CARL ROBERT ALVAREZ, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA, STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-10699
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 8, 2012
[PUBLISH] D.C. Docket No. 6:08-cv-01024-JA-DAB. FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MAY 8, 2012 JOHN LEY CLERK
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
(May 8, 2012)
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
Carl Robert Alvarez appeals from a district court order dismissing his
In his federal complaint, Alvarez claims that the State prevented him from gaining access to physical evidence for purposes of DNA testing, in violation of his procedural due process rights under the
After thorough review, we affirm. The Supreme Court has recently made it abundantly clear that there is no freestanding constitutional right to access evidence for DNA testing, and that the federal courts may only upset a state‘s postconviction DNA access procedures if they are fundamentally inadequate to vindicate substantive
I.
Because this case was decided on a motion to dismiss, we take the facts from Alvarez‘s complaint and the attached exhibits as true. Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (“When considering a motion to dismiss, all facts set forth in the plaintiff‘s complaint are to be accepted as true and the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
These are the essential facts and procedural history. In 1991, Alvarez was convicted in the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court for Seminole County, Florida, of first degree murder, sexual battery, and aggravated child abuse of his stepson, Joshua Boynton, who was seven years old. On the evening of December 5, 1989, Alvarez made a 911 phone call reporting that his stepson was unconscious. Boynton was still unconscious when the paramedics arrived about four minutes later. Boynton never regained consciousness, however, and was determined to be brain dead the following day. His life support systems were removed on December 7, 1989. Boynton had sustained injuries to the left side of his face, left ear, both eyes, the left side of the head, and the inside parts of his thighs and buttocks.
Alvarez claims that no physical evidence linked him to the crime and that his conviction was based wholly upon his pre-trial statements denying responsibility for the crimes. In fact, the State‘s medical evidence contradicted Alvarez‘s pre-trial statements. Thus, for example, the State‘s medical evidence established that the Boynton‘s injuries were not consistent with the victim falling from a couch -- the explanation initially offered by Alvarez to paramedics. The medical testimony further provided that the condition of Boynton‘s anus was consistent with it having been penetrated by a blunt object or finger. The defense‘s theory at trial was no longer that Boynton had fallen from a couch, but rather that Boynton‘s injuries were inflicted by someone other than Alvarez and that it was possible that a third party may have injured Boynton while Alvarez was asleep that night or when Boynton was at a neighbor‘s house or with his mother earlier in the day.
During the investigation of Alvarez, the State collected the following pieces of physical evidence: Joshua Boynton‘s pajama top on which a small amount of blood was found; Joshua Boynton‘s pajama bottom and jeans; Joshua Boynton‘s sweatshirt; a pair of men‘s sweatpants; a men‘s white Hard Rock Cafe sweatshirt and Joshua Boynton‘s belt; a vomit-soaked towel; a pair of men‘s pajamas; one towel; a pair of blue jeans; and one pair of sweatpants. Alvarez claims that none of this physical evidence was submitted for DNA testing at the time of his criminal trial in 1990, observing that “[s]ophisticated DNA tests were not then generally available.”
Alvarez also says that in 1990 the blood found on Boynton‘s pajama top was insufficient to allow for DNA testing, but
Following his conviction, Alvarez collaterally filed in state court a “Petition for Post-Sentencing DNA Testing,” pursuant to
(A) Whether it has been shown that physical evidence that may contain DNA still exists.
(B) Whether the results of DNA testing of that physical evidence likely would be admissible at trial and whether there exists reliable proof to establish that the evidence containing the tested DNA is authentic and would be admissible at a future hearing.
(C) Whether there is a reasonable probability that the movant would have been acquitted or would have received a lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been admitted at trial.
After several rounds of amendation, Alvarez filed a “Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction DNA Testing” in state court, maintaining his innocence and seeking access to the physical evidence for DNA testing. He claimed this would exonerate him because the resulting tests would establish the identity of the real perpetrator of these crimes. Alvarez theorized that the victim‘s injuries were sustained as a result of violent conduct, so there would be a reasonable possibility that bodily fluids would have been left behind on the physical evidence, including the blood found on the victim‘s pajama top.
The state court conducted a hearing on the petition in June 2006 pursuant to Florida‘s now-decade-old DNA access procedures. Ultimately, the court denied the third amended petition in a brief order. It found that Alvarez had “failed to meet the first and third prongs” of the rule‘s three-part test. As for the first prong, the court found that because the injury to the victim was allegedly “caused by some blunt object, but not a penis,” there was a strong likelihood that no DNA evidence relating to the victim‘s injuries existed on the items in evidence. And as for the third prong, the court found that Alvarez‘s theory of innocence was simply “I didn‘t do it,” and that Alvarez failed to adequately explain how DNA testing would exonerate him, resulting in an acquittal or lesser sentence. The state trial court‘s order was summarily affirmed per curiam by Florida‘s Fifth District Court of Appeal. Alvarez, 951 So. 2d at 852.
Alvarez then filed the instant civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida pursuant to
This timely appeal followed.
II.
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under
The Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Osborne controls the resolution of many of the issues raised on appeal, so we explicate it at some length. Osborne involved an Alaska prisoner convicted by an Alaska jury of kidnaping, assault, and sexual assault. 129 S. Ct. at 2314. Osborne later filed a
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the attempt to constitutionalize the issue of postconviction access to DNA evidence. The Court reasoned instead that the task of “harness[ing] DNA‘s power to prove innocence” within the existing criminal justice framework “belongs primarily to the legislature.” Id. at 2316. Of course, the legislative procedures for postconviction access to DNA evidence still must be consonant with the requirements of due process; thus, the Supreme Court observed that Osborne had “a liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with new evidence under state law.” Id. at 2319. But it squarely rejected the Ninth Circuit‘s extension of the Brady right to exculpatory evidence in this context. Id. at 2319-20. The Court reasoned that “[a] criminal defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have the same liberty interests as a free man,” and that “Osborne‘s right to due process is not parallel to a trial right, but rather must be analyzed in light of the fact that he has already been found guilty at a fair trial, and has only a limited interest in postconviction relief.” Id. at 2320.
After again rejecting Brady as the wrong framework, the Supreme Court posed the operative question this way: “whether consideration of Osborne‘s claim within the framework of the State‘s procedures for postconviction relief offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, or transgresses any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that there was “nothing inadequate about the procedures Alaska has provided to vindicate its state right to postconviction relief in general, and nothing inadequate about how those procedures apply to those who seek access to DNA evidence.” Id.
The Supreme Court also rejected Osborne‘s attempt to defend the Ninth Circuit‘s opinion on substantive due process grounds. The Court flatly held that “there is no such substantive due process right.” Id. at 2322; see also Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2011) (”Osborne has rejected substantive due process as a basis for [DNA testing] claims.“). Noting its general reluctance to expand the concept of substantive due process, Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2322 (citing Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)), the Court further observed that in the context of DNA testing, “[t]here is no long history of such a right, and the mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that substantive due process sustains it,” id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Finally, the Court noted that “[t]he elected governments of the States are actively confronting the challenges DNA technology poses to our criminal justice systems and our traditional notions of finality.” Id. The Court reasoned that “[t]o suddenly constitutionalize this area would short-circuit what looks to be a prompt and considered legislative response.” Id. The Court concluded that it was “reluctant to enlist the Federal Judiciary in creating a new constitutional code of rules for handling DNA.” Id.
With Osborne in mind, we turn to Alvarez‘s claims.
A.
Alvarez‘s first and primary assertion was that Florida‘s DNA access procedures fail to meet the requirements of procedural due process. As briefed, the claim challenged the constitutionality of Florida‘s procedures both facially and as-applied to his case. At oral argument, however, Alvarez‘s counsel expressly abandoned
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine is a jurisdictional rule that precludes the lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009). This is because ”
(noting the “narrowness” of the Rooker-Feldman rule). We have since explained that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine operates as a bar to federal court jurisdiction where the issue before the federal court was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment so that (1) the success of the federal claim
Fully aware that Rooker-Feldman is a narrow jurisdictional doctrine, we nonetheless hold that Alvarez‘s challenge to the Florida courts’ resolution of his petition is squarely within its orbit. Although this Circuit has yet to consider the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the context of a
Alvarez similarly seeks review and rejection of the state court judgment in this case. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291. His as-applied procedural due process claim plainly and broadly attacks the state court‘s application of Florida‘s DNA access procedures to the facts of his case; notably, it does not challenge the constitutionality of those underlying procedures. Alvarez claims that in denying his petition for DNA testing, “the State court arbitrarily ignored material facts showing a ‘reasonable probability’ that Mr. Alvarez would have been acquitted,” and that the state court made erroneous findings of fact concerning his petition.
Alvarez‘s claim is thus unlike the claim before the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Switzer, where the Court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar a claim that Texas‘s DNA access statute, as authoritatively construed by the Texas courts, was unconstitutional. Id. at 1297-98. On this point, Skinner stands for the unremarkable proposition that the existence of a state court judgment interpreting or relying upon a statute does not bar a federal court from entertaining an independent challenge to the constitutionality of that statute. Id. at 1298 (“[A] state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts, but a statute or rule governing the decision may be challenged in a federal action. Skinner‘s federal case falls within the latter category.“). Again, Alvarez has abandoned any such broad challenge to the constitutionality of Florida‘s DNA access procedures in this case, and our holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars his procedural due process attack on the state court judgment is wholly consonant with the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Skinner.
Alvarez‘s as-applied procedural due process challenge boils down to a claim that the state court judgment itself caused him constitutional injury by arbitrarily denying him access to the physical evidence he seeks under Florida‘s concededly constitutional
The district court did not err in determining that, to the extent Alvarez has alleged a violation of procedural due process because of the way the Florida state courts applied Florida‘s DNA access procedures to the facts of his case, Rooker-Feldman barred the court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim.
B.
Alvarez‘s second argument is styled as an actual innocence claim based on the Due Process Clause. Alvarez says that the State‘s “refusal to allow the release of biological evidence for DNA testing . . . deprived him of the opportunity to make a conclusive showing that he is innocent of the crimes for which he is currently incarcerated although he is, in fact, innocent.” He relies on Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), where the Supreme Court “assume[d], for the sake of argument . . . that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim,” id. at 417 (emphasis added).
To the extent Alvarez has thereby raised a substantive due process right to obtain biological evidence for DNA testing, in order “to make a conclusive showing that he is innocent,” the claim is without merit, because the Supreme Court in Osborne unambiguously concluded that there is no substantive due process postconviction right to obtain evidence for DNA testing purposes. 129 S. Ct. at 2322-23.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Osborne in reference to the petitioner‘s “oblique[]” reliance “on an asserted federal constitutional right to be released upon proof of ‘actual innocence,‘” 129 S. Ct. at 2321, this kind of claim “would be brought in habeas,” id. at 2322. In Osborne, the Court assumed without deciding that such a constitutional right exists, “because even if so there [was] no due process problem” under federal habeas and discovery procedures. id. at 2321-22 (citing
Further, in this Circuit we have already ruled that Osborne foreclosed Herrera-based actual innocence claims of the sort made here. See Cunningham v. Dist. Attorney‘s Office, 592 F.3d 1237, 1255 (11th Cir. 2010) (“After the Court issued its decision [in Osborne], we asked the parties for supplemental briefing to address Osborne‘s impact on this appeal. In response, Cunningham conceded that his Brady, substantive due process, Herrera-based actual innocence, and clemency-related claims did not survive the Osborne decision. We agree with those concessions.” (emphases added)); id. at 1272 (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that Herrera is not a basis for obtaining DNA testing in a
C.
Alvarez also makes two cursory, one-paragraph arguments that seek to constitutionalize a right to access evidence for DNA testing under the
These claims likewise are without merit under Osborne. One of the main reasons underlying the decision in Osborne is that it should be primarily up to the state and federal legislatures to fashion procedures that balance the powerful exonerating potential of DNA evidence with the need for maintaining the existing criminal justice framework and the finality of convictions and sentences. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2316-17, 2322-23. For us to sweep aside Florida‘s established procedures and constitutionalize a right to access evidence for DNA testing under the
D.
Finally, Alvarez argues that the State, by denying him access to the physical evidence, has effectively deprived him of the opportunity to litigate his claim, in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Alvarez has pointed us to no underlying cause of action that he was prevented from lodging in a court of law. Alvarez can hardly claim that he was denied the opportunity to present a substantive due process claim, a
Thus, for example, unlike the Alaska and federal statutes at issue in Osborne, Florida‘s procedures explicitly provide for the possibility of a hearing on a motion to obtain DNA testing.
In other respects, Florida‘s procedures mirror the federal statute in the protections afforded applicants. Both provide, for example, that the government must bear the costs of DNA testing if the applicant is indigent.
In short, inasmuch as Florida‘s postconviction DNA access procedures either mirror or are more applicant-friendly than the Alaska and federal statutes endorsed in Osborne, Florida‘s postconviction DNA access procedures plainly do not offend any principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, nor do they transgress any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320; cf. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 1263 (“Alabama‘s procedures pass [constitutional] muster if they compare favorably with Alaska‘s.“).
Moreover, the State‘s “out-of-court refusal to release evidence for DNA testing in no way prevent[ed Alvarez] from asking a state court to order release of that evidence.” Id. at 1272. Indeed, that is precisely what Alvarez did in this case -- he sought release of the evidence from the state court, and the state court denied his request. Under these circumstances, Alvarez cannot raise a colorable claim that he was deprived of access to the courts by the State‘s actions; the district court properly dismissed this claim too.
AFFIRMED.