Castaneira v. MayorkasCastaneira v. Mayorkas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Ryan Castaneira, pro se, brings this action to challenge the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services‘s (“USCIS“) and Department of Homeland Security‘s (“DHS“) (collectively, “defendants“) denial of his Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative (“I-130” or “petition“), filed on behalf of his Mexican national wife. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 15. Castaneira seeks, among other remedies, declaratory and injunctive relief that sets aside the decision by USCIS to deny his petition, see Decision Denying Petition (“Denial“), ECF No. 15-6, and declares that the Adam Walsh Child Safety and Protection Act of 2006 (“AWA“),
Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, including spouses and children, receive certain preferential treatment under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA“). See, e.g.,
In 2006, Congress рassed the AWA, which, among other things, amended the INA to provide that USCIS must deny a
(A) An offense (unless committed by a parent or guardian) involving kidnapping.
(B) An offense (unless committed by a parent or guardian) involving false imprisonment.
(C) Solicitation to engage in sexual conduct.
(D) Use in a sexual performance.
(E) Solicitation to practice prostitution.
(F) Video voyeurism as described in
section 1801 of Title 18 .(G) Possession, production, or distribution of child pornography.
(H) Criminal sexual conduct involving a minor, or the use of the Internet to facilitate or attempt such conduct.
(I) Any conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.
B. Factual and Procedural Background
Castaneira is a U.S. citizen residing in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. On September 20, 2006, Castaneira was arrested in Georgia and charged with “Computer or Electronic Pornography, Computer Child Exploitation, and Driving While License Suspended or Revoked.” See Not. of Intent to Deny (“NOID“) at 2, ECF No. 15-1. The arrest “stemm[ed] from a 2006 internet exchange on an adult-only website with” an individual whom Castaneira “believed not to have attained the age of majority” but who was in fact an adult “undercover police officer.” Am. Compl. ¶ 2. Subsequently, Castaneira was convicted of violating
In 2018, Castaneira married a Mexican national, Magdalena Perez Resendiz. Am. Compl. ¶ 2; NOID at 1. A year later, on August 19, 2019, Castaneira filed a Form I-130 for adjustment of his wife‘s status pursuant to
The NOID described the process for showing that Castaneira‘s case did not fall under the AWA and, if the AWA applied, the process for showing that he presented “no risk” of harm to his wife, as well as the
On May 26, 2022, Castaneira filed his initial pro se Complaint in this Court to contest the evidentiary standards аpplied to adjudicate his Form I-130 petition and for a judgment declaring the AWA inapplicable to his convictions. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Subsequently, on June 13, 2022, Castaneira sent USCIS a response to the NOID with facts and evidence surrounding the nature and circumstances of his convictions. See Denial at 2. On August 24, 2022, with a final decision on the petition still pending, defendants moved to dismiss the initial Complaint under
On November 10, 2022, USCIS formally denied Castaneira‘s petition. See Denial at 5. USCIS determined that Castaneira was ineligible to file the petition due to his prior convictions, reasoning that the evidence submitted did not prove his past crimes were not a “specified offense against a minor” as defined by the AWA, nor did it establish, beyond any reasonable doubt, that Castaneira posed no risk to the safety and well-being of his wife. Id. at 1-5. Defendants notified the Court about the agency‘s decision on the same day it was issued, see Defs.’ Not. of Agency Decision, ECF No. 11, and Castaneira then sought leave to amend the Complaint, see Pl.‘s Mots. to Amend, ECF Nos. 12 & 14. The Court granted Castaneirа leave to amend his initial Complaint on November 22, 2022, see Minute Order (Nov. 22, 2022), and the Amended Complaint was docketed the following day, see Am. Compl.
Castaneira asserts five claims in the Amended Complaint:
- That defendants failed to either follow or overrule USCIS‘s precedential decision in Matter of Chawathe, 25 I. & N. Dec. 369 (USCIS AAO 2010), and therefore violated the requirement that an agency follow its own regulations in making discretionary decisions, see United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60-64;
- That defendants wrongfully applied a beyond any reasonable doubt standard rather than a preponderance of the evidence standard, in violation of Chawathe, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65-68;
- That Castaneira‘s convictions do not qualify as “specified offense[s] against a minor” as dеfined by
34 U.S.C. § 20911(7) and, consequently, the AWA does not apply to his case, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 69-73; - That the law is uncertain regarding the definitions of certain terms USCIS uses in reaching its “no risk” determination, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 74-78; and
- That defendants’ decision denying his petition violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA“) because it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,”
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) , Am. Compl. ¶¶ 79-85.
On January 23, 2023, defendants filed a motion to dismiss Castaneira‘s Amended
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
A defendant in a civil action may move to dismiss a complaint under
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
A defendant in a civil action may also move to dismiss a complaint under
C. Filings by Pro Se Parties
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “However, even though a pro se complaint must be liberally construed, the complaint must nonetheless present a claim on which the court can grant relief.” Williams v. Bank of New York Mellon, 169 F. Supp. 3d 119, 124 (D.D.C. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That is, a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from the requirements of the federal rules. See Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants’ motion asks the Court to dismiss Castaneira‘s Amended Complaint
A. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction to Review USCIS‘s “No Risk” Determination
Defendants move to dismiss Castaneira‘s first, second, fourth, and fifth claims, all of which challenge the manner in which USCIS made its “no risk” determination in his case, on grounds that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review such determinations. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 12-23. Castaneira maintains that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear those claims pursuant to
Defendants argue that no jurisdiction exists to review the first, second, fourth, and fifth claims because (1) Congress stated in explicit statutory language that the process and outcome of the “no risk” determination are exercises of USCIS‘s unreviewable discretion, Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 12-15; (2) the APA, INA, and AWA preclude federal courts from examining the standard of proof that USCIS applies in cases subject to the AWA, id. at 15-21; and (3) there is no other source of jurisdiction available, id. at 21-23. Castaneira counters that even if USCIS‘s ultimate “no risk” determination is shielded from review by statute, its policies and procedures for reaching that decision are not, Pl.‘s Opp‘n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 10-14, and, more specifically, that Congress intended the tеrm “determination” in the relevant provision of the AWA to relate only to a final risk assessment and not the evidentiary standard used to make that assessment, id. at 14-19. Defendants nevertheless reiterate that the language Congress used, “sole and unreviewable discretion,”
Pursuant to
The relevant statutory provision in this case,
While Castaneira acknowledges that the ultimate “no risk” determination is unreviewable, he insists that courts may review the evidentiary standard used in making that determination. See Pl.‘s Opp‘n to Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 11-13. That argument is without merit. As several other courts have held, “[a]pplication of the ‘no risk’ standard [] solely vests in USCIS‘s authority,” and that includes the selection of an evidentiary standard. See Bourdon, 940 F.3d at 545-49; Gebhardt, 879 F.3d at 987; Bremer, 834 F.3d at 930; Struniak v. Lynch, 159 F. Supp. 3d 643, 655 (E.D. Va. 2016); Bakran, 894 F.3d at 563; see also Safadi v. Howard, 466 F. Supp. 2d 696, 699-700 (E.D. Va. 2006) (holding that where a statute does not impose limits on discretionary authority, the entire adjudication process is precluded from judicial review under
In other words, the Court lacks jurisdiction to question defendants’ application of the “beyond any reasonable doubt” standard, even where the challenge does not purport to be one to the agency‘s final “no risk” determination, because the burden of proof is a necessary factor in reaching that final determination. USCIS may not grant a Form I-130 petition unless USCIS determines that the petitioner poses “no risk” to the intended beneficiary.
Castaneira argues that the authorities holding that the unreviewability of “no risk” determinations extends to the evidentiary standard were wrongly decided because they failed to address the import of the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office‘s precedential decision in Chawathe, which held that, “[e]xcept where a different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance
As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Bourdon, none of the Accardi line of cases involved a statutory grant of authority including the word “unreviewable.” Bourdon, 940 F.3d at 549; see Accardi, 347 U.S. at 262-63 (“the Attorney General may suspend deportation of such alien” on certain enumerated grounds); Service, 354 U.S. at 370 (“the Secretary of State may, in his absolute discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Department of State or of the Foreign Service of the United States whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisаble in the interests of the United States“); Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 538-39 (no specific grant of statutory authority governing Secretary‘s authority to terminate certain class of employee).2 And that is an important omission. “Supreme Court cases reviewing the discretion of Executive Branch officials cannot guide [the Court] in cases, like this one, where [the courts] are told by Congress not to review that discretion in the first place.” Bourdon, 940 F.3d at 549.
This Court therefore agrees with other courts’ interpretation of
To be clear, nothing in this Memorandum Opinion should be read as expressing any view on the merits of USCIS‘s decision to apply a beyond any reasonable doubt standard in making “no risk” determinations under the AWA in spite of the rule laid out in Chawathe. But even if USCIS disregarded its own binding precedent and thereby acted unlawfully, it does not follow that this Court has the power to afford Castaneira any sort of remedy—at least not where Congress has deprived the courts of such power by statute. That conclusion should come as no surprise. After all, Congress under the Constitution has plenary power over immigration, see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1972), so it is within the bounds of Congress‘s authority to exclude “no risk” determinations from the jurisdiction of courts to review.3
Accordingly, all of Castaneira‘s four claims that challenge USCIS‘s discretionary
Finally, Castaneira argues that other bases of federal jurisdiction exist to sustain his claims, specifically ”
The Declaratory Judgment Act allows the Court “to declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,”
“Rather, the statute merely creates a remedy in cases otherwise within the Court‘s jurisdiction.” Hassan v. Holder, 793 F. Supp. 2d 440, 446 (D.D.C. 2011). In the same way, the All Writs Act,
In conclusion, Castaneira‘s challenge to the burden of proof that USCIS applied in making its “no risk” determination under
B. Castaneira Fails to State a Claim That the AWA Does Not Apply
Defendants move to dismiss Castaneira‘s third claim—that his convictions do not qualify as “specified offense[s] against a minor,”
As noted above,
As a threshold matter, the Court must determine the applicable interpretive framework. Castaneira contеnds that the Court must apply the categorical approach, under which courts may “look only to the statutory definitions“—i.e., the elements—of a defendant‘s prior or instant offenses, and not “to the particular facts underlying those convictions.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990); see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 70-71. In his view, the categorical approach requires a reading of “sex offense against a minor” that does not extend to any of the Georgia statutes he is convicted of violating, because it is possible to violate those statutes where there is no actual minor victim. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 71-72. Another possible interpretive framework is the circumstance-specific approach, under which courts examine not just the elements of the crime, but “the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).
While the D.C. Circuit has not addressed whether the definition of “sex offense against a minor” is analyzed under the categorical or circumstance-specific approach, every court of appeals to consider the question has held that the circumstance-specific approach applies. See United States v. Thayer, 40 F.4th 797, 802-05 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Dailey, 941 F.3d 1183, 1190-93 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Hill, 820 F.3d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700, 708-09 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 2010). This Court agrees.
Three aspects of the statute point toward the circumstance-specific approach as the proper mode of analysis. First, while another provision of the statute defines a “sex offense” as “a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another,”
The question, therefore, is whether the particular conduct underlying Castaneira‘s offenses “by its nature is a sex offense against a minor,”
As defendants note, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA“) considered a nearly identical question in Matter of Izaguirre, 27 I. & N. Dec. 67 (BIA 2017). The facts of that case are similar to this one. USCIS denied the petitioner‘s Form I-130 petition, filed on behalf of his beneficiary spouse, after determining that his conviction, computer-aided solicitation of a minor in violation of
What little case law exists concerning the same or similar issues under the AWA supports the BIA‘s conclusion in Izaguirre. The Eleventh Circuit has held, albeit without much analysis, that a sex offense is one “against a minor” for purposes of
This Court agrees with the BIA and the Eleventh Circuit that an offense may be “a sex offense against a minor” even where the offendеr was unwittingly interacting with an adult undercover officer. The text and purpose of the AWA point squarely in that direction.
First, as the BIA noted, if Congress intended the actual identity of the victim to be dispositive, it knew how to say so
Second, the statutory context in which
Third, as the BIA further reasoned, see Izaguirre, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 70, a reading that excluded offenders who intended to harm a minor but who were merely factually unable to do so
would undermine the express purpose of the AWA: “to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children,”
Having concluded that the phrase “sex offense against a minor” applies to offenses involving adult undercover officers, the Court easily concludes that that phrase applies to Castaneira‘s conduct. Castaneira concedes that he “was convicted of” the various Georgia offenses for using the “Internet to solicit/entice Cpl. Lackey, a person believed to be 15, to engage in sexual conduct” and for “Internet contact containing explicit verbal descriptions of sexual conduct with Cpl. Lackey, a person believed to be 15.” Am. Compl. ¶ 34 n.10. That is “conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.”
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court will GRANT defendants’ motion to
Date: July 1, 2023
Royce C. Lamberth
United States District Judge