BP AMERICA, INCORPORATED; BP CORPORATION NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED; BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY; BP ENERGY COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
No. 16-60604 CONSOLIDATED WITH No. 21-60083
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
October 20, 2022
Agency Nos. IN13-15-000, IN13-15-001, IN13-15-002
Petitions for Review of Orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Before JOLLY, WILLETT, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.
Hurricane Ike made landfall over southeastern Texas on September 13, 2008. Although more than a decade has elapsed since the hurricane‘s passage, there yet remains some legal rubble for this court to clear.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has brought this enforcement action against BP, alleging the company capitalized on the hurricane-induced chaos in commodities markets by devising a scheme to manipulate the market for natural gas.1 Now, years later, BP seeks judicial review of FERC‘s order finding that BP engaged in market manipulation and imposing a $20 million civil penalty.
BP makes a bevy of arguments as to why FERC‘s order should be overturned, but all are meritless save one. Contrary to FERC‘s position, we hold that the Commission has jurisdiction only over transactions in interstate natural gas directly regulated by the Natural Gas Act (NGA). Specifically, we reject FERC‘s broader theory that its authority to address market manipulation extends to any natural gas transaction which affects the price of a transaction under the NGA. Otherwise, however, we uphold the Commission‘s order. Nevertheless, because FERC predicated its penalty assessment on its erroneous position that it had jurisdiction over all (and not just some) of BP‘s transactions, we must remand for reassessment of the penalty in the light of our jurisdictional holding. Thus, we GRANT in part and DENY in part BP‘s petition for review and REMAND to the agency for reassessment of the penalty.
I
A
To understand BP‘s scheme, some background on the natural gas industry is necessary. In addition to producing and selling their own oil and gas, participants in the natural gas market are permitted to engage in a variety of trades. In general, traders may make either “physical” or “financial” transactions. Physical trading involves the purchase or sale of actual natural
Shortly before Hurricane Ike arrived, traders on BP‘s Texas team had amassed a significant financial position known as a “spread.” The value of this spread position was determined by the difference in natural gas prices at Henry Hub, a major natural gas market in Louisiana frequently used as a national benchmark, and Houston Ship Channel (HSC), a gas hub in Houston. When gas prices at Henry Hub were higher than those at HSC, BP‘s financial position became more valuable; the greater the difference, the more money BP stood to make.
When the hurricane hit, natural gas prices at HSC plummeted, causing BP to realize a sizeable profit. And amidst the tumult in the market, BP spied an opportunity; the company would make millions more if the price differential between HSC and Henry Hub persisted after the hurricane became history. According to FERC, BP capitalized on this opportunity by engaging in a glut of physical gas sales at HSC, intending to depress the prices on which the value of its financial position depended. BP‘s task was eased by the fact that it did not need to cause a sudden spike or dip in prices—a change which would have been easily detected by regulators—but only needed to delay the market‘s return to normal following the hurricane.
Central to BP‘s plan was the Houston Pipeline (HPL). The HPL connects HSC to Katy, another natural gas hub approximately thirty miles away. BP had purchased the right to transport a certain amount of natural gas on the HPL per day in order to satisfy its various business needs, but the pipeline was generally underutilized. BP thus allowed its Texas trading desk to engage in arbitrage using the HPL; when there was a price difference between Katy and HSC, traders could transport gas accordingly between the two to make a profit while incurring only minor transportation costs. According to FERC, however, BP traders effectively abandoned their arbitrage strategy after the hurricane, instead using the HPL to transport significant quantities of natural gas from Katy to HSC, thereby lowering prices at the latter. Although BP incurred some losses in its physical trading by buying at Katy and selling at HSC regardless of whether it was economical to do so, these losses were dwarfed by the increase in value to BP‘s financial position. Access to transportation capacity on the HPL was therefore essential to the BP traders’ scheme.2
The Texas trading desk‘s machinations went undetected until November 5, 2008. On that day, Clayton Luskie, a junior member of the Texas team, was attending a BP assessment program designed to determine whether aspiring traders were qualified for advancement in the company. While there, Luskie described the team‘s trading strategy to a member of BP‘s senior management, who became concerned that what Luskie had described “could be perceived as market manipulation.” Alarmed, Luskie called Gradyn Comfort, a senior member of the Texas team and primary trader in charge of transactions at Katy and HSC. Because Luskie called Comfort at his trading desk, BP recorded
LUSKIE: So I was telling [the senior BP executive] how we, you know, what we are doing at Ship Channel this month. And you know, he just started asking me about, you know, what, kind of what we do and strategy and what not. And I was telling him about our HPL transport. And the way I explained it was not very good. And I came off sounding like we either transport or don‘t transport solely on the kind of how we think it‘s going to affect the index and help our paper position. Which as I was explaining, I realized that‘s not right and that‘s the exact same thing that we‘re sort of accusing [a rival company] of currently. So how would you explain our dealings on HPL and with our paper position that don‘t make it sound like we‘re—
COMFORT: [Interposing] Clayton, Clayton—
LUSKIE: —manipulating the index.
COMFORT: Clayton.
LUSKIE: Yeah.
COMFORT: I think . . .
[Fifteen second pause]
COMFORT: Most of the time we ship economically.
LUSKIE: Right.
COMFORT: And the—
LUSKIE: [Interposing] I mean, it‘s just that we‘re not—
COMFORT: [Interposing] Clayton, Clayton.
LUSKIE: Yeah.
[Ten second pause]
COMFORT: You know, the—there‘s times we can‘t unwind all of our positions, but most of the time we tend to ship economically.
LUSKIE: Right.
COMFORT: Okay?
LUSKIE: Is it just that we‘re not—
COMFORT: [Interposing] Clayton.
[Fifteen second pause]
COMFORT: And then . . . the aspects that go into cash I think are multiple. And . . .
[Fifteen second pause]
COMFORT: Just give me a second here, okay?
LUSKIE: Yeah.
[Pause]
LUSKIE: Hey, I tell you what, I need to actually, I need to run.
COMFORT: Yeah.
LUSKIE: Can I call you back?
COMFORT: Yeah, that would be a good idea.
LUSKIE: Okay.
COMFORT: Okay, thanks.
Despite claiming that that he “need[ed] to run,” Luskie called Comfort back on Comfort‘s unrecorded cell phone less than one minute later. Comfort did not answer but returned the call two minutes later. Comfort and Luskie then had two unrecorded cell phone conversations lasting nine and ten minutes, respectively. Neither party was able to recall with specificity what was discussed during those phone conversations. In the last such conversation, however, Luskie and Comfort decided to report the initial, recorded phone conversation to BP‘s internal compliance team, which led FERC to initiate an investigation and which culminated in this enforcement proceeding.3
B
Following several years of discovery and administrative proceedings, FERC issued its decision. See BP Am., Inc., 156 FERC 61,031 (2016). In its decision, the Commission compared BP‘s natural gas trades during the Investigative Period—from September 18 to November 30, 2008—to its trading during the prior portion of 2008. FERC found that, following Hurricane Ike, BP changed its trading behavior at HSC by selling more natural gas, selling earlier in the day, selling at lower prices, and transporting more gas from Katy to HSC even when doing so was unprofitable. Viewing these changes together with the phone calls already discussed, FERC concluded that BP had engaged in market manipulation and ordered BP to pay a civil penalty of approximately $20 million. BP petitioned this court for review of FERC‘s order but agreed to stay the case pending the Commission‘s decision on BP‘s request for rehearing. In December 2020, FERC issued its order on rehearing, which modified portions of FERC‘s jurisdictional holdings but otherwise upheld its previous decision and penalty. See BP Am., Inc., 173 FERC 61,239 (2020). BP brought another petition for review, which was consolidated with the previous case. These petitions are now properly before us and are ripe for our review.4
II
We review FERC‘s order under the standards established by the Administrative Procedure Act,
The agency‘s factual findings and conclusions will be upheld unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence.
III
BP raises a number of issues to challenge FERC‘s order. First, BP argues that FERC did not have jurisdiction over its conduct because (1) FERC‘s jurisdiction extends only to interstate activity and (2) none of the transactions at issue were transactions in interstate gas regulated under the Natural Gas Act. Second, BP asserts that it did not engage in market manipulation and that FERC‘s conclusion to the contrary was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. Third, BP contends that, even if it did engage in market manipulation, various errors
A
We begin by addressing whether FERC had jurisdiction over the allegedly manipulative transactions.
1
The Natural Gas Act forms the cornerstone of FERC‘s regulatory power over the natural gas market. The foundational principle limiting that power is found in section 1(b) of the Act, which provides that:
The provisions of [the NGA] shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale . . . and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, and to the importation or exportation of natural gas in foreign commerce and to persons engaged in such importation or exportation, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas . . . or to the production or gathering of natural gas.
This statutory scheme, as originally enacted, eventually resulted in a fragmented natural gas market, with much gas sequestered away in disparate intrastate markets and unable to cross state lines without being subjected to NGA regulations. Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 899 F.2d 1250, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Congress responded by passing the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA). Id. The NGPA permitted interstate pipelines to transport gas “on behalf of” intrastate pipelines without subjecting the intrastate pipeline or other downstream recipients of the gas to the full ambit of NGA regulations, thus helping to integrate the interstate and intrastate markets.
Finally, in response to widespread reports of price manipulation in western energy markets, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 381-82 (2015). Among other provisions, the Act amended the NGA by adding section 4A, which contains the anti-manipulation provision forming the basis of this case. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 315, § 4A, 119 Stat. 594, 691 (codified at
It shall be unlawful for any entity, directly or indirectly, to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of natural gas or the purchase or sale of transportation services subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance (as those terms are used in [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934]) in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary in the public interest or for the protection of natural gas ratepayers.
2
FERC does not contend that all of the transactions that were part of BP‘s manipulative scheme were interstate transactions directly subject to the NGA. Instead, the Commission argues that the anti-manipulation provision creates a new and independent source of jurisdiction for FERC to spread its wings. Pointing out that the statute above forbids manipulation by “any entity” “in connection with” a jurisdictional transaction, FERC argues that it has jurisdiction over any natural gas transaction that is part of manipulative scheme, so long as that scheme affects the price of an NGA-jurisdictional transaction.
i
We first observe that, in interpreting statutes, it is seldom appropriate to seize on single words or phrases; instead, statutory interpretation requires consideration of the statutory scheme as an integrated whole. Context provided by surrounding language or statutory provisions can illuminate the meaning of an otherwise cryptic passage. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“[A] reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation.“). Our first look is therefore to section 1(b) of the NGA, which establishes a basic dichotomy: FERC is given power over “the transportation [or sale] of natural gas in interstate commerce,” but the provisions of the NGA “shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas,” including intrastate transportation and sales.
ii
Nevertheless, FERC argues that this long-established partition between intrastate and interstate transactions was nullified for purposes of the anti-manipulation rule. More specifically, FERC argues that BP‘s scheme—even if conducted using only intrastate trades—was, in the words of the anti-manipulation provision, “in connection with” interstate, NGA transactions because it affected the price of those transactions.5
iii
Precedent confirms our understanding of the text. In Texas Pipeline Ass‘n v. FERC, 661 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2011), we considered a similar jurisdictional issue. In that case, FERC asserted that an amendment to the NGA had given it a new and separate “transparency authority” not constrained by the jurisdictional limitations of section 1(b).
Furthermore, we have previously noted that “where Congress has decided to expand FERC‘s jurisdiction, it has done so explicitly and unambiguously.” Id. at 263-64. In both Texas Pipeline and this case, the new rule that purportedly expanded FERC‘s jurisdiction was added to the NGA by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
Finally, the Supreme Court has indicated that language similar to that found in the anti-manipulation provision incorporates the NGA‘s jurisdictional provisions. In Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., the Court examined a provision authorizing FERC to adjust “any rate, charge, or classification . . . collected by any natural-gas company in connection with any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. Oneok, 575 U.S. at 378 (emphasis removed) (quoting
Thus, our textual analysis and relevant precedent compel the conclusion that the Commission cannot exercise its jurisdiction merely because a manipulative scheme may affect the prices of interstate natural gas trades.6
3
Although we reject its broader jurisdictional claim, FERC asserts as an alternative basis for its jurisdiction that several of BP‘s natural gas sales made as part of its manipulative scheme were, in fact, transactions in interstate gas directly regulated under the NGA. Although FERC does not assert that any of BP‘s transactions directly involved the purchase or transportation of natural gas across state lines, the Commission convincingly points to its long-held position—which BP does not challenge here—that once gas is sold or transported in interstate commerce, it remains interstate gas thereafter. See Westar Transmission Co., 43 FERC 61,050, 61,141 n.12 (1988). Stated differently, once gas is sold or transported in a transaction subject to NGA regulations, all subsequent transactions, whether interstate or intrastate, are controlled by the NGA.
BP does not dispute that the natural gas it sold had been transported under a contract
We review for substantial evidence FERC‘s finding that the contracts in the eighteen disputed transactions were governed by the NGA.9 On this record, we can but conclude that the Commission‘s finding that the NGA controlled was supported by substantial evidence. One after-the-fact, undetailed spreadsheet containing little more than an unexplained assertion that the contract was under the NGPA does not overcome the unambiguous language on the face of the contract to the contrary. And while BP asserts that the drafter of the contract simply did not have a template for NGPA transactions, BP points to no evidence of this in the record before us other than the company‘s own assertions of the same before the Commission. Even assuming the accuracy of BP‘s representation, FERC reasonably concluded that, had the parties intended an NGPA contract, they could have created a new template or otherwise modified the contractual language. Substantial
evidence does not require even a preponderance of the evidence, but instead demands that the agency produce “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620 (quoting Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 229) (quotation marks omitted). FERC has carried its burden here. It was reasonable to take the language in the contract at face value. The Commission thus had substantial evidence to conclude that the disputed natural gas was transported under an NGA contract, meaning that FERC had jurisdiction over the eighteen later transactions in which BP sold the same gas. We therefore uphold FERC‘s assertion of jurisdiction over those eighteen of BP‘s sales.10
B
We move on to consider FERC‘s finding that BP engaged in market manipulation. Although BP gives various reasons for us to find that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously or without the support of substantial evidence, we find that BP‘s contentions ultimately amount to disagreements with FERC‘s permissible interpretations of the evidence and reasonable resolution of conflicting expert testimony. We address BP‘s principal arguments in turn.11
First, BP claims that FERC‘s selection of the Pre-Investigative Period failed to account for seasonal changes in the natural gas market.12 Yet FERC‘s witnesses testified that some trading behaviors, such as transportation between Katy and HSC, depended not on seasonal factors but solely on price differences between the two hubs. Moreover, FERC tried using alternative comparator periods and found essentially the same results: during the Investigative Period, BP sold more, sold earlier, and transported more gas to HSC. We therefore cannot accept BP‘s seasonality arguments.
Next, BP challenges FERC‘s findings concerning its increased sales at HSC. Though BP does not deny that, by volume, it sold more natural gas at HSC during the Investigative Period, it argues that this fact is the blameless result of having more gas to sell under its monthly contracts.13
BP further challenges FERC‘s conclusion that BP traded earlier in the day as part of its manipulative scheme. BP first states that there is no evidence early trades have any manipulative effect and goes on to argue that, in any event, its Investigative Period trades were no earlier than normal. The first contention is directly contradicted by the record; FERC‘s expert testified that early trades send pricing signals to other market participants and may affect other transactions throughout the day. As to the second contention, while BP‘s expert indicated that the company‘s transactions were not particularly early during the Investigative Period, FERC correctly points out that this result was reached only by combining sales and purchases. Disaggregating sales from purchases shows that BP was an early seller at HSC and early buyer at Katy. Given that FERC‘s core allegation of wrongdoing was that BP bought gas at Katy to sell and deflate prices at HSC, we find it reasonable for the Commission to have accepted its own expert‘s testimony. See La. Crawfish Producers Ass‘n-W. v. Rowan, 463 F.3d 352, 356 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n agency may rely on its own experts, so long as they are qualified and express a reasonable opinion.“).
BP also objects to FERC‘s transport analysis, which found that the company transported gas from Katy to HSC even when it was uneconomic to do so. More specifically, the analysis showed that there was a statistically significant relationship between BP‘s transport decisions and the price differential at Katy and HSC during the Pre-Investigative Period; BP became indifferent to this price spread, however, during the Investigative Period. BP says that FERC improperly used the end-of-day average prices at HSC and Katy, rather than intraday prices, pointing out that its traders could not make transport decisions during the trading day based on the end-of-day average price. But we think that FERC‘s choice of metric was reasonable, both because end-of-day prices tend to track intraday prices and because the Commission was comparing prices to the total flow of natural gas—a figure which itself represents the sum of transportation decisions throughout the trading day.
Finally, we cannot accept BP‘s argument that the Commission failed to establish intent to manipulate the market. FERC showed that BP changed its behavior by transporting more natural gas to HSC, selling more, and selling at a time calculated to maximally influence market prices. There is nothing arbitrary and capricious in FERC‘s technical analysis or reasoning. Furthermore, the suspicious nature of BP‘s trading patterns is accentuated by the interactions between Gradyn Comfort and Clayton Luskie. During a recorded phone conversation, Comfort repeatedly interrupted Luskie‘s line of inquiry, which cast doubt on the team‘s trading strategy, and took several extended pauses as he ineffectively cast about for a convincing answer. Luskie then terminated the call by saying that he “need[ed] to run” but called Comfort back on an unrecorded line almost immediately thereafter, and neither party could remember what was
conversations with specificity. It is certainly reasonable to conclude that Comfort had an awareness that his scheme was illicit and sought to prevent incriminating information from being revealed on a recorded call, and Luskie eventually realized this and endeavored to circumvent the recording. Given the incriminating call and the suspect details of BP‘s actual trading, FERC‘s finding of market manipulation is supported by substantial evidence. We therefore affirm FERC‘s finding that BP violated the anti-manipulation rule.14
C
We now turn to the Commission‘s penalty assessment. The parties dispute whether FERC‘s penalty was arbitrary and capricious. But many of the issues pertinent to determining an appropriate penalty, such as the proper calculation of profits and market harm, are ill-suited to our resolution given our holding that FERC has jurisdiction only over some of BP‘s transactions. The appropriate course is therefore to remand to the Commission for reassessment of the penalty in the light of our jurisdictional holding. We will, however, address the penalty issues that are unaffected by our decision as to jurisdiction.15
1
We cannot agree with BP that FERC improperly treated as binding, or retroactively applied, its advisory sentencing guidelines.16 FERC explicitly acknowledged, when applying the guidelines, that they were advisory only; contrary to BP‘s assertions, that the agency acted consistent with its non-binding guidance does not prove that it misconstrued that guidance as carrying the force of law. Nor was it arbitrary or capricious for FERC, in its guideline calculations, to account for several settlements BP entered into before the guidelines were promulgated. By statute, FERC is required when imposing a penalty to “take into consideration the nature and seriousness of the violation and the efforts to remedy the violation.”
2
Nor did the Commission err by taking into account BP‘s violation of a settlement agreement with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. BP argues, and FERC concedes, that only the CFTC can find a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). But the settlement BP entered into with the CFTC prohibited BP from “directly or indirectly engaging in
3
Finally, FERC did not err in denying BP credit for its compliance program under the sentencing guidelines. Although BP did have a well-funded compliance program, which FERC initially found to be diligent and helpful, the Commission changed its view on learning of what it saw as several deficiencies in BP‘s program. Most notably, FERC found that BP‘s compliance systems failed to track traders’ profit and loss or trading by location; that a manager in compliance told a senior BP official, before investigating, that he did not think the Texas team had done anything wrong; and that BP prematurely ended its internal investigation. Although, given BP‘s non-negligible compliance efforts, the agency could have come to another conclusion, we cannot say that it was arbitrary or capricious for FERC to deny BP credit for its compliance program under these circumstances.
D
BP‘s next major argument asserts that the Commission violated the APA‘s separation of functions rule by intermixing its investigatory and adjudicatory roles.17 Specifically, BP contends that certain orders issued by FERC support a finding that the agency violated the separation of functions rule. In considering this claim, we first examine what is required by the statute‘s text. The APA promotes neutrality in agency adjudication by commanding that:
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557 of this title, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings.
In arguing that FERC violated the principles set out above, BP points to several Commission orders. These orders implemented the separation of functions rule by
As we have discussed, the APA does not prohibit all overlap between investigatory and adjudicatory roles in general; it only prohibits individuals from performing both functions in the same case. Although the individuals named in FERC‘s orders were members of the Commission‘s investigatory office, BP offers no reason to believe that they did, in fact, work as investigators on BP‘s case. Instead, BP can offer only speculation to this effect. But courts considering separation of function challenges have generally required particularized allegations as to who committed a violation or how it occurred. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. FERC, 650 F.2d 687, 710 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing allegation adjudicator improperly considered ex parte information offered by agency investigators in a particular memorandum and at a particular meeting); Gibson v. FTC, 682 F.2d 554, 560 (5th Cir. 1982) (considering claim that administrative law judge was tainted by previous work as a staff attorney to an agency head); Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 615 F.2d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980) (same as Gibson and collecting cases). The conjecture offered by BP here does not suffice.18
But BP complains that it was prevented from obtaining evidence pertinent to its separation of functions argument by FERC‘s denial of its request for privilege logs, which it contends would have allowed it to evaluate FERC‘s compliance with the separation of functions rule. BP, however, has failed to show that it was entitled to such privilege logs. There is no indication that BP took any of the more modest investigatory steps that would have been appropriate before seeking voluminous discovery from FERC. See, e.g., Grolier, 615 F.2d at 1222 (indicating that sworn statements from relevant agency figures may resolve a separation of functions issue and that such statements, if uncontradicted, may be a basis to deny further discovery). This court has previously denied expansive requests to sift through an agency‘s records in search of an APA violation, particularly where there was “nothing in the material brought to this court‘s attention to suggest” impropriety on the part of the agency. Air Prods., 650 F.2d at 710 n.37. BP‘s concerns, based on speculation and devoid of any concrete facts plausibly suggesting that FERC intermixed its investigatory and adjudicatory functions, do not suffice “to overcome the ‘presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.‘” Id. (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). Thus, we reject BP‘s argument that FERC violated the separation of functions rule.19
E
BP‘s final argument is that FERC‘s entire enforcement action must be dismissed because it is barred by the statute of limitations. FERC counters that this court does not have jurisdiction to consider the issue because BP failed timely to raise it before the agency. Although we must, of course, decide the jurisdictional question first, we briefly lay out the parties’ positions on the merits of the statute of limitations question because doing so is helpful to our discussion of jurisdiction.
1
On the merits, both parties agree that the limitations period applicable in this case is provided by
an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture . . . shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued.
The parties disagree, however, as to whether, in the race to the deadline, FERC broke the ribbon in time. FERC contends that its enforcement proceeding began in August of 2013—just within the five-year limitations period—when it issued its order to show cause. BP, on the other hand, argues that FERC‘s action was untimely because the Commission‘s order to show cause cannot initiate a “proceeding” within the meaning of the statute of limitations.
2
Having set the scene by laying out the parties’ substantive positions, we now proceed to decide whether we have jurisdiction to consider the statute of limitations.
It is undisputed that BP did not address the statute of limitations in its application for rehearing in 2016. Instead, BP first raised the issue more than a year later in a 2017 motion to reopen. Thus, BP must show that it had “reasonable ground” for its failure timely to assert the matter at rehearing.
BP argues that it did have reasonable ground for its delay, pointing to two cases, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017), and FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161414. According to BP, these cases, which were issued after the application for rehearing had been filed, changed the law to support BP‘s substantive position—which we have already laid out above—on the statute of limitations. Because these allegedly crucial cases issued only after the application for rehearing had been filed, BP contends that it had reasonable ground for failing to raise the issue at rehearing.
But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that subsequently issued decisions can provide reasonable ground for failing to raise an issue at rehearing, BP‘s cases simply did not change the law in the manner suggested by BP. To reiterate, the core dispute between the parties on the merits—and the issue that BP claims these two cases decided in its favor—is whether the order to show cause constitutes the beginning of a “proceeding” within the meaning of the statute of limitations. See
We thus turn to address the two cited cases. Kokesh, for its part, did not even consider the issues involved in this case, such as the meaning of “proceeding” or the effect of an order to show cause. Instead, the Supreme Court in Kokesh held only that the limitations period in
Moreover, though Kokesh and Barclays may well have provided BP with untimely inspiration—or perhaps a reminder of a missed opportunity—neither decision was necessary for BP to make its case. BP‘s core argument is one of statutory interpretation concerning the meaning of a “proceeding” for the purposes of
In sum, an examination of BP‘s proffered cases reveals that neither constitutes an intervening change in law which could excuse BP‘s untimeliness. And, in any event, BP could have reasonably made the same arguments even in the absence of the cited cases. We thus conclude that BP did not have “reasonable ground” for its delay in raising the statute of limitations.
IV
In this appeal, we have rejected FERC‘s expansive assertion that it has jurisdiction over any manipulative trade affecting the price of an NGA transaction. We have, however, reaffirmed the Commission‘s authority over transactions directly involving natural gas in interstate commerce under the NGA. We have further determined that there was substantial evidence to support FERC‘s finding that BP manipulated the market for natural gas. We have found that FERC‘s reasoning in imposing a penalty was not arbitrary and capricious, though we have concluded that FERC‘s
Accordingly, BP‘s petition for review is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the matter is REMANDED to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for reassessment of its penalty in the light of our jurisdictional holding.
Petition GRANTED in part; DENIED in part; REMANDED.
