All Acres Roofing, LLC vs. Brandon Beau Ballard

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District

Jun 30, 2026

WD88100

All Acres Roofing, LLC (“All Acres“) appeals the trial court‘s denial of its motion for sale of real estate that was filed in an effort to collect on a prior judgment against Brandon Ballard (“Ballard“). All Acres argues that the trial court should have granted the motion despite Ballard‘s assertion of a homestead exemption because the exemption does not prevent the sale of real property to execute on a judgment. Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background¹

On May 1, 2008, Ballard acquired title to a house in Jackson County by special warranty deed. Ballard duly recorded the deed on May 28, 2008.

In June 2022, Ballard entered a contract with All Acres to repair the roof, gutters, soffits, and fascia on his house (“Contract“). After Ballard paid an initial deposit of $5,750, All Acres made repairs on the house. Ballard paid an additional $4,000 following the repairs, but failed to pay the total amount owed under the Contract.

In May 22, 2023, All Acres filed a first amended petition that asserted four counts: (1) foreclosure of a mechanic‘s lien (“Count I“); (2) breach of contract (“Count II“); (3) unjust enrichment (“Count III“); and (4) the Missouri Prompt Pay Act² (“Count IV“). All of the counts arose out of All Acres’ claim that it had not been fully paid $15,600 for work performed under the Contract. All Acres sought monetary damages of $5,850, plus pre- and post-judgment interest and attorney‘s fees. All Acres also sought to foreclose its mechanic‘s lien.

Ballard filed an answer, denying All Acres’ allegations. Ballard also filed a counterclaim for breach of contract (“Counterclaim“). In the Counterclaim, Ballard contended that the total Contract amount was only $11,500; that he had paid $9,750; and

that he had not paid the remaining $1,750 due on the Contract because All Acres did not complete the work. Ballard sought monetary damages of $4,750 to complete the work on his house less the amount he admitted he still owed.

All Acres filed a reply. It refuted that the Contract was only for $11,500 instead of $15,600, and it denied that it had not completed the work required under the Contract.

Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment on February 8, 2024 (“Judgment“). The trial court awarded All Acres a monetary judgment “in the amount of $6,200 on the matter of breach of contract,” but denied the claim to foreclose a mechanic‘s lien because “there was no proper notice given.” Neither party appealed the Judgment.

In May 2024, All Acres filed a real estate levy against Ballard‘s house. In response, Ballard filed an affidavit of homestead exemption, claiming the house was his primary residence and was therefore his homestead.

Subsequently, three appraisals were performed to evaluate the value of Ballard‘s house. One found the property to be worth $135,000; another found the property to be worth $100,000; and the final one found the property to be worth $120,000. The appraisers’ reports each included a space for the appraiser to subtract the outstanding amount of any pre-existing mortgages from the determined value. One of the appraisals marked “--” in this space. Another appraisal stated “[n]ot available.” And the third appraisal left the space blank. All three appraisers determined that “[a] severance of a portion of the property representing a $15,000 homestead on the said property would

greatly depreciate the value of the residue of the premises, and therefore cannot practically be severed.”

Following the appraisals, All Acres filed a motion for sale of real estate to force the sale of Ballard‘s house in an effort to execute on the Judgment. Ballard opposed the motion, asserting that he had filed an affidavit of homestead exemption without objection, and that the real estate levy had not been properly served. The trial court held a hearing on the motion.

At the hearing, All Acres argued that Ballard was the sole record owner of the house, and asked the trial court to order the sale of the house. Ballard argued that the homestead exemption prevented the house from being sold because he had acquired title before the Judgment was entered, and because the appraisals found that a portion of the property representing his $15,000 homestead exemption could not be severed from the rest of the property. All Acres agreed that Ballard was entitled to assert the homestead exemption, but argued that the exemption did not preclude Ballard‘s house from being sold, and only operated to protect the amount of the exemption.

On June 3, 2025, the trial court issued an order denying All Acres’ motion for sale of real estate (“Order“). The trial court noted that Ballard lived in and owned his homestead; that Ballard established his homestead prior to the entry of the Judgment; and that the homestead exemption applied because the homestead‘s deed had been recorded “before the creation of the execution debt.” The trial court concluded that “Missouri statutes do not give this Court authority to grant the motion . . . .”

On June 12, 2025, All Acres filed this appeal.

Appellate Jurisdiction

“[T]he right to appeal is purely statutory, and where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists.” Harris v. Mo. Sec‘y of State, 725 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting Fannie Mae v. Truong, 361 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Mo. banc 2012)). “Although many statutes govern ‘the right to appeal, the only statute even potentially applicable to the present case is section 512.020(5) . . . .‘”³ Wilson v. City of St. Louis, 600 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting First Nat‘l Bank of Dieterich v. Pointe Royale Prop. Owners’ Ass‘n, Inc., 515 S.W.3d 219, 221 (Mo. banc 2017)). Section 512.020(5) provides:

Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause from which an appeal is not prohibited by the constitution, nor clearly limited in special statutory proceedings, may take his or her appeal to a court having appellate jurisdiction from any:

. . .

(5) . . . special order after final judgment in the cause . . . .

To determine whether All Acres has the right to appeal the Order, we must address two issues: (i) whether the Order is a special order after the entry of a final judgment in the cause; and, if it is, (ii) whether the Order was required to be denominated a “judgment” in order to perfect the right of appeal.

A “special order after final judgment in the cause” was most recently defined by our Supreme Court as an order that “relates to the enforcement or an ‘attack’ on the

enforcement of a final judgment.” Hudson v. Joplin Reg‘l Stockyards, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Mo. banc 2024) (citation omitted). Consistent with this definition, trial court rulings on motions resolving an attempt to execute on a final judgment are routinely treated as appealable special orders pursuant to section 512.020(5). Cf. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 278 S.W.3d 730, 732 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (“An order quashing a writ of garnishment is a special order that is appealable under this provision.“) (citation omitted); Holy Temple Homes, Ltd. v. West, 812 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991) (recognizing that an order concerning a motion to quash execution on a judgment is a “special order after final judgment” under section 512.020(5)); Carrow v. Carrow, 294 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Mo. App. 1956) (holding that “a motion to quash an execution is a special proceeding attacking the enforcement of a judgment” that is appealable as a special order pursuant to section 512.020).

Here, All Acres’ motion for sale of real estate was an attempt to execute on, and thus to enforce, the Judgment awarding All Acres $6,200 in damages. The Order denying the motion for sale of real estate therefore qualifies as a special order pursuant to section 512.050(5), but only if the Judgment was a “final judgment in the cause.” See GUI, Inc. v. Adams, 978 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998) (holding that the phrase “‘any special order after final judgment’ . . . contemplates that a judgment has become final“). In its second point on appeal, All Acres argues that the Judgment was a “final judgment.”

“A final judgment is a legally enforceable judicial order that ‘disposes of all claims (or the last pending claim) in a lawsuit.‘” Rhodes v. Mo. Highways & Transp. Comm‘n, 718 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Mo. banc 2025) (quotations omitted). “To determine how many pending claims exist that must be disposed, ‘the focus is on the number of legal rights asserted in the action.‘” Id. (quoting Jefferson Cnty. 9-1-1 Dispatch v. Plaggenberg, 645 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Mo. banc 2022)). An effort to “enforce . . . one legal right” is “a single claim, regardless of the fact that it seeks multiple remedies.” Id. (quoting Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Mo. banc 1994)). “[I]f multiple forms of relief are sought with respect to one set of facts, it is still one claim, and an order resolving some prayers for relief and not others does not fully resolve that claim and is not a judgment . . . .‘” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 768 n.6).

The Judgment was entered after a bench trial. The Judgment entered a monetary award in favor of All Acres “on the matter of breach of contract,” and thus resolved Count II (the breach of contract claim in the first amended petition) and the competing Counterclaim for breach of contract asserted by Ballard. See Hackathorn v. Four Seasons Lakesites, Inc., 959 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998) (holding that a judgment resolves a counterclaim by implication where the judgment, by granting relief on a competing claim, necessarily resolves issues raised by the counterclaim). The Judgment also denied the claim to foreclose All Acres’ mechanic‘s lien, and thus resolved Count I of the first amended petition. The Judgment did not expressly address Counts III or IV of the first amended petition.

All Acres argues that the Judgment was nonetheless a final judgment because unjust enrichment was pled in Count III in the alternative to breach of contract pled in Count II, and because the Prompt Pay Act was pled in Count IV as a duplicative basis for

recovering pre-judgment interest and attorney‘s fees already sought in the breach of contract count. In essence, All Acres argues that even though the Judgment did not expressly reference Counts III and IV, it is nonetheless a final judgment because it left no “issues open for further adjudication.” Rhodes, 718 S.W.3d at 423 (noting that a trial court‘s failure to resolve all claims or prayers for relief “leav[es] such issues open for further adjudication” so that there is no final judgment).

We agree. The Judgment awarded damages “on the matter of breach of contract.” This means that “the trial court found a contract existed, which is antithetical to . . . [an] unjust-enrichment claim[]” that is pled in the alternative. CoMo Premium Constr. LLC v. Pulster, 724 S.W.3d 823, 829 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). The Judgment in favor of All Acres for breach of contract constituted an implicit denial of All Acres’ unjust enrichment claim as a matter of law. See id. at 828 (“Under the doctrine of ‘implicit finality,’ ‘[i]f a judgment, by implication, necessarily carries with it a finding upon other counts, the judgment will be sustained as final even though the count is not specifically mentioned.‘“) (quoting Jefferson v. Am. Fin. Grp., Inc., 163 S.W.3d 485, 487 n.2 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005)); see also Rule 55.10⁴ (permitting pleading in the alternative even if the plaintiff cannot ultimately recover on both claims).

Moreover, Counts II and IV of the first amended petition both sought relief for pre-judgment interest and attorney‘s fees. But the Prompt Pay Act is not an independent cause of action, as it merely provides authority for recovering pre-judgment interest and

attorney‘s fees on a properly asserted legal theory for recovering for unpaid work on a private construction project. Section 431.180; see Vance Bros., Inc. v. Obermiller Constr. Servs., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 562, 564 (Mo. banc 2006) (recognizing availability of Prompt Pay Act damages in any cause of action concerning the failure to pay, including a breach of contract action or an action on account); Fru-Con/Fluor Daniel Joint Venture v. Corrigan Bros., Inc., 154 S.W.3d 330, 338 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) (recognizing the availability of Prompt Pay Act damages in a quantum meruit action).

The Judgment awarded monetary damages to All Acres on its breach of contract claim in the amount of $6,200. That award was in excess of the unpaid contract balance of $5,850, and thus necessarily included pre-judgment interest. “‘A plaintiff is only entitled to be made whole once,’ and thus cannot recover ‘more than one full recovery for the same harm.‘” CoMo Premium Constr., 724 S.W.3d at 829 (quoting Twehous Excavating, Inc. v. Jefferson City Ret., LLC, 613 S.W.3d 499, 504 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020)). The issue of pre-judgment interest is not left unresolved by the Judgment.

Though the Judgment is silent on the issue of attorney‘s fees, pursuant to Rule 74.16, a claim for attorney‘s fees must be pursued by motion as an independent action following the entry of a final judgment. Rule 74.16(b)(3). Accordingly, a prayer for the recovery of attorney‘s fees in a petition no longer suspends the finality of a judgment. Wiseman v. Mo. Dep‘t of Corr., 710 S.W.3d 29, 35-36 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).

We conclude that the Judgment was a final judgment. As a result, the Order denying All Acres’ motion for sale of real estate is an appealable special order after final

judgment in the cause pursuant to section 512.020(5). All Acres’ second point on appeal is therefore granted.

The question remains whether the Order had to be designated as a “judgment” pursuant to Rule 74.01(a) in order to perfect the right of appeal authorized by section 512.020(5). Though the right of appeal is controlled by statute, article V, section 5 of the Missouri Constitution cloaks our Supreme Court with the authority to “establish rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading for all courts . . . , which shall have the force and effect of law” as long as those rules do not change, among other things, “the right of appeal.” Adopted pursuant to this authority, Rule 74.01(a) provides that a “judgment,” when used in the rules of civil procedure, “includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies,” and is only entered when “a writing signed by the judge and denominated ‘judgment’ or ‘decree’ is filed.”

Prior to 2019, Missouri courts routinely interpreted Rule 74.01(a) to require that a special order after a final judgment had to be denominated a “judgment” or “decree” in order to perfect the right of appeal described in section 512.020(5). See, e.g., Brooks v. Brooks, 98 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Mo. banc 2003) (holding that while a qualified domestic relations order is an appealable special order, the order must be denominated either a “judgment” or “decree” to perfect the appeal); Hamilton, 278 S.W.3d at 732 (holding that an order granting a motion to quash a garnishment was a special order pursuant to section 512.020(5), but had to be denominated as a “judgment” to perfect the right of appeal).

In Meadowfresh Solutions USA, LLC v. Maple Grove Farms, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 758 (Mo. banc 2019), our Supreme Court acknowledged “persistent confusion

surrounding the issues of what a judgment is, what form it takes, and when it is entered” for the purposes of determining the appealability of a trial court ruling. Id. at 760 (quoting State ex rel. Henderson v. Asel, 566 S.W.3d 596, 598 (Mo. banc 2019)). In Meadowfresh, a limited liability company filed a motion seeking to revoke, or in the alternative, to modify and change, an interlocutory order appointing a receiver. Id. at 759. The trial court issued an order denying the motion. Id. The limited liability company appealed pursuant to section 512.020(2), which authorizes an appeal from an order refusing to revoke, modify, or change an interlocutory order appointing a receiver. Id. In addressing whether an “order” from which an appeal is authorized by section 512.020 must first be designated a “judgment” before an appeal can be taken, the Court reached two conclusions. First, the Court held that:

Requiring the [trial] court to inaccurately label its clearly interlocutory order as a judgment for the sole purpose of allowing [the limited liability company] to perfect an appeal, which is authorized expressly by two different statutes, defies reason and elevates form over substance.

Id. at 762 (emphasis added). Second, the Court held that:

Moreover, requiring this inaccurate labeling merely to take an appeal from statutorily authorized orders does not comport with this Court‘s long-standing precedent to review the content, substance, and effect of the order entered and the [trial] court‘s intent and purpose when doing so.

Id. (emphasis added). The Court then overruled its earlier holdings in Spiece v. Garland, 197 S.W.3d 594 (Mo. banc 2006), and Brooks v. Brooks, 98 S.W.3d 530 (Mo. banc 2003), “to the extent . . . inconsistent with this opinion.” Id.⁵ Spiece had held that even

though an order granting a new trial is appealable pursuant to section 512.020(1), the order must be denominated a judgment pursuant to Rule 74.01(a) to perfect the right of appeal. 197 S.W.3d at 595-96. And, as previously noted, Brooks had held that even though a qualified domestic relations order entered after final judgment in a dissolution cause is an appealable special order pursuant to section 512.020(5), the order must be denominated a judgment pursuant to Rule 74.01(a) to perfect the right of appeal. 98 S.W.3d at 532.

Meadowfresh thus clarified that the Rule 74.01(a) denomination requirement does not apply to statutorily authorized appeals from “orders” described in section 512.020.⁶

That includes the interlocutory orders contemplated by section 512.020(1) through (4). See Thomas v. H‘Doubler, 663 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (observing that section 512.020(1)-(4) “lists the interlocutory orders from which an immediate appeal may be taken“). And it includes any “special order after final judgment,” as was at issue in Brooks.⁷ See Hudson, 701 S.W.3d at 865-66 (entertaining an appeal from a trial court order granting a motion to revive a judgment because the order was a “special order after final judgment“);⁸ Reeves v. Sobczak, 728 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (applying Meadowfresh to conclude that docket entry orders ruling on motions to enforce a final dissolution decree were appealable special orders after final judgment that did not need to be denominated as “judgments“); W. Blue Print Co., LLC v. Roberts, 696 S.W.3d 75, 79 & n.6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (concluding that a docket entry order denying a

motion to order release of a judgment was an appealable special order after final judgment that did not need to be denominated as a “judgment“).

We conclude that the trial court‘s Order denying All Acres’ motion for sale of real estate is a special order after final judgment that did not need to be denominated as a “judgment” or “decree” in order to perfect the right of appeal provided by section 512.020(5). As such, we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.⁹

Standard of Review

Our review of a court-tried civil case is governed by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). Reeves, 728 S.W.3d at 473. “We must affirm the trial court‘s judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the

weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.” Id. (quoting Moore v. Moore, 484 S.W.3d 386, 389 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016)). When assessing whether the trial court erroneously declared or misapplied the law, “we defer to the trial court‘s factual determinations but otherwise review the trial court‘s legal conclusions and application of law to the facts de novo.” McLeod v. McLeod, 681 S.W.3d 215, 228-29 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (citing Singleton v. Singleton, 659 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Mo. banc 2023)). “An alleged misapplication of the law will only constitute reversible error if the misapplication of law ‘materially affects the merits of the action [so that we have] a firm belief that the . . . judgment is wrong.‘” Id. at 229 (alteration in original) (quoting Odermann v. Mancuso, 670 S.W.3d 461, 471 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)).

We are “primarily concerned with the correctness of the result, not the route taken by the trial court to reach it . . . .” Mo. Soybean Ass‘n v. Mo. Clean Water Comm‘n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Mo. banc 2003) (citations omitted). Thus, we will affirm the trial court‘s judgment “if it is correct on any ground supported by the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied on that ground.” Id. (citations omitted).

Analysis

In its first point on appeal, All Acres asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motion for sale of real estate because “Missouri precedent supports that a [trial] court has the authority to sell an individual‘s homestead and transfer homestead rights to proceeds” that can be applied toward satisfaction of the Judgment. Though we agree with All Acres that the homestead exemption did not preclude the sale of Ballard‘s property as a matter

of law, we nonetheless affirm the trial court‘s Order on an alternative basis that is supported by the record.

A judgment creditor is entitled to execute upon a judgment during the ten-year period after rendition of the judgment. Sections 513.015, 513.020. This includes the right to execute a levy to seize and sell the real or personal property of the judgment debtor. Sections 513.040, 513.010.1; see Rules 76.05, 76.06 (how a judgment creditor can make a levy of execution). However, a levy on a judgment debtor‘s homestead is subject to exemption. A homestead comprises a person‘s dwelling house, appurtenances, and the land associated therewith, which the person owns and occupies. Section 513.475.1; Meeks Leasing Co. v. Young, 881 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994). A homestead is an “estate sui generis” that is “governed by the homestead law, can only be sold in pursuance to the provisions of that law, and is not subject to the general law . . . .” Meeks Leasing, 881 S.W.2d at 235 (quoting Karsznia v. Kelsey, 262 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Mo. 1953)). “The homestead law is a code unto itself, having for its purpose the safekeeping of the homestead for the householder . . . by making it forbidden fruit to creditors.” Id. (quoting Karsznia, 262 S.W.2d at 846).

The homestead exemption does not render a homestead immune from attachment and execution, however, and instead only protects up to $15,000 of equity in the homestead. Section 513.475.1; see Ferm v. Crenshaw, 468 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Mo. App. 1971) (describing section 513.475 as providing the “homestead exemption“). This means that a homeowner‘s “excess [of equity above the $15,000 cap] in a homestead may be subjected to the payment of the debts of the homestead claimant.” Daniels v. Pecks, 288 S.W. 84, 85 (Mo. App. 1926)

(citations omitted). Even then, the homestead exemption only applies to debts that arise after the homeowner acquires the homestead of record. Section 513.510 (“homestead shall be subject to attachment and levy of execution upon all causes of action existing at the time of the acquiring such homestead,” which is considered the date of filing the deed of the homestead). Because the homestead exemption is “self-enforcing,” the owner does not need to submit a verified request of exemption for it to apply.¹⁰ Meeks Leasing, 881 S.W.2d at 236. But the owner must own and occupy the property as his homestead in order for the exemption to automatically apply. Id.

When a judgment creditor files a levy of execution against real property that is subject to the homestead exemption, the owner of the property can either: (1) carve out a portion of the property that is valued up to $15,000 to retain as his homestead; or (2) refuse to select a portion of the property to retain as his homestead. Section 513.480. In either case, the sheriff charged with responsibility for executing on the levy must appoint three disinterested appraisers to value the homestead, to fix the location and boundaries of the homestead, and to determine whether a portion of the property valued up to $15,000 can be severed from the remainder of the property. Id.; section 513.525. It is not sufficient to merely determine the value of property subject to the homestead

exemption, however, as the effect of the exemption on the ability to levy depends on the amount of equity in the property. Section 513.485. The homestead is “absolutely exempt from sale until the sheriff determine[s] through appraisal whether there [is] equity, taking into account mortgages, liens, and exemption value.” Meeks Leasing, 881 S.W.2d at 237.

If the required appraisals determine that the owner holds less than $15,000 of equity in the homestead, the homestead remains exempt from sale. See Karsznia, 262 S.W.2d at 845-46 (because the value of the owners’ equity was less than $1,500, the homestead exemption amount at the time, the homestead was exempt from attachment and execution for a debt that arose after acquiring the homestead); Tapley v. Ogle, 62 S.W. 431, 432 (Mo. 1901) (when a homestead comes within the prescribed value limit, it is absolutely exempt from attachment and sale for debts contracted after the homestead was acquired). But if the required appraisals determine that the owner holds more than $15,000 in equity in the homestead, the homestead can be severed from the totality of the property if possible prior to sale, or if not, then the whole of the property will be sold with proceeds divided to compensate the owner for the homestead before any balance is applied to the outstanding judgment. Sections 513.475.1, 513.480, 513.520, 513.525; see Daniels, 288 S.W. at 85.

Here, after All Acres filed a real estate levy on Ballard‘s homestead, Ballard did not elect to carve out a portion of his property to retain as his homestead. The three appraisals that the sheriff was required to secure each concluded that a portion of the property valued at $15,000 could not be severed for Ballard to retain as his homestead. Though each of the required appraisals valued Ballard‘s property at more than $15,000,

none of the reports determined the equity in Ballard‘s property. Rather, the required appraisal reports were equivocal on this point, expressing either dash marks, “[n]ot available,” or a blank space on the line where the amount of outstanding indebtedness against the property was required to be noted. See section 513.485. “[U]ntil the sheriff determined through appraisal whether there was equity, taking into account mortgages, liens, and exemption value,” the homestead was “absolutely exempt from sale.” Meeks Leasing, 881 S.W.2d at 237; see also Brennecke v. Riemann, 102 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Mo. 1937) (noting that although “there is authority for ordering a sale of a homestead and transferring the owner‘s homestead rights to the proceeds[,]” such a remedy is “drastic” and “should not be employed except where it is very clear that there would be a substantial excess if a sale was made“) (citing Daniels, 288 S.W. 84).

We acknowledge that the Order did not purport to deny All Acres’ motion on this basis, and instead appeared to accept Ballard‘s contention that because he took title to his homestead prior to incurring the debt All Acres sought to enforce, the homestead could not be levied as a matter of law. This is legally erroneous for the reasons explained. But a trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed based on any “ground supported by the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied on that ground.” Mo. Soybean Ass‘n, 102 S.W.3d at 22. Because the record does not establish “whether the real estate in question had value above the sum of existing mortgages, the homestead claim amount, and delinquent taxes or other superior liens,” the sheriff could not “proceed with his levy until he . . . ascertained, in the mode directed by the act . . . the value of the premises, and that they are beyond the limit protected against executions.” Meeks Leasing, 881 S.W.2d at 236

(citation and quotation omitted). As a result, the trial court did not err in denying All Acres’ motion for sale of real estate because the “[t]he lien of [the J]udgment [could] not attach to the surplus in value until [it was] ascertained by an admeasurement of the proper homestead . . . .” Id. (quoting Macke v. Byrd, 33 S.W. 448, 450 (Mo. 1895)).

Point One is denied.¹¹

Conclusion

The Order is affirmed.

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur

Notes

“In the appeal of a bench-tried case, we view the evidence and reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment, disregarding evidence and inferences to the contrary.” (citing ).

The Prompt Pay Act claim was made pursuant to section 431.180. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as supplemented through May 22, 2023, when All Acres filed its first amended petition.

All references to section 512.020 are to RSMo 2016 as supplemented through June 12, 2025, the date All Acres filed its notice of appeal.

All Rule references are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules, Volume I--State, 2023, unless otherwise noted.

It follows that , which relied on and to conclude that a special order after final judgment must be denominated as a “judgment” to perfect the right of appeal, is also overruled to the extent inconsistent with .

The Court in cautioned “that this opinion does not eliminate the requirement of Rule 74.01(a) in which actual judgments--judicial orders fully resolving at least one claim in a lawsuit and establishing all of the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to that claim--and ‘final judgments’ (i.e., judgments resolving the last claim in a lawsuit or a ‘distinct judicial unit’ of claims and certified for immediate appeal by the [trial] court pursuant to Rule 74.01(b)) must be denominated as such so an appeal may be taken.” (emphasis in original). This cautionary proviso appears calculated, in part, to remind that some proceedings initiated after a final judgment that are designed to attack or aid in the enforcement of the judgment will not qualify as an appealable special order pursuant to section 512.020(5)Bate v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 464 S.W.3d 515, 517 (Mo. banc 2015) (a Rule 74.06(b) motion to seek relief from a final judgment or order has the nature of an independent proceeding and is appealable as an independent judgment); (“The independent nature of a Rule 74.06 proceeding requires that a new final judgment be entered in that proceeding to invoke appellate jurisdiction.“); (since an amendment effective January 1, 2007, a Rule 74.05(d) motion to set aside an interlocutory order of default or a default judgment has been characterized as an independent action, so that a trial court order granting or denying such a motion is a separately appealable judgment for which finality is calculated pursuant to Rule 81.05(a)); (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (holding in a Rule 74.16 procedure to recover attorney‘s fees after the entry of a final judgment that “Missouri law is clear that a motion that is expressly declared by Supreme Court Rule to be an independent action must be resolved by an independent judgment that meets the requirements of Rule 74.01(a) before it is final and appealable . . .“).

Appealable special orders pursuant to section 512.020(5) are not “interlocutory” orders. Post-final judgment proceedings to attack or aid in the enforcement of a final judgment result in a “final” resolution. That “final” resolution will be appealable either pursuant to section 512.020(5) as a “special order after final judgment,” or as a “final judgment” if entered in a Rule-designated “independent action.” See supra note 6; see also (holding that an appealable special order after final judgment in the cause refers to an order that constitutes a “final and complete disposition of the subject matter of the motion” filed to attack or aid in the enforcement of the final judgment, consistent with treating special orders after final judgment as “proceeding[s] independent of the proceedings in the principal cause“); (citing favorably).

The record on appeal in , which is available on Case.Net, confirms that the trial court‘s grant of the motion to revive the underlying judgment was an “order” that was not denominated as a judgment, consistent with .

The timeliness of an appeal also impacts our jurisdiction. (“Timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional.“) (quotation omitted). There is a split of authority between this Court and our Southern District about when an appeal from a section 512.020(5) special order after final judgment must be filed. Compare (holding that an order reviving a judgment was a special order after final judgment that was final upon its entry, requiring appeal to be filed within ten days pursuant to Rule 81.04(a)), and (holding that a special order after final judgment becomes final upon its entry and must be appealed within ten days pursuant to Rule 81.04(a)), with (holding that a judgment revival order is a special order after final judgment that is not final upon its entry, but that remains subject to Rule 81.05(a), which addresses the effect of authorized after-trial motions on finality), and (declining to follow and concluding that a special order after final judgment “terminates what is deemed to be an independent proceeding, [so that the] order should be treated as a judgment subject to Rule 81.05(a)‘s finality rules“). We need not further address this split of authority because All Acres filed its notice of appeal within ten days of entry of the Order, and thus on a timely basis under either appellate districts’ view of the law. See Rule 81.05(b) (treating prematurely filed appeal as timely).

Though the failure to do so may not be fatal to the homestead exemption, the law does express the requirement that a judgment debtor file a verified request of exemption with the levying officer within twenty days after receiving notice of the levy of execution. Section 513.445.2; Rule 76.075(b); see sections 513.430 (types of property that are exempt from attachment), 513.440 (exemption for a head of family is up to $1,250 and $350 per dependent child).

This determination does not prohibit All Acres from undertaking further efforts to execute on the Judgment, including again by way of real estate levy. See section 513.015 (“[t]he party in whose favor any judgment . . . is rendered, may have an execution in conformity therewith“); see, e.g., (res judicata did not prohibit refiled habeus corpus proceedings based on different facts). The failure of proof on the issue of Ballard‘s equity in the homestead did not resolve the issue so as to preclude its future determination.

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