DUSTY BUTTON and MITCHELL TAYLOR BUTTON v. JULIET DOHERTY, KRISTA KING-DOHERTY and LUIS PONS
24-CV-5026 (JPC) (KHP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
July 30, 2025
TO: HON. JOHN P. CRONAN, United States District Judge
FROM: HON. KATHARINE H. PARKER, United States Magistrate Judge.
In this case, Plaintiffs (and formerly significant dance industry figures) Dusty and Taylor Button sue Juliet Doherty, a young dancer, her mother Krista King-Doherty, and a dance photographer, Luis Pons, claiming their stardom in the dance industry (among others) abruptly ended when Defendants conspired to defame them beginning in or around 2018, culminating in Doherty joining a lawsuit filed by several young dancers in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada against the Plaintiffs in 2021 (the “Nevada Action“). The Nevada Action is led by a dancer named Sage Humphries who claims, as do the other plaintiffs in the action, that Plaintiffs sexually abused her. Plaintiffs deny the allegations and allege they have been falsely accused by the dancers and in fact had a consensual dating relationship with Humphries. When Doherty joined the action, she too alleged the Plaintiffs sexually abused her at a dance festival in Panama. According to the Buttons, however, in reality it was Doherty who sexually assaulted them.
In response to the Nevada Action, Plaintiffs brought this action and other actions in
1. Overview of Parties and Claims
Plaintiffs are a married couple currently living in South Carolina. They resided in Nevada when the Nevada Action was filed. Humphries et al. v. Button, No. 2:21-cv-01412 (D. Nev.), ECF No. 221 ¶¶ 11-12. They resided in Massachusetts in 2018 when the alleged assault in Panama occurred. (ECF No. 41, Amended Complaint, at 74 ¶ 199, 76 ¶ 213, 88 ¶¶ 251, 253). Dusty Button (“Dusty“)4 “was a world-renowned ballerina” who trained and danced at various well known ballet schools in the United States and England, rising to be principal ballerina at the Boston Ballet in 2014. (ECF No. 41, at 16-17 ¶¶ 1-4.) Dusty also earned money through corporate sponsorships and teaching. For example, she “was Red Bull‘s first and only ballet athlete,” and has performed and taught dance across the United States and in thirty countries. (Id. ¶ 5.) According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Mitchell Taylor Button (“Taylor“) “was one of the world‘s most influential custom Ferrari and military vehicle designers and builders” between 2014 and 2021, when the underlying events in the Complaint took place. (Id. at 17 ¶ 8.) Both of the Buttons were active on social media and promoted themselves and their brands through social media, which also contributed substantially to their income.5 At the time of the
Defendants Krista King-Doherty (“King-Doherty“) and Luis Pons (“Pons“) were “well-known figures in the dance community.” (Id. at 19 ¶ 14.) King-Doherty in particular was “a well-known and globally sought-after master dance teacher and dance choreographer,” with “31,000 subscribers” on Instagram, who had taught dance with Dusty. (Id. at 19-20 ¶¶ 16, 18.) King-Doherty “resides in and is domiciled in Albuquerque, New Mexico,” though Plaintiffs allege she “frequents New York City, NY on a recurring basis for business purposes.” (Id. at 14 ¶ 48.) Pons “was a well-known and sought-after dance photographer with a social media following of at least 57,000 subscribers” on Instagram. (Id. at 19 ¶ 17.) Defendant Juliet Doherty (“Doherty“) is a New York resident who “was an actress and model, world-renowned dancer and social media influencer with a following of at least 320,000 subscribers on Instagram” and a number of “fan pages” which posted in support of her. (Id. at 13 ¶ 47; 19 ¶ 15.)
According to the Plaintiffs, their business and reputations were ruined by false accusations by various people, including the Defendants, that Plaintiffs abused young dancers (sexually and otherwise). The accusations started in or about 2017 when the parents of Sage Humphries called the police in Massachusetts claiming that Plaintiffs owned dangerous weapons and were having an inappropriate relationship with their daughter. (Id. at 56 ¶ 144) Ultimately, in 2021, Sage Humphries and another young dancer, Gina Menichino, filed the Nevada Action through their counsel, Sigrid McCawley, an attorney at the Boies Schiller Flexner
Plaintiffs assert that, as a result of Defendants’ (and others‘) false and defamatory conduct, they were subjected to “severe cyber bullying and harassment” and had to delete their Instagram account, which caused them to lose substantial revenue they previously enjoyed through their social media presence. (ECF No. 41, at 17-18 ¶¶ 7, 11, 12, 13.) They also claim that they suffered other adverse consequences as a result of the sexual abuse allegations against them including loss of employment and loss of business relationships and opportunities.
2. The 2018 Panama Trip
The sexual abuse that underlies the Plaintiffs’ claims against Doherty (and Doherty‘s claims in the Nevada Action against Plaintiffs) occurred in July 2018 in Panama. That month the Plaintiffs traveled to Panama City, Panama, where Dusty was headlining “the Panama Ballet
Doherty “was also contracted to perform” at the festival in Panama City. (Id. at 24 ¶ 33.) Plaintiffs met Doherty for the first time at the airport in Panama. (Id. at 23 ¶ 32.) The Plaintiffs say that, during this trip, Doherty “was extremely persistent in pursuing a friendship with Plaintiffs.” (Id. at 25-26 ¶ 39.) On one occasion, they say, while festival attendees and employees were “gathered at the hotel pool to celebrate,” Doherty “came to sit with Plaintiffs at a poolside table and unexpectedly decided to open up” to them regarding details about her personal life; namely, Doherty allegedly stated she had had “kissed a girl” and “liked it.” (Id. at 26-27 ¶¶ 40-44.)
After the festival concluded, Sepulveda invited the Plaintiffs and Doherty to stay in Panama to enjoy the location. (Id. at 27 ¶ 47.) Doherty allegedly asked to move into the Buttons’ room so she would not have to pay for her own room. (Id. at 27-28 ¶¶ 48.) Plaintiffs agreed. (Id. at 28 ¶ 49.) According to Plaintiffs, Doherty exposed herself to them after showering, jumped into their bed in a suggestive position, inappropriately touched Dusty under the table at dinner one night, became drunk and flirtatious with them in the pool and inappropriately touched and tried to kiss them in the pool and suggested she wanted to initiate a threesome, and attempted to kiss Dusty in their shared room. Sepulveda and his son allegedly witnessed some of this behavior. (Id. at 28-32 ¶¶ 50-51, 53-65; 35-36 ¶¶ 72-83.) According to Plaintiffs, after they left Panama, Doherty falsely told others, including to their employers, sponsors and contractors, that she was drugged and sexually abused in Panama by
Plaintiffs state in their complaint that they never pursued a “criminal report” against Doherty for assaulting them in Panama out of purported sympathy with Doherty‘s alleged statements regarding her sexuality (Id. at 40 ¶ 92.) They allege they sought “advice from a detective they knew in Massachusetts and were advised that civil recourse would be the best option.” (Id. ¶ 93.)
3. The Alleged Defamatory Statements of Defendants
Defendants assert that “[f]or years” after the 2018 Panama trip, Doherty “slandered and harassed Plaintiffs including by spreading malicious and defamatory rumors that Dusty and Taylor ‘kind of drugged her’ and ‘raped’ her.” (Id. at 45, ¶ 109.) As detailed in the complaint, the vast majority of allegedly defamatory statements identified by Plaintiffs were made shortly after the Panama trip in 2018 and in the complaint and other filings in the Nevada Action. A few other statements were private text messages or statements made by the Defendants to others that Plaintiffs learned about from discovery in the Nevada Action. Other statements were made on social media. Although not entirely clear, it appears that the alleged harm from the alleged defamation occurred in the immediate aftermath of the filing of the Nevada Action or earlier (i.e., prior to February 2023 when Doherty withdrew from the Nevada Action). Although the prolix complaint contains many generalized assertions, the Court has identified approximately nineteen specific statements that the Plaintiffs have alleged were made by
- Doherty allegedly told Sepulveda via text message on September 15, 2018, “As I have discovered during the end of my trip in Panama, both of the [B]uttons have serious criminal charges pending against them. I do not want to be connected to them in any way,” “[F]or the reputation of your festival[,] I don‘t think you want to be connected to them,” and “[T]hey are not good people.” (ECF No. 44-1; ECF No. 41, at 45-47 ¶¶ 112-16.) The Plaintiffs say Doherty‘s statements “convinced” Sepulveda to terminate his relationship with them. (ECF No. 41, at 47 ¶¶ 117-18.) According to Plaintiffs, Pons informed Doherty about criminal allegations that had been made about them sometime prior to September 15, 2018.8 (Id. at 45-46 ¶¶ 107, 114).
- In a text message dated March 2, 2019, with Slawek Wozniak (the son of Slawomir Wozniak, who runs the Master Ballet Academy9), Doherty stated, “[R]emember they kind of drugged me so probably better to stay away from them,” indicating she was “sure” of this. (ECF No. 44-2; ECF No. 41, at 47-48 ¶¶ 119-22.) Plaintiffs discovered the text messages to Wozniak in 2023 during
discovery in the Nevada action.10 (Id. ¶ 121.) - In 2019, Plaintiffs allegedly discovered that at some unspecified time in 2018 or 2019 Doherty “made further defamatory statements to company members at Ballet West, . . . including stating that Plaintiffs drugged and raped her in Panama in 2018.” (Id. at 69 ¶ 180.)
- Plaintiffs allege King-Doherty and/or Doherty “told the owner of [Youth America Grand Prix [‘YAGP‘]] that the Plaintiffs were child predators” at an unspecified place and time, in an unspecified manner.11 (Id. at 70 ¶ 182, 130 ¶ 386-87 n.24.)
- Plaintiffs identify a number of allegations Doherty made in the complaint in the Nevada Action which they claim are false and defamatory. These include that Plaintiffs spiked Doherty‘s drink (id. at 59-60 ¶¶ 146-47); that Dusty inflicted “juvenile sexual abuse” against her (id. at 66-67 ¶¶ 166-170); that Plaintiffs “drugged and molested” her when they were in Panama; that Plaintiffs “emphasized their power in the dance world and spoke negatively about their enemies in the dance community,” and “suggested that they had the ability to negatively impact individuals’ dance careers” (id. at 58 ¶ 145 & 53 ¶ 142); that “[t]he Buttons encouraged [Doherty] to share personal details about her life with them” and “Dusty told [Doherty] she felt like [Doherty]‘s ‘big sister‘” (id. at 54 ¶ 143); that Plaintiffs showed her pictures of “a room full of guns that the
Buttons had at their house” (id. ¶ 144); that Dusty touched Doherty‘s genitals without consent (id. at 60 ¶ 148); that she “felt overwhelmed and scared,” attempting to “escape the pool,” but ultimately falling and suffering bruises and scrapes (id. at 62 ¶ 149); that Doherty “locked herself in the bathroom and continued vomiting,” with Plaintiffs “repeatedly” knocking to be let in, but Doherty “kept the door locked because she did not feel safe” with Plaintiffs (id. at 62-63 ¶ 150); and that Doherty “passed out on the bathroom floor” and “woke up . . . in bed in a towel lying next to Dusty.” (id. at 63 ¶ 151.) - On February 24, 2023, in connection with withdrawing from the Nevada Action, Doherty “allegedly posted a picture to Instagram showing a picture of herself smiling with the caption, “yep that‘s alright with me!” and a mailbox emoji. (Id. at 71 ¶ 188.) She also stated in her court filing that she was withdrawing “due to severe online harassment in retaliation for her claims.”12 (Id. ¶ 189; Humphries v. Button, No. 2:21-cv-01412-ART-EJY, ECF No. 132.)
- At some point before Humphreys’ August 23, 2023 deposition in the Nevada Action, Doherty allegedly “told [Humphreys] that she was raped by both Plaintiffs and that she woke up naked and afraid.” (ECF No. 41, at 64, ¶ 152.)
Regarding Pons, the Plaintiffs allege he made the following defamatory statements:
- Plaintiffs allege on July 12, 2018, Pons told Doherty “The [B]uttons are very strange people. When you have time I can explain but they are dangerous
people[,] and I‘m not joking at all. I know why she was kicked out of Boston ballet[]. Saying this with love of course[], looking out for you.” (Id. at 133 ¶ 399.) - Around the same time in 2018, Pons also said Plaintiffs were “[h]ighly manipulative and strange. Keep [th]em at a distance[]. Crazy shit.” (Id. ¶ 401.)
Finally, the Plaintiffs allege generally that “Defendants,” allegedly made the following defamatory statements:
- “[A]s late as the summer of 2024,” one or more Defendants allegedly made statements “via social media and to former employers that Plaintiffs are going to be ‘locked up.‘” (Id. at 167 ¶ 559.)
4. The Plaintiffs’ Relationship with Sage Humphries
The Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains a lengthy rehashing of an allegedly “open dating relationship” between themselves and Sage Humphries. The Court does not recite the full allegations here because they are largely irrelevant to the instant action. However, Plaintiffs do acknowledge that on August 1, 2017, and June 11, 2018, Humphries filed a series of (purportedly false) police reports in Massachusetts against Plaintiffs regarding the potential illegal sale of firearms in California and alleging third-party stalking by Plaintiffs. (Id. at 88 ¶¶ 251-52, 124-25 ¶ 373.) They admit that on or around August 15, 2018, the Massachusetts Court “granted a permanent restraining order against Plaintiffs.” (Id. at 89 ¶ 255.) According to the Plaintiffs, Slawomir Wozniak shortly thereafter terminated the Master Ballet Academy‘s relationship with them. (Id. at 127-29 ¶¶ 377-79.) This suggests that the termination of this relationship was not the result of any conduct by Defendants in this action.
According to Plaintiffs, the alleged defamation caused a “loss of millions of dollars in revenue, assets and income, as Plaintiffs’ businesses, good names and network of professional relationships were all destroyed.” (Id. at 136 ¶ 414.) “As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct,” Plaintiffs claim they no longer work in their respective industries and have been completely unemployed since 2021.13 (Id. at 137 ¶ 418.) Plaintiffs assert that they “themselves, were their business, contracted by numerous private contractors which immediately ceased working with Plaintiffs following the defamatory global media campaign waged against them, including . . . contractors and sponsors who had employed and worked with Plaintiffs for over fifteen years, and who immediately disassociated themselves from Plaintiffs.” (Id. at 136 ¶ 415.) They received “death threats, threats of physical violence if they were to be seen in public and harassing messages,” including on social media. (Id. ¶ 416.) They allege they were “physically, forcibly and embarrassingly removed from public events and various restaurants and stores where their names and likenesses were recognized from the media that Defendants orchestrated.” (Id. ¶ 417.) They state they have “severe trauma and PTSD as a direct result” of the statements alleged in the Complaint and have contemplated suicide. (Id. at 147 ¶ 458; 149 ¶ 464.)
King-Doherty, who as noted above is a resident of New Mexico, moves to dismiss the claims against her on the ground that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over her. She and Doherty also move to dismiss for failure to state a claim, including because some claims are time-barred.14 In a separate motion, Pons argues the complaint should be dismissed against him for failure to state a claim, including because some of the claims are time-barred. Although the parties are in different states and the conduct about which Plaintiffs complain occurred in Panama and various states, including New York and Nevada, Defendants argue principally for the application of New York law to all the claims. Though not entirely clear, it appears Plaintiffs argue that New York law should apply to their malicious prosecution claim and that Nevada law should apply to their remaining claims. Thus, choice of law issues must be addressed.
1. Personal Jurisdiction
Under
2. Choice of Laws Principles
While courts generally abstain from performing a choice-of-law analysis on a motion to dismiss, they will do so where the pertinent facts are clear from the face of the complaint. Holborn Corp. v. Sawgrass Mut. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 3d 392, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). “Federal courts sitting in diversity look to the choice-of-law rules of the forum state.” Int‘l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 363 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 12 (2d Cir. 1998)). Because jurisdiction in this case is premised on diversity, New York choice-of-law rules apply.
“If an actual conflict exists, courts must decide which choice-of-law test is most appropriate.” Id. Here, all the causes of action in this case sound in tort, and thus New York‘s choice-of-law rules for tort causes of action, which require an interest analysis in the event of a conflict of laws, apply. GlobalNet Financial.Com, Inc. v. Frank Crystal & Co., Inc., 449 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (1985) (cleaned up)). Under this test, New York courts will apply “the law of the state with the most significant interest in the litigation.” Kinsey v. N.Y. Times Co., 991 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Lee v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Generally, the state of the plaintiff‘s domicile will have the most significant relationship to the case, and its substantive law will therefore govern. Id. When weighing a state‘s interests, “New York distinguishes between conduct-regulating rules and loss-allocating rules.” Kinsey, 991 F.3d at 176 (citing Sheldon v. PHH Corp., 135 F.3d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 1998)). For conduct-regulating rules, New York “usually applies the traditional law of the place of the tort.” Id. Defamation causes of action are “considered conduct-regulating.” Id. (citing AroChem Int‘l, Inc. v. Buirkle, 968 F.2d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 1992)). However, where, as here, multiple states are involved in the alleged conduct giving rise to the complaint, New York courts consider “whether another jurisdiction has a more significant relationship to the case,” and must “weigh all the
3. Failure to State a Claim and Statute of Limitations
For a complaint to survive a
When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court may consider “any written instrument attached to the complaint as an exhibit, any statements or documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, documents that are ‘integral’ to the complaint even if they are not incorporated
These same standards apply to motions to dismiss complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs. Jenkins v. N.Y.C. Dep‘t of Educ., 2011 WL 5451711, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2011). However, the court must construe a pro se plaintiff‘s complaint liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
1. Personal Jurisdiction over King-Doherty
Because jurisdiction here is premised on diversity, the Court looks to New York‘s long-arm statute to evaluate whether personal jurisdiction is proper. Bresciani v. Leela Mumbai-A-Kempinski Hotel, 311 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 2007) (“To answer th[e] question [of personal jurisdiction over a defendant], we look first to the law of the State of New York, in which the district court sits.“) If the defendant‘s contacts with the forum are not “continuous and systematic” such they would be sufficient for the exercise of general jurisdiction, the Court must assess whether it has specific jurisdiction to hear the claims in this case. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 567-68.
New York
The only possible basis for exercising jurisdiction over King-Doherty is subsection (1) as to the defamation claims and subsections (1) and potentially (2) with respect to the other tort claims, because Plaintiffs are not within New York and the conduct does not relate to real property. To establish jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant under
Plaintiffs have alleged King-Doherty made statements on Instagram and Facebook (and potentially over the phone), from her home in New Mexico (presumably), targeted at companies and/or individuals potentially residing in New York. The most specific assertion of a communication to someone in New York is their assertion that King-Doherty “intentionally, maliciously and willingly made defamatory and salacious statements to the owner of YAGP,” which is located in New York City, “in conspiracy with various third[ ]parties to intentionally destroy Plaintiff‘s [sic] business relationship with YAGP; which she did.” (Id. at 130 ¶¶ 386-87.) Even if this statement were made in person, there are no clear allegations regarding any specific business transactions in which King-Doherty was engaged in New York that have a nexus with the claims against her. Nor do Plaintiffs allege that any defamatory statements were made in New York or that King-Doherty engaged in other tortious conduct while in New York. While Plaintiffs point generally toward their loss of business with YAGP, this allegation is insufficient to establish that King-Doherty conducted business in New York and that her alleged tortious conduct arises from that business.
Plaintiff‘s assertion that “New York recognizes a conspiracy theory as the basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary under [
2. Whether New York or Nevada Law Applies to the Claims Against Doherty and Pons
While this Court sits within New York, the allegations of the Amended Complaint allege a “global campaign” of defamation and other torts, often crossing state lines. Accordingly, this Court must evaluate which state‘s law will apply. Defendants chiefly argue for application of New York‘s substantive law and statutes of limitations, while Plaintiffs chiefly argue for application of Nevada law and statutes of limitations (including, in part, by citing largely to Ninth Circuit caselaw),15 operating with the impression that Nevada recognizes the discovery rule in defamation cases. As noted above, the Court sitting in diversity applies New York‘s choice of law rules.
A. Statutes of Limitation
Both New York and Nevada apply the traditional rule which considers statutes of limitation to be matters of procedure rather than substance. See Abbott Laboratories v. Feinberg, 477 F. Supp. 3d 57, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Asian American Ent. Corp., Ltd. v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 324 F. App‘x 567, 568-69 (9th Cir. 2009). This means the Court should apply the relevant statute of limitations of the forum state (i.e., New York‘s statutes of limitation). Abbott Laboratories, 477 F. Supp. 3d at 61. Also, relevant here, New York has a borrowing statute. Under this law, “‘[w]hen a nonresident sues on a cause of action accruing outside New York,
B. Substantive Law
Before analyzing whether the allegations in the Amended Complaint plausibly support any of the causes of actions pled, the Court must determine which law applies. The Court begins by comparing New York and Nevada substantive law in such cases.
To state a prima facie claim for defamation under New York law, “the plaintiff must allege (1) a false statement about the plaintiff; (2) published to a third party without authorization or privilege; (3) through fault amounting to at least negligence on part of the publisher; (4) that either constitutes defamation per se or caused ‘special damages.‘” Gargiulo v. Forster & Garbus Esqs., 651 F. Supp. 2d 188, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Dillon v. City of New York, 704 N.Y.S. 2d 1, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 1999)). Under Nevada law, a plaintiff must prove (1) the defendant made “a false and defamatory statement” in (2) “an unprivileged publication to a third person,” with (3) an applicable level of “fault, amounting to at least
There also appears to be no substantive difference in the law of Nevada and New York with respect to the elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with business relations/prospective business relations, or civil conspiracy.16 Starting with intentional infliction of emotional distress, in New York, to prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must show “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, measured by the reasonable bounds of decency tolerated by society; (2) intent to cause or disregard or a substantial probability of causing severe emotional distress; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) severe emotional distress.” Sorrell v. County of Nassau, 162 F. Supp. 3d 156, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Nevada similarly requires the plaintiff to establish “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct with either the intention of, or reckless disregard for, causing emotional distress, (2) the plaintiff‘s having suffered severe or extreme emotional distress and (3) actual
Likewise, there is no difference in law between New York and Nevada causes of action for tortious interference with business relations/prospective economic advantage. Both require a contractual or prospective contractual relationship between the plaintiff and a third party, knowledge by the defendant of the relationship/prospective relationship, intent to harm the plaintiff by interfering with the relationship, the absence of privilege or justification by the defendant, and actual harm as a result of the defendant‘s conduct. Compare Winter-Wolff Int‘l, Inc. v. Alcan Packaging Food and Tobacco Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 233, 242 & n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) and In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 681, 702 (Nev. 2011).
Finally, neither state recognizes civil conspiracy as an independent cause of action where an underlying tort cannot be maintained. Heilbut v. Cassava Sciences, Inc., 24-cv-05948 (JLR), 2025 WL 919654, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2025); In re. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys. (MERS) Litig., 744 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1027 (D. Ariz. 2010). And the elements of a civil conspiracy are likewise substantially the same. In Nevada, “[a]n actionable civil conspiracy consists of a combination of two or more persons who, by some concerted action, intend to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another, and damages result from the act or acts.” Consolidated Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Nev. 1998); Sternberg v. Warneck, No. 23-cv-01466 (APG) (EJY), 2024 WL 4804826, at *9 (D. Nev. 2024), modified on other grounds, 2025 WL 1489701, at *7 (D. Nev. 2025). To sustain a civil conspiracy theory for liability in New York, a plaintiff “must allege [1] a cognizable cause of action, [2] agreement among the conspirators, [3] an overt act in furtherance of the agreement,
Insofar as there is no significant difference between New York and Nevada law for any of these torts, the Court will apply New York substantive law when analyzing the claims.17
3. Whether Plaintiffs Have Stated Plausible Claims Against Doherty and Pons Under New York Law
Doherty and Pons argue that certain of Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by applicable statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs otherwise fail to state plausible claims.
A. Assault & Battery Claims
The assault and battery claims against Doherty are indisputably time-barred as pleaded. In this case, the New York borrowing statute would apply since the cause of action accrued in Panama. Panama applies a one-year statute of limitations to such claims.
B. Malicious Prosecution
The malicious prosecution claim is also time-barred. New York applies a one-year statute of limitations to malicious prosecution claims.
i. Time-Barred Claims
New York applies a one-year statute of limitations on defamation claims (whether libel or slander).
The Complaint was initially filed in this case on June 27, 2024. Thus, absent any tolling or estoppel, any statements made before June 27, 2023, would be time-barred. Yet by Plaintiff‘s own admission, almost all the allegedly defamatory statements made by Doherty and Pons were made before June 27, 2023. Doherty‘s statements were made on February 12, 2018;
Plaintiffs claim that even if their defamation claims are time-barred, they should receive the benefit of equitable estoppel22 of the relevant statutes of limitations. “Under New York
There are no exceptional circumstances warranting equitable estoppel here. To start, Plaintiffs affirmatively plead that Doherty gave them direct notice of the statements she was making when she joined the Nevada Action. Additionally, there is no showing that Defendants misrepresented or concealed material facts intending that Plaintiffs would act on such misrepresentation or concealment to delay the bringing of this action. Nor can Plaintiffs show, on their pleading, that they relied on conduct of any of the Defendants in delaying bringing this action. Plaintiffs plead that they were aware of rumors about them and were fully aware of the substance of Doherty‘s assertions about them when she joined the Nevada action and plead that they did not bring defamation claims sooner out of concern for Doherty‘s emotional state. Thus, their decision to delay bringing suit was conscious and not based on misrepresentations or concealment of facts by Defendants. Plaintiffs cite to a Ninth Circuit case, Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1995), for the proposition that “the applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine often depends on matters outside the pleadings,” rendering conclusions on equitable tolling inapt to a
ii. Timely Claims
There are only three statements potentially attributable to Doherty or Pons that arguably were made within the year prior to the filing of this action.
First, Plaintiffs contend “Defendants” made defamatory statements about them in 2023 and 2024 to third parties including but not limited to various former employers such as affiliates of YAGP, Cancun Ballet Festival and Master Ballet Academy. (ECF No. 41, at 161 ¶ 534.) Particularly regarding YAGP, Plaintiffs allege that at some point either King-Doherty or Doherty called the Plaintiffs “child predators.” However, these allegations are far too conclusory to state a claim of defamation. Little to no information is provided about the precise statements made, the specific defendant who made the statements or to whom, or the precise dates of the statement.23 See Manolov v. Borough of Manhattan Community College, 952 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Second, they allege Doherty told Sage Humphries that she was raped by both Plaintiffs —
Third, they claim as late as the summer of 2024, “Defendants” made statements “via social media and to former employers that Plaintiffs are going to be ‘locked up.‘” (ECF No. 41, at 167 ¶ 559.)
Plaintiffs assert the following theories of defamation: (1) prima facie defamation; (2) defamation per se; (3) libel per se; and (4) slander per se. As noted above, the Court looks to New York substantive law to evaluate these claims. “Defamation, consisting of the twin torts of libel and slander, is the invasion of the interest in a reputation and good name.” Albert v. Loksen, 239 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally, spoken defamatory words are slander; written defamatory words are libel.” Id. To state a prima facie claim for defamation under New York law, “the plaintiff must allege (1) a false statement about the plaintiff; (2) published to a third party without authorization or privilege; (3) through fault amounting to at least negligence on part of the publisher; (4) that either constitutes defamation per se or caused ‘special damages.‘” Gargiulo v. Forster & Garbus Esqs., 651 F. Supp. 2d 188, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Dillon v. City of New York, 704 N.Y.S. 2d 1, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 1999)). New York courts encourage the resolution of “defamation
“The elements of a cause of action for slander under New York law are (i) a defamatory statement of fact, (ii) that is false, (iii) published to a third party, (iv) ‘of and concerning’ the plaintiff, (v) made with the applicable level of fault on the part of the speaker, (vi) either causing special harm or constituting slander per se, and (vii) not protected by privilege.” Albert, 239 F.3d at 265-66. “‘Special harm’ means ‘the loss of something having economic or pecuniary value.‘” Id. at 271 (citing Liberman v. Gelstein, 605 N.E.2d 344, 347 (N.Y. 1992)) (cleaned up). “The four categories of statements that have historically constituted slander per se in New York are those that (i) charge the plaintiff with a serious crime; (ii) tend to injure the plaintiff in his or her trade, business or profession; (iii) imply that the plaintiff has a loathsome disease; or (iv) impute unchastity to a woman.” Id. (citing Liberman, 605 N.E.2d at 347).24
To show a cause of action for libel, a plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) the defendant made “a written defamatory statement of fact concerning the plaintiff,” which they (2) published to a third party, with (3) “fault,” meaning negligence regarding the truth of the statement (or, under certain circumstances, actual malice regarding its falsity); (4) “the falsity of the defamatory statement“; and (5) “special damages or per se actionability.” Celle v. Filipino Rep. Enters. Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir. 2000). Where a plaintiff is a “public figure,” the heightened standard of “actual malice” applies. Goldfarb v. Channel One Russia, 663 F. Supp. 3d 280, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). “Actual malice” involves “acting ‘with knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.‘” Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)). Libel per se involves a libelous statement where the “defamatory meaning” is plain on the face of the statement itself, as opposed to those statements which are defamatory only with reference to extrinsic facts. Id. at 300.
Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim on the two remaining categories of allegedly defamatory statements. First, even assuming the truth of the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the statement that the Plaintiffs would soon be “locked up” is a statement of opinion. Statements of opinion are not actionable in defamation cases. Hammer v. Amazon.com, 392 F. Supp. 2d 423, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Here, the statement that the Plaintiffs would soon be “locked up” is plainly understood as a hope for the Plaintiffs to face criminal sanctions for the conduct alleged by Humphries, Doherty, and others. Regardless of whether they were facing criminal charges, it was not a statement capable of being proven false.
Second, the alleged statement to Humphries (which is only considered timely granting an extremely favorable inference to Plaintiffs) fails as a matter of law because the Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege actual malice. The New York Anti-Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (“Anti-SLAPP“) statute,
Here, Plaintiffs are attempting to obtain money damages against Doherty because she joined a lawsuit and spoke on a matter of public concern (i.e., alleged sexual abuse in the dance world). That the matter of what happened between Plaintiffs and Doherty is a matter of public concern cannot be meaningfully debated. Indeed, Plaintiffs admit as much in their Amended Complaint, which is replete with allegations that they are world-renowned artists working in the dance industry (including Taylor, who was Dusty‘s photographer), with nearly half a million social media followers each. They state that the abuse allegations against them were published in a number of high-profile publications. They expressly connect the allegations against them to the movement referred to as #MeToo. (ECF No. 41, at 20 ¶ 19.) Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court is constrained to the inference that Doherty shared her rape/sexual assault allegation with Humphries in connection with joining the Nevada Action and sharing her experience in Panama. Indeed, the Amended Complaint repeatedly insists that Doherty and Humphries were closely coordinating their litigation efforts in Nevada. Thus, it is apparent from the pleading in this case that this statement was made in connection with “public petition and participation” and relates to “lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest.”
To reiterate, bald assertions and conclusions of law are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Manolov, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 531 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Indeed, courts will typically assess “actual malice from objective facts.” Celle, 209 F.3d at 183. While the Complaint is replete with conclusory assertions that Doherty acted with actual malice, there are no facts pleaded to support those assertions. There is nothing inherently improbable about her story, and her source is her firsthand knowledge of the situation and her relationship with the Plaintiffs. While it is true that she voluntarily withdrew her claims in the Nevada Action against the Plaintiffs, the withdrawal by itself is not cause to conclude that she knew or should have known her claims were meritless. As a result, the defamation claims should be dismissed.
b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The New York statute of limitations on IIED claims is one year.
Under New York law, to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must show “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, measured by the reasonable bounds of decency tolerated by society; (2) intent to cause or disregard or a substantial probability of causing severe emotional distress; (3) a causal connection between the conduct
Moreover, neither of the statements as pleaded qualifies as “extreme and outrageous;” nor have Plaintiffs pleaded the requisite level of intent to cause severe emotional distress. New York law requires a much greater showing of outrageous or atrocious conduct than mere statements of sexual assault allegations to support a claim of IIED. See Sylvester v. City of New York, 385 F. Supp. 2d 431, 441-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting “[a]llegedly lying about the circumstances surrounding [a man shot by police] does not rise to the level of” an IIED claim); see also Kurschus v. PaineWebber, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 386, 389-91, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (sustaining an IIED claim where defendants had allegedly orchestrated a sophisticated scheme not only to accuse plaintiff, falsely, of sex crimes but to have him actually arrested and charged with sodomy, resulting in his being abused by officers and inmates while in detention, with the charge ultimately dropped by a grand jury). Thus, the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim should be dismissed.
c. Tortious Interference with Business Relations
Plaintiffs’ claim for tortious interference with business relations wholly duplicates the
New York does not recognize an independent cause of action for civil conspiracy; rather, it recognizes civil conspiracy only as a theory of liability to connect Defendants. Heilbut v. Cassava Sciences, Inc., 24-cv-05948 (JLR), 2025 WL 919654, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2025). Thus, the claim should be dismissed for this reason. Further, to sustain a civil conspiracy theory for liability, a plaintiff “must allege [1] a cognizable cause of action, [2] agreement among the conspirators, [3] an overt act in furtherance of the agreement, [4] intentional participation by the conspirators in furtherance of a plan or purpose, and [5] damages.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations of conspiracy are wholly insufficient to support such a theory against Doherty or Pons. Therefore, this clam should be dismissed.
e. Leave to Amend
Pursuant to
While it is true that Plaintiffs have already had the opportunity to amend after multiple opportunities to review the sufficiency of their allegations, this is the first such opportunity
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends that the motions at ECF Nos. 42 and 46 be granted and the Amended Complaint be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice as to the assault, battery, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy claims, and otherwise without prejudice.
Dated: July 30, 2025
New York, New York
Respectfully submitted,
Katharine H. Parker
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Plaintiffs shall have seventeen days and Defendants shall have fourteen days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to
Plaintiffs shall have seventeen days to serve and file any response. Defendant shall have fourteen days to serve and file any response. Any objections and any responses to such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable John P. Cronan at the United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007-1312, and served on the other parties. See