ANTOINE CLARK, as personal representative for Angelo Clark v. ROBERT COUPE, DOC Commissioner; PERRY PHELPS; DAVID PIERCE; MAJOR JEFFREY CARROTHERS; CAPTAIN BURTON; CAPTAIN RISPOLI; CAPTAIN WILLY; DR. WILLIAM RAY LYNCH; DR. PAOLA MUNOZ; DR. DAVID YUNIS; RHONDA MONTGOMERY; SUSAN MUMFORD; STEPHANIE D. JOHNSON; CONNECTIONS COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROGRAMS INC; STEFANIE STREETS; STEPHANIE EVANS-MITCHELL; CAROL VODVARKA; CAROL VANDRUNEN; LEZLEY SEXTON
No. 21-2310
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
November 28, 2022
RESTREPO, ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
PRECEDENTIAL; Argued: March 30, 2022; *(Amended pursuant to Clerk‘s Order dated 2/1/22)
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (D.C. No. 1-17-cv-00066) District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
Dwayne J. Bensing [ARGUED]
Susan L. Burke American Civil Liberties Union 100 West 10th Street Suite 706 Wilmington, DE 19801
Chad S.C. Stover Barnes & Thornburg 222 Delaware Avenue Suite 1200 Wilmington, DE 19801 Counsel for Appellant
Ryan T. Costa [ARGUED] Kenneth L. Wan Office of Attorney General of Delaware Delaware Department of Justice 6th Floor 820 North French Street Carvel Office Building Wilmington, DE 19801 Counsel for Appellee
Peter M. Slocum Lowenstein Sandler One Lowenstein Drive Roseland, NJ 07068 Counsel for Amicus Appellant National Disability Rights Network
Daniel Greenfield Northwestern Pritzker School of Law MacArthur Justice Center 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 Counsel for Amicus Appellant Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center
Laura L. Rovner Tempest Cantrell (law student) Chris Nafekh (law student) Katie Scruggs (law student) University of Denver
Civil Rights Clinic 2255 East Evans Avenue Suite 335 Denver, CO 80208 Counsel for Amicus Appellants Richard Morgan and Dan Pacholke
Brian Biggs DLA Piper 1201 North Market Street Suite 2100 Wilmington, DE 19801 Counsel for Amicus Appellant Professors and Practitioners of Psychiatry Psychology and Medicine
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
Angelo Clark, a prisoner diagnosed with manic depression and paranoid schizophrenia, brought an as-applied claim alleging his months-long placement in solitary confinement violated his constitutional rights.1
I.
A. Factual Allegations
The District Court dismissed Clark‘s conditions of confinement claim pursuant to
While an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC) in Delaware, Clark was placed in solitary confinement on or around January 22, 2016. Following an incident at mealtime involving another inmate, prison officials moved Clark to the Secure Housing Unit (SHU). App. 66, ¶ 50. By 2016, Clark had been treated for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder at the prison for at least ten years, a fact of which the prison officials were aware. App. 59, ¶ 5. Despite having few disciplinary “points” on his record and no security classification meriting solitary confinement, Clark remained in the SHU for seven months. App. 66, ¶¶ 50, 51.
Inside the SHU, Clark was alone in his cell except for three one-hour intervals per week. The SHU cells are approximately eleven by eight feet with solid doors and two four-inch-wide windows, one of which faced the hallway. App. 64, ¶ 39. The cell lights were on from approximately 6 a.m. to 11:30 p.m., which meant they were off for approximately six hours a day. Meals were delivered without human contact through a slot in the door. App. 59, ¶ 8.
Solitary confinement meant Clark was deprived of all opportunities to engage in “normal” human interaction; he was not allowed to work and prohibited from participating in educational programs or religious services. Id., ¶ 7. He was permitted only four phone calls and four visitors per month. App. 64, ¶ 40.
The JTVCC‘s policy regarding inmates in the SHU is that they must “earn their way out” by exhibiting appropriate behavior. App. 69, ¶ 68. While in isolation, Clark would “yell and bang on the door to get the attention of the [Department of Corrections] officials.” Id., ¶ 69. Prison officials considered these outbursts and Clark‘s inability to “calm[ ] down” to be
disciplinary incidents and would punish him by extending his stay in the SHU. When Clark would question why he remained in the SHU for “months and months,” prison officials would put him in the “naked room,” an isolation cell where he was given an open smock for clothing. App. 67, ¶ 57.
For the seven months, Clark was trapped in a “vicious cycle” where his mental illness would cause behavior that was punished by conditions that furthered his mental deterioration. App. 61, ¶ 13. Clark‘s extended stay in the SHU worsened his mental illness and caused lasting harm. As a result of the isolation, Clark experienced “increased hallucinations, paranoia, self-mutilation, sleeplessness, and nightmares.” App. 60, ¶ 12.
Clark further alleges defendants Commissioner Coupe and Warden Pierce knew of the American Correctional Association (ACA) study on the effects of solitary confinement on seriously mentally ill inmates, the results of which were published in March 2016—two months after Clark entered the SHU and five months before he was released. The ACA
recommended prisons implement measures to ensure the isolation would not exacerbate an inmate‘s mental illness.3 App. 72, ¶ 84. Warden Pierce participated in the ACA study in 2015. The study‘s report singled out Warden Pierce, stating that he is not “open to change in regards to restrictive housing objective and classification regarding the mentally ill,” and cited his authority “to over-ride decision[s] on classification and/or mentally ill treatment decisions.” App. 75, ¶ 94.
The complaint avers the ACA study, the “other prior lawsuits” against the JTVCC, and the prisons officials’ “familiarity with their own policy and practice” provided the DOC defendants with direct notice of the “extreme adverse effects” of holding seriously mentally ill inmates like Clark in solitary confinement.4 App. 73, ¶ 86.
B. District Court Proceedings
Clark sued JTVCC prison officials, including Commissioner Coupe and Warden Pierce, under
accused the defendants of inflicting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Parsing the
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the conditions of confinement claim that we address now. In his initial complaint, Clark alleged that—as a mentally ill inmate—the conditions of solitary confinement placed him at risk for serious substantial harm, and the prison‘s practice of placing inmates with known mental illness in the SHU is done with deliberate indifference to the “serious mental health implications of long term confinement in isolation.” App. 79, ¶ 113. Given the enhanced risk of substantial harm, Clark alleged this practice as applied to him constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Following the magistrate‘s recommendation, the District Court dismissed the conditions of confinement claim on qualified immunity grounds. The court concluded the law did not support Clark‘s claim “that housing a mentally ill inmate in solitary confinement for long periods of time violates
a clearly established Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.” App. 4 (citing App. 108). Accordingly, it ruled the prison officials were immune from suit. This appeal addresses that ruling.6
II.
Before addressing the propriety of the dismissal, however, we must address whether Clark is legally barred from raising this claim given the jury verdict deciding his other
First, we must determine which of these doctrines provides the appropriate framework for addressing the reviewability of the instant appeal. Here, the District Court allowed two of Clark‘s three
Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, addresses the effect a prior adjudication in a different case has on a current case; “it doesn‘t often have much to say about the preclusive effects of rulings within the framework of a continuing action.” Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2154 (2018) (plurality decision) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, collateral estoppel does not apply when two rulings are made at different stages within the same proceeding. United States v. Briseno, 843 F.3d 264, 270 (7th Cir. 2016). Instead, the “[r]elitigation of issues previously determined in the same litigation is controlled by principles of the law of the case doctrine rather than collateral estoppel.” Hull v. Freeman, 991 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). See also United States v. Reyes-Romero, 959 F.3d 80, 93 (3d Cir. 2020). Here, Clark‘s three
But the law of the case doctrine does not bar an appellate court from reviewing the propriety of the District Court‘s ruling. Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 924 F.2d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 1991). Instead, it is this Court‘s function to review the decisions of the District Court. Reyes-Romero, 959 F.3d at 93 (citing Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 716 (2016)). We are not bound by the District Court‘s decision to dismiss Clark‘s conditions of confinement claim and “owe no deference” to its findings beyond what the standard of review demands. Id. at 93.
Even if issue preclusion did apply, it would only bar the re-litigation of findings “truly essential” to the jury‘s verdict deciding Clark‘s other
Such a finding would run contrary to this Court‘s precedent, which treats conditions of confinement claims as separate and distinct from challenges addressing access to medical care. In Porter, we recognized the viability of a claim alleging the “substantial risk of serious psychological and physical harm” posed by solitary confinement without identifying the absence of mental health treatment as a necessary element. 874 F.3d at 441-42 (citing Williams v. Sec‘y Pennsylvania Dep‘t of Corrs., 848 F.3d 549, 566–68 (3d
Cir. 2017)). In Palakovic v. Wetzel, we held allegations that solitary confinement was “inhuman for [Palakovic] in light of his mental illness” averred a viable conditions of confinement claim without discussing his access to mental health treatment. 854 F.3d 209, 226 (3d Cir. 2017). Accordingly, we conclude that the jury‘s verdict does not preclude our review of Clark‘s “per se” solitary confinement claim.9
Finally, “issue preclusion ‘cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue.‘” Reyes-Romero, 959 F.3d at 93 (quoting United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol., PC, 923 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 2019)). Clark‘s conditions of confinement claim was denied on qualified immunity grounds; the District Court concluded there was no clearly established right preventing the placement of a mentally ill inmate in solitary confinement for an extended period of time. Clark appealed this ruling at the first possible instance, after final judgment was entered dismissing his case. Given that he has not had a “full and fair adjudication” of this issue, he cannot be estopped from pursuing the conditions of confinement claim on appeal. Id. (quoting 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(5)).
For these reasons, we reject the State‘s argument that the jury‘s verdict prevents this Court from reviewing the dismissal of his conditions of confinement claim. We now turn to whether that dismissal was proper as a matter of law.
III.
We review de novo a district court‘s dismissal of a claim based on the
IV.
Clark alleges his prolonged stay in solitary confinement, imposed by prison officials who knew he was mentally ill, caused him to suffer mental deterioration for no justifiable reason in violation of his
A. Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam)). In assessing whether qualified immunity was properly granted, we engage in a two-part analysis: (1) whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a right had been violated, and (2) whether that right was clearly established when it was allegedly violated to the extent “that it would have been clear to a reasonable person that his conduct was unlawful.” Williams, 848 F.3d at 557.
The District Court dismissed Clark‘s conditions of confinement claim based on the second part, finding no clearly established right, without addressing whether he sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation. We will do so now. Clark raised an as-applied challenge, alleging the particular conditions of his confinement violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In defining the right allegedly violated, we assess whether Clark‘s allegations show the conditions he endured were cruel and unusual, rather than determine if he succeeded in alleging a broader claim that solitary confinement of a mentally ill inmate violates the
“The Eighth Amendment ‘prohibits any punishment which violates civilized standards and concepts of humanity and decency.‘” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1992)). The Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition as “impos[ing] affirmative duties on prison officials ‘to provide humane conditions of confinement.‘” Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). To sufficiently allege prison officials violated his
complaint had to allege facts showing (1) the deprivation he endured was “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the prison officials had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Thomas, 948 F.3d at 138 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
The deprivation element is adequately pled when the allegations depict conditions where the inmate is denied “the minimal civilized measure of life‘s necessities.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991). The benchmark for alleging such deprivation is not that the inmate was merely uncomfortable; he or she must show they are “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Showing a substantial risk of harm is a less demanding standard than alleging conditions posing “a probable risk of harm.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep‘t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015).
The second element is subjective and requires an inmate to sufficiently plead prison officials acted with deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted). Deliberate indifference is effectively alleged where an inmate shows officials knew of, but disregarded, that the prison conditions posed “an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001).
As to the first element, this Court has previously held that factual allegations comparable to Clark‘s were sufficient to allege conditions that pose a substantial risk of serious harm. In Palakovic, a young man “diagnosed with a number of serious mental disorders” was repeatedly placed in solitary confinement for “30-day stints” during the thirteen months he spent in a Pennsylvania prison. 854 F.3d at 217, 225. Like Clark, Palakovic was severely isolated with limited opportunity for any social interaction during these stays. Id. at 217. Palakovic‘s parents, who brought the claim on their son‘s behalf, alleged prison officials knew the conditions of confinement “were inhumane for him in light of his mental illness” because the majority of the self-harm incidents occurred in the prison‘s solitary confinement cells. Id. at 225. Palakovic ultimately committed suicide in one of these cells. Id. at 217. This Court held Palakovic‘s parents sufficiently pled an Eighth Amendment claim by alleging prison officials
imposed conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm to their mentally ill son. Id. at 225-26.
In so holding, the Palakovic Court acknowledged “the robust body of legal and scientific authority recognizing the devastating mental health consequences caused by long-term isolation.” Id. at 225. Citing our decision in Williams, the Palakovic Court recognized “a growing consensus” that solitary confinement conditions can cause “severe and traumatic psychological damage” that in turn leads to high rates of self-harm or suicide in inmates who had spent time in solitary confinement. Id. It is “[a]gainst this backdrop of
This brings us to the second element of a conditions of confinement claim, whether Clark sufficiently alleged the prison officials possessed a culpable state of mind. We conclude that he did. Clark claimed the DOC defendants were “well aware” that he was seriously mentally ill, given that he had been treated for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder at the prison for over ten years. App. 59, ¶ 5. He alleged they knew that placing him in solitary confinement would cause him to be “severely and adversely affected.” Id. ¶ 6. According to Clark‘s complaint, the prison officials acted in complete disregard for their own policies and procedures, which require seriously mentally ill inmates to be closely assessed and evaluated before being placed in solitary confinement. App. 69-70, ¶¶ 72, 73. Clark further alleged these particular officials were made aware of the unjustifiable risk posed by their conduct by the ACA‘s investigation into the JTVCC‘s use of solitary confinement for mentally ill inmates. As noted, the investigation‘s results, published while Clark was in the SHU, directly criticized defendant Warden Pierce‘s practices and recommended fundamental changes to the conditions of
solitary confinement to alleviate any potential harm. App. 72, 75, ¶¶ 84, 94. Despite this purported awareness of his mental illness and the risk of serious harm, Clark alleged prison officials disregarded his pleas to leave the SHU and unnecessarily kept him there for seven months, causing his mental health to deteriorate. Clark alleged the months in isolation caused him to experience “increased hallucinations, panic attacks, paranoia, nightmares and self-mutilation.” App. 75-76, ¶ 97.
Again, the Palakovic decision is illustrative. In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged the prison officials knew the inmates were mentally ill and that prolonged isolation posed a substantial risk of harm. In Palakovic, officials were provided notice by the prior incidents of self-harm that occurred in segregated housing and their knowledge of a pending investigation by the Department of Justice into the prison‘s use of solitary confinement. 854 F.3d at 217. Here, the alleged notice to prison officials was far more direct: the DOC‘s own internal policies required they consider Clark‘s mental illness in determining both the appropriateness and length of time spent in solitary confinement, and the results of a completed investigation concluded that defendant Warden Pierce and the JTVCC‘s use of isolation threatened the health of mentally ill inmates. Moreover, Clark alleged his symptoms were noticeably exacerbated by the isolation and prison officials responded by keeping him in the damaging conditions for seven months. Following Palakovic, we hold these allegations are sufficient to plead the DOC defendants possessed a culpable state of mind.
This Court has recognized “the increasingly obvious reality that extended stays in solitary confinement can cause serious damage to mental health.” Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 226. See also Porter, 974 F.3d at 441 (“It is well established in both case law and scientific and medical research that prolonged solitary confinement . . . poses a
mind, we conclude his allegations that he was kept in solitary confinement by prison officials who were deliberately indifferent to the effects of prolonged isolation on his already severely compromised mental health are sufficient to raise a viable Eighth Amendment claim.
V.
Having held Clark sufficiently alleged a violation of his
“A Government official‘s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 248 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The ultimate question is whether the state of the law when the offense occurred” gave the prison officials “fair warning” that their conduct violated Clark‘s
To determine whether such “fair warning” existed, we search first for “factually analogous” cases in the Supreme Court, and then turn our inquiry to whether “binding opinions from our own Court” were in existence. Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 165 (citing Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2017)). If neither source provides relevant caselaw, we consider whether “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the Court of Appeals could clearly establish a right for purposes of qualified immunity.” L.R., 836 F.3d at 248.
Finally, “[w]e may also take into account district court cases, from within the Third Circuit or elsewhere.” Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 166 (citing L.R., 836 F.3d at 248).
Before searching for relevant caselaw, however, we must first identify the specific right Clark alleged was violated. Defining the contours of the right is critical to determining whether it was clearly established; we must define the right “at the appropriate level of specificity.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012). “This requires us to frame the right ‘in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.‘” Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 165 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). We define the right with specificity because only then can we determine whether “the violative nature of the [officials‘] particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam). We
The District Court defined Clark‘s alleged right as prohibiting prison officials from “housing a mentally ill inmate in solitary confinement for long periods of time.” App., 4. As so defined, the court held the complaint did not allege a violation of a clearly established Eighth Amendment right and dismissed the claim. But, given the facts averred in Clark‘s complaint, we find this characterization of the alleged right insufficiently specific. In defining the alleged right, the circumstances surrounding Clark‘s confinement in the SHU matters. The particularities of the prison officials’ alleged conduct in imposing the seven-month stay must be considered when deciding whether qualified immunity was appropriate. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (“The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of the particular conduct is clearly established.“) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the particular conduct at issue was prison officials keeping Clark in solitary confinement for seven months despite knowing of his serious mental illness. He alleged these DOC defendants had been made aware of the devastating effects of the JTVCC‘s solitary confinement units and had direct notice that extended stays in the SHU “exacerbate the symptoms of mental illness for
prisoners and result in further deterioration of their mental health.” App. 69, ¶ 67. He claimed he was kept in the SHU because the manifestations of his mental illness would be treated as “prison rule infractions,” which resulted in increased punishment and additional time in the SHU. App. 60, ¶ 12; App. 69, ¶ 70. As noted earlier, Clark alleged complaining about his prolonged stay in isolation would result in his being sent to the “naked room,” an isolation cell where he received only an open smock for clothing. App. 67, ¶ 57. His allegations included the assertion that the DOC defendants had the “authority and ability” to change their practices but deliberately did not do so, choosing instead to intentionally inflict “extreme emotional and mental distress” on him. App. 78, ¶ 108-09. Viewing these allegations in their totality, we modify the District Court‘s enunciation of the alleged right to: the right of a prisoner known to be seriously mentally ill to not be placed in solitary confinement for an extended period of time by prison officials who were aware of, but disregarded, the risk of lasting harm posed by such conditions.
In determining whether this articulated right was clearly established at the time of Clark‘s seven-month stay in the SHU, we broaden the scope beyond determining whether “the very action in question has been held unlawful.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The Supreme Court does not require that earlier cases share the same or even similar facts for a right to be deemed clearly established; it is enough that the prior cases are “factually analogous.” Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 165 (citing Fields, 862 F.3d at 361). Further, we must look at analogous cases with the understanding that this Court takes a “broad view of what constitutes an established right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. at 166 (internal citations omitted). As a result, state officials can still receive fair warning that their conduct is violative even in “novel factual circumstances” never previously addressed in caselaw. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. See also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory
Here, Clark alleged facts that put the officials’ conduct squarely in the purview of established Eighth Amendment law. By alleging prison officials imposed solitary confinement for
months, knowing the isolation carried a substantial risk of exacerbating his mental illnesses but keeping him there until he suffered serious harm, Clark alleged conduct that no reasonable corrections officer could conclude was constitutionally permissible. Two decades ago, this Court held prison conditions “may not be so brutal or unhealthy as to be in itself a punishment.” Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000). In assessing the conditions of segregated housing units, “[t]he touchstone is the health of the inmate.” Id. at 364. While the law recognizes that prison officials are authorized to punish for disciplinary infractions, the Constitution forbids them to do so “in a manner that threatens the physical and mental health of the prisoners.” Id. In Young, this Court recognized that determining the constitutionality of prison conditions is a heavily fact-specific inquiry, where the particular characteristics of the prisoner raising the challenge are taken into consideration. Id. at 365 (noting fact that prisoner was HIV-positive made unsanitary conditions “all the more revolting” given that he is “more susceptible to infection and disease“). Clark alleges months in the SHU were particularly dangerous for him because his mental illnesses made the extreme and prolonged isolation an inhumane condition, given his susceptibility to serious psychological injury. App. 78-79, ¶¶ 108, 112. See also Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 225 (holding conditions of solitary confinement were inhumane for Palakovic “in light of his mental illness“).
Despite the threat of harm posed by isolation, we recognize that solitary confinement does not per se violate the Constitution “as long as the conditions of confinement are not foul, inhuman or totally without penological justification.” Young, 960 F.2d at 364 (citing Ford v. Bd. of Managers of New Jersey State Prison, 407 F.2d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 1969)). But Clark alleges conditions that contravene those requirements. Even assuming Clark was initially placed in the SHU for a justified penological purpose, the “pronounced worsening” of his mental illness symptoms resulting from months in isolation was wholly pointless and unjustified. App. 58, ¶ 1; App. 79, ¶ 114. No penological purpose was served by irrevocably damaging Clark‘s already severely compromised mental health; the increased incidents of hallucinations or self-
mutilation resulting from the exacerbation of his schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder cannot be deemed a legitimate “part of his penalty” for committing a disciplinary infraction. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). We hold Clark‘s allegations give rise to the reasonable inference that prison officials imposed conditions resulting in the “gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). At the time of Clark‘s stay in the SHU, imposing conditions that cause the “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain” had long violated the
To constitute cruel and unusual punishment, however, the wanton and unnecessary infliction pain must be done knowingly. Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court established that prison conditions do not violate the
There is no indication in the complaint that prison officials imposed the prolonged term of solitary confinement for legitimate non-punishment reasons, such as for Clark‘s own protection or out of administrative necessity. See, e.g., Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348, 354 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding no constitutional violation where three-month stay in solitary confinement was due to a “grave shortage of general
population cell space“) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974)). Long before Clark‘s stay in the SHU, Eighth Amendment law prohibited officials from recklessly imposing conditions carrying a known risk to a prisoner‘s health for no justifiable reason. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843-45. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (noting a “general constitutional rule” prohibits the wanton and unnecessary infliction of cruelty on prisoners).
Moreover, the subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of harm can be inferred from the objective circumstances of a prison‘s conditions if such conditions pose an obvious danger to the inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825. Here the risk was obvious because the harm inherent in conditions of solitary confinement has long been recognized. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized the threat to prisoners’ mental health over a century ago:
A considerable number of prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). This Court has long held that allegations of inflicting a serious mental injury are sufficient to state a claim under the
prisoner cases); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1529 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (severe psychological pain can violate the Eighth Amendment); Scher v. Engelke, 943 F.2d 921, 924 (8th Cir. 1991) (“fear, mental anguish, and misery” can cause sufficient pain to violate the Eighth Amendment). Clark alleged his pre-existing condition of serious mental illness heightened the impact of solitary confinement, rendering it capable of inflicting severe mental trauma. By claiming the prison officials knowingly imposed such conditions, Clark sufficiently alleged the violation of a clearly established right.10
In addition to violating the
knew but ignored the DOC‘s prohibition against his seven-month stay in segregation. Clearly established law dictated that such internal governing policies are relevant in determining whether the officials received fair warning of a potential constitutional violation. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 743-44 (recognizing Department of Corrections’ regulations are relevant to determining whether prison officials had fair warning of constitutional violation); Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting prison regulations that govern correctional officers’ conduct relevant in determining whether inmate‘s right was clearly established).
Allegations that the officials disregarded prison regulations while inflicting wanton pain provided sufficient grounds for the denial of qualified immunity at the complaint stage. See Young, 801 F.3d at 182 (in deciding whether prison officials were entitled to immunity on remand, district court instructed to determine whether punishment violated prison regulations). Indeed, the DOC policies become all the more relevant in determining whether officials had fair warning that their conduct “ran counter” to the
Clark alleges these officials received another warning that their conduct was potentially unconstitutional when they were sued in federal court. Two months after Clark entered solitary confinement, the District Court of Delaware ruled defendant Commissioner Coupe‘s alleged conduct of placing mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement, without adequate mental health treatment and out-of-cell time, raised a viable constitutional claim. Cmty. Legal Aid Soc‘y, Inc. v. Coupe, No. 15-688-GMS, 2016 WL 1055741, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 16, 2016) [hereinafter CLASI]. In that case, CLASI claimed Commissioner Coupe, who remained Commissioner of the DOC at the time of Clark‘s stay in the SHU, knew the prison‘s practice of keeping mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement would “exacerbate their symptoms of mental illness and cause serious harm to their mental and physical health.” Id. at *1. The district court denied Coupe‘s motion to dismiss the claim,
ruling that CLASI‘s allegations rendered it plausible that Coupe “was aware that placing mentally ill patients in solitary confinement could deprive inmates in a manner that is ‘objectively, sufficiently serious’ [so] that Coupe would draw the inference that a ‘substantial risk of serious harm exists.‘” Id. at *4 (internal citation omitted). While this decision did not create a clearly established right, Clark is correct that the CLASI decision provided JTVCC prison officials with direct notice that their conduct regarding solitary confinement potentially violated the
The CLASI decision contains additional support for concluding Clark alleged the violation of a clearly established law. In this Court, decisions from district courts are relevant in determining whether prison officials received fair warning that their conduct was violative. See Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 167 (in the absence of “actually analogous precedent” from the Supreme Court or this Court, relevant and timely district court decisions can help determine whether the law was clearly established). See also Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 321 n.10 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]s our prior decisions have illustrated, district court opinions do play a role in the qualified immunity analysis.“). The district court cases cited in the CLASI opinion provide a robust consensus of decisions specifically addressing the constitutionality of assigning mentally ill prisoners to solitary confinement: Ind. Protection & Advocacy Servs. Comm‘n v. Comm‘r, Ind. Dep‘t of Corr., No. 1:05-cv-01317-TUP-MJD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182974, at *60–61 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) (Indiana Department of Correction‘s practice of putting seriously mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement threatens permanent injury and violates the Eighth Amendment); Jones El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d. 1096, 1101–02 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (granting injunctive relief because conditions of solitary confinement “can be devastating” to mentally ill prisoners housed in supermax prison); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (placement of mentally ill inmates “in the SHU is the mental equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe” and therefore unconstitutional); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1320-21 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that prison‘s policies and
practices regarding segregating inmates with serious mental disorders violates the class members’ Eighth Amendment rights); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1549-50 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that Arizona prison officials’ practice
Notice of clearly established law also came from Delaware‘s own state legislature. Had Clark‘s seven-month term in solitary confinement been imposed by a Delaware state court, it would have been illegal. Five years before Clark‘s stint in the SHU the Delaware legislature enacted a statute prohibiting courts from imposing a term of solitary confinement longer than three months. Section 3902 of the Delaware Code read in relevant part:
In every case of sentence to imprisonment for a term exceeding 3 months, the court may by the sentence direct that a certain portion of the term of imprisonment, not exceeding 3 months, shall be in solitary confinement.
conduct was unreasonable. Here, Clark alleged that the JTVCC‘s officials knew his prolonged stint in isolation posed a substantial risk to his mental health but imposed the conditions anyway, despite knowing serious pain resulted and that such pain served no penological purpose. Established
VI.
Given the specific conduct alleged and the warnings of potential misconduct provided the defendants, we conclude further proceedings are warranted. The District Court‘s grant of qualified immunity was premature in light of the possible
Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the District Court dismissing this claim and remand for further proceedings.