Mаrie CHALOUX; Nancy Morgan, and Clarence Paine, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Vaughn KILLEEN, in his officiаl capacity as Sheriff of Ada County, State of Idaho; Robert Aja, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Gooding County, Stаte of Idaho, and on behalf of all other County Sheriffs of the State of Idaho, similarly situated, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 88-3563
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Argued and Submitted March 10, 1989. Decided May 1, 1989.
873 F.2d 1274
Phillip Collaer, Deputy Pros. Atty., Boise, Idaho, for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho.
Before WRIGHT and ALARCON, Circuit Judges, and TEVRIZIAN*, District Judge.
EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:
We consider here whether county sheriffs are liable under
Appellants Marie Chaloux, Nancy Morgan, and Clarencе Paine subsist on government benefits exempt by federal statute from garnishment. Those benefits are deposited directly into their bank accounts.
In unrelated actions, creditors obtained default judgments against each appellant. Appellee sheriffs served post-judgment writs of execution and garnishment on the banks holding each account. None of the appellants received notice of the garnishments or of their right to claim exemptions. Morgan and Chaloux succeeded eventually in claiming exemptions. Paine did not and creditors obtained all funds in his account.
Appellants sued the sheriffs for declaratory and injunctive relief under
I
The sheriffs are not liable under
To hold a сounty liable in an official capacity suit, appellants must establish that an official county policy caused thеir injuries. Monell v. New York City Dep‘t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Official county policy may be set only by an official with “final policymaking аuthority.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1978). To identify those officials with “final policymaking authority” we look to state law. Id. In St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 924-25, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988), the Suрreme Court reemphasized that “we can be confident that state law ... will always direct a court to some official or body that has responsibility for making law or setting policy.” See Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1234-35 (9th Cir.1989); Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir.1989); Hammond v. County of Mаdera, 859 F.2d 797, 802 (9th Cir.1988); Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. San Luis Obispo County, 841 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied,
Idaho‘s garnishment statutes delegate no policymaking authority to the sheriffs.
In spite of the nondiscretionary language of the garnishment statutes, appеllants contend the sheriffs exercised policymaking authority. They claim the notice provisions of the statutes are сonstitutionally deficient. They note that those statutes do not forbid the sheriffs from giving constitutionally required notice. They claim that the sheriffs chose deliberately not to supplement the notice provisions of the statute and that the choicе constituted county policy.
We reject appellants’ argument and hold that the sheriffs did not subject themselves to
This case is distinguishable from Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir.1989). In Gobel we held that a county attorney was carrying out county policy by implementing a program mandated by a state statute. That statute assignеd discretion to the county attorney, charging him with developing and administering a “deferred prosecution program.” Id. at 1206 n. 14. Here, in contrast, the Idaho garnishment statutes confer no discretion on the sheriffs. Their role is entirely ministerial.
We join other circuits in holding that county officials are not liable under
[The judge‘s duties] in implementing Sec. 4.28, much like that of a county sheriff in enforcing state law, may more fairly be characterizеd as the effectuation of the policy of the state of Texas embodied in that statute for which the citizens of a рarticular county should not bear singular responsibility.
We adopt the reasoning of Briscoe. The sheriffs are not liable for performing ministerial duties under state law.
At oral argument appellants relied on Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir.1980). In Finberg, the аppellant sued a county sheriff and a prothonotary in their official capacities under
In contrast to Finberg, appellants here have not argued that the county sheriffs are state officials. Instеad, they argue that the county is the real party in interest and that a county policy caused their injuries. Although we do not decide the issue, we note that we have found nothing in Idaho law that suggests the sheriffs should not be treated as county officials. Wе hold that the county is not liable under
II
Appellants also contend that the district court abused its discretion by not ruling on its motion for class certification and by not allowing appellants leave to amend their complaint to add other parties. These contentions are moot in light of our holding.
AFFIRMED.