Larry Richardson, a pro se litigant incarcerated in state prison, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the denial of his motion for reconsideration. We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
I. Background
On October 12, 2006, Richardson, a prisoner at the Charlotte Correctional Institution (CCI), filed a grievance with Warden Johnson, requesting single-cell housing because of his cellmate’s “unhygienic actions.” On October 16, two days before Warden Johnson received this grievance, Richardson’s cellmate attacked him in the cell, causing severe bleeding from lacerations on Richardson’s face, arms, and back. The prison authorities moved him to a different cell the next day. Thereafter, Richardson filed numerous grievances seeking a transfer to single-cell housing on various grounds, including the attack and his former cellmate’s destruction of his property. These grievances were either returned as improper or denied.
After the district court granted Richardson leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), he filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Secretary of the Florida Departmеnt of Corrections, James McDonough; Warden Johnson and Inspector Laughlin at CCI; and three CCI guards, “John Doe (Unknown Legal Name),” Mr. Adams, and Mr. McNealy. In relevant part, Richardson alleged that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by (1) assigning him to a cell with another inmate who was knоwn to be dangerous and who later attacked him, (2) refusing him medical treatment for 15 hours after the attack, and (3) denying his numerous grievances and requests.
In December 2007, the district court sua sponte dismissed the claims against Secretary McDonough, Mr. Adams, and Inspector Laughlin without prejudice because Richardson’s сomplaint contained no allegations connecting them to any violation of Richardson’s Eighth Amendment rights. The district court also dismissed Richardson’s claim against John Doe without prejudice because naming fictitious parties in pleadings was not permitted in federal court. Finally, the district court directed the United States Marshals to serve process on McNealy and Johnson by mailing the appropriate papers to Shirley Matthew, a correctional officer at CCI.
On January 11, 2008, Matthew notified the court that she had served Wаrden Johnson but had been unable to serve McNealy because there was “no such person at this institution.” After learning of the failure of service, Richardson sent a letter to Matthew on January 28 stating that McNealy had worked the “4 p.m. to 12 p.m. shift” at CCI in July 2007 and that “it should of [sic] been simple for you located Guard, Mr. McNealy within that prison facility.” He also stated in the *737 letter that “John Doe, a Mr. Mitchell” would be easy to identify “by your simply reviewing the complaint.”
In an order dated November 5, 2008, the court dismissed Richardson’s claim against McNealy without prеjudice for failure to timely serve under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). The court also granted Warden Johnson’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Richardson had not shown that Johnson was aware of a substantial risk of a serious physical thrеat to Richardson. The court noted that the grievance Richardson submitted prior to the attack mentioned only that his cellmate was “unhygienic” and that it was not stamped “received” until two days after the attack.
Richardson then filed a motion for reinstatement and an immediate hearing, arguing that the court made erroneous factual findings regarding the grievance process and improperly failed to consider his letter to Matthew, the court-appointed service agent. The district court construed this filing as a motion fоr reconsideration and denied it. Richardson appeals both the district court’s dismissal of his claims and its denial of his motion for reconsideration.
II. Discussion
A. Claims Against McDonough, Adams, Laughlin, and Doe
Richardson first argues that the court erred in dismissing (1) his § 1983 claims against McDonough, Adams, Doe, and Laughlin
sua sponte
and (2) his claim against Warden Johnson undеr Rule 12(b)(6).
1
We construe Richardson’s brief liberally and review these district court orders
de novo. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr.,
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law.
U.S. Steel, LLC v. Tieco, Inc.,
We conclude that the district court correсtly dismissed Richardson’s claims against McDonough, Adams, and
*738
Laughlin. Richardson has not alleged that Secretary McDonough was himself deliberately indifferent to Richardson’s health or safety or that Richardson’s injuries were the result of an official policy that McDonough establishеd as the Secretary for the Florida Department of Corrections.
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
We also conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Richardson’s claim against John Doe. As a general matter, fictitious-pаrty pleading is not permitted in federal court.
See, e.g., New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc.,
Finally, we conclude that the district court correctly granted Warden Johnson’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Richardson made no аllegations that Johnson had acted with deliberate indifference to his health or safety. The grievance Richardson filed before the attack asserted only that his cellmate was “unhygienic.” Because the complaint failed to allege that Johnson had disrеgarded a known risk, the district court properly dismissed the claim against Johnson.
See Farrow,
B. Failure to Serve McNealy
Richardson argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim under Rule 4(m) for the failure to timely serve McNealy. Richardson contends that, because he was a pro se prisoner-litigant proceeding IFP, the court-appointed process server was responsible for effecting service on McNealy.
The
sua sponte
dismissal of a complaint for failure to serve under Rule 4(m) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc.,
When a court grants a litigant leave to proceed IFP, the officers of the court must “issue and serve all process.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). “[T]he failure of the United States Marshal to effectuate service on behalf of an
in forma pauperis
*739
plaintiff through no fault of that plaintiff constitutes ‘good cause’ for the plaintiffs failure to effect timely service within the meaning of Rule 4(m).”
Rance,
We have no binding authority stating whether a
pro se
prisoner-litigant proceeding IFP is at fault when he cannot provide the current address of a prison guard to the court-appointed service agent. In
Ranee,
we reversed a Rule 4(m) dismissal when “[n]othing in the record indicate[d] that [the plaintiff] share[d] in the Marshal’s fault for failure to effectuate service.”
Id.
at 1288. In
Fowler v. Jones,
In a case with nearly identical facts, the Seventh Circuit held that “when the district court instructs the Marshal to serve papers оn behalf of a prisoner, the prisoner need furnish no more than the information necessary to identify the defendant.”
Sellers v. United States,
[p]rison guards do not want prisoners to have their home addresses, and the Bureau of Prisons is reluctant to tell prisoners even the current place of employment of their former guards. This is a sensible precaution, for prisoners aggrieved by guards’ conduct may resort to extra-legal weapons after release if they do not deem the results of the litigation satisfactory .... Because the Marshals Service is part of the Department of Justice, 28 U.S.C. § 561, it should have ready access to the necessary information.
Id. at 602. In a subsequent decision, the Seventh Circuit applied Sellers to a pro se prisoner proceeding IFP in a state prison:
The present cases involve state prisoners, not federal prisoners, but the distinction is irrelevant. Sellers is grоunded in the belief that use of marshals to effect service alleviates two concerns that pervade prisoner litigation, state or federal: 1) the security risks inherent in providing the addresses of prison employees to prisoners; and 2) the reality that prisoners often get the “runaround” when they attempt to obtain information through governmental channels and needless attendant delays in litigating a case result.
Graham v. Satkoski,
We find this reasoning persuasive. It is unreasonable to expeсt incarcerated and unrepresented prisoner-litigants to *740 provide the current addresses of prison-guard defendants who no longer work at the prison. Thus, we conclude that, as long as the court-appointed agent can locate the prison-guard dеfendant with reasonable effort, prisoner-litigants who provide enough information to identify the prison-guard defendant have established good cause for Rule 4(m) purposes.
We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of Richardson’s claim against McNealy and remand to the district court for a determination whether McNealy can be located with reasonable effort. If so, McNealy must be served; otherwise, the district court properly dismissed Richardson’s claim against McNealy.
C. Motion for Reconsideration
Finally, Richardson argues that the cоurt erred in denying his motion for reconsideration. We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.
Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla.,
Insofar as Richardson’s motion for reconsideration can be construed to concern defendants other than McNealy, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion: Richardson’s motion simply attempted to relitigate old matters and present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment. With regard to McNealy, however, we vacate the district court’s denial because the district court abused its discretion in failing to determine whether Richardson had established good cause under Rule 4(m).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the district court’s orders are
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Notes
. Although the court did not identify the basis for its sua sponte dismissal of these defendants, it appears that the court entered its order under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides that "[t]he court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” Upon review, "the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint ... is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
. We cited
Sellers
with approval in
Rance,