Jоanne BADGETT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 11-01363 (TFH).
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Feb. 25, 2013.
Georgia. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Andrew J. Saindon, D.C. Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THOMAS F. HOGAN, District Judge.
Plaintiffs, 34 former employees of the District of Columbia’s Department of Parks and Recreation, brought this action seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief against the District of Columbia. The claims originate from Plaintiffs’ dismissal from their positions pursuant tо a reduction-in-force. Plaintiffs’ five count Complaint alleges they were wrongfully terminated from their positions and that the District violated their Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights during their administrative appeal of the reduction-in-force.
Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment1 [Dkt. No. 3], Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 7] and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Supplement the Record In Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 15]. Upon careful consideration of the motions, responses thereto, and the record in this matter, the Court grants the District’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ federal law claims (Counts I-IV); denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; dismisses Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claim (Count V) without prejudice; and dismisses Plaintiffs’ Motion to Supplement the Record In Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court lacks no familiarity with the parties in this action nor the circumstances from which the action arises. Indeed, the present suit reprеsents the third action, all originating from the same essential facts, brought against the District Defendants within the last three years. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Local 2741 v. District of Columbia, 689 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C.2009) (“AFGE I”); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Local 2741 v. District of Columbia, No. 2009 CA 8263 (D.C.Super.Ct. June 23, 2011) (“AFGE II ”).
Plaintiffs were among those whose positions were eliminated through the RIF. Id. ¶ 1. According to Plaintiffs, the District “intentionally” and “maliciously” manufactured the budgetary shortfall “in order to justify [the] closure of child care centers and contract[] out services originally provided by OES.” Id. ¶ 10. They allege, the District did so by: intentionally suppressing program enrollment figures; declining to apply for federal funding for the programs; and unlawfully reallocating some $4 million in appropriated funds. Id. ¶ 28. The following actions ensued.
A. Prior Litigation
In August of 2009, individual OES employees, Local 2741, and its bargaining unit members filed suit in this Court seeking to enjoin the RIF. See AFGE I, 689 F.Supp.2d at 33. Relying on
Weeks after this Court dismissed AFGE I, Local 2741, its bargaining unit members, and 34 individually named DPR employees filed a complaint against the District of Columbia in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. Their amended complaint alleged numerous violations of District law. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Local 2741 v. District of Columbia, No. 2009-CA-8263 (D.C.Super.Ct. June 23, 2011) (attached as Ex. 1 to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss) [Dkt. No. 7-1]. Also finding the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies, the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 7.
B. Appeal to the Office of Employee Appeals
Plaintiffs eventually turned to the administrative process prescribed by the Comprehensive Merit Protection Act (“CMPA”),
C. Present Action
Counts I-III of Plaintiffs’ five-count Complaint allege Plaintiffs were terminated without an opportunity to be heard in violation of their Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights; Count IV alleges the OEA’s delay constituted a violation of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment; and Count V alleges wrongful termination in violation of District law. Both sides hаve filed dispositive motions in this matter. Plaintiffs seek partial summary judgment. The District seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56(a) provides “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court’s power to hear a case. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (citations omitted). When challenged on the issue, the party asserting subject-matter jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that the court does in fact have subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824, 828 (D.C.Cir.2007).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court first addresses, and ultimately rejects, the District’s arguments that Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, under the doctrine of res judicata. The Court then turns to Plaintiffs’ due process claims and concludes Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed.
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Defendants argue the CMPA represents the sole recourse for Plaintiffs’ grievances and divests this Court of jurisdiction to hear their claims. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 10-11. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is dominated by federal law claims arising under
B. Res Judicata
Defendants also invoke the doctrine of res judicata to argue the litigation in AFGE I and II precludes Plaintiffs’ claims here. “The doctrine of res judicata prevents repetitious litigation involving the same causes of action or the same issues.” Sheppard v. District of Columbia, 791 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear Mfg. Co., 723 F.2d 944, 946 (D.C.Cir.1983)). The preclusive effects of res judicata come in two forms—claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See NextWave Pers. Communs., Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130, 143 (D.C.Cir.2001). “Under the claim preclusion aspect of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars subsequent suits based on the same cause of action.” Id. (quoting I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund, 723 F.2d at 946–47). “Whether two cases implicate the same cause of action turns on whether they share the sаme nucleus of facts.” Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, 393 F.3d 210, 217 (D.C.Cir.2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, “a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies
The doctrine’s preclusive effects do not extend to the claims now raised by Plaintiffs. In AFGE I, the plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim was dismissed because the plaintiffs had yet to exploit available administrative remedies. See AFGE I, 689 F.Supp.2d at 35.4 In light of the OEA’s resolutiоn of Plaintiffs’ appeals and Plaintiffs’ decision not to appeal, Plaintiffs have now effectively exhausted their administrative remedies. See
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ due process claims—both procedural and substantive—based on the OEA’s delayed resolution of Plaintiffs’ appeals, are not claim precluded because they rely on facts which materialized after the resolution of the prior litigation. Drake, 291 F.3d at 66 (“[r]es judicata does not preclude claims based on facts not yet in existence at the time of the original action” (citation omitted)). At the time of filing AFGE I and II, Plaintiffs had not initiated the administrative proceedings, let alone suffered the delay which forms the predicate for their claims.
C. Federal Constitutional Claims
Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims sound under
Pursuant to § 1983, Plaintiffs allege their Fifth Amendment rights were violated when they were deprived of a constitutionally-protected interest in their employment without due process of law. More specifically, Counts I-III of Plaintiffs’ Complaint allege procedural due process violations and Count IV alleges a substаntive due process violation. Counts I-III may be further distinguished in that Count II alleges the District’s statutory scheme denied Plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard, in violation of their procedural due process rights, while Counts I and III are premised on the OEA’s delayed ruling on Plaintiffs’ appeals.
1. Count II—procedural due process claim based on the District’s statutory scheme
The second count of Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges the District’s statutory scheme denied Plaintiffs an opportunity to
“A procedural due process violation occurs when an official deprives an individual of a liberty or property interest without providing appropriate procedural protections.” Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 689 (D.C.Cir.2009). To establish a violation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must establish two things. First, that they “had a protected property interest in [their] job.” Thompson v. District of Columbia, 530 F.3d 914, 918 (D.C.Cir.2008). Second, assuming they possessed a protected interest, a plaintiff must show they were deprived of the interest without due process of law. See Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C.Cir.1991).
Of course, “[o]nce it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208 (D.C.Cir.2001). However the timing and extent of the process due is circumstance dependent. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893 (“[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural pro5tections as the particular situation demands” (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593)).
Plaintiffs argue that as career service employees under
Under District law, Plaintiffs had at their disposal a number of procedural safeguards to protect against the deprivation of their prоtected property interest without due process. First, Plaintiffs were entitled to challenge whether the statutorily prescribed RIF notice and separation procedures were followed.
[u]nder the law of both the District of Columbia and this Cirсuit, an employee with a property interest in his job has the right to due process if he raises a non-frivolous claim that his employer eliminated his job, not as a genuine cost-saving measure, but as a pretext for getting rid of him.
Thompson, 530 F.3d at 918 (emphasis in original); see also Anjuwan v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Pub. Works, 729 A.2d 883, 885 (D.C.1998); Levitt v. District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals, 869 A.2d 364, 366 (D.C.2005).
Furthermore, if Plaintiffs believed their termination was motivated by some discriminatory purpose, they were entitled to raise a challenge before the OEA or file a complaint in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia.6 See
Assessing Plaintiffs’ claim against this procedural backdrop, Count II cannot survive because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the available process was inadequate or that they were denied the aforementioned protections. Nothing in the record for this matter reflects Plaintiffs sought, but were denied, a hearing on their claims of pretext before the OEA.7 Had this been the case, Plaintiffs were entitled to multiple levels of judicial review. Seе Levitt, 869 A.2d at 366 (reversing OEA’s dismissal of employee’s appeal of RIF for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanding for evidentiary hearing on employee’s claim of pretext). Instead, Plaintiffs stipulated before the OEA that the OEA lacked jurisdiction over their claims. See Initial Decision at 3; Compl. ¶ 40. The OEA’s decisions thus only addressed whether the required notice and separation procedures were complied with and, finding they had been, upheld Plaintiffs’ dismissal pursuant to the RIF. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim alleging denial of the opportunity to be heard cannot survive where Plaintiffs themselves eschewed the opportunity to exploit the very procedural safeguards which they argue they were denied. See Yates v. District of Columbia, 324 F.3d 724, 726 (D.C.Cir.2003).
2. Counts I and III—procedural due process claims based on administrative delay
Counts I and III of Plaintiffs’ Complaint allege the OEA’s delayed ruling on their appeals also constituted a violation of their procedural due process rights. More specifically, Count I alleges the agency’s delay denied them an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time, Compl. ¶¶ 51-53, while Count III alleges the agency’s delay in contravention of District law constitutes a per se violation of their procedural due process rights. Id. ¶ 71. Neither claim survives the District’s motion.
Nonetheless, there are circumstances under which administrative delay may be so severe that it amounts to a procedural due process violation. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (“[a]t some point, a delay in the post-termination hearing would become a constitutional violation”). However, where, as here, procedural safeguards exist to obviate prejudice from delay and a plaintiff fails to takе advantage of those measures, no such constitutional violation occurs. See New York State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Pataki, 261 F.3d 156, 169 (2d Cir.2001); Medina v. District of Columbia, 517 F.Supp.2d 272, 284 (D.D.C.2007).
Plaintiffs were not without recourse in the face of the OEA’s grievous delay. Plaintiffs could have, under the procedures proscribed by D.C. Court of Appeals Rule 21, sought a writ of mandamus compelling agency action. See Medina, 517 F.Supp.2d at 283; Yeager v. Greene, 502 A.2d 980, 981 n. 3 (D.C.1985) (“the writ of mandamus is technically used as a form to require an official to perform an affirmative, mandatory action ...”). Additionally, under § 2-510 of the District of Columbia’s Administrative Proсedures Act, Plaintiffs could have petitioned the D.C. Court of Appeals “[t]o compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”
3. Count IV—substantive due process claim
Count IV of Plaintiffs Complaint alleges the OEA’s delay in rendering a decision on Plaintiffs’ appeal constitute a violation of their Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights.
As this Court noted in AFGE I, on a substantive due procеss claim based on executive action, the “threshold question is whether the behavior . . . [was] so egregious, so outrageous, that it may be fairly said to shock the contemporary conscience.” AFGE I, 689 F.Supp.2d at 36 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)). In other words, “plaintiffs would need to demonstrate ‘an act of grave unfairness,’ such as ‘a deliberate flouting of the law’ . . .” AFGE, AFL-CIO, Local 2798 v. Pope, 808 F.Supp.2d 99, 111 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting in part Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, Local 446 v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 341, 353 (D.C.Cir.2007)). “Inadvertent errors, honest mistakes, agency confusion, even negligence in the performance of official duties, do not warrant redress . . .” Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C.Cir.1988) (citation omitted).
Here, to be sure, the length of time between the filing of Plaintiffs’ appeals and the resolution of those appeals is alarming. However, taking the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ Complaint as true, no set of facts therein establishes the sort of egregious and deliberate conduct necessary to prevail on a substantive due process violation claim. As such, Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim must be dismissed.
D. Wrongful Termination Claim under District Law
Count V of Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges wrongful termination in violation of District law. A federal district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising from the same common nucleus of facts as an action over which the court has original jurisdiction.
In light of the Court’s dismissal of all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims and upon consideration of the aforementioned factors, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiсtion over Plaintiffs’ wrongful termination claim. Judicial economy suggests dismissal. This matter is in a relatively early phase of litigation as it has not progressed beyond early dispositive motions and the Court has yet to address the substance of Plaintiffs’ local law claims. See Johnson v. District of Columbia, 869 F.Supp.2d 34, 37 (D.D.C.2012). Further, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction will not prevent Plaintiffs’ from pursuing their claim in state court. Under
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and grants the District’s Motion to Dismiss Counts I-IV. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count V and therefore dismisses the count without prejudice. Finally, in light of these dispositions, the pending Plaintiffs’ Motion to Supplement the Record In Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied as moot.
An appropriate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.