BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL 863 PENSION FUND v. FOODTOWN, INC., MARTIN VITALE; RONALD GINSBERG; HY SHULMAN; NICHOLAS D‘AGOSTINO; GEORGE P. FARLEY; JOSEPH AZZOLINA; VICTOR LARACCA; GERARD NORKUS; RON DICKERSON; SYDNEY KATZ; WILLIAMS MICHAS DONALD NORKUS; EDMUND J. PACZKOWSKI, JACK PYTLUK; MICHAEL ZIMMERMAN; DAVID MANIACI; WILLIAM DAVIDSON; FOOD CIRCUS SUPERMARKETS, INC.; NORKUS ENTERPRISES, INC.; NORKUS, INC.; NORKUS FOODTOWN, INC.; DAVIDSON SUPERMARKET, INC.; DAVIDSON BROTHERS, INC.; FRANELEN, INC.; NICHOLAS MARKETS, INC.; FOOD KING, INC.; WEST ESSEX FOODTOWN, INC.; L.J.V., INC.; E. DICKERSON & SON, INC. P.S.K. SUPERMARKETS, INC.; MANYFOODS, INC.; FRANCIS MARKETS, LTD; HARP MARKETING CORPORATION; SIDNEY CHARLES MARKETS, INC.; D‘AGOSTINO SUPERMARKETS, INC.; V&V, INC.; NEPTUNE CITY LIQUORS, INC.; JOHN DOES 1-50; ABC CORPORATIONS 1-5; ABC CORPORATIONS 1-50
No. 01-2542
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
July 17, 2002
296 F.3d 164
Honorable Harold A. Ackerman
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Recommended Citation
“Bd Trustees 863 v. Foodtown Inc” (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 402. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/402
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Before: McKEE and FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and POGUE, Judge, United States Court of International Trade*
(Opinion Filed: July 17, 2002)
Kenneth I. Nowak (Argued)
Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum & Friedman
Newark, NJ 07102-5410
Attorney for Appellant
Willkie, Farr & Gallagher
New York, NY 10019-6099
Susan Stryker
Sterns & Weinroth
Trenton, NJ 08607
Attorneys for Appellees - Foodtown, Inc., et al.
Anthony X. Arturi, Jr. (Argued)
Alampi, Arturi, D‘Argenio, & Guaglardi, LLP
Englewood Cliffs, NJ 007632
Attorney for Appellee - Martin Vitale
* Honorable Donald C. Pogue, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
James M. Strauss
Christopher M. Houlihan
Putney, Twombly, Hall & Hirson, LLP
New York, NY 10175
Attorney for Appellees - Nicholas D‘Agostino and D‘Agostino Supermarkets, Inc.
OPINION OF THE COURT
POGUE, Judge, Court of International Trade:
Obligated by two collective bargaining agreements with Teamsters Local 863 (the “Local“), Twin County Grocers, Inc. (“Twin“), a wholesale distributor of supermarket and related products which had become insolvent, incurred withdrawal liability in the amount of $9.3 million to the Local‘s multiemployer pension fund. The Board of Trustees of the pension fund (“Appellant“) sought judgment against several corporate and individual defendants (“Appellees“).1 The Appellant alleges that the Appellees were Twin‘s alter ego, that Twin‘s corporate veil should be pierced to assess liability on the Appellees, and that the Appellees breached fiduciary duties and aided and abetted the breach of fiduciary duties owed to the Appellant. The district court dismissed the action for lack of standing, based on its conclusion that the bankruptcy trustee was the only suitable party to pursue such a proceeding. The Board of Trustees of the pension fund appeals. We reverse as to the first three counts.
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
I.
We exercise plenary review over the district court‘s granting of a
II.
Appellant‘s claim is based on withdrawal liability established by the
ERISA was enacted by Congress to protect employees’ pension rights. Milwaukee Brewery Workers’ Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 513 U.S. 414, 416 (1995). Congress found, however, that ERISA “did not adequately protect plans from the adverse consequences that resulted when individual employers terminate[d] their participation in, or withdr[e]w from, multiemployer plans.” Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 722 (1984). As a result, several years after the enactment of ERISA, Congress promulgated the MPPAA to foster the growth and continuance of multiemployer pension plans. See Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192, 196 (1997). The MPPAA‘s primary objective is to insulate these plans in order to protect the retirement benefits of covered employees. In order to satisfy this goal, the MPPAA requires employers who withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans to pay a “withdrawal liability.” See, e.g., ILGWU Nat‘l Retirement Fund v. Minotola Indus., Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6147 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Withdrawal liability is imposed in order “to ensure that workers’ retirement benefits w[ill] actually be available during retirement.“).
Complete withdrawal liability, pursuant to
With regard to alter ego liability in cases involving claims to pension benefits protected by ERISA, as amended by the MPPAA, there is “a federal interest supporting disregard of the corporate form to impose liability.” Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 460-61 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he congressional intent of ERISA is to hold employers responsible for pension benefits, so that when the corporate form poses a bar to liability, ‘concerns for corporate separateness are secondary to what we view as the mandate of ERISA.’ “)(internal citations omitted).
Certainly the district court was correct that once a company or individual files for bankruptcy, creditors lack standing to assert claims that are “property of the estate.” The Bankruptcy Code defines the “estate” as “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,”
Here, however, Twin‘s withdrawal liability is not property of the estate. Although Twin filed its bankruptcy petition on December 7, 1998, it did not cease operations until it entered into a Shutdown Agreement on December 25, 1998, and it continued contributions to the pension fund until January 25, 1999. Therefore, the claim for withdrawal liability did not arise until after the filing of the bankruptcy petition.7
The claim for withdrawal liability is also not a legal or equitable interest of the debtor. In order for the claim to be the “legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property,” the claim must be a “general one, with no particularized injury arising from it.” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pepsico, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1989) (“If a claim is a general one, with no particularized injury arising from it, and if that claim could be brought by any creditor of the debtor, the trustee is the proper person to assert the claim, and the creditors are bound by the outcome of the trustee‘s action.“). On the other hand, if the claim is specific to the creditor, it is a “personal” one and is a legal or equitable interest only of the creditor. A claim for an injury is personal to the creditor if other creditors generally have no interest in that claim. Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1348-49.8
Appellees rely on a New Jersey bankruptcy case, Tsai v. Buildings by Jamie, Inc. (In re Buildings by Jamie, Inc.), 230 B.R. 36 (D.N.J. 1998), to demonstrate that alter ego and veil piercing actions are the property of the bankruptcy estate. Their reliance, however, is misplaced. There, the trustee had standing to pursue an alter ego action on behalf of the corporate debtor to recover on a defaulted loan. Thus, the action was based on a general injury suffered by a corporate debtor prior to its bankruptcy filing. The cause of action in the present action arises from a statutorily imposed withdrawal liability that occurred after the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
III.
Appellees also argue that should this court hold that Appellant has standing, the district court‘s decision to dismiss the amended complaint should still be affirmed on the alternate ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We find that the Appellant has made the necessary showing for three of the four counts in its complaint.
A. Counts I and II: Disregarding Corporate Formalities
Abuses of the corporate form allow courts to impose liability on the corporation‘s shareholders. The purpose of alter ego liability and piercing the corporate veil “is to prevent an independent corporation from being used to defeat the ends of justice, to perpetrate fraud, to accomplish a crime, or otherwise to evade the law ....” State Dep‘t of Envtl. Protect. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 500 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
Piercing the corporate veil is a “tool of equity,” Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 284 (3d Cir. 1983), a “remedy that is involved when [a subservient] corporation is acting as an alter ego of [a dominant corporation.]” Peter J. Lahny IV, Securitization: A Discussion of Traditional Bankruptcy Attacks and an Analysis of the Next Potential Attack, Substantive Consolidation, 9 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 815, 865 (2001).
gross undercapitalization ... failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment of dividends, the insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time, siphoning of funds of the corporation by the dominant stockholder, non-functioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate records, and the fact that the corporation is merely a facade for the operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders.
Craig, 843 F.2d at 150 (quoting American Bell, Inc. v. Federation of Telephone Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 886 (3d Cir. 1984)).
Appellant alleges that defendants failed to maintain formal barriers between the management structures of Foodtown and Twin; failed to maintain formal barriers between Foodtown and Twin for purposes of legal representation; commingled funds and other assets; and failed to observe other corporate formalities. Am. Compl. PP 79(a), (b), (c), (e).
Notes
Appellant, however, must also allege that Foodtown used Twin to perpetrate fraud, to accomplish injustice, or to circumvent the law.10 Here, Appellant alleges, in subparagraph 79(d), that the Appellees diverted monies destined for withdrawal liability. Appellant‘s enumeration of Appellees’ actions, consisting of diverting funds, fictitious invoices and kickbacks, “inject[s] precision and some measure of substantiation into their allegations of fraud,” consistent with Rule 9(b). See Naporano Iron & Metal Co. v. Amer. Crane Corp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 494, 511 (D.N.J. 1999). When viewed in the light most favorable to the Appellant, these allegations can support a claim that Appellees used Twin “to perpetrate fraud, to accomplish injustice, or to circumvent the law.” Major League Baseball, 729 F. Supp. at 1046.
B. Count III: Fiduciary Duties
The third count of Appellant‘s complaint alleges that “[t]he individual officers and directors of Twin and Foodtown are fiduciaries with respect to Union Employees who were Plan participants represented by Plaintiff.” Am. Compl. P 85. Appellees argue that they are not fiduciaries under ERISA. The district court, however, stated that Appellant‘s fiduciary duty claims “were being brought under state and common law and not under ERISA.” Appellant‘s Br., Ex. B, at 4 & n.2 (“The Fund‘s theory of liability is not based on Defendants’ status as ‘fiduciaries’ per se under ERISA but as fiduciaries to the Fund as a creditor of Twin, an insolvent corporation.“)(quoting Pl.‘s Br. at 36).
Generally, corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty only to the corporation‘s shareholders. “This duty includes an obligation not to take action which would be adverse to the Corporation‘s interests.” Ayr Composition, Inc. v. Rosenburg, 261 N.J. Super. 495, 501 (App. Div. 1993) (internal quotations omitted). Once a corporation becomes insolvent, however, the directors assume a fiduciary or “quasi-trust” duty to the corporation‘s creditors. See id. at 505. In this quasi-trust relationship, “officers and directors cannot prefer one creditor over another, and they have a ‘special duty not to prefer themselves.’ ” In re Stevens, 476 F. Supp. 147, 153 n.5 (D.N.J. 1979). Based on the allegations here, the trial court could find that the individual officers and directors of Twin and Foodtown breached their duties under their quasi-trust relationship by “withholding and diverting for their own benefit the monies that should have been used to make ... contributions.” Am. Compl. P 85.
C. Count IV: Aiding and Abetting Fiduciary Duties
In the fourth count of its complaint, Appellant claimed that “[a]s an ‘employer’ under ERISA, Twin, Foodtown and Defendant Control Group members are fiduciaries with respect to Union Employees who were Plan participants represented by Plaintiff.” Id. P 88.11 Appellant contends that “Defendants jointly and severally aided and abetted the breach of fiduciary duties owed to Plan participants by Twin, Foodtown and the Defendant Control Group members, by knowingly and willfully participating in those entities’ breach of their fiduciary duties under ERISA.” Id. P 89. Although the district court characterized Appellant‘s fiduciary duty claim in count III of the complaint as a “common law claim,” it is not possible to understand Appellant‘s claim of aiding and abetting fiduciary duties in this manner.
In this count, Appellant‘s claim is that Twin and Foodtown breached fiduciary duties owed under ERISA. In order to acquire fiduciary status under ERISA, the party must (1) be named as a fiduciary in the instrument establishing the plan; (2) named as a fiduciary pursuant to a procedure specified in a plan instrument; or (3) fall within the statutory definition of fiduciary. Glaziers & Glassworkers v. Newbridge Sec., 93 F.3d 1171, 1179 (3d Cir. 1996).
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a [pension] plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any monies or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of the plan ....
IV.
Prior to instituting an action for withdrawal liability, ERISA requires written notice to the withdrawing party of the amount of withdrawal liability claimed and a demand for payment.
V.
Foodtown also argues that Twin “unconditionally released all the estate‘s claims against the Foodtown Appellees.” Foodtown Br. at 60. In a consent order approving Twin‘s settlement with Foodtown and various other corporate defendants, a general release provided, in pertinent part, that “[r]eleasors hereby remise, release and forever discharge by these presents ... and do hereby remise, release and forever discharge [the Foodtown Appellees] ... from any and all manners of action ... causes of action, suits, debts, sums of money ... now known or unknown, or hereafter becoming known, from the beginning of the world until the date of this General Release.” Consent Order Approving Settlements with Foodtown, Heller and Lloyd‘s, Dismissal of Lawsuit and Entry into Mutual Releases, Supp. App. II, SA 358. Foodtown claims that this release bars the present action.
Appellant argues that the settlement agreement “expressly stated that the [release given by the Debtor to the Foodtown Appellees] ... shall not be deemed to be a release of the Fund‘s claim” in this action. Appellant‘s Br. at 3, 9. According to Foodtown, however, the inclusion of this provision demonstrates that Twin “generally released the Foodtown Appellees only after due notice to the Appellant, and that Appellant made a deliberate decision to waive its right to object.” Foodtown Br. at 27.
A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
