur‘s attackers had any affiliation with the government, that they were working for anyone in the government, or that they had any official governmental title or authority. Judge Miller would deny the petition because, in his view, substantial
COUNSEL
Douglas Jalaie, Los Angeles, California, for Petitioner.
Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director; Jonathan Robbins, Senior Litigation Counsel; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
OPINION
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
Chanpreet Kaur, a native of the state of Punjab in India, seeks asylum for fear of persecution in her country of origin on account of her work for the Mann Party and advocacy for the independent Sikh state of Khalistan. At her removal proceedings, she testified credibly that, as a result of her political activities, a group of men from the Indian National Congress Party, one of Punjab‘s major political parties, accosted her while she was alone at her parents’ store, dragged her into the public street, started ripping off her clothes and attempted to gang rape her. As a result of this assault, she suffered scrapes and facial bruising that required medical attention. This was not an isolated incident. Just months before this attack, agents of the Congress Party had threatened her while she was walking on the street. And just months after the attack, when Kaur left Punjab for Cyprus,
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA“) concluded that the attempted gang rape and death threats against Kaur, and the physical assault of her parents, was not a sufficient “amount of mistreatment” so as to constitute past persecution. Rather, the BIA reasoned that the attempted gang rape “did not rise to the level of persecution” because Kaur lacked evidence of “treatment for psychological harm,” or other “ongoing issues” stemming from this assault.
The BIA erred in imposing evidentiary requirements of ongoing injury or treatment beyond the sexual assault itself in order to show persecution. Kaur‘s credible testimony about the attempted gang rape is sufficient to show persecution. Attempted rape by a gang of men, in broad daylight on a public street, is especially terrorizing because it powerfully demonstrates the perpetrator‘s domination, control over the victim and imperviousness to the law. Requiring evidence of additional harms both minimizes the gravity of the sexual assault and demeans the victim. We grant Kaur‘s petition for review and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Kaur was born in Punjab, India in 1993. In February 2015, she joined the Shiromani Akali Dal Simranjeet Singh Mann Party (“Mann Party“), which advocates for the creation of Khalistan, a sovereign state for the Sikh people.
Kaur‘s story is no exception. Kaur was first harassed by agents of the Congress Party, one of Punjab‘s major political parties, on account of her Mann Party membership in May 2016. Four Congress Party members on motorbikes accosted her in the street, cursed her, and told her that she would not “be able to show [her] face to the world” if she continued working for the Mann Party. Undeterred, Kaur continued her political activities.
Five months later, in October 2016, Kaur was working in her parents’ shop when a group of male members of the Congress Party entered and asked her to find some items they wished to purchase. It was about 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon. When she brought the items to the counter, the men grabbed her arms, pulled her over the counter, and dragged her into the street. They slapped her, kicked her, yelled obscenities at her, and told her that they were doing this to her because she was a Mann Party member. The men started ripping off Kaur‘s clothing because, as Kaur stated, “they wanted to rape me.” Her father was away at the time, and her mother, who has difficulty walking, was unable to come to her aid. Kaur cried out for help and some of her neighbors came to her rescue. Still, she suffered injuries during this attempted gang rape that required immediate treatment from a nearby doctor.
Soon thereafter, Kaur left Punjab for Cyprus. While she was there, in February 2017, she received several threatening
Roughly one month later, in March 2017, the Congress Party won elections in Punjab, and assumed power in the state.1 Over the following months, Kaur made her way to Mexico, ultimately crossing into the United States near the San Ysidro port of entry in September 2017. She was almost immediately detained and charged as removable under
Even after Kaur was detained in the United States, her persecutors did not stop. Kaur testified that, in February 2018, her father was severely beaten on the way home from his Sikh temple by Congress Party agents. His assailants repeatedly asked Kaur‘s father if he knew where Kaur was located. A month later, the police showed up at her father‘s door to ask about Kaur‘s whereabouts. When Kaur‘s father explained that she was in the United States, the police thought he was lying and beat both him and Kaur‘s mother.
II.
During her immigration proceedings, Kaur conceded removability and applied for asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). She claimed a well-founded fear of
The Immigration Judge (IJ) found that Kaur testified credibly.2 However, the IJ rendered an oral decision rejecting Kaur‘s claim for relief on the basis that the attempted gang rape, death threats, and other harassment Kaur and her family had suffered did not constitute past persecution. The IJ also concluded that Kaur had not demonstrated that the attempted rape and harassment were committed by the government or by actors the government was unable or unwilling to control. In the alternative, the IJ concluded that even if Kaur had demonstrated past persecution, she had not demonstrated that she was unable to safely relocate within India to avoid future persecution. Finally, explaining that it was “4:15 in the afternoon” and therefore the court‘s time was limited, the IJ quickly dismissed Kaur‘s claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief. Accordingly, the IJ ordered Kaur removed to India.
On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ‘s order of removal. The BIA denied Kaur‘s asylum request, reasoning that she had failed to establish past persecution because she did not supplement her credible testimony of attempted rape with additional evidence of treatment for psychological harm or of ongoing issues. Skipping over Kaur‘s contention that she was persecuted by her government, the BIA also concluded that Kaur had not shown that the Indian government was unable or unwilling to control the individuals who had harassed, threatened, and attempted to rape her. In the alternative, the BIA found that, even assuming Kaur had
Kaur timely petitioned for review.
III.
We have jurisdiction under
IV.
To be eligible for asylum, Kaur must demonstrate that she “is unable or unwilling” to return to India “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of . . . [her] political opinion.”
It is uncontested that Kaur had suffered past physical abuse and death threats on account of her political opinion. However, the BIA concluded that she had failed to establish that the abuse and threats rose to the level of persecution or that it was “committed by the government, or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control.” Each of these conclusions was marred by legal error, which we discuss in turn below.
A.
The BIA concluded that although some forms of “sexual assault short of rape can and do[] constitute persecution,” the attempted gang rape could not rise to the level of persecution unless Kaur produced “evidence of treatment for psychological harm or further specific testimony regarding ongoing issues” stemming from the attack. But this is not the law. When a petitioner demonstrates that she has suffered an attempted rape, she need not adduce additional evidence of harm—psychological or otherwise—to establish past persecution. Attempted rape itself is a severe violation of bodily integrity and autonomy, and so is itself almost always a form of persecution.
We have consistently treated rape as one of the most severe forms of persecution an asylum-seeker can suffer. Rape and sexual violence have a long and tragic history as weapons of war.3 They are often an “atrocious” form of physical violence. See Garcia-Martinez, 371 F.3d at 1072; Lopez-Galarza v. I.N.S., 99 F.3d 954, 962 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Rape at the hands of government authorities while imprisoned on account of one‘s political views can be an atrocious form of punishment indeed.“); see also Robin L.
Rape and other forms of sexual violence have a profound psychological impact on the victim. Sitting en banc, we have explained that rape‘s psychological effects are “`severe and long-lasting‘” and include “`avoidance of situations that trigger memories of the violation, profound feelings of shame, [and] difficulty remembering events.‘” Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1070–71 (alteration in original) (quoting Lopez-Galarza, 99 F.3d at 962). In Lopez-Galarza, we surveyed the medical evidence regarding the psychological effect of rape, and noted that:
The effects of rape appear to resemble the effects of torture. A recent article compared the psychological sequelae of rape survivors to the psychological distress endured by survivors of abuse constituting torture under international law, and concluded that the
suffering of rape survivors is strikingly similar in intensity and duration to the suffering endured by torture survivors.
99 F.3d at 963 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Note, Torture by Means of Rape, 84 Georgetown L.J. 1913, 1931 (1996)). The comparison between the psychological effects of rape and the psychological effects of torture is telling. We have elsewhere explained that “torture is per se disproportionately harsh; it is inherently and impermissibly severe; and it is a fortiori conduct that reaches the level of persecution.”4 Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1225 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, rape‘s physical and psychological effects are equivalent to the most severe horrors inflicted upon asylum seekers.
We have also explained that some forms of physical violence are so extreme that even attempts to commit them constitute persecution. Indeed, we have held that attempted murder constitutes persecution. Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 803 (9th Cir. 2004); Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 504 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013) (“`[M]urder attempts constitute persecution.‘” (citing Lopez, 366 F.3d at 803)); see also Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Att‘y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1233 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Put simply, attempted murder is persecution.” (citing Deloso, 393 F.3d at 860)). In fact, because murder is perhaps the ultimate threat to bodily integrity, “[i]n certain [] cases, we have held that . . . death
Similar to attempted murder and attempted kidnapping, attempted rape almost always constitutes persecution.6
[W]e are unwilling to dismiss so casually a threat of imminent rape. The threatened rape was one way for the soldiers to express their domination and control over [the petitioner], as well as a way to send a message to [her] about what might happen if [she did not stop her political activities].
Id. at 477 (first citing Ali, 394 F.3d at 787; and then citing Lopez-Galarza, 99 F.3d at 959, for the proposition that “rape
Similarly, in Uwais v. U.S. Attorney General, the Second Circuit considered the asylum application of a petitioner whom a police officer had attempted to rape during civil strife in Sri Lanka. 478 F.3d 513, 516 (2d Cir. 2007). The BIA had rejected her claim, concluding that the attempted rape was the result of sexual desire and not persecutory intent. Id. at 518. In response, the Second Circuit explained that the attempted rape in that case could not be viewed as “simply a criminal act,” id. (quoting Garcia-Martinez, 371 F.3d at 1072), in part because “sexual violence in the context of civil strife is often not about sex, but instead about domination, intimidation, and control,” id. (citing Ali, 394 F.3d at 787). Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded to the BIA to consider whether the attempted rape constituted past persecution on account of the petitioner‘s political opinion. Id. at 519. Thus, the decisions of the Second and Seventh Circuits support our conclusion that because attempted rape is itself a violation of the autonomy of the victim, it can form the basis of a claim to past persecution itself.
Furthermore, as this case demonstrates, attempted rape is almost always a form of sexual assault. The Model Penal Code defines sexual assault as nonconsensual or offensive sexual contact.8 Sexual Assault,
Sexual assault is more than just a violation of bodily autonomy. Just as rape‘s severe psychological effects include shame and a clouded memory, Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1071, sexual assault‘s psychological effects include “self-blame, a pervasive feeling of loss of control, and memory loss or distortion.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, ¶ 72, (July 1991)9; see also
The BIA‘s requirement of demonstrating additional or ongoing psychological harm makes little practical sense as well. Just like rape, attempted rape inflicts serious psychological wounds.12 See Susan Reese et al., Lifetime Prevalence of Gender-Based Violence in Women and the Relationship With Mental Disorders and Psychosocial Function, 306 J. Am. Med. Ass‘n 513, 513 (2011) (studying the correlation between all forms of gender-based violence, including attempted rape, and long-lasting mental health concerns); Kirsten Johnson et al., Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights Violations With Physical and Mental Health in Territories of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, 304 J. Am. Med. Ass‘n 553, 559 (2010) (studying the effects of sexual violence, including attempted rape, in a conflict zone). Because the psychological harm of an attempted rape is inherent in the
In light of the foregoing, there can be little question that the attempted rape of Kaur rises to the level of persecution. A group of Congress Party agents—all men—dragged her into the street and ripped off her clothes with the intent of raping her. If not for Kaur‘s successful cries for help, she would have been the victim of a gang rape. Even so, this attack left her bloodied and bruised, and in need of medical treatment. This attack alone is enough to constitute persecution, and the BIA erred by diminishing this serious sexual violence and insisting that Kaur produce evidence of additional or ongoing harms.
Furthermore, that Kaur suffered past persecution is plain on the record before us. In addition to the attempted gang rape, Kaur endured death threats and her parents were attacked on multiple occasions. Death threats alone can constitute persecution, Lim, 224 F.3d at 936, and “[v]iolence
B.
We next turn to the BIA‘s legally erroneous understanding of who persecuted Kaur. To establish past
The administrative record reflects that when Kaur‘s persecution began, the Congress Party was already part of the government in Punjab: it held 46 out of 117 seats in the state legislature and was a key opposition party with the
In Reyes-Guerrero v. I.N.S., 192 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999), we found that the petitioner was able to establish past persecution in a situation analogous to Kaur‘s. Although the source of the petitioner‘s persecution was not directly at issue there, we treated persecution by members of Colombia‘s Liberal Party—a party that rose from a minority member of the national legislature to the ruling party during the course of the petitioner‘s persecution—as if the government itself were the persecutor.18 See id. at 1243–44
In Reyes-Guerrero, we assumed that the petitioner had suffered past persecution even though, as here, members of an opposition party were the perpetrators of the persecutory acts. 192 F.3d at 1246. We did not address whether the government was unable or unwilling to control the opposition party members. Id. Reyes-Guerrero does not stand alone. We had previously held that an asylum petitioner demonstrated past persecution for his political opinion based on testimony that, among other things, he “was shot at by opposition party members and narrowly missed death the last time he visited [his home country].” Ajayi v. I.N.S., 962 F.2d 13 (Table), at *4 (9th Cir. 1992).
In rejecting Kaur‘s claim to past persecution, the BIA neither mentioned that Kaur had claimed persecution by her government, nor did it discuss the record evidence19 and
The dissent fails to consider the complexity of multi-party parliamentary systems such as India‘s (and Punjab‘s in particular).21 The analysis becomes further strained in cases
Furthermore, the dissent fails to account for the fact that a persecutory act against Kaur and her family took place a year after the Congress Party came to power in Punjab, and it seems to miss the point that the BIA never addressed Kaur‘s claim that she was persecuted by government actors at all. When the BIA considers this claim, as we direct on remand, it should consider the totality of the persecutory acts against her, including those where it was undisputed that the Congress party controlled the government in Punjab.
V.
If, on remand, the BIA concludes that Kaur‘s past persecution was at the hands of her government, she will be
In the prior proceedings, the BIA concluded that even if Kaur had demonstrated past persecution, she had not carried her burden of “show[ing] that she could not safely relocate within India.” At the time, the BIA did not have the benefit of our recent decision in Singh v. Whitaker, in which we emphasized that once a petitioner establishes past persecution, “the burden is on the government” to show that the petitioner “can reasonably relocate internally.” 914 F.3d at 659. Furthermore, Singh explained that the BIA must conduct an “individualized analysis” to determine whether relocation is possible. Id. at 661. That analysis must take account of the “persons or entities that caused the past persecution,” “the nature and extent of the persecution” suffered by Kaur, and any “future political activities” by Kaur.26 Id. Thus, on remand, the BIA should conduct a thorough, individualized analysis of Kaur‘s ability to
PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED.
MILLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Chanpreet Kaur seeks to establish eligibility for asylum on the basis of past persecution. In the court‘s evaluation of that claim, there is much with which I agree. I agree that both rape and attempted rape can constitute persecution. Cf. Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 2020). I agree that an asylum applicant should not bear a heightened evidentiary burden to show psychological harm resulting from sexual assault, including attempted rape. And I agree that the harm Kaur suffered was sufficiently severe to be characterized as persecution.
But to constitute “persecution” as that term is used in asylum law, suffering or harm must have been “inflicted either by the government of a country or by persons or an organization that the government was unable or unwilling to control.” Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985); accord Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2010). No matter how severe it may be, purely private violence does not constitute persecution unless the government is unable or unwilling to control it. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that Kaur‘s attackers were not part of the government and that the government was not unable or unwilling to control them. Because substantial evidence supports that finding, I would deny the petition for review.
Kaur cites several incidents as past persecution, but by far the most serious is the attempted rape that took place in October 2016. The other incidents consisted of threats to Kaur or attacks on other members of her family, rather than violence directed at her. The Board determined that those other incidents did not constitute past persecution, and the court does not suggest that they would compel a grant of relief by themselves. The case therefore turns on the October 2016 attack, so, like the court, I will focus on it.
Kaur testified that she was attacked by a group of men whom she described as “members of the Congress party” who objected to her membership in a rival political party. At the time, the Congress Party did not form the government either of India or of the state of Punjab, where Kaur lived. The immigration judge found “insufficient evidence to show that [Kaur‘s attackers] had any affiliation with the government, that they were working for anyone in the government or that they had any official governmental title or authority.” The immigration judge also determined that the men appeared to be “afraid that [Kaur] would report them to police or have them prosecuted in local court,” demonstrating that “the government does, in fact, arrest perpetrators or that prosecutors charge perpetrators with crimes in such incidents.” The Board affirmed the immigration judge‘s findings that Kaur had not shown the requisite governmental involvement.
Kaur now claims that she was persecuted directly by the government. The Board cannot be faulted for not addressing that claim more directly because even under a generous reading of Kaur‘s brief to the Board, she presented it only obliquely. The focus of her argument before the Board was not that her attackers were part of the government, but rather that they were persons whom the government was unable or
To be sure, Kaur did assert that “the members of the Congress Party who harmed [her] were working on behalf of their party, on behalf of those members who work for the government.” But the immigration judge made a directly contrary finding, determining that Kaur had not shown that the men had “any affiliation with the government [or] that they were working for anyone in the government.” The Board endorsed that finding, stating that “[t]he men who attacked [Kaur] were private citizens.” That statement by the Board was not offered simply in passing; it formed a key part of the Board‘s reasoning.
The Board‘s finding should be sufficient to resolve this case. We may set aside the agency‘s factual findings only if they are not supported by substantial evidence—that is, only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
First, at the time of the attack, the Congress Party was an opposition party; it did not form the government. It is true that the Congress Party later formed the government in
Our decision in Reyes-Guerrero v. INS, 192 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1999), is not to the contrary. That case involved a Colombian prosecutor who had received death threats for investigating “crimes committed by high ranking members of the opposition.” Id. at 1246. But the only issue we addressed was whether the harm the petitioner had suffered was inflicted on account of his political opinion. Id. at 1245–46. We did not consider the source of the petitioner‘s harm, whether directly or indirectly. That is not to say that Reyes-Guerrero was wrongly decided—in light of the then-ongoing civil war in Colombia, if we had considered the issue, it would not have been difficult to conclude that the Colombian government was unable to control violence by private actors, including opposition political parties. See Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2005). Indeed, we noted that Reyes-Guerrero “requested and was provided protection by the national security agency,” yet he continued to receive death threats anyway. Reyes-Guerrero, 192 F.3d at 1243–44. We did not hold that violence or threats of violence by an opposition party are necessarily attributable to the government. Until today, no court has read our decision to establish that proposition.
Our decision in Ajayi v. INS, 962 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision), is similarly unhelpful to Kaur. The statement in that case that the petitioner had been “shot at by opposition party members” in Nigeria does appear to have described events that occurred before the governing regime was “ejected from power by a military coup.” Id. at
I fully agree that it can sometimes be difficult to identify which parties are part of the government in a multi-party parliamentary system. But the complexity of foreign political systems is hardly a reason for us to set aside the Board‘s judgment and assume for ourselves the responsibility of deciding who constituted the government of Punjab in October 2016. It is the function of the Executive Branch, not the courts, to determine which entity to recognize as the government of a foreign country. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 14–16 (2015). That function is a striking example of how the administration of the immigration laws can involve “especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations“—questions that we are poorly equipped to answer. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988).
Second, even if the Congress Party had been part of the Punjabi government in October 2016, it would not follow that every action taken by every member of the party was an action of the government. In the United States, for example, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party may each, at
Substantial evidence supports the Board‘s determination that the harm Kaur suffered was not inflicted by the government or by forces the government was unable or unwilling to control. On that basis, I would deny the petition for review.
Notes
Attorney: Who were harassing you?
Kaur: The Congress was.