This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Duffy, J, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) dismissing defendant-third-party plaintiff-appellant PepsiCo, Inc.’s (PepsiCo) third-party complaint against third-party defendant-appellee Banner Industries, Inc. (Banner). PepsiCo’s complaint sought damages for losses it suffered when it became liable on bonds it guaranteed as a surety on behalf of its wholly owned subsidiary, Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. (Lee Way). These bonds were drawn in favor of plaintiff St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. (St. Paul); their value exceeded $1 million.
PepsiCo alleges that when Banner’s partially owned subsidiary, Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. (CL), bought Lee Way from PepsiCo in 1984, Banner caused CL to sell off Lee Way’s assets to pay debts CL owed to Banner. According to PepsiCo, if Banner had not caused CL to pay its debts to Banner in this fashion, Lee Way would have retained sufficient assets to pay its own debts, and PepsiCo would not have become liable on the guarantee it had executed in St. Paul’s favor.
When Lee Way defaulted on its obligations, St. Paul sued PepsiCo for the money due on the bonds. PepsiCo answered the complaint and denied liability. It also filed a third-party complaint asserting two causes of action against Banner: that Banner was CL’s alter ego, and therefore is accountable for CL’s misdeeds and that Banner caused PepsiCo’s loss “in whole or material part by the wrongful diversion of Lee Way assets,” and therefore is accountable for its own improper conduct. The district court granted summary judgment for Banner and dismissed the third-party complaint. PepsiCo appeals from this decision.
We affirm the dismissal by the district court, but we do so on a jurisdictional basis without reaching the merits.
BACKGROUND
During the time that PepsiCo owned Lee Way, Lee Way and St. Paul executed many bonds. These bonds covered such areas of potential liability for Lee Way as workers’ compensation claims and claims for state licensing and regulatory fees and taxes. In the event that Lee Way defaulted on any of the obligations guaranteed by a St. Paul bond, however, PepsiCo had agreed to indemnify St. Paul “from all loss and expense ... incurred by [St. Paul] by reason of having executed any bond” for Lee Way. The indemnity agreement included a provision that “under no circumstances will termination or cancellation of [a] bond relieve [PepsiCo] of its obligation to indemnify [St. Paul].”
In 1984, PepsiCo sold the financially ailing Lee Way to CL. Lee Way had pre-tax losses of over $23 million in 1983; in the offering memorandum distributed by Pep-siCo to CL, Alex. Brown & Sons, an investment advisor, described Lee Way as “a likely candidate for a leveraged buyout.” In the course of negotiations surrounding the sale of Lee Way to CL, PepsiCo alleges it made an issue of CL’s ability to continue to operate Lee Way, and required that any purchaser of Lee Way operate Lee Way in such a way that Lee Way could pay its debts, including those debts for which St. Paul had issued bonds. According to Pep-siCo, its pre-sale investigation of CL indicated that CL was a company with a “positive net worth.” Furthermore, CL represented that it could restore Lee Way to *691 profitability; however, as CL noted in its proposed business plan, a document discussing implementation of the sale, CL intended to finance its purchase of Lee Way through “the transfer and/or sale of assets.”
PepsiCo apparently was content to rely on CL’s assertions that it would restore Lee Way to profitability, as it did not insist that CL agree to pay PepsiCo for any liability resulting from the St. Paul indemnity agreement. Under the terms of the indemnity agreement, PepsiCo would remain liable for claims based on acts that occurred before the sale of Lee Way. In fact, as PepsiCo admits, even if the bonds had been cancelled as of the day of the sale, PepsiCo “would still be liable for Lee Way’s failure, after the sale, to pay for those workers^] compensation claims that had accrued before the sale.” Nevertheless, although PepsiCo “had CL contractually agree to use CL’s best efforts to replace PepsiCo on its guarantees ... and ... cause[d] St. Paul to cancel its bonds,” it did not extract a promise from CL that PepsiCo’s own liability would be limited. CL was under no obligation to PepsiCo to hold it harmless from the indemnity agreement.
The sale to CL went through based on PepsiCo’s understanding that CL was a financially viable operation, and that even though it was not profitable at the time of the sale, its management was capable of operating Lee Way and CL together in a commercially feasible manner.
The injury from which PepsiCo alleges it suffers was avowedly a result of the concealment from PepsiCo of Banner’s true relation to CL, which PepsiCo contends was one of financial domination and managerial control. PepsiCo insists that it had no knowledge at the time it sold Lee Way to CL of this relationship. As to Banner’s financial relation to CL, it was clear that at the time of the sale Banner was both a debtor and a substantial creditor of CL. The financial arrangements between the two companies included a tax-sharing agreement. PepsiCo urges, however, that the receivables on CL’s books that were owed to it by Banner were debts that Banner had either refused to pay or for which “there was not even a claimed assurance of realizability.” Upon examination of a balance sheet for CL, which was certified for CL by Arthur Andersen & Co., one of Pep-siCo’s expert witnesses testified that he did not think that realization by CL of the money it was owed was “assured beyond reasonable doubt.... I have seen nothing which would permit me to state unequivocally that Banner has guaranteed payment of the tax effect of the CL[] losses.”
PepsiCo alleges that the operational relationship between CL and Banner was, in fact, one of complete domination and control of CL by Banner. Although Banner had entered an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) in March 1983, which reduced its holding in CL from 100 percent to 49.99 percent, and later further reduced its holdings by ten percent, Banner, in PepsiCo’s view, retained control of CL through domination of CL’s board of directors, manipulation of CL’s officers, undercapitalization of CL and the consequent dependence of CL on Banner for financial support. Pepsi-Co contends that, through Banner’s influence and domination of CL, Banner caused CL to “plunder[ ]” Lee Way, stripping it of assets. The revenue from the sale of these assets was then allegedly used to settle CL’s debts to Banner. When CL could no longer afford to operate Lee Way as a going concern because of the alleged asset-stripping carried on by CL, Lee Way defaulted on its obligations under the St. Paul bonds. If CL had not complied with Banner’s ambitions and stripped Lee Way of its assets, then, PepsiCo alleges, Lee Way would not have defaulted on its obligations under the St. Paul bonds. Thus, PepsiCo argues that Banner is responsible for its injury both because of its direct acts and its control of CL.
After CL’s alleged plunder of Lee Way, in February 1985, CL merged with Lee Way to form a company known as Lee Way Holding Co. This was reputedly done so that the assets of both companies could be pooled to pay the liabilities of both. Pepsi-Co alleges that this act in itself harmed it because all of CL’s assets were subject to liens, while none of Lee Way’s were. *692 Thus, the merger resulted in Lee Way’s assets being easily available for the payment of debts for which CL’s own liened assets were unavailable. Furthermore, at the time of the merger, CL owed Lee Way almost $7 million. This debt was wiped out in the merger. A week after the merger took place, Lee Way Holding Co. filed for protection from its creditors under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Lee Way Holding Co., No. 2-85-00661 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio).
Two weeks after the merger of CL and Lee Way, St. Paul instituted this action in the Southern District of New York seeking payment from PepsiCo of its debt under the indemnity agreement. PepsiCo im-pleaded Banner as a third-party defendant in St. Paul’s action, alleging that Banner’s domination of CL and its actions in causing CL to strip Lee Way of its assets were the cause of PepsiCo’s liability. Specifically, PepsiCo stated two causes of action against Banner: that “third-party defendant Banner used CL and CL used Lee Way as alter egos, ... without due regard for the separate corporate existences of CL and Lee Way, by reason whereof the corporate veils of CL and Lee Way should be pierced and Banner ... should be required to indemnify and pay over to PepsiCo the amount of any liability herein,” and that any liability of PepsiCo to St. Paul “will have been caused ... by the third-party defendant Banner, and the third-party defendant should be required to indemnify and pay over to PepsiCo the amount of any adjudged liability herein.” PepsiCo initially denied liability to St. Paul, but has since entered into an “interim arrangement” whereby it has agreed to pay St. Paul “for all loss and expense reasonably and in good faith incurred by St. Paul in administering, defending and/or settling” claims arising out of Lee Way’s default on the bonds. Four months after filing its third-party complaint against Banner, PepsiCo filed a claim as an unsecured creditor in Lee Way Holding Co.’s bankruptcy proceeding.
St. Paul and Banner both moved for summary judgment in the instant action. The district court did not rule on St. Paul’s motion, finding it moot in light of the interim arrangement. It granted Banner’s motion as to both counts of PepsiCo’s complaint, however, on the ground that “Pepsi-Co ha[d] not established wrongdoing by Banner sufficient to disregard corporate separateness and cannot be permitted to shift to Banner the losses suffered by virtue of its status [as] a guarantor of Lee Way debts.” PepsiCo thereafter filed a motion requesting the entry of judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), which the district court granted. PepsiCo thereafter filed a notice of appeal from this judgment.
On appeal, PepsiCo argues that the district court’s decision had the effect of ruling that Banner was not liable because PepsiCo had not sought an agreement from Banner that Banner would pay any debts to St. Paul that Lee Way was not able to pay. Specifically, PepsiCo urges that the district court misconstrued the law as it applies to alter ego liability, that the district court did not adequately consider the record presented to it, that the district court should not have ruled against Pepsi-Co on the ground that PepsiCo “theoretically could have avoided the harm,” and that the district court should have made findings of fact with respect to the dismissal of PepsiCo’s second cause of action.
DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction: Appealability
In granting PepsiCo’s motion for the entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), the district court gave no reasons for its action. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, require that
[w]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, ... the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims ... only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims ... shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims ... and the *693 order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). In this case, the court merely wrote the words “Motion granted So ordered” and signed the cover of the notice of motion submitted by PepsiCo. It rendered no opinion on the matter and adopted no reasons for the decision.
Under the plain terms of Rule 54(b), this writing is not sufficient to constitute the entry of a final determination, and thus we would not have appellate jurisdiction over this case.
See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
In this case, we are troubled by the district court’s action for two reasons. First, the court’s error was not that it used formulaic and conclusory language in granting PepsiCo’s motion for the entry of judgment,
see, e.g., National Bank,
Second, the interim arrangement cited by the district court as the reason St. Paul’s motion for summary judgment was moot is not a final determination of PepsiCo’s liability. Had a judgment been entered on St. Paul’s claim, the issue currently before us would clearly be of relevance to the determination of liability in this case. However, without a judgment entered against Pepsi-Co, its obligation is certain only insofar as it continues to abide by the interim arrangement. To this effect, the extent of PepsiCo’s liability is unknown, and hence the size of PepsiCo’s claim against Banner is undetermined.
As to the first problem, however (the problem of the district court’s abbreviated notation granting PepsiCo’s motion), we believe that the reasons for the district court’s actions are readily apparent from the record presented to us. The third-party claim at issue completely disposes of Pepsi-Co’s entire claim for indemnity. It thus finally determines a distinct and separable part of the suit. There is no just reason for delay, as PepsiCo has already asserted to the district court that it has been making *694 payments to St. Paul, and thus, it has already paid those funds for which it claims it is entitled to reimbursement.
This latter fact also disposes of the second problem we have identified with the district court’s action. St. Paul's complaint against PepsiCo and PepsiCo’s complaint against Banner state that PepsiCo’s potential liability to St. Paul is $1,020,000, in addition to attorney’s fees and costs (although the interim arrangement places no such limitation on the amount of payments PepsiCo is to make to St. Paul). In fact, in an affidavit supporting St. Paul’s motion for summary judgment, an attorney for St. Paul stated that PepsiCo had, as of April 27, 1987, paid St. Paul more than $1,600,-000 for loss and expense incurred by St. Paul. In its brief, PepsiCo states that it has paid St. Paul over $2 million as of the date of the district court’s decision denying summary judgment to St. Paul. Furthermore, PepsiCo has stated that it is “not disputing its liability for” the $2 million it has paid St. Paul.
Because PepsiCo has already paid St. Paul an amount exceeding the amount requested in St. Paul’s complaint, 1 and because it is unlikely that St. Paul’s reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred in connection with this matter exceed the difference between the amount paid and the amount of the bond, we will proceed on the premise that St. Paul’s demand has become moot, as PepsiCo has given St. Paul everything St. Paul has requested in its complaint. 2 In effect, PepsiCo’s liability has been determined by its payments pursuant to the interim arrangement. Thus, resolution of the third-party complaint of PepsiCo against Banner will finally determine an issue in this action that will not be mooted by further proceedings below.
Thus, this purpose of Rule 54(b), the avoidance of unnecessary appeals and the conservation of judicial resources, is served by our exercising jurisdiction. We therefore hold that we have jurisdiction to entertain the instant appeal and that the district court’s decision to grant Rule 54(b) certification as it did was not an abuse of discretion.
B. Jurisdiction: The Effect of the Ohio Bankruptcy Proceeding
1. The Allegations in, and Findings of the Bankruptcy Court
PepsiCo has filed a claim in Lee Way Holding Co.’s bankruptcy proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of Ohio. The claim alleges that PepsiCo is an unsecured creditor of Lee Way Holding Co. and that payment is due to it on the bases, inter alia, of breach of contract, contribution, indemnification, reimbursement of guarantees and overdue notes and advances. The bankruptcy trustee and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (together, the bankruptcy plaintiffs) have brought claims against Banner in the bankruptcy court, contending that Banner’s actions caused loss to CL, and thus to Lee Way Holding Co. See Luper v. Banner Industries, Inc. (In re Lee Way Holding Co.), No. 2-85-00661, — B.R. — (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio June 21, 1989). On June 21, 1989, the bankruptcy court issued an opinion denying a motion brought by Banner to dismiss these claims. Id.
In the bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy plaintiffs allege that CL sustained significant losses and was dependent on Banner from 1980 on, that “[a]s a consequence [of this], Banner was determined to *695 protect itself against loss or exposure on its contingent liabilities ... that would arise by virtue of Banner’s controlling stock ownership if CL were unable to continue its business operations.” They further allege that after the March 1983 ESOP was implemented, Banner continued to control CL’s board of directors, that as a result of this “the Board of Directors of CL consistently made decisions that inured to the benefit of Banner,” that Banner required CL to agree to indemnify it for earlier guarantees it had executed regarding CL’s own debt, that this agreement “was an attempt by Banner to ensure that CL would operate its business in a manner designed to protect Banner’s interests,” and that the tax sharing agreement between Banner and CL was designed to give Banner benefits it otherwise would have lost with the implementation of the ESOP and “purportedly g[ave] the right [to Banner] to offset amounts owed to CL against amounts owed by CL in connection with the Banner Guaranties.” While not directly implicating these actions as harmful to Lee Way, it is clear that the bankruptcy plaintiffs are alleging that the same acts identified by PepsiCo as causing harm to Lee Way also caused harm to both the estate and the unsecured creditors, of whom Pep-siCo is one.
Banner argued to the bankruptcy court that the bankruptcy plaintiffs did not have standing to assert alter ego claims against it. The court rejected this assertion and determined that both the bankruptcy trustee and the unsecured creditors’ committee had standing to assert the alter ego claims against Banner. As to the trustee, the court stated that under Ohio law an alter ego claim may be asserted by a debtor corporation and also that “the trustee stands in the shoes of creditors,” and therefore could assert an alter ego claim. As to the creditors’ committee, the court held that “[a] creditors’ committee ... has the statutory right to intervene in adversary proceedings related to a bankruptcy case.” (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1982) and
Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Michaels (In re Marin Motor Oil, Inc.),
The court also determined that the bankruptcy plaintiffs’ action was a proceeding under its jurisdiction as provided by the Bankruptcy Code, as “[a]ny recovery by the plaintiffs would inure to the benefit of the debtor’s estate and the unsecured creditors.” The court said that it could not “conclude that recognizing the ability of the plaintiffs to bring an action based on alter-ego would result in a loss of this Court’s jurisdiction.”
Discussing a related claim, the court noted that the bankruptcy plaintiffs’ interest in Banner’s assets is contingent on their successful prosecution of their alter ego claims. In this regard, the debtor (Lee Way Holding Co.) also has a contingent interest in the property. Even though Lee Way Holding Co. is not in possession of Banner’s assets, should the bankruptcy plaintiffs prevail on their alter ego claim, this property would become property of the estate, insofar as Banner would be liable for CL’s obligations. It therefore would be available for distribution to CL’s unsecured creditors, including PepsiCo.
Thus, the bankruptcy court has determined that it has jurisdiction over at least some of the same issues that are being litigated in this suit; the difference between the two suits is that in the bankruptcy court any proceeds from the alter ego claims would be available for all of Lee Way Holding Co.’s unsecured creditors whereas in our case any proceeds would be used to satisfy only PepsiCo’s claims. Banner does not dispute PepsiCo’s assertion that it has standing to assert an alter ego claim, but it does maintain that PepsiCo’s second cause of action, based on wrong done by Banner in diverting CL’s assets, is a generalized claim that is property of the *696 bankruptcy estate and thus properly brought only by the bankruptcy trustee.
Banner’s concession of PepsiCo’s standing to assert the alter ego claim notwithstanding, we must independently examine the standing issue.
See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. United Furnace Co.,
2. The Standing of the Bankruptcy Trustee, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and PepsiCo a. Article III Standing Requirements
Constitutional principles of standing require an allegation that the plaintiff sustained a direct injury that can be traced to the defendant’s conduct, and relief from this injury must be likely to follow from an adjudication favorable to the plaintiff.
See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Radish,
— U.S. —,
b. The Framing of the Question
The question whether alter ego claims and other claims of creditors against third parties to a bankruptcy proceeding may or should be brought by the trustee in bankruptcy of a debtor corporation has been considered by several circuits, although our circuit has not directly decided the issue. The courts that have considered this issue, however, have reached differing conclusions.
See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett,
The Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, said that where a plaintiff alleges that an individual should be held liable under state law for an insolvent corporation’s debts because the individual stripped the corporation of its assets for the individual’s own benefit, the bankruptcy trustee is the proper party to bring the action.
MortgageAmerica,
The Fifth Circuit later stated that the rule of
MortgageAmerica
applied to alter ego actions under Texas law as well. In
S.I. Acquisition,
the plaintiff alleged that a corporate parent-subsidiary arrangement was used “as a cloak to conceal fraud, wrongs, and injustice.”
As additional support for its decision in
S.I. Acquisition
the court noted that the plaintiff’s allegations, if proved, would benefit all the creditors, but that the plaintiff there was proceeding alone. Thus, “to allow [the plaintiff’s] actions to proceed would undercut the general bankruptcy policy of ensuring that all similarly-situated creditors are treated fairly.”
Id.
at 1153. In other words, if one creditor could bring an alter ego action outside of the bankruptcy court, all creditors could. To prevent a “multi-jurisdictional rush to judgment [and] ... a potential conflict in judgments,”
id.
at 1154, potentially resulting in collateral estoppel problems, the court held that alter ego actions against a bankrupt corporation’s parent were, under Texas law, stayed by the filing of bankruptcy.
See also Gibraltar Savings,
The Seventh Circuit determined that, under the laws of Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin, alter ego claims that involve a bankrupt corporation must be brought in the bankruptcy court. In a case where a trustee was pursuing alter ego claims in the bankruptcy court, and eleven creditors brought their own action in the district court, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the creditors’ complaint for lack of standing. Because the trustee “represents not only the rights of the debt- or but also the interests of creditors of the debtor,”
Koch Refining,
Noting that alter ego claims often “involve[] improper or fraudulent actions by fiduciaries of a corporation,” id. at 1344, the court proceeded to examine state law to
*698
determine if the alter ego claims in question could be asserted by the creditors. It held that the existence of an alter ego relationship is determined by the circumstances of the case at hand, but that fraud or other injustice is necessary to an alter ego finding.
Id.
at 1345. Furthermore, under the laws of the states involved, “the alter ego theory is an equitable, remedial doctrine that may be asserted by any creditor without regard to the specific nature of his relationship with the corporation and its alleged alter ego.”
Id.
Under this version of alter ego law, the court held that the bankruptcy trustee could bring an alter ego cause of action.
Id.
at 1346. While a trustee could choose to abandon a claim, and allow creditors to pursue it independently, where there had been no such election, the creditors did not have standing to assert the cause of action.
Id.
at 1346-50 & n. 9 (“allegations that could be asserted by any creditor could be brought by the trustee ... a single creditor may not maintain an action on his own behalf against a corporation’s fiduciaries if that creditor shares in an injury common to all creditors and has personally been injured only in an indirect manner”). However, the court later held that where a creditor has been the direct object of an alter ego’s actions, and has suffered an immediate and distinct injury, that creditor may maintain an action outside of the bankruptcy proceedings.
See Ashland Oil,
The Fourth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion, under Virginia law, finding that an alter ego claim belongs to the corporation and thus is property of the bankruptcy estate and properly asserted by the bankruptcy trustee.
Steyr-Daimler-Puch,
In a related context, the Tenth Circuit has likewise recognized that an action alleging preferential transfers by a director of a bankrupt corporation could not be maintained outside the bankruptcy court, because the bankruptcy trustee has the right “to recover damages for misconduct, mismanagement, or neglect of duty by a corporate officer or director.”
Delgado Oil Co. v. Torres,
Under Arkansas law, however, the Eighth Circuit has held that an alter ego action is personal to the creditors, and therefore cannot be asserted by a bankruptcy trustee.
Ozark Restaurant,
The
Caplin
holding was also the crucial factor in
Williams,
decided by the Ninth Circuit, which held that even where creditors had assigned their causes of action to the bankruptcy trustee, “[t]he Trustee lacked authority to bring suit” on alter ego claims.
The Sixth Circuit has not addressed the question of standing to assert alter ego claims, although two lower court decisions have examined the question under Ohio law. The first,
D.H. Overmyer,
found
Caplin
to be controlling, and stated that a “[sjtate court[ ] in ... Ohio ha[s] held that a reorganization trustee lacks standing to assert the claims of creditors against third parties who allegedly aided the bankrupt in diverting its assets.”
While our Circuit has not addressed the specific question whether an alter ego claim may be maintained by the bankruptcy trustee,
see 10th Avenue Record Distribs.,
*700 As to the stay of the appeal granted to the partnership, however, we conditioned the stay on “the requirement that the [Southern District of New York] district court’s ... decision and the judgment that followed be given full faith and credit by the [Eastern District of California] bankruptcy court.” Id. We made this condition to avoid res judicata problems that would occur if the parties attempted to relitigate the district court’s decision in the bankruptcy court.
c. The Legal Standard
We agree with those courts that have held that the determination of whether a claim may be brought by a creditor of a bankrupt corporation outside of the bankruptcy proceedings depends on an analysis of state law. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy trustee may bring claims founded,
inter alia,
on the rights of the debtor and on certain rights of the debtor’s creditors,
see, e.g.,
11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 544, 547 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Whether the rights belong to the debtor or the individual creditors is a question of state law,
see Morton v. National Bank (In re Morton),
Caplin
is not controlling. That case involved allegations by debenture holders that an indenture trustee had engaged in misconduct. The company that issued the debentures had gone into bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy trustee attempted to assert the debenture holders’ claim against the indenture trustee. The Supreme Court held that when “the nature of Chapter X [reorganization] proceedings, the role of the trustee in reorganization, and the way in which standing to sue on behalf of debenture holders would affect or change that role” were examined,
Caplin,
however, is distinguishable from the case at hand. In
Caplin,
the Court highlighted the “elaborate system of controls [that exist] with respect to indenture trustees and reorganization proceedings,”
id.
at 428,
Additionally, the Court noted that should the bankruptcy trustee lose the suit brought against the indenture trustee, “a question would arise as to who was bound by any settlement.”
Caplin,
That this proposition is true is indicated by the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code. When considering the auto
*701
matic stay provision, the House Report stated that the stay “provides creditor protection. Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor’s property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors.” H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 340,
reprinted in
1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787, 5963, 6297. It is plain from this passage that Congress intended to protect all creditors by making the trustee the proper person to assert claims against the debtor. This reasoning extends to common claims against the debtor’s alter ego or others who have misused the debtor’s property in some fashion. If a claim is a general one, with no particularized injury arising from it, and if that claim could be brought by any creditor of the debtor, the trustee is the proper person to assert the claim, and the creditors are bound by the outcome of the trustee’s action.
See Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades,
Although the claims raised by PepsiCo are not against the debtor but are against a third party, the same reasoning applies. The claims, if proved, would have the effect of bringing the property of the third party into the debtor’s estate, and thus would benefit all creditors. It therefore would be illogical to distinguish between this type of claim against a third party and a claim against the debtor. See id. (while the same facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint seeking damages due to fraud would have supported claim brought by bankruptcy trustee, plaintiff’s claim was not discharged by bankruptcy proceeding as plaintiff had “alleged with particularity that misrepresentations of facts were made by [the defendant] in furtherance of a conspiracy to defraud [the plaintiff]”).
Nor does our decision in
Teachers,
We realize that here it is Banner, the alleged alter ego, rather than the bankruptcy trustee that is contesting PepsiCo’s assertions, and that the bankruptcy trustee has apparently not moved to stay these proceedings or to intervene in this case. *702 Nor has PepsiCo attempted to obtain a decision that the trustee has abandoned the causes of action asserted here. We are also aware that Banner may at the appropriate time seek review of rulings made in Luper. Nevertheless, we believe that under the Bankruptcy Code and the circumstances of this case, if either of PepsiCo’s asserted causes of action in this suit is property of the debtor or a claim otherwise properly asserted by the bankruptcy trustee, PepsiCo does not have standing to raise that cause of action outside of the bankruptcy proceeding. 3 Even if PepsiCo could overcome this jurisdictional hurdle, it would still have to show an abandonment of the claim by the bankruptcy trustee, 11 U.S.C. § 554, or a grant of relief from the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), (e), to press its claims outside of the bankruptcy proceedings.
Finally, PepsiCo argues that because the Tenth Circuit has allowed Banner to assert claims against PepsiCo outside of the bankruptcy court, PepsiCo should be allowed to assert claims against Banner as well. The decision to which PepsiCo refers,
Courtney v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc.,
No. 86-2846 (10th Cir. Oct. 24, 1988), is an unreported order and judgment. Therefore it has “no precedential value” other than for the purposes of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the law of the case. Tenth Cir.R. 36.3. Pepsi-Co urges that Banner is bound by the collateral estoppel effect of
Courtney
in this Court and must accede to PepsiCo’s standing. We disagree. This Court is not bound by the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the law of bankruptcy proceedings and standing. Nor do we believe that Banner would be bound by
Courtney
in any event.
Courtney
concerned whether a surety (Banner) who was subrogated to a bankrupt’s claims could bring those claims outside of the bankruptcy proceeding. Although PepsiCo makes a brief attempt to argue that it is subrogated to Lee Way’s claims, we are unpersuaded. PepsiCo had no contractual right to subrogation, and we do not believe that equity compels the application of the subrogation doctrine to the circumstances here,
cf. Caplin,
Neither party challenges the district court’s determination that Ohio state law applies to the alter ego doctrine and the claim of Banner’s alleged tortious acts. We agree with that determination. With this framework in mind, we turn to the causes of action PepsiCo alleges in this case.
d. The Alter Ego Doctrine
The basic principles of the alter ego doctrine in Ohio were set forth in
Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. General Products Corp.,
(1) domination and control over the corporation by those to be held liable is so complete that the corporation has no sep *703 arate mind, will, or existence of its own; (2) that domination and control was used to commit fraud or wrong or other dishonest or unjust act, and (3) injury or unjust loss resulted to the plaintiff from such control and wrong.
Id.
at 418. The crux of the action, however, is that maintaining the separateness of the corporation and its alter ego would allow the alter ego to avoid either an otherwise enforceable obligation, or the law, or that maintaining the separate corporations would be inequitable.
See, e.g., id.; E.S. Preston Assocs. Inc. v. Preston,
Although no Ohio case directly addresses whether a corporation may bring an alter ego action against its own parent, the basis for the action in Ohio is the avoidance of some wrong or injustice that would result if the separateness of a corporation and its alter ego were maintained. If injustice would result from a corporation’s not being recognized as the alter ego of its subsidiary, and that subsidiary brought an alter ego action against the parent, there is nothing to indicate that such an action would not be recognized in Ohio. To the contrary, the purpose of the alter ego action would be frustrated, and injustice could result, if an alter ego action between a parent and a subsidiary were not recognized.
See S.I. Acquisition,
Friedman,
Friedman is of little help to the analysis of modern alter ego law. Not only was the trustee in that case not contending that the defendants were the alter ego of a legal entity such as a corporation, he was not even contending that they were the debt- or’s agents. In addition, federal bankruptcy law specifically provides for the avoidance of property transfers occurring subsequent to the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 549 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Nothing in modern Ohio law indicates that a corporation may not bring an action against its parent on an alter ego theory. We believe that, under Ohio law, a corporation would be able to assert an alter ego cause of action against its parent corporation. The cause of action therefore becomes property of the estate of a bank *704 rupt subsidiary, and is properly asserted by the trustee in bankruptcy.
Nevertheless, PepsiCo is asserting its alter ego action not on behalf of Lee Way Holding Co., but as a creditor. If, however, the cause of action is a general one, and does not accrue to PepsiCo individually, PepsiCo cannot seek individual relief outside of the bankruptcy court.
See Koch Refining,
PepsiCo has not alleged the type of harm necessary to support a finding of standing. Its injury is not a particular one that can be directly traced to Banner’s conduct. Instead, it has alleged a secondary effect from harm done to Lee Way.
See ASARCO,
Although PepsiCo alleges that it has suffered individual harm due to Banner’s relationship with CL, as PepsiCo would have structured its deal with CL differently had it known of Banner’s “true” relationship with CL and its intent to use CL to strip Lee Way of its assets, PepsiCo has not shown that this harm differs in kind from the harm suffered by any other creditor of CL or Lee Way.
PepsiCo’s personalization of the harm stems from its original relationship to Lee Way. Because Lee Way was the entity that was stripped of assets, and because PepsiCo was the seller of Lee Way, Pepsi-Co asserts that its harm is direct and specific to it. To the contrary, however, Pepsi-Co’s harm is precisely that suffered by all other creditors of CL and Lee Way: because CL and Lee Way were used by Banner to preferentially pay off debts owed to Banner, all other creditors of CL and Lee Way fell into disfavored positions. The source of the assets used to finance the payments to Banner is of no moment: if we were to stretch PepsiCo’s theory to the limit, the source of any asset of either CL or Lee Way that was sold to obtain money to pay Banner would be a preferred creditor. That is, if a company sold CL equipment on credit, and CL sold that equipment to pay Banner, then, under PepsiCo’s theory, the company that sold the equipment to CL would have sustained particularized harm if it were not paid. This, however, is precisely the situation that the Bankruptcy Code is designed to eliminate.
See Lincoln Savings Bank v. Suffolk County Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass’n, Inc.),
As is clear from the opinion of the bankruptcy court in hwper, an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors has been formed in this case. Presumably, as Pepsi-Co is an unsecured creditor of Lee Way Holding Co., and as it has filed a claim in the bankruptcy court against Lee Way Holding Co., PepsiCo is represented by or is a member of the committee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1982 & Supp. Y 1987). Thus, not only does it have a voice through which to articulate its claim against Banner in the bankruptcy court, see 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1982), but its claim of alter ego has already been filed in the bankruptcy court and is being litigated.
*705 Therefore, because an alter ego claim is the property of the estate, and because the injury in this case is a generalized one, which is already being litigated by the bankruptcy trustee and by the unsecured creditors’ committee, PepsiCo does not have standing to assert its alter ego claim outside of the bankruptcy proceeding.
e. PepsiCo’s Allegations of a Direct Cause of Action
PepsiCo also alleges that it agreed to sell Lee Way to CL “on the explicit understanding that CL would use its best efforts to maintain Lee Way as an ongoing, viable, operating company,” and that CL did not do this. According to PepsiCo, CL’s failure to live up to its agreement was due to Banner, which caused CL to apply Lee Way’s assets to pay off CL’s liabilities to Banner. Therefore, PepsiCo contends that if it is liable to St. Paul, “all such liability will have been caused in whole or material part by the wrongful diversion of Lee Way assets caused by ... Banner, and [Banner] should be required to indemnify and pay over to PepsiCo the amount of any adjudged liability.”
In its briefs to this Court, PepsiCo declares that the district court erred by not making specific findings regarding this claim before it granted summary judgment to Banner. However, it is not clear to us that PepsiCo has even alleged a cause of action that exists under Ohio law. Pepsi-Co’s complaint does not allege that Banner perpetrated a fraud on PepsiCo. Rather, it contends that “diversion of assets is itself an actionable wrong.” To support this view of the law, it cites a Fourth Circuit case applying Virginia law and an unreported Ohio appeals court case.
The first of these cases,
National Carloading Corp. v. Astro Van Lines, Inc.,
We think that this statement in J.B. Stoves is far from an unequivocal adoption of the cause of action that PepsiCo asserts here. Even if we assume that PepsiCo has stated a valid claim under the law of Ohio, however, we see several problems with PepsiCo’s theory. First, as an unreported decision, J.B. Stoves is “persuasive authority” only on courts in the state district in which it was rendered. Ohio S.Ct. Rules for Reporting Opinions 2(G)(2). There is no provision comparable to Rule 2(G)(2), however, stating that an unpublished decision is persuasive authority outside of that district. Thus, we are not bound by the holding of J.B. Stoves.
Second, should we find such a cause of action to exist under Ohio law, we would be left with the same problem that was fatal to PepsiCo’s first claim: the problem of standing. PepsiCo alleges that it had an “understanding” with CL and that Banner wrongfully interfered with that understanding. It asserts that Banner’s interference harmed it because it breached this less-than-contractual “understanding” between it and CL.
Banner contends that this claim is only that of a general creditor, and that Pepsi-Co’s harm is not particularized. Therefore, Banner argues, PepsiCo cannot assert this claim outside of bankruptcy. We agree. PepsiCo’s allegations boil down to a contention that Banner’s actions reduced the fund *706 from which Lee Way’s debts would be paid. Although PepsiCo alleges that it had an “understanding” with CL that these assets would be used for paying Lee Way’s debts, this is not enough to create the kind of particularized harm necessary to support an action by a creditor outside of the bankruptcy proceeding.
In the end, PepsiCo is alleging that CL’s acts resulted in a preferential transfer to Banner. Because PepsiCo contends that it had some sort of right to the proceeds transferred to Banner, based on its “understanding” with CL, PepsiCo contends that it suffered particularized harm. This claim fails. It is often the case that creditors give debtors items that the creditors believe the debtors will put to good use and from which the debtors will profit, so as to be able to pay the creditors. PepsiCo’s “understanding” with CL apparently did not limit the use that CL could make of any particular Lee Way asset; PepsiCo has alleged no such limitation. Indeed, CL’s offering papers make it plain that sale of assets was not only contemplated by the parties, but was a vital part of the deal. If CL did not sell assets, it would not have been able to buy Lee Way in the first place. PepsiCo’s allegations therefore raise no more than a claim of generalized harm to the estate and creditors of CL and Lee Way. This claim is properly asserted by the bankruptcy trustee, see 11 U.S.C. § 547, unless it is abandoned, see 11 U.S.C. § 554, a circumstance not present here.
PepsiCo nevertheless argues that, if its claim is facially valid, it may bring it outside of the bankruptcy proceedings. We reject this argument. Although we have held that RICO actions against principals of bankrupt corporations may be brought concurrently with a bankruptcy proceeding,
see Bankers Trust,
Furthermore, the Bankers Court rejected Bankers’ argument that it could bring a RICO action to recover for its lost debt, and specified that
[i]t is the bankruptcy court, in the first instance, that has power to appoint a trustee, to order the claim abandoned by the trustee so that Bankers may proceed, or to grant some other relief from the automatic stay. Any argument and decision on this point should thus take place, in the first instance, in the bankruptcy court.
Bankers Trust,
For these reasons, we believe that Pepsi-Co has no claim under Ohio law for injury suffered when Banner allegedly caused CL to strip Lee Way of its assets. Even if PepsiCo has stated a valid claim, it has not *707 taken the proper action in the bankruptcy court to enable it to proceed independently.
Finally, we realize that “jurisdiction may be proper in more than one forum,”
First City Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. v. Simmons,
CONCLUSION
Because the causes of action asserted by PepsiCo should, under the Bankruptcy Code, be asserted by the bankruptcy trustee, and because PepsiCo has not obtained either an order granting relief from the automatic stay or an order finding that the trustee has abandoned the claims asserted here, and because PepsiCo does not have a particularized and direct injury traceable to Banner, PepsiCo lacks standing in this Court. The judgment of the district court dismissing the third-party complaint is affirmed. No costs.
Notes
. It is not clear why PepsiCo has paid St. Paul more than the amount demanded in St. Paul's complaint. Apparently, however, other bonds exist on which PepsiCo may be liable to St. Paul.
. As a corollary to this, we note that the district court should have dismissed St. Paul’s entire complaint as moot, instead of denying its summary judgment motion as moot and placing the matter on the suspense docket of the court.
See Deakins v. Monaghan,
.
Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass,
