Facts
- C.T.J.C. filed applications for DIB and SSI benefits on April 1, 2020, citing multiple health issues as the basis for her disability claim. [lines="27-31"]
- Initial denial of her claim occurred on August 18, 2020, followed by a reconsideration denial on April 22, 2021. [lines="33-35"]
- An administrative hearing was held on January 25, 2022, led by ALJ Shane McGovern, resulting in an unfavorable decision on March 8, 2022. [lines="36-41"]
- The Appeals Council denied review on October 26, 2022, making the ALJ’s decision the final agency decision. [lines="42-43"]
- C.T.J.C. asserted that the ALJ erred in assessing her mental health impairments and the opinion of her physician assistant, Anastacia Wall. [lines="247-256"]
Issues
- Did the ALJ err in determining that C.T.J.C.'s mental health impairments of depression and anxiety were non-severe? [lines="249-250"]
- Did the ALJ fail to properly consider the medical opinion of Physician Assistant Anastacia Wall? [lines="254-255"]
Holdings
- The ALJ applied the correct legal standards, and substantial evidence supported his finding that C.T.J.C.'s mental health impairments were not severe. [lines="323"]
- The ALJ adequately explained why Anastacia Wall’s opinions were not persuasive, concluding that they lacked objective medical support and were inconsistent with the record. [lines="568-569"]
OPINION
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF FLORIDA, INC. and JOSE LUIS MEJIA ENCARNACION, Plaintiffs, v. SCOTTY RHODEN, Sheriff, in his official and individual capacities, RANDY CREWS, Undersheriff, in his official and individual capacities, EVELYN BLUE, Captain, Corrections Division, in her individual capacity, and BAKER COUNTY CORRECTIONS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Defendants.
Case No. 3:22-cv-1044-TJC-LLL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
September 11, 2024
TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN, United States District Judge
This
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts1
The ACLU and Encarnacion, a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee at the Baker County Detention Center (Baker), bring the Amended Complaint against Defendants BCCMC; Scotty Rhoden, Baker County Sheriff, in his official and individual capacities;2 Evelyn Blue, Captain of the Corrections Division of the BCSO, in her individual capacity; and Randy Crews, Undersheriff of Baker County, in his individual capacity. (Doc. 15).
Plaintiffs allege that the ACLU has been investigating reports of constitutional violations at immigrant detention facilities, including Baker, for years, with an increased focus on Baker since May 2022. (Doc. 15 ¶¶ 41-43, 47).
Encarnacion has also criticized the conditions at Baker by signing an administrative complaint regarding abuse in February 2022, participating in a hunger strike in protest of the conditions at Baker in May 2022, and sending an administrative complaint in May 2022. Id. ¶¶ 44-46.
The ACLU created the Baker Legal Assistance Program (BLAP) to
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants denied the ACLU access to Baker shortly after the ACLU escalated its public criticism of Baker and made the public records request. Id. ¶¶ 11. The Programs Coordinator informed the ACLU that the decision to postpone the September 9 visit was made by someone higher in the chain of command than Blue. Id. ¶ 76. Plaintiffs allege that the person who made the decision to postpone the visit was Rhoden because he is Blue‘s supervisor and because of Rhoden‘s statement that he would not “allow people to come in here and lie about our facility.” Id. 77.
BCSO approved BLAP‘s September 30 visit with the ACLU in attendance, but it was postponed due to Hurricane Ian. Id. ¶ 90. BLAP‘s October 14, 2022 visit occurred as planned, and the ACLU attended the visit. Id. ¶ 140. BLAP attempted to reschedule both the September 9 and September 30 visits in October and November, and the ACLU intended to attend both rescheduled visits. Id. 91. However, Baker rejected BLAP‘s proposed rescheduled dates without providing a reason, and instead offered to reschedule the visits in December 2022 and January 2023. Id. ¶¶ 92-93. BLAP rejected Baker‘s
Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that BCSO has a pattern and practice of opening legal mail outside of the presence of detained individuals, including Encarnacion. Id. 198. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Encarnacion has received opened legal mail from his attorney approximately six times. Id. ¶ 144. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants selectively open the legal mail of detainees who speak to attorneys about the conditions at Baker. Id. ¶ 147.
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants have a written policy that requires attorneys to notify BCSO about incoming legal mail before the legal mail arrives at Baker. Id. ¶ 131. The policy states that if attorneys do not email the facility about incoming legal mail before its arrival, the mail may be denied or delivered late. Id. Defendants have not posted this policy online and make no effort to provide advance notice of the policy to attorneys. Id. ¶ 135. Defendants started applying the policy to the ACLU around August or September 2022 without notice. Id. 138-39. This policy has allegedly affected: Encarnacion, who had legal mail denied and returned to his attorney; the ACLU, which had legal mail sent to Baker denied or returned; and the ACLU‘s other detained clients and prospective clients at Baker. Id. ¶¶ 132-134, 137-138, 142. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants selectively apply this policy to correspondence of individuals who speak to attorneys about the conditions at Baker. Id. ¶ 141.
Plaintiffs allege that these alternatives to a confidential legal call are insufficient because they cost money, even for indigent clients and pro bono attorneys. Id. ¶¶ 105-108. Having the detainee call the attorney is also insufficient for various reasons including because detainees can only make calls from the housing unit where other people are within earshot and because calls are limited to twenty minutes. Id. ¶¶ 109-113. In-person legal visits are not a sufficient alternative to confidential phone or video legal calls because Baker is in a remote location far from immigration attorneys or pro bono services, and,
Plaintiffs also allege that before refusing to schedule legal calls, Defendants did not allow legal calls to be confidential because they had to take place in the law library where the calls could be overheard by others, including BCSO employees. Id. ¶¶ 117-23. Plaintiffs allege that Encarnacion has been forced to discuss his legal matters with his attorney on the phone in the presence of BCSO employees and other detainees. Id. ¶ 124. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants interfered with these legal calls in various other ways as well. Id. 125.
B. Summary of Claims and Relief Sought
All six Counts of the Amended Complaint are First Amendment claims brought under
- Count I (Postponed Visit): Defendants violated the ACLU‘s right to free speech by denying their right to speak to detainees.
- Count II (Postponed Visit): Defendants violated the ACLU‘s right to freedom from retaliation.
Count III (Postponed Visit): Defendants violated Encarnacion‘s, Detained Clients‘, and Prospective Clients’ right to free speech by inhibiting them from meeting with BLAP attorneys. - Count IV (Postponed Visit): Defendants violated Encarnacion‘s, Detained Clients‘, and Prospective Clients’ rights to freedom from retaliation.
- Count V (Legal Mail Policies): Rhoden, in his official and individual capacities, and BCCMC, violated Plaintiffs’ rights by opening legal mail outside the detainees’ presence and by precluding the delivery of legal mail to detainees without a prior verification email.
- Count VI (Legal Phone Call Policies): Rhoden, in his official and individual capacities, and BCCMC, violated Plaintiffs’ rights to free speech by failing to provide access to confidential legal calls.
Plaintiffs seek (1) a declaration that Defendants’ conduct violates Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) an injunction prohibiting Defendants from subjecting Plaintiffs to the unlawful acts described in the Amended Complaint; (3) compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages; and (4) reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. Id. at 68.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under
To state a claim under
III. DISCUSSION
A. BCCMC — All Counts
BCCMC argues that all six Counts against it should be dismissed for many reasons, see generally (Doc. 26), but the Court need address only one: Plaintiffs improperly lumped all the Defendants together without identifying the separate acts of BCCMC. (Doc. 26 at 7-9).
The Eleventh Circuit has referred to complaints that violate
Plaintiffs allege that BCCMC is a nonprofit corporation, with a board appointed by the Baker County Board of County Commissioners, that owns Baker and is responsible for the facility‘s operations and management. (Doc. 15 ¶¶ 23, 36). Plaintiffs allege that BCCMC has delegated the authority to operate Baker to BCSO, but BCCMC retains the right to monitor the facility and to intervene if BCSO is not operating the facility in accordance with applicable standards. Id. ¶¶ 38-40.
The Amended Complaint repeatedly attributes the alleged acts of wrongdoing to “Defendants” without differentiating among them. For example:
BCCMC argues that “this action hinges on the conduct by the person/entity that instituted certain policies, cancelled the alleged legal visits, or opened the alleged legal mail. Without clear specification of who the person/entity was, BCCMC is unable to respond in an educated manner.” (Doc. 26 at 9). In response, Plaintiffs argue that they do not improperly lump Defendants together because they allege that Rhoden made the decision to deny access to Baker and implemented the mail and phone policies, Blue and Crews executed Rhoden‘s decision to deny access to Baker, and BCCMC failed to intervene. (Doc. 35 at 45-46). Thus, Plaintiffs are apparently only seeking to hold BCCMC responsible for failing to prevent the wrongdoing of the other Defendants. If Plaintiffs are only seeking to hold BCCMC responsible for failing to prevent the wrongdoing of other Defendants, it is unclear upon which theory
In any event, as discussed at the hearing, the Court is unpersuaded that BCCMC is a necessary or proper party to this case. Plaintiffs can achieve full relief against the remaining Defendants. Therefore, the Court will dismiss all claims as to BCCMC with prejudice.4
B. Detained Clients and Prospective Clients
Plaintiffs bring Counts III-VI on behalf of unnamed “detained clients and prospective clients.” See generally (Doc. 15). Plaintiffs allege that the ACLU has third-party standing to assert a First Amendment claim on behalf of these individuals because “[i]n addition to experiencing harm as an organization, the [ACLU] has a ‘close relationship’ with the individuals at Baker who wished to meet with [BLAP] about potential legal claims, and these individuals’ ability to protect their own rights is hindered by Defendants’ denial of access.” (Doc. 15 at ¶¶ 185, 194, 203, 213).
Defendants argue that the claims brought on behalf of the unnamed detained clients and prospective clients of the ACLU violate
Generally, a party “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” See Kowalski v. Turner, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). However, “there may be circumstances where it is necessary to grant a third[-]party standing to assert the rights of another.” Id. at 129-30. When a party seeks third-party standing, they must show that “the party asserting the right has a ‘close’ relationship with the person who possesses the right,” and that “there is a ‘hindrance’ to the possessor‘s ability to protect his own interests.” Id. at 130 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)). The Supreme Court has permitted third-party standing in First Amendment cases, id., and when “enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights,” id. at 131 (describing U.S. Dep‘t of Lab. v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990)).
C. Individual Capacity Claims and Qualified Immunity
Rhoden, Blue, and Crews, in their individual capacities, argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim and that they are entitled to qualified immunity for all claims against them.6 See generally (Doc. 28). A defendant asserting qualified immunity must first show “that he or she was acting within his or her discretionary authority,” then “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., 69
To evaluate a claim of qualified immunity, the Court must ask: “(1) whether, taken in the light most favorable to the injured party, the facts alleged show the [official‘s] conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) if the right violated under those alleged facts was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). “For a plaintiff to overcome a claim of qualified immunity, both questions must be answered affirmatively.” Id.
1. Postponed Visit: Denial of Access Claims (Counts I and III)
A prisoner retains all First Amendment rights that “are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Mitchell v. Peoples, 10 F.4th 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987)). When prison officials “chill, inhibit, or interfere” with a prisoner‘s ability to “speak, protest, and complain openly to his attorney,” they infringe on the prisoner‘s right to free speech. Id. at 1230 (quoting Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1334 (11th Cir. 2008)). Additionally, free citizens have a First Amendment right to communicate with prisoners. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989). Access to prisons, whether in person or through writing, “is essential to lawyers and legal assistants representing prisoner clients.” Id.
- whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the regulation and a legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;
- whether there are alternative means of exercising the asserted constitutional right that remain open to the inmates;
- whether and the extent to which accommodation of the asserted right will have an impact on prison staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources generally; and
- whether the regulation represents an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns.
Pesci II, 935 F.3d at 1166 (citations omitted).7
Rhoden, Blue, and Crews argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged the violation of a constitutional right because, although the ACLU has a First Amendment right to speak to detainees, it “does not have a constitutionally-protected right to unlimited, unfettered, and unrestricted access to detainees for in-person meeting[s] in the facility,” and “rescheduling a group visit is not a violation of anyone‘s constitutional rights.” (Doc. 27 at 10, 12, 16).8 Rhoden,
i. Violation of a Constitutional Right
The ACLU and its detained clients, including Encarnacion, have First Amendment rights to communicate with each other, Mitchell, 10 F.4th at 1230; Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407, but the facts alleged here do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The September 9 meeting was canceled and postponed for no stated reason. The September 30 meeting was also postponed due to a hurricane. The October 14 meeting went forward as scheduled. BLAP attempted to reschedule the September 9 and 30 meetings for October and November, but Baker instead offered dates in December and January. While this rescheduling was no doubt inconvenient and perhaps frustrating, it is not the stuff of a First Amendment violation. Indeed, Plaintiffs have cited no case
Additionally, one canceled prison visit and two postponements do not amount to a prison regulation or policy that warrants analysis under the modified Turner standard. Cf. Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1085 (11th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (appeal concerning the adequacy of the measures implemented by a detention center to protect its prisoners from the spread of COVID-19); Rodriguez v. Burnside, 38 F.4th 1324 (11th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added) (First Amendment challenges to a prison‘s shower policies), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1780 (2023). However, even assuming this is a prison regulation or policy, for the reasons just stated, it does not amount to a constitutional violation under Turner. Because the Court has determined that there is no constitutional violation alleged, it will not engage in a “clearly established” analysis.
Accordingly, Rhoden, Blue, and Crews, in their individual capacities, are entitled to qualified immunity on Counts I and III to the extent Plaintiffs seek monetary damages. Also, Plaintiffs may not proceed with their claims in Counts I and III against Rhoden, Blue, and Crews, in their individual capacities, for declaratory and injunctive relief because Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged these Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Cf. Benning, 71
2. Postponed Visit: Retaliation Claims (Counts II and IV)
“[A]s a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech.” Bell v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 6 F.4th 1374, 1376-77 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019)). To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must allege: “first, that his speech or act was constitutionally protected; second, that the defendant‘s retaliatory conduct adversely affected the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech.” Christmas v. Nabors, 76 F.4th 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008)).
There is no question that Plaintiffs engaged in protected speech when they publicly criticized the Baker County jail operation. Neither is the causal connection element of a retaliation claim contested. Only the second element is at issue here. To satisfy the second element, a plaintiff must allege that “the defendant‘s allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1254 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 809 (2006). “The effect on freedom of speech may be small, but since there is no justification for harassing people for exercising their constitutional rights it
Rhoden, Blue, and Crews argue that their conduct did not adversely affect Plaintiffs’ speech, nor would it have deterred anyone from exercising their First Amendment rights. See (Doc. 27 at 13-14, 16). In response, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ actions adversely affected their protected speech because canceling the September 9 visit was an adverse action, “[a] plaintiff need not be ‘actually chilled’ in the exercise of their rights” to show an adverse action, and the denial of access to Baker was highly likely to deter the exercise of First Amendment rights. (Doc. 35 at 14-17, 22-24). Plaintiffs also argue that case precedent and the ACLU‘s demand letter provided Defendants notice that retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights is unlawful. Id. at 42-43.
i. Violation of a Constitutional Right
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Rhoden, Blue, and Crews, in their individual capacities, retaliated against them in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs have alleged that their speech criticizing Baker was constitutionally protected, that Rhoden, Blue, and Crews’ retaliatory conduct adversely affected Plaintiffs’ protected speech, and that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory conduct and the adverse effect on Plaintiffs’
ii. Clearly Established Right
Plaintiffs have also sufficiently alleged that their rights to be free from retaliation under the First Amendment were clearly established. It is “settled law that state officials may not retaliate against associations and individuals
3. Legal Mail Policies (Count V)
An inmate‘s right to free speech entitles him to use the mail to communicate confidentially with his or her attorneys. Mitchell, 10 F.4th at 1230. The Eleventh Circuit has long held that prison officials violate a prisoner‘s First Amendment right to free speech when they open properly marked legal mail outside the detainee‘s presence. Id. at 1229.
Rhoden, in his individual capacity, argues that Plaintiffs do not allege he
4. Phone Call Policies (Count VI)
As with Count V, Rhoden, in his individual capacity, argues that Plaintiffs do not allege that he was personally involved in the issues alleged in Count VI, and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. See generally (Doc. 28). As Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument, Count VI against Rhoden in his individual capacity is dismissed.
D. Official Capacity Claims
All six Counts are brought against Rhoden in his official capacity. Suits against municipal officers sued in their official capacities are “functionally equivalent” to suits against the municipality the officer represents. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). Although municipalities may be sued under
As to Counts I and III, there is no constitutional violation alleged so there can be no official capacity liability. As to Counts II and IV, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the alleged retaliation was a result of a government policy, custom, or practice. Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged constitutional violations in Counts V and VI regarding legal mail and phone call policies and have sufficiently alleged that the constitutional violations were a result of government policies, customs, or practices. See (Doc. 15 ¶ 204) (“Defendant Rhoden is responsible for the adoption and implementation of the challenged legal mail policies.“) and id. ¶ 214 (“Defendant Rhoden is responsible for the adoption and implementation of the pattern, practice, and policy of refusing to provide access to confidential legal calls.“). Thus, Rhoden‘s official capacity Motion is due to be granted only as to Counts I-IV and denied as to Counts V and VI.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
Rhoden, Crews, and Blue‘s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Motion is granted as to Counts I, III, V, and VI, and those Counts are dismissed with prejudice as to these Defendants in their individual capacities. To the extent Counts III-VI are brought on behalf of unascertained prospective clients, Counts III-VI are DISMISSED for lack of standing without prejudice. The Motion as to Counts II and IV is denied. - Rhoden‘s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Motion is granted as to Counts I-IV and those Counts are dismissed with prejudice against Rhoden in his official capacity. The Motion is denied as to Counts V and VI against Rhoden in his official capacity.
- BCCMC‘s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 26) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims against BCCMC are DISMISSED with prejudice.
- Thus, Counts II and IV will go forward against Defendants Rhoden, Crews, and Blue in their individual capacities. Counts V and VI will go forward against Rhoden in his official capacity. Plaintiffs are already proceeding on an Amended Complaint (Doc. 15). The Court has determined that any further amendment to the dismissed counts would be futile and that the case is positioned to go forward with the remaining Counts. Answers from the remaining Defendants to the remaining Counts are due no later than September 30, 2024.
TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
United States District Judge
jcd
Copies:
Counsel of record