Button v. Doherty
1:24-cv-05026
S.D.N.Y.Jul 31, 2025Background
- Plaintiffs Dusty and Mitchell Taylor Button, formerly prominent in the dance world, sued Juliet Doherty (a dancer), her mother Krista King-Doherty, and photographer Luis Pons, alleging a conspiracy to defame them and destroy their reputations/careers after sexual abuse allegations.
- The alleged defamatory conduct largely arose from the Buttons' 2018 trip to Panama and Juliet Doherty’s later participation in the high-profile Nevada Action, in which multiple dancers accused the Buttons of sexual abuse (allegations the Buttons deny).
- Plaintiffs asserted claims for assault, battery, breach of duty, and malicious prosecution against Doherty, and claims for defamation, tortious interference with business relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and civil conspiracy against all three defendants.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (as to King-Doherty), failure to state a claim, and on statute of limitations grounds; Pons and Doherty also sought dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The court found most allegedly actionable statements and conduct occurred well before June 2023 (the 1-year limitations threshold under NY law for torts/defamation), or were otherwise immune (e.g., pertinent court filings), and held that New York law and its limitations applied to the bulk of the claims.
- The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of all claims: some with prejudice (time-barred, not legally cognizable), others without prejudice (for failure to state a timely claim or lack of sufficient facts).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal Jurisdiction over King-Doherty | King-Doherty had sufficient NY contacts for jurisdiction (including YAGP communications) | No specific or continuous contacts with NY to establish jurisdiction | No personal jurisdiction; claims dismissed |
| Statute of Limitations – Defamation | Accrual should be from discovery; claims timely via equitable estoppel | NY's 1-year statute applies from first publication; no basis for tolling or estoppel | Most defamation claims time-barred; no tolling or estoppel |
| Substantiation of Defamation/IIED | Statements were false, malicious, and intended to, or did, cause business damages | Statements were either time-barred, nonactionable opinion, or lacked allegations of actual malice | Dismissed; not plausible under NY law, actual malice not pled |
| Duplicative and Non-Cognizable Claims | Separate claims for IIED, tortious interference, civil conspiracy are valid | Claims are duplicative of defamation or not recognized under NY law (e.g., standalone conspiracy) | Dismissed; duplicative or not legally cognizable |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading standard, factual content requirement)
- N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (actual malice requirement for public concern/public figure defamation)
- Celle v. Filipino Rep. Enters. Inc., 209 F.3d 163 (elements of libel under NY law)
- Goldfarb v. Channel One Russia, 663 F. Supp. 3d 280 (actual malice and public figure issue for defamation)
- Gargiulo v. Forster & Garbus Esqs., 651 F. Supp. 2d 188 (NY defamation elements)
- Albert v. Loksen, 239 F.3d 256 (difference between libel/slander per se, elements in NY)
- Sorrell v. County of Nassau, 162 F. Supp. 3d 156 (elements of IIED in NY)