BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS & OPPORTUNITIES ET AL.
SC 20696
Supreme Court of Connecticut
September 6, 2022
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D‘Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.
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Syllabus
Pursuant to statute (
Pursuant further to statute (
The defendant M filed a complaint with the named defendant, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, on behalf of his minor child, A, alleging that the plaintiff board of education had discriminated against A on the basis of A‘s mental disability. A, who had been diagnosed with several mental and cognitive disorders, attended a public magnet school, where he initially was enrolled as a special education student who was entitled to an individualized education plan and special accommodation services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (
- The board could not prevail on its claim that the trial court incorrectly determined that the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim that the board violated the ADA and to identify ADA violations for purposes of determining whether
§ 46a-58 (a) had been violated; the board conceded at oral argument before this court that its claim was controlled by this court‘s recent conclusion in Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert (343 Conn. 90), made in the context of a discrimination claim predicated on a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ), that the language of§ 46a-58 (a) unambiguously confers on the commission the authority to identify violations of federal civil rights laws for the purpose of determining whether state law has been violated and that, when the commission finds a violation of federal antidiscrimination law as a factual predicate to a violation of§ 46a-58 (a) , it does so as a matter of state law. - The trial court correctly determined that M was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing the complaint with the commission on A‘s behalf: although the board failed to raise the exhaustion issue in the proceedings before the referee, that claim implicated the commission‘s subject matter jurisdiction, an issue that could be raised at any time, and, therefore, that issue properly was before the trial court and this court; moreover, although a party is required to exhaust his or her available administrative remedies provided by state law (
§ 10-76h ) before he or she may file a civil action seeking relief for the denial of a free and appropriate public education, M‘s complaint did not seek such relief, as the claims therein could have been brought outside of the school setting, and the fact that A was unable to take advantage of the educational services at the magnet school as a result of the board‘s unilateral actions did not convert M‘s claim for discrimination on the basis of A‘s disability into a claim for a denial of a free and appropriate education; furthermore, the history of the proceedings in the present case bolstered this court‘s conclusion that the complaint did not seek relief for the denial of a free and appropriate education, as A‘s parents never invoked formal procedures pursuant to§ 10-76h , they did not ask the referee during the proceedings on the complaint to order the board to reenroll A at the magnet school, to designate him as a special education student, or to provide him with appropriate educational services, and there was no reason to believe that they wanted or would be entitled to such relief in light of the fact that A had since been enrolled in a school in another district, where he was receiving a free and appropriate education. - The board‘s claim that the referee incorrectly determined that a public school is a place of public accommodation pursuant to
§ 46a-64 did not implicate the commission‘s subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, was not reviewable: contrary to the board‘s contention that its claim could be raised at any time because it implicated the board‘s subject matter jurisdiction, the claim regarding the proper interpretation of the phrase “place of public accommodation” alleged that the commission had failed to establish an element of a statutory remedy, which implicated the commission‘s statutory authority and the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the commission‘s jurisdiction, and, in the present case, the claim that M raised in his complaint, that the board had violated§ 46a-64 by discriminating against A on the basis of his disabilities in a place of public accommodation, was within the class of claims that the commission has authority or competence to decide.
Argued April 27—officially released September 6, 2022
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the human rights referee for the named defendant, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, awarding damages to the claimant in an action alleging discrimination by the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, where the court, Cohn, J., ren-dered judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
Michael E. Roberts, human rights attorney, with whom was Megan K. Grant, human rights attorney, for the appellee (named defendant).
Opinion
KAHN, J. A was a student with disabilities enrolled in the John C. Daniels Interdistrict Magnet School of International Communication (John Daniels), a public school located in New Haven. His father, M, filed a complaint with the named defendant, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), alleging that the plaintiff, the Board of Education of the City of New Haven (board), had discriminated against A on the basis of his disabilities by unilaterally withdrawing him from the school. A human rights referee concluded that the board had discriminated against A on the basis of his disabilities and awarded damages of $25,000. The board appealed to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal. The board then filed this appeal,1 claiming that the trial court incorrectly determined that (1) the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate A‘s claim, pursuant to
The record reveals the following facts that were found by the commission or that are undisputed. In February, 2010, M submitted an application for A to attend kindergarten at John Daniels. John Daniels is open to all state residents, and admission is determined by a lottery system. See
A was diagnosed with several mental and cognitive disorders, including Asperger‘s syndrome, childhood disintegrative disorder, attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder and “anxiety [disorder not otherwise specified].” As the result of these disorders, A had difficulty coping with large groups of children and with overstimulating or chaotic environments. His symptoms included “inconsistent regression in normal development, poor social skills, sensory issues, difficulty managing feelings, auditory and visual hallucinations, challenges with concentration and focus, poor processing skills and difficulty with transitions.” A also physically manifested these disorders in a variety of ways, including shaking his hands up and down, making unusual facial expressions and using distorted speech.
A was accepted as a student at John Daniels and began attending in September, 2010. Because of his various disorders, A was enrolled as a special education student entitled under the IDEA to an individualized education plan and special accommodation services. Between September, 2010, and March, 2011, A‘s parents sought and received a number of accommodations for him, including transportation to and from school on a smaller school bus and an additional snack during the school day.
On September 16, 2010, M sent an email to the principal of John Daniels, Gina Wells, in which he thanked her for informing him about the “buddy” who had been assigned to A and indicating that, if Wells had provided the information earlier, much confusion and misunderstanding could have been avoided. Wells forwarded the email to the assistant principal, Marlene
On March 29, 2011, A was injured at school when another child pulled on his clothing and he fell. A‘s mother took him to the emergency department at Yale New Haven Hospital, where it was determined that he had suffered a concussion. Upon his discharge, A‘s parents were given a “return to school certificate,” indicating that he could return to school when he was symptom free for twenty-four hours. In the days following his injury, A continued to have symptoms, including disorientation, malaise and headaches. A‘s parents spoke to his primary care physician, who recommended that he stay at home until he was symptom free.
When A failed to return to school, Wells and the board‘s truancy department made several phone calls to his parents. On April 8, 2011, the board requested a “student absence inquiry” report, which indicated that, during the school year, A had had sixteen excused absences and ten unexcused absences. Eight of the unexcused absences occurred after A‘s injury. After obtaining the report, the board sent a habitual truancy notice to A‘s parents, which indicated that a copy of the notice would be sent to court. M retained an attorney, Patricia Kaplan, to represent him in the truancy proceeding.
Meanwhile, A‘s parents had requested a planning and placement team meeting to discuss whether A was eligible for special education services. On April 8, 2011, Lou Faiella, a certified legal intern with the Quinnipiac Law School legal clinic, which represented A and his parents, sent an email to Kathleen Cassell, a board administrator, requesting that the meeting be cancelled because A‘s
parents had decided that “this [was] not the route that they would like to take at this time.”5 On April 13, 2011, Amy Vatner, an advocate with African Caribbean American Parents of Children with Disabilities, sent an email to Wells and Maralyn Klatzkin, a special education teacher, indicating that A‘s parents would be filing a request for mediation with the state Department of Education. Wells forwarded
A planning and placement team meeting took place at the office of the board‘s superintendent on May 5, 2011. M, Cassell, Klatzkin, Lorna Link, a school psychologist, Kasey Masa, a teacher, Donna Kosiorowski, a nurse and § 504 coordinator, Michelle Laubin, attorney for the board, Wells, Virginia Bauer, assistant director of West Haven pupil services, Typhanie Jackson, the board‘s director of student services, and Vatner attended the meeting. M indicated that he was concerned that A was no longer designated as a special education student and, therefore, was no longer entitled to an individualized education plan. He also stated that A would not be returning to school until he was cleared to do so by his physicians and expressed an interest in obtaining homebound services for A. When M was questioned about A‘s continued absence from school, he attempted to present a handwritten letter from A‘s physician regarding his medical status and his diagnosis of post-concussion syndrome. The board declined to accept the letter because, according to the planning and placement team, it was illegible, undated, and not on the physician‘s letterhead. Upon leaving the meeting, M understood that he needed to obtain another letter from A‘s physician and that A would return to John Daniels as soon as his physicians medically cleared him.
Immediately after the meeting, however, Jackson, acting on behalf of the New Haven board, obtained a form for withdrawal from John Daniels, filled it out with A‘s information and signed it. Although the form had signature lines for the parents of the withdrawing student, neither of A‘s parents was asked to sign it. The board did not notify A‘s parents that he had been withdrawn.
On May 16, 2011, A‘s physician prepared a typewritten note indicating that A was still having symptoms from his concussion and recommending that he return to
school at the beginning of the next school year. M faxed the note to Kaplan, who forwarded it to John Daniels on or about June 2, 2011.
Later in June, 2011, M learned that A had been withdrawn from John Daniels when he stopped by the board‘s office and an unidentified woman informed him of the withdrawal. He also was shown a copy of the withdrawal form at that time. After speaking to Jackson about the withdrawal and questioning her about its legality, it appeared to him that the board was not going to allow A to return to John Daniels. Because A‘s parents believed that A would not be allowed to return to John Daniels, and because they were uncertain at the time whether they would still be living in
On November 1, 2011, M filed a complaint with the commission alleging that the board had engaged in unlawful discrimination on the basis of mental disability when it withdrew A from John Daniels. On October 4, 2013, M filed an amended complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the board had discriminated against A in violation of
Will Clark, the board‘s chief operating officer, testified at the hearing before the human rights referee that the board did not have a policy in 2011 of withdrawing students for habitual truancy. Jackson testified that a child never would be withdrawn from school on the basis of a medical condition. She further testified that a child who was receiving homebound services would not be withdrawn.8
The human rights referee concluded that a public school is a place of public accommodation for purposes of
The board appealed from the referee‘s ruling to the trial court. After hearing oral arguments, the trial court remanded the matter to the human rights referee for a determination of whether the board had violated the ADA.9 On remand, the board claimed that, because the complaint was actually seeking relief for the denial of a free and appropriate education (FAPE) under the IDEA, M was required to exhaust his remedies for an IDEA violation before he could seek relief pursuant to the ADA. In her articulation, the human rights referee noted that the board had not raised that claim previously, and the trial court had not requested that she address the issue in the remand order. Nevertheless, the referee concluded that the complaint did not raise “a FAPE claim.” The referee further noted that, to the extent
The trial court upheld the decision of the human rights referee. With respect to the board‘s claim that the commission had no jurisdiction over A‘s claim because he failed to exhaust his remedies pursuant to the IDEA, the court concluded that there was no exhaustion requirement because the claim raised in the complaint was properly characterized as a claim of discrimination on the basis of physical disability, not a claim for a FAPE. The court also rejected the board‘s claim that the commission had no jurisdiction to adjudicate claims pursuant to the ADA. The court declined to consider the board‘s claim that that the human rights referee had incorrectly determined that a public school is a place of public accommodation because the board did not raise that issue in the proceedings before the referee. After considering the board‘s other claims, the trial court concluded that they were without merit and dismissed the appeal.11
This appeal followed. The board claims on appeal that the trial court incorrectly determined that the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim that the board violated the ADA and that M was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the IDEA before he could bring his claims pursuant to
accommodation.
I
We first address the board‘s claim that the trial court incorrectly determined that the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim that the board violated the ADA. In support of this claim, the board makes two arguments. First, it contends that, to the extent that the commission has been designated as a “deferral agency” under federal law with the authority to adjudicate ADA claims, its authority is coextensive with the authority of the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).12 According to the board, in a proceeding under Title II of the ADA (Title II),
Whether the commission has the authority to identify violations of the
At oral argument before this court, the board conceded that this court‘s recent decision in Gilbert is controlling in the present case. In Gilbert, the plaintiff, the Connecticut Judicial Branch (branch), contended that the commission had no authority under
marks omitted) id., 102; unambiguously “conferred on the commission the authority to identify violations of federal civil rights laws . . . .” Id., 103. With respect to the branch‘s contention that, because the relevant federal statute authorized only federal courts to formally resolve Title VII claims, the EEOC had no such authority and, in turn, the commission had no such authority; see id., 105-106; this court concluded that “the branch [relied] on a non sequitur insofar as the commission has never purported to adjudicate Title VII claims . . . .” Id., 107. Rather, ”
As we indicated, the board concedes in the present case that our reasoning in Gilbert with respect to Title VII claims applies equally to the board‘s claim that the commission has no authority to adjudicate claims pursuant to Title II of the ADA. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the commission has the authority to identify ADA violations for purposes of determining whether
II
We next address the board‘s contention that the commission lacked jurisdiction over the ADA claim because the substance of the claim is that A was denied a FAPE under the IDEA, and, therefore, M was required by
As a preliminary matter, we consider whether this issue is properly before us when the board failed to raise the issue in the proceedings before the human rights referee.18 See, e.g., Ferraro v. Ridgefield European Motors, Inc., 313 Conn. 735, 759 (2014) (rule that reviewing court is not required to consider claim unless it was distinctly raised before initial decision maker applies to appeals from administrative proceedings). Because the board claims that M failed to exhaust his remedies under the IDEA before filing his complaint with the commission, the claim implicates the commission‘s subject matter jurisdiction. Cf., e.g., Garcia v. Hartford, 292 Conn. 334, 338-39 (2009) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies implicates trial court‘s subject matter jurisdiction). A
claim that an agency lacked subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. E.g., Ross v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 118 Conn. App. 55, 60 (2009). We conclude, therefore, that the issue was properly before the trial court and is properly before this court.
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that, as the commission points out, this court has held that an agency is competent, and must be given the opportunity, to determine its own jurisdiction before a party can challenge the agency‘s jurisdiction in court.19 See Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 215 Conn. 616, 622 (1990). In Cannata, the named defendant, the Department of Environmental Protection (department), ordered the plaintiffs to cease and desist from cutting down trees in an area subject to certain environmental regulations because they had failed to obtain a permit. Id., 619-20. The plaintiffs appealed from the order to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal because they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by applying for a permit. Id., 620. The plaintiffs then appealed to this court, claiming that the department had no jurisdiction over their activities. We observed that, “[w]hen a particular statute authorizes an administrative agency to act in a particular situation it necessarily confers [on] such agency authority to determine whether the situation is such as to authorize the agency to act—that is, to determine the coverage of the statute—and this question need not, and in fact cannot, be initially decided by a court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 623. Accordingly, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., 633.
We conclude that Cannata is distinguishable from the present case. First, unlike the plaintiffs in Cannata, the board did not deliberately bypass an administrative proceeding that could have provided adequate administrative relief when it raised the exhaustion claim in the trial court.20 Rather, its failure to raise the
Second, we emphasized in Cannata that the jurisdictional issue in that case involved “factual determina-
tions best left to the [department]. This is precisely the type of situation that calls for agency expertise. Relegating these determinations to the [department] in the first instance will provide a complete record containing the [department‘s] interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions for judicial review.” Id., 627. In the present case, the jurisdictional claim involves the proper interpretation of state and federal statutory schemes that are not administered by the commission and that this court is equally competent to interpret.21 Moreover, there is no claim that the record is inadequate for review of the issue. Accordingly, we conclude that we may review the claim.
We turn, therefore, to the merits of the board‘s claim that the commission lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint because M was required by
The IDEA requires that, “before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter [of the IDEA], the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.”
that it claims that M would be required to exhaust the available state remedies provided by
We must determine, therefore, whether the complaint filed with the commission, in fact, sought relief for the denial of a FAPE. “To make this determination, we look to the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, [580 U.S. 154 (2017)], for guidance . . . .” Graham v. Friedlander, supra, 334 Conn. 580. Under Fry, courts making this determination should consider two factors. Id. “The
“The first factor—whether the claim could have been brought outside the school setting—can be evaluated in the form of two hypothetical questions: First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school—say, a public theater or library? And second, could an adult at the school—say, an employee or visitor—have pressed essentially the same grievance? . . . If the answer to both questions is yes, then it is unlikely that the complaint is about the denial of a FAPE.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 581.
Applying these factors in the present case, we conclude that M‘s complaint did not, in fact, seek relief for the denial of a FAPE. We acknowledge at the outset that our analysis is somewhat hampered by the informal and nontechnical pleading requirements in discrimination proceedings before the commission. We note, for example, that M was not required to, and did not, specify the relief that he was seeking in the complaint that he filed on A‘s behalf. Nevertheless, viewing the complaint and the proceedings before the commission in their entirety and in the light most favorable to a finding of jurisdiction, we are persuaded that M was not required to exhaust his remedies under
In reaching this conclusion, our decision in Graham v. Friedlander, supra, 334 Conn. 564, is instructive. In Graham, we concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint alleging that the defendants, including the Norwalk Board of Education, had engaged in negligent hiring and supervision of various persons and entities that had provided autism related services to the plaintiffs’ children, was not, in fact, a claim for the denial of a FAPE; id., 566-67; because “the plaintiffs could have brought essentially the same claim if they attended a
municipal summer camp that touted a unique special needs program . . . [but] was run by uncertified and unqualified staff.” Id., 581. Similarly, in the present case, M could have filed a complaint with the commission containing the same claim if a municipal summer camp for children with special needs had unilaterally dismissed A on the basis of his post-concussion syndrome.
We further concluded in Graham that “an adult participating in a municipally funded behavioral therapy treatment program offered in the evenings at a school could also bring the same claim for regression resulting from services provided by an uncertified and unqualified behavior therapist.” Id., 582. Similarly, in the present case, an adult could bring the same claim if he or she were unilaterally dismissed from such a program on the basis of a physical disability.
The board disputes these conclusions and contends that, because the gravamen of M‘s complaint was that A was deprived of special education services, M was seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE. Specifically, the board contends that, “[b]ecause this case ultimately involves [A‘s] disenrollment from the school immediately after a [planning and placement team] meeting was held to discuss [A‘s] designation as a special education student, the alleged conduct is limited to the school setting. No other public facility can designate a student as ‘special education’ or provide a student with access to special education services, and, conversely, no other public
We used the following hypothetical to illustrate this point: “If a teacher hits a special education student over the head and the student misses school for two weeks due to a concussion, the child could still bring an assault claim against the teacher, even though one of the harms alleged in the complaint could be that the child did not receive special education services for two weeks while recovering from the injury. The mere acknowledgment that the child received inadequate services for two weeks would not [however] make the claim one for the
denial of a FAPE. The claim would remain one for assault.” Id., 586-87. Similarly, in the present case, the fact that A was unable to take advantage of the educational services offered at John Daniels when the board unilaterally withdrew him from the school because of his post-concussion syndrome does not convert his claim for discrimination on the basis of disability into a claim for a denial of a FAPE. The former claim “impli-cate[s] those . . . intangible consequences of discrimination . . . such as stigmatization and deprivation of opportunities for enriching interaction with [his former] fellow students“; (internal quotation marks omitted) Lawton v. Success Academy Charter School, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 3d 353, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); whereas the latter claim implicates a loss of educational services.
The second Fry factor—the history of the proceedings—bolsters our conclusion. Although A‘s parents were undoubtedly seeking a FAPE while A was enrolled at John Daniels, including filing a request for a mediation with the state Board of Education to restore A‘s designation as a special education student, they never invoked the formal procedures for filing a due process complaint or requesting a hearing pursuant to
To support its claim to the contrary, the board relies on the Appellate Court‘s recent decision in Phillips v. Hebron, 201 Conn. App. 810 (2020).25 In Phillips, the minor plaintiff, who had been diagnosed with Down syndrome and was without functional speech, attended kindergarten in an elementary school in the town of Hebron. Id., 812. During a visit to the school, the plaintiff‘s father discovered that the plain-
tiff‘s desk and chair were located in the coatroom of the kindergarten classroom. Id., 813. Subsequent inquiries revealed that the plaintiff slept 2.5 hours per day in the coatroom and spent 40 minutes per day on average working on classwork or projects in that space. Id., 813-14. The plaintiff‘s father submitted a special education complaint form (state complaint) and a request for a due process hearing to the Bureau of Special Education. Id., 815. The state complaint sought, among other things, modifications to the plaintiff‘s individualized education plan. Id. After the defendant Hebron Board of Education filed a motion to dismiss the request for a due process hearing, the plaintiff‘s father withdrew the request and asked the department to investigate the state complaint. Id., 816. Upon concluding its investigation, the department issued a report in which it found that the plaintiff had not been denied a FAPE and stated that the parties were entitled to request a due process hearing if they disagreed with the report‘s conclusions. Id. The plaintiff‘s father did not file a request for a hearing but, instead, brought an action against the Hebron Board of Education and certain of its employees, alleging, among other things, that they had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in violation of
On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded that, read in the context of the core allegations of the complaint; namely, that the defendants had violated the plaintiff‘s rights under the IDEA; id., 835; the plaintiff‘s purported discrimination claims, in fact, sought “redress for the defendants’ failure to provide a FAPE . . . .” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 839. The court reasoned that, under the first Fry factor, “the plaintiff could not sue a public facility for failing to educate him in the least restrictive environment; nor could an adult sue the school on such a basis.” Id. Applying the second Fry factor, the history of the proceedings, the court observed that, before the plaintiff‘s father filed the complaint, he sought a due process hearing on the ground that the plaintiff had been denied a FAPE. Id., 841. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court‘s judgment with respect to the exhaustion issue. Id., 845.
We are not persuaded by the board‘s contention that the Appellate Court‘s decision in Phillips supports its position. As we explained, unlike the complaint in Phillips, the complaint in the present case did not allege that the board had violated A‘s rights under the IDEA or, indeed, make any reference to the IDEA or to A‘s right to a FAPE, and, unlike the plaintiff in Phillips, neither A nor his parents ever invoked the administra-tive proceedings designed to remedy the denial of a
FAPE. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court correctly determined that M was not required to exhaust his remedies pursuant to
III
Finally, we address the board‘s claim that the commission lacked jurisdiction over M‘s claim pursuant to
This court previously has had occasion to discuss the “ongoing confusion as to whether the failure to plead or prove an essential fact [for purposes of invoking a statutory remedy] implicates the [tribunal‘s] subject matter jurisdiction or its statutory authority.” In re Jose B., 303 Conn. 569, 572 (2012). We noted in In re Jose B. that, “[o]nce it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 574. We further noted that the question of whether the action belongs to the class of cases that the tribunal has authority to decide is “[s]eparate and distinct from the question of whether a [tribunal] . . . properly exercises its statutory authority to act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 574-75. A challenge to the tribunal‘s statutory authority “raises a claim of statutory construction that is not jurisdictional.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 573. After discussing a number of cases in which this court and the Appellate Court applied these principles with disparate results, we con-cluded that a claim that a party has failed to allege or to establish an element of a statutory remedy implicates the tribunal‘s statutory authority and the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the tribunal‘s subject matter jurisdiction.27 Id., 579.
In the present case, the complaint alleged that the board had violated
to decide. We conclude, therefore, that the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. See id., 574.
In support of its claim to the contrary, the board essentially contends that, because a public school is not a place of public accommodation as a matter of law, the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree. In the cases that we cited in our discussion in In re Jose B. regarding the distinction between statutory authority and subject matter jurisdiction, the alleged jurisdictional deficiencies also involved questions of law.28 We concluded that the trial court‘s jurisdiction was not implicated in any of these cases, but, instead, the claims implicated the trial court‘s statutory authority and the legal sufficiency of the complaints. Id., 579. We conclude, therefore, that the board‘s claim that the trial referee incorrectly determined that a public school is a place of public accommodation is not reviewable because it does not implicate the commission‘s subject matter jurisdiction.29
In summary, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the commission had jurisdiction to identify violations of the ADA for the purpose of determining whether the board violated
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.