In re: Frederick J. Smith v.

SMITH, In J. Movant. re: Frederick

No. 07-1220. of Appeals, States Court

Sixth Circuit. 24, 2009.

Sept. BATCHELDER,

BEFORE: Chiеf SUTTON, Judge, SUHRHEINRICH Judges. Circuit SUHRHEINRICH, Judge. In this Petitioner Freder- ick J. Smith an order directing seeks officials produce physical evidence collected the investi- gation underlying his state criminal convic- tion. hold that the district court We lacked on the basis of doctrine, Rooker-Feldman and DISMISS this action. Background

I. On March found was guilty by jury first-degree criminal conduct, robbery, sexual armed pos- during session of a firearm the commission prosecution’s of a felony. case con- testimony sisted of the of the complainant evidence, blood-type admission of pos- the assailant indicated (i) Smith, sessed B an African- sample blood. A of identified biological blood, possesses type American B as material ... is available for DNA twenty testing. of the percent African-Ameri- can population. The evidence was tested (ii) biological The identified material in a procedure through known subjected ... was not previously to “electrophoresis analysis,” no or, tested, DNA testing previously if longer generally accepted by usеd nor subject will be to testing DNA tech- community. scientific nology was not available when

Smith presented five alibi witnesses— the defendant was convicted. family four members and a friend —who (iii) identity The of the defendant as part testified that Smith was in a different the perpetrator of the crime was at of Detroit at or near time of the of- during his or her triаl. Smith, v. Mich.App. fense. See People 770.16(3) (2005) Comp. § Mich. Laws 385 N.W.2d (amended 2006). Smith years was sentenced to two in The state trial court prison felony conviction, denied Smith’s mo- thirty on the tion, holding ‍‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‍present that Smith sixty years offense, “failed prison in for the sex prima proof facie twenty years sought the evidence and ten to for rob armed to be tеsted material issue of bery. ap His conviction was on affirmed Smith, People identification peal. case.” v. See N.W.2d at 655. The Smith, (Order No. 83006566-01 Supreme Court denied leave to 2005). Court, Oct. Smith Smith, dated appeal. See People No. (Mich. 28, 1986). appeal this decision. Sept. On November Smith filed a Instead, on January Smith

petition for corpus writ of habeas in feder- Kym Worthy, Prosecuting sued Attorney al district court. The district dis- court Wayne County, Michigan, Judge upon one-year missed action based Edwards, Judge Wayne Prentis of the statute of limitations found in 28 U.S.C. Circuit, district court 2244(d)(1). § Jones, Smith No. 01- pursuant § to 42 Smith U.S.C. al- CV-74504-DT, 2002 WL 31875516 leged that his constitutional were (E.D.Mich. 2002). Nov. violated Defendants’ refusal to order sought injunc- in his case and August

On peti- filed a directing tive officials testing Wayne County tion for DNA conduct DNA pursuant to Mich. provides, 770.16. The statute sponte sua deemed pertinent part: as a or Smith’s action second successive (3) The court order shall petition for habeas relief and transferred all following: defendant does of the pursuant the matter this Court to 28 (a) proof facie prima Presents 2244(b)(3)(A) U.S.C. for authorization to evidence be tested is material petition. file second successive habeas person’s issue of convicted the matter in abeyance pending We held identity perpetrator ... as the Supreme Court’s decision Dist. crime that resulted the conviction. Judicial Att’y’s the Third Dist. Offiсe — (b) U.S. —, all following by Establishes (2009), convincing clear evidence: 174 L.Ed.2d in which Su- brought com- to consider cases losers preme granted certiorari plaining injuries the same issue raised Smith. judgments rendered before the district ultimately not The Court did Supreme inviting proceedings court commenced and simply assumed question decide this but rejection district сourt this claim petitioner that a could raise Exxon, 284, judgments.” 544 U.S. at 125 the ultimate under 1983 reached It does not bar “a district right has a petitioner] [a “whether subject-matter exercising juris- court from the obtain Due Process Clause simply attempts a party diction because access to the State’s evi- postconviction litigate in a previоusly federal court matter 129 testing.” ‍‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‍for DNA S.Ct. at dence 293, litigated in state court.” Id. at 125 2316, majority 2319. The held a con- plaintiff “If presents S.Ct. 1517. a federal a prisoner victed does not have freestand- independent some albeit one that DNA ing evidence. legal denies a conclusion a state court Rather, the majority 129 S.Ct. at 2322. has he reached а case which was a that, most, prisoner may a have a held at jurisdiction,” then is party, there the process right proper not apply. Rooker-Feldman Id. right. application of a state-created Id. omitted). (quotation 2319-20. interpreted limita

This Court “has Analysis II. tion to mean that the Rooker-Feldman applies only when com plаintiff every As must we at the plains injury the judg from our over this outset consider Burns, ment itself.” Carter v. 524 F.3d Arbaugh Corp., appeal. v. Y & H (6th Cir.2008) (internal 796, quotations 798 514, 500, 1235, 163 126 S.Ct. omitted). perti and citation The (2006). above, As noted Smith did not inquiry nent after Exxon is the “source of appeal the state trial the court the injury” plaintiff alleges in the fed denying testing. motion DNA complaint. eral McCormick v. Braver Thus, question becomes whether (6th Cir.2006). 382, appeal is under the barred Rooker-Feld inquiry The the source of [focuses on] doctrine, man doctrine. Under that “low injury plaintiff alleges precluded er federal courts are from exer complaint. federal If the source cising appellate jurisdiction over final decision, court is then judgments.” Marks Tennes the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would (6th Cir.2009) see, (inter prevent the court asserting from omitted). quotation nal marks and citation jurisdiction. If there some other is so [28 This “[b]eeause U.S.C.] injury, source of such as third authority long interpreted, vests to review actions, then the an in- asserts solely a state court’s in [the dependent claim. Suрreme] Corp. Court.” Exxon Mobil Welch, Corp., Saudi Basic Indus. See also Lawrence v. Cir.2008), reh’g 368-69 en banc denied, filed, The ex Feb. recently petition for cert. 9, 2008) (No. plained (July that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 09- U.S.L.W. 3058 48) (same). Herr, occupies ground,” namely, “narrow that it See also Hamilton (6th Cir.2008) “is to cases from 540 F.3d (stating confined kind acquired which the doсtrine its name: that “what the Rooker-Feldman doctrine rights by denying statutory tional bars are claims that seek primarily Thus, court by’ ‘caused from testing. “source of quotation internal marks and judgment”; injury” in this case is the state trial court citation order that denied Smith access to DNA is, complaining That parallel not apply doctrine does Marks, wrongfully stаte trial denied him litigation, state and Exxon, pe (citing evidence because of his F.3d at 622 1517), “judicial improper nor to review of tition was complaining —but including decisions executive that the statute itself is flawed—Smith agen[cies],” (quot id. state administrative of an “complaining by Md., Serv. ing Inc. v. Pub. Verizon judgment seeking and review Comm’n, 535 U.S. 644 n. 122 S.Ct. of judgment,” and ‍‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‍(2002)), to claims cleаrly by barred Rooker-Feldman. Exx by parties of conduct third improper on, at S.Ct. 1517.1 with see proceedings, connection the state Carter, (holding also 524 F.3d at 799 Co., Weltman, Weinberg Todd v. & Reis properly the district court dismissed (6th Cir.2006) (alleging plaintiffs as-applied con challenge to the plaintiffs by harm that the was caused of stitutionality the Tennessee collateral affidаvit, false state defendant’s Rooker-Feldman)-, review statutes garnishment pro in the court’s decision (holding id. at 798-99 that the district cf. feder ceedings). prohibit And it “does not in dismissing court erred plaintiffs jurisdic al courts from exercising district challenge constitutionality facial to the plaintiffs merely tion where claim is statutes). collateral Tennessee general challenge constitutionality applied rights law in the state Even Smith’s civil claim state appli presents independent rather than a to the law’s an ex basis for the Carter, particular review, state cation in case.” ercise of federal it fails (internal quotations at 798 First, several reasons. and citation Court held in Osborne thаt there is no right freestanding process substantive due alleges § 1983 complaint, In his to DNA at 129 S.Ct. comply Defendants’ failure first to Second, any procedural 2322. process § with Mich. 770.16 violated claim is untenable Michigan’s also because process to right of law under statutory comprehensive scheme is more Amendments, and Fifth and Fourteenth procedures than the state sanctioned second, that Defendants’ “failure/refusal (“We the Osborne Court. id. at 2320 biological allow DNA of critical evi- Cf. inadequate proce see about the nothing Plaintiffs and dence violates provided dures Alaska has to vindicate guar- Due rights substance Process clause postconviction gen right relief gra- the 14th Amendment.” The anteed eral, then, nothing inadequate about how complaint, Smith’s vamen of apply eonstitu- procedures is that Defendants’ violated his those who seek such, recently Feldman As it is a direct 1. As we observed similar doctrine. statutory “use the skeleton of Smith cannot state court attack on a and there appeal civil law to the district v. fore barred Rooker-Feldman.” Briscoe ultimately court and overturn the decision Jackson, Fed.Appx. Cir. precise the state courts. This is the 2008). prohibited by Rooker- state-court reversal evidence.”). Third, probability” “a reasonable there existed such access to “the verdict would be foreclosed that with the evidence likely would federal claims see Dist. the defen- judicata principles, more under res have been favorable Feldman, Appeals Proc. (quoting Id. at 94 N.Y.Crim. Columbia dant.” 462, 487-88, 440.30(l-a)(a) added in (emphases Law question (leaving open McKithen)). § 1983 In his federal judicata of res fore whether doctrine attor- that the district McKithen claimed of federal on elements litigation closes ney violated his constitutional Whitbeck, issue); Howard complaints for DNA post-conviction access (6th Cir.2004) (stating testing of injunctive directing general where a that “even allegedly knife used to commit mounted, proceedings attack is on court dismissed crime. Id. under the the federаl claim may foreclose the basis of Rooker-Feldman. applicable judicata”), of res reversed, reasoning The Second Circuit doctrines, immunity see Will McKi- injury because the for which that Police, 491 Dept. State U.S. of court redress “existed sought then federal (holding S.Ct. prior in exact form to the state-court in his or against a a state official that suit injury it could not be “an judgment,” against a the capacity official suit her by’ the court.” Id. at 98. ‘caused state under cognizable and not state itself Instead, injury “properly the was under- Clem, 1983); 492 F.3d Dixon ratified, ac- simply been stood to have Cir.2007) (6th immuni (noting judicial that in, by unpunished [the or left quiesced function afford ty judicial protects (internal quotаtion state court].” immunity); Pusey City ing absolute omitted).2 marks and citation (6th Youngstown, 11 F.3d 657-58 Cir. 1993) have abso (holding prosecutors that In disagree reasoning. with this our We immunity). lute McKithen, view, well as “injury” as in fact exist injury this that the Second Circuit recognize We prisoner was denied until state conclusion on virtu- has reached a different the state court testing by requested See MсKithen ally indistinguishable facts. applicable state statutes. Cir.2007). Brown, (2d After Cf. 481 F.3d 89 McCormick, (holding 451 F.3d at 395 murder being attempted convicted of and receivership vio- probate court’s order charges, McKithen related as plaintiffs lated the County pursuant Queens was barred be- an unlawful seizure and provided statute which to a New York alleges cause “the count grant application “the shall harmed illegal of such evidence” if court order itself was forensic DNA Albany Bd. interpreted (quoting Hoblock v. Circuit Exxon Mobil 2. The Second Elections, (2d Cir.2005)). In requiring complain of "an McCormick, Cir- judgment,” we characterized Second " inquiry" complains "a to that of explained cuit's test as similar ‘a federal suit adopted injury” test we judgment, even if it "the source of from a state-court McCormick, only McCormick. See appears complain of a third actions, injury” (borrowing party's the "source of the when the third actions are 393-94 decision, Davani v. judgment and not test from a Fourth Circuit produced a state-court ratified, in, Transp., unpun- Virginia Dep't 434 F.3d 712 simply acquiesced or left ” McKithen, Cir.2006)). 481 F.3d at 97 ished it.’ reasоn, we this plaintiff]”).3 applied For this de- Court has never Rooker- [the ap- adopt cline to the Second Circuit's Feldman to dismiss an action for want of Dennis, jurisdiction.”); in this case. proach see also Lance v. III. Conclusion (2006); id. at reasons, (Stevens, J., foregoing appeal dissenting For the is 1198 on non-Rook- prejudice without to Smith grounds) (stating DISMISSED er-Fеldman Exxon-Mo- returning to the “finally state court revisit bil interred the so-called ‘Rooker- ”). post-Osborne. Feldman doctrine’ ‍‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‍The idea behind Rooker-Feldman SUTTON, Judge, concurring that 28 U.S.C. the statute that part dissenting part. gives the United States I agree aspect majority’s with one authority to final decisions of the (its rejection of the merits of this courts, by impliсation denies federal (its appeal) but not the other conclusion jurisdiction district courts —and strips that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine appeals jurisdiction courts of chal- —over jurisdiction federal courts of to hear lenges judgments. to state-court Exx- case). on, 544 U.S. at 1517. If a eighty-six years, In the Supreme Court party wishes to a state-сourt has enforced the Rooker-Feldman limit on judgment, it must seek review in the U.S. just of the federal courts Court, not the federal district twice. of App. See Dist. Columbia Ct. Mobil, courts. Id. In Exxon the Court Feldman, 1303, 460 U.S. 103 75 S.Ct. confined the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to (1983); Fidelity L.Ed.2d 206 Rooker v. ground,” namely a “narrow brought “cases Co., 44 Trust 263 U.S. S.Ct. 68 by complaining inju- state-court losers (1923). L.Ed. 362 most reсent Court’s judgments ries caused state-court ren- applications suggest of the doctrine that dered before the court proceedings that, may be name is not it— inviting commenced and district court re- Feldman, Rooker or or if the case does not view and of those claims.” Id. at present virtually challenge, identical it is 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517. Smith’s claims do not unlikely that the strips the federal occupy ground.” this “narrow jurisdiction courts of to hear the claim. Corp. Invoking procedural Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic substantive and due Corp., process, complains Michigan Indus. Smith S.Ct. (2005) (“Since evidence, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 Feld- has denied him access to DNA Indeed, complaint we think the conclusion reached was of an McKithen is inconsistent with Second Cir judgment. The valid claim in Hoblock, cuit's 87-88. plaintiff employer in volved a who sued his Hoblock illustrated the difference between a violating state court for both state anti-dis barred claim and a valid claim under Rooker- and Title VII If crimination laws and lost. examples. Feldman with two The barred bringing sued in federal court decisiоn, claim involved a state-court based suit, alleging injury the same he would not be law, purely on state that terminated a father’s judgment, alleged from the state because the parental and ordered state to take employer's was based on the discrimi custody of If the father his son. sued view, injury in nation. In our McKithen federal court for return оf his son on the judice and the case sub resembles the former grounds that the state violated his example and not the latter. process rights, federal substantive due his claim no better because “liberty process interest fares implicates Michigan provides comprehensive new evi a more his innocence with demonstrating law,” рrocedure accessing for evidence for DNA Atty’s Dist. dence under Office upheld Dist. v. than the Alaska scheme ‍‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‍the Third Judicial — 2320-22; —, 2308, 2319, 174 See id. at see also Osborne. U.S. true, It is not Smith’s substantive Mich. 770.16. however, satisfy sovereign, prosecutorial process challenge judicial immunity “likely” He immunizes the requirements. as Rooker-Feldman’s in forward-looking re-test evi defendants from the a constitutional serts trial, junctive even if he had using dence from his then-unavailable seeks 15-16; Maj. Op. claim. testing techniques right the State meritorious —a him. The see also R.l at 11. These doctrines shield grant refuses to however, suits, judgment, damages officials from not forward- Allen, injunctions. injury; looking create or cause this the State of Seе Pulliam 522, 541-42, prosecutors) did. 466 Michigan (through its S.Ct. ratified, (1984) “simply (judicial immunity); ac L.Ed.2d 565 The state in, quiesced unpunished” Sup. or left the State’s Ct. Va. v. Consumers Union States, Inc., him to new DNA refusal to allow access (1980) Brown, (prose McKithen (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation immunity); parte Young, cutorial Ex 123, 159-60, Rooker-Feldman does not cover U.S. 52 L.Ed. process (sovereign immunity). substantive due and 714 shows that thе district court by itself (and we) have over this case. process chal

Smith’s lim

lenge also exceeds Rooker-Feldman’s construed, Fairly Smith’s grasp. pro

ited papers present as-applied challenge

se an Michigan’s procedures adequacy obtaining post-conviction access to Wayne

DNA and to the actions of the applying Office in Prosecutor’s procedures, not a America, UNITED STATES of ¶¶ 42, R.1 itself. See aintiff-Appellee, Pl explicitly contemplated 44-45. Osborne challenge in DNA-access cases, Osborne, see 129 S.Ct. at and I SHULL, Robert H. Defendant- invited what Rooker-Feld doubt Appellant. prevents. man No. 08-4168. majority’s I cannot embrace the While jurisdictional rulings, agree I with much Appeals, States ruling alternative on the merits. Sixth Circuit. no Under Smith has substantive 8,Oct. evidence from process right to access subject his criminal trial and it to DNA id. And his

Case Details

Case Name: In re: Frederick J. Smith v.

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Sep 24, 2009

Citation: 349 F. App'x 12

Docket Number: 07-1220

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.