Brian King v. The City of Crestwood, Missouri; John Newsham, in his official capacity, City of Crestwood Municipal Court Judge
No. 16-4560
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
Submitted: December 13, 2017 Filed: August 13, 2018
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Brian King sued the City of Crestwood, Missouri (“City“) after successfully defending himself in its municipal court against a charge that he violated an ordinance. Following the dismissal of the charge, Municipal Judge John Newsham (“Judge Newsham“), who presided over the matter, denied King‘s motion for costs and attorney‘s fees incurred in his defense. King sought redress by filing suit under
I. Background
In April 2013, King visited a bowling alley in Crestwood, a municipality located in St. Louis County. At closing time, several inebriated patrons became rowdy, and a fight involving two people ensued. King intervened, stopping the fight by drawing a gun. When police arrived, they brought the situation under control but made no arrests.
Several months later, the City filed an amended information in the Municipal Court of Crestwood, Missouri.2 It charged King with violating Crestwood Municipal Code § 16.12, the City‘s disorderly conduct ordinance, and stated, “Upon information and belief, Defendant inserted himself into the altercation and, at some point, drew his firearm. Upon information and belief, Defendant pointed his firearm at [one of the combatants].” Complaint at 7, King v. City of Crestwood, Missouri, No. 4:16-cv-01383-AGF (E.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2016), ECF
King filed an answer in which he pleaded not guilty and, relying on
After a bench trial, Judge Newsham found King not guilty of the charged violation. However, Judge Newsham did not expressly rule on King‘s affirmative defense. Several months later, King filed a motion pursuant to
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 563.016, a person who uses force as described in sections 563.031, 563.041, 563.046, 563.051, 563.056, and 563.061 is justified in using such force and such fact shall be an absolute defense to criminal prosecution or civil liability.
2. The court shall award attorney‘s fees, court costs, and all reasonable expenses incurred by the defendant in defense of any civil action brought by a plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant has an absolute defense as provided in subsection 1 of this section.
Judge Newsham subsequently held that the court did not have jurisdiction over King‘s petition for the fees and costs incurred in mounting his justification defense. He analogized King‘s case to Bright v. Mollenkamp, 482 S.W.3d 467 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). The Bright court held that municipal courts lack jurisdiction to decide a petition for expungement. Id. at 468. In reaching that conclusion, the court considered municipal courts’ status as divisions of circuit courts and that their jurisdiction is limited to ordinance violations. Id. at 468-69.
Instead of appealing the decision of the municipal court within the state court system, King filed this case in federal court. King alleged that the City and Judge Newsham, in his official capacity, violated his federal due process rights by not granting him attorney‘s fees, costs, and expenses available under state law. Count 1 alleged that Judge Newsham‘s order “establish[ed] a policy of ‘no jurisdiction’ to award costs and attorney fees under Missouri ‘Justification’ statutes” and sought the costs and fees that he requested from the municipal court, $250,000 in damages, and a declaration that the “policy” is “unconstitutional and void.” Complaint at 13. Count 2 sought a
[j]udgment declaring Judge Newsham‘s Order of June 2, 2016 unconstitutional and void; that any and all judicial policies, practices, and customs purporting to avoid jurisdiction over “Justification” defenses arising out [of] the Federal and Missouri Constitution, statutes, rules, ordinances, and case law are Unconstitutional in violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, together with any further relief and remedy allowed by law or equity.
King prays Judgment of damages from Judge News[ham], jointly and severally with Crestwood, as in COUNT 1, acknowledging the District Court is obliged to follow the law of “judicial immunity” as expressed in Pierson v. Ray [, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)], while King advances his appeal that that decision be reviewed.
Complaint at 17-18 (italics added).
The defendants moved to dismiss. They argued: (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine;3 (2) the municipal judge‘s order was not a statement of policy of the City of Crestwood; (3) the claim against Judge Newsham is redundant to the claim against the city; (4) Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity barred the suit; and (5) King failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss on the basis that King had failed to identify a municipal policy. The court noted that
II. Discussion
We review de novo a district court‘s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In re K-tel Int‘l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2001). We affirm the district court‘s holding that no municipal liability under
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “recognizes that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.” [Lemonds v. St. Louis Cty., 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000)]. The doctrine precludes district courts from obtaining jurisdiction both over the rare case styled as a direct appeal, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923), as well as more common claims which are “inextricably intertwined” with state court decisions. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983). The doctrine has its foundation in the Supreme Court‘s appellate jurisdiction statute, as well as a “concern[] with federalism and the proper delineation of the power of the lower federal courts.” Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 495;
28 U.S.C. § 1257 .Simes v. Huckabee, 354 F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 2004) (second alteration in original).
In the usual case, we are obligated to resolve an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a claim. Edwards v. City of Jonesboro, 645 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-97 (1998)). However, we have stated that a court may bypass a “murky” Rooker-Feldman issue to dispose of a case on preclusion grounds “because our inquiries under preclusion law and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine ... overlap.” In re Athens/Alpha Gas Corp., 715 F.3d 230, 235 (8th Cir. 2013). The district court cited Athens/Alpha as justification for avoiding a Rooker-Feldman analysis and moving directly to the merits of King‘s claims. However, Athens/Alpha considered dispositive preclusion questions, not more general merits questions. See Nw. Title Agency, Inc. v. Minn. Dep‘t of Commerce, 685 F. App‘x 503, 504-05 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“[W]e have previously concluded that it is ‘permissible to bypass Rooker-Feldman to reach a preclusion question that disposes of a case.’ (quoting Athens/Alpha, 715 F.3d at 235)). Nonetheless, we think the principle announced in that case is applicable to the facts here.
In Athens/Alpha, we interpreted Steel Co. as allowing “a federal court [to] reach a merits question before deciding a statutory standing question.” Athens/Alpha, 715 F.3d at 235 (citation omitted). Noting that Rooker-Feldman is a matter of statutory, and not Article III, standing, and Rooker-Feldman and preclusion questions are analyzed similarly, we stated that courts could circumvent the former to dispose of a case on the latter. Id. (“We therefore agree with the courts that have deemed it permissible to bypass Rooker-Feldman to reach a preclusion question that disposes of a case.” (citations omitted)). We recognized that this “rationale
Whether Rooker-Feldman applies to the instant case is somewhat “murky.” However, we are satisfied that the rationale of Athens/Alpha that allows us to consider a preclusion claim before a Rooker-Feldman claim may apply in similar circumstances where the merits easily result in dismissal. Accordingly, we conclude that it is reasonable to bypass Rooker-Feldman applicability and consider the merits of King‘s claim.4
B. Municipal Liability
The district court correctly held that King‘s failure to identify a municipal policy warranted dismissal. We stated in Granda, the case upon which the district court relied, that
[a] claim brought against a municipality under
§ 1983 is sustainable only if a constitutional violation has been committed pursuant to an official custom, policy, or practice of the city, see Monell v. N.Y. City Dep‘t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Williams v. Butler, 863 F.2d 1398, 1400 (8th Cir. 1988), or is so pervasive among non policymaking employees of the municipality so “as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590, 603 (8th Cir. 2003). Although a single act of a city official “whose acts or edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy” may give rise to municipal liability under§ 1983 , Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, a municipality will only be liable under§ 1983 , where a city official “responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question” makes a deliberate choice among competing alternatives that results in the violation of constitutional rights. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986).
In Granda, Fayette Granda, a truant student‘s mother, was jailed by Municipal Judge Bettye Battle-Turner (“Judge Turner“), who presided over St. Louis, Missouri‘s truancy docket. Id. at 566. Granda sued the city and Judge Turner, arguing that her incarceration violated her due
Granda appealed, and we affirmed. We reasoned that the municipal court is a division of a state court system subject to review within that system, and Judge Turner‘s action was a judicial decision, not a policy decision of the city:
Judge Turner‘s order was a judicial decision made in a case that came before her on a court docket, and Granda does not appeal the district court‘s holding that the judge was entitled to judicial immunity. Granda fails to cite a single case where a municipality has been held liable for such a decision. We conclude that the judicial order incarcerating Granda was not a final policy decision of a type creating municipal liability under
§ 1983 .
Id. at 569. There is no meaningful difference between the order challenged here and the order challenged in Granda.
“The municipal court is a division of the state circuit court, and review of a judge‘s decisions is to be sought in that court.” Id. Therefore, Judge Newsham‘s order is “a judicial decision that is subject to review or reversal by higher state courts.” Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (“[T]he authority to make municipal policy is necessarily the authority to make final policy.“); Butler, 863 F.2d at 1398 (holding city liable under
Our conclusion is in accord with those of other courts. See, e.g., Mackey v. Helfrich, 442 F. App‘x 948, 950 (5th Cir. 2011) (“A county judge acting in his judicial capacity to enforce state law does not act as a municipal official or lawmaker. Only with respect to actions taken pursuant to his administrative role can a judge be said to institute municipal policy.” (citation omitted)); Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases and holding that a municipal judge who allowed his clerk to sign warrants on his behalf even though he had not reviewed them was not a promulgator of municipal policy); El-Amin v. Downs, 272 F. Supp. 3d 147, 152 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Plaintiff‘s [§ 1983] claim against the District rests on the erroneous premise that the decision rendered by the presiding judge at his criminal trial constituted policymaking.“); Bliven v. Hunt, 478 F. Supp. 2d 332, 337 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (collecting cases).
King‘s arguments in opposition are unpersuasive. For instance, he states that under
King also discusses at length legislative amendments to
Finally, King suggests that even if the complained-of conduct does not constitute a policy, it is representative of an unconstitutional custom. He points, for example, to the fact that the City‘s municipal court‘s disposition forms do not have a field for awarding costs to a defendant. However, no due process violation is present “if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Clark, 375 F.3d at 702 (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533). As discussed above, King could have sought a trial de novo in a circuit court. He might also have simply been able to re-file the petition in that court as a new case. See Mollenkamp, 482 S.W.3d at 469 (“Instead of filing in the Municipal Division, Appellant must file his petition for expungement in the circuit court in which the Municipal Division is located. Municipal courts are a division of the circuit courts.“). The availability of further process within the state court system defeats this claim.
Judge Newsham‘s handling of King‘s case does not present a final policy or custom that can give rise to a
C. Pendent State Claim
Finally, King argues that if we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of his federal claims, we should remand to the district court to either adjudicate or dismiss without prejudice his pendent state law claim:
[I]f for any reason the Court is unpersuaded, then at least remand to the district court to make plain that King‘s unlitigated, unresolved pending state claim set forth in his Verified Motion for attorneys fees, be separately identified and either adjudicated by the district
court as a pendent state claim, or dismissed without prejudice.
Appellant‘s Br. at 40 (citation omitted).
A district court‘s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Miller, 821 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting Johnson v. City of Shorewood, Minn., 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2004)). On this record, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.
III. Conclusion
We affirm.