Boechler, P.C., Appellant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Appellee
No. 19-2003
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
July 24, 2020
The Federal Tax Clinic of the Legal Services Center of Harvard Law School, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s). Appeal from The United States Tax Court. Submitted: June 17, 2020. Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
Boechler, P.C. (“Boechler“) filed a petition for review of a notice of determination from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“IRS“). Under
I. Background
On June 5, 2015, the IRS sent Boechler a letter noting a discrepancy between prior tax document submissions. The IRS did not receive a response and imposed a 10% intentional disregard penalty. Boechler did not pay the penalty. The IRS mailed Boechler a notice of intent to levy. Boechler timely requested a Collection Due Process (“CDP“) hearing but failed to establish grounds for relief on the discrepancy or the unpaid penalty. On July 28, 2017, the
Boechler mailed a petition for a CDP hearing on August 29, 2017, one day after the 30-day filing deadline had expired. The United States Tax Court received Boechler‘s untimely petition and the IRS moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Boechler objected, arguing that the 30-day time limit in
II. Discussion
We review questions of the tax court‘s subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Martin S. Azarian, P.A. v. Comm‘r, 897 F.3d 943, 944 (8th Cir. 2018). The tax court is an Article I court and as such it is a court with “strictly limited jurisdiction.” Bartman v. C.I.R., 446 F.3d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kelley v. Comm‘r, 45 F.3d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that filing deadlines ordinarily are not jurisdictional” but instead are usually “quintessential claim-processing rules.” Sebelius v. Auburn Reg. Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 154 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). That said, a rule that “governs a court‘s adjudicatory capacity” is jurisdictional and “[o]ther rules, even if important or mandatory . . . should not be given the jurisdictional brand.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011).
We address first the threshold issue of whether the 30-day time limit in
The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).
A few years ago, this court considered § 6330 in the context of whether the tax court‘s jurisdiction over original notices of determination extended to supplemental notices. Hauptman v. C.I.R., 831 F.3d 950, 952–53 (8th Cir. 2016). In Hauptman, the panel identified two prerequisites for jurisdiction over an initial notice of determination: (1) the issuance of a notice of determination following a CDP hearing, and (2) the taxpayer‘s filing of a petition challenging that determination within 30 days of the issuance date. Id. at 953 (citing Gillum v. Comm‘r, 676 F.3d 633, 647 (8th Cir. 2012); Gray v. Comm‘r, 723 F.3d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 2013)); see Tschida v. C.I.R., 57 F. App‘x. 715, 715–16 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (unreported) (holding that the failure to comply with
Although the IRS argues that we are bound by Hauptman and required to find
As a general principle, a statutory time limit is jurisdictional when Congress clearly states that it is. Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 717 (2016). Mere proximity to a jurisdictional provision is insufficient. See Sebelius, 568 U.S. at 155–56 (stating that an otherwise non-jurisdictional provision does not become jurisdictional “simply because it is placed in a section of a statute that also contains jurisdictional provisions“). “Congress must do something special, beyond setting an exception-free deadline, to tag a [time limit] as jurisdictional and so prohibit a court from tolling it.” United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 410 (2015). Even so, Congress does not have to “incant magic words” to make a deadline jurisdictional if the “traditional tools of statutory construction . . . plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.” Id. We determine whether Congress made the necessary clear statement by examining “the text, context, and relevant historical treatment of the provision at issue.” Musacchio, 136 S. Ct. at 717 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Boechler, relying on Myers v. Commissioner, asserts
The IRS directs our attention to the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Duggan v. Commissioner, 879 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2018), which held that
A plain reading demonstrates that the phrase “such matter” refers to a petition to the tax court that: (1) arises from “a determination under this section” and (2) was filed “within 30 days” of that determination. See Myers, 928 F.3d at 1039 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (reaching the same conclusion when analyzing the identically worded parenthetical in
Boechler also contends that counting the 30-day filing deadline from the date of determination rather than the date of receipt is a violation of due process or equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. We review this question of law de novo. See Linn Farms and Timber Ltd. P‘ship v. Union Pac. R. Co., 661 F.3d 354, 357 (8th Cir. 2011). To satisfy due process, the government must “provide owners notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Supreme Court has long held that when the [government] chooses to regulate differentially, with the laws falling unequally on different geographic areas . . . the Equal Protection Clause is not violated so long as there is no underlying discrimination
A statutory time limit challenged as an arbitrary and irrational classification that violates due process or equal protection, which does not draw a suspect classification or violate a fundamental right, need only be supported by a rational legislative purpose. See Holder v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 825, 830–31 (8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting claim that a law requiring appeals to be filed in Virginia violated equal protection because non-Virginians are not a protected class); see also United States v. Prior, 107 F.3d 654, 660–61 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying rational basis review to criminal defendant‘s challenge to statute of limitations as arbitrary in violation of Fifth Amendment). A statutory time period‘s starting point satisfies rational basis review if it promotes an agency‘s “fiscal integrity” by insuring a workable deadline and reasonable timeframe. See Boyd v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 624, 626–27 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding SSA statute of limitations requiring application be made within six months after children reached age of majority). Boechler bears the burden to establish that the filing deadline in
Boechler argues that the 30-day filing deadline is arbitrary and irrational because it is calculated from the date of determination rather than the date of receipt via certified mail and such a calculation method may result in a 2- or 3-day discrepancy in receipt date depending on where the taxpayer lives in relation to an IRS mailer. However, calculating the filing deadline from the date of determination streamlines and simplifies the complex undertaking of enforcing the tax code. If the IRS were required to wait 30 days from the date that each individual received notice, it would be unable to levy at the statutory, uniform time. Calculating from the date of determination guards against taxpayers refusing to accept delivery of the notice and promotes efficient tax enforcement by ensuring a reasonable and workable timeframe and deadline. Based on these rational reasons for the calculation method, and Boechler‘s inability to identify any actual discrimination or discriminatory intent, the 30-day filing deadline from the date of determination does not violate the Fifth Amendment.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
In 2003, we squarely held that the 30-day filing deadline in
Thirteen years after Tschida was decided, we reached the same conclusion in a published opinion. We explained that, as a “prerequisite[] to the tax court‘s exercise of jurisdiction,” “the taxpayer must file a petition challenging [a notice of] determination within thirty days after the determination is issued.” Hauptman v. Comm‘r, 831 F.3d 950, 953 (8th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). To support this conclusion, we cited a Seventh Circuit opinion holding that “[u]nless a taxpayer fulfills the statutory prerequisites for invoking the Tax Court‘s
The court concludes that our statement in Hauptman was dicta because “the gravamen of [Hauptman‘s] holding was limited to the question of whether the tax court‘s jurisdiction extended to supplemental notices of determination,” not original notices of determination. Ante at 4. But the taxpayer‘s argument in Hauptman was that the tax court lacked jurisdiction. In resolving that issue, we decided that (1) the tax court had jurisdiction over the original notice of determination and (2) there were no additional requirements for the tax court to acquire jurisdiction over the supplemental notices. See Hauptman, 831 F.3d at 953. I do not think we could have found there was jurisdiction over the supplemental notices without also finding there was jurisdiction over the original notice. See id. (noting that “the same jurisdictional prerequisites apply” to both original and supplemental notices). And we explicitly found that the tax court had jurisdiction over the original notice because both jurisdictional prerequisites were satisfied. See id. Although this issue was not contested by the parties, I believe it was necessary to our decision. See Sanzone v. Mercy Health, 954 F.3d 1031, 1039 (8th Cir. 2020) (stating that dicta is “a judicial comment . . . that is unnecessary to the decision” (cleaned up)).
As the court notes, deeming the 30-day filing deadline in