Lead Opinion
My Truong (hereinafter, “Truong”) appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae on its unlawful de-tainer action. Truong raises five points on appeal. Truong’s first three points challenge the constitutional validity of section 534.010, RSMo 2000,
Factual and Procedural History
Truong púrchásed a home in Imperial, Missouri, in March 2006 and executed a deed of trust in connection with the purchase that was duly recorded. In early 2010, Truong encountered difficulty in paying his mortgage. Truong entered into a loan modification agreement with his lender in an effort to become current under his mortgage obligation. Truong left the United States to visit Vietnam in August 2010 and did not return until September 9, 2010. In his absence, he received several letters at his home. Two letters were dated August 4, 2010. One letter contained a permanent loan modification approval. The second letter contained a notice of default. A letter dated August 9, 2010, was a notice of foreclosure. A letter dated August 17, 2010, provided notice of a trustee’s sale.
On September 10, 2010, one day after Truong returned home and received the letters, the trustee’s sale took place. Fannie Mae was the successful purchaser of the property and obtained a trustee’s deed for Truong’s property. Despite the sale, Truong continued to maintain possession of his home.
On September 22, 2010, Fannie Mae filed its petition for unlawful detainer, asserting it had the legal right of possession to the property and that Truong unlawfully and wrongfully possessed the property. The petition alleged Fannie Mae had been damaged for lost rents and profits. Fannie Mae filed a motion for summary judgment against Truong, along with a statement of uncontroverted facts. Truong filed his answer, raised affirmative defenses and counterclaims, and requested a jury trial. Truong’s answer included all of the constitutional and procedural claims he raises on appeal.
A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held January 18, 2011. Pri- or to the hearing, Truong filed a motion in opposition to Fannie Mae’s summary judgment motion, a statement of uncontrovert-ed facts, and a response denying several of
The associate circuit judge was mindful of the statutory requirements for an unlawful detainer action but expressed concern about the fairness of the proceedings given the recent economic climate. The judge stayed the proceedings for thirty days so that Truong could file the appropriate action in circuit court challenging title to his home. When Truong’s counsel indicated she was “not sure how this will work on appeal,” the associate circuit court stated, “Well, like I said earlier, it’s still an unlawful detainer [action]. And you don’t have any appeal to the Court of Appeals. You’ve got a de novo right, and you’re going to have to post a bond to keep possession.” Truong did not file any action in civil court during the thirty day stay.
On February 28, 2011, the associate circuit judge granted Fannie Mae’s motion for summary judgment, denied Truong’s constitutional and procedural challenges, and awarded Fannie Mae $6,000 in damages. Fannie Mae obtained possession of Truong’s home on March 31, 2011. Instead of applying for a trial de novo in the circuit court, Truong filed a notice of appeal with this Court. This appeal follows.
Standard of Review
This Court is a court of limited appellate jurisdiction. Mo. Const, art. V, sec. 3; Alumax Foils, Inc. v. City of St. Louis,
Discussion
Fannie Mae argues this Court should dismiss this appeal for two reasons. Since Fannie Mae’s first argument is dis-positive, the second ground for dismissal need not be addressed. Fannie Mae argues Truong’s failure to apply for a trial de novo in the circuit court deprives this Court of the authority to hear his appeal directly.
In Missouri, the right to appeal is purely statutory, and “where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists.” Farinella v. Croft,
The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to the intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning. Riverside-Quindaro Bend Levee Dist. v. Intercontinental Engineering Mfg. Corp.,
What is disputed is whether the unlawful detainer action was “tried” for purposes of section 512.180.1. Truong asserts the case was not “tried” because he requested a jury trial but did not receive one because the associate circuit judge entered summary judgment in Fannie Mae’s favor. As a result, Truong believes the appropriate remedy was to file a direct appeal instead of an application for a trial de novo.
Within the context of section 512.180, a case is “tried” when there is a full disposition of issues in the case, whether disposed of on issues alleged in the pleadings or on the basis of preliminary motions. See Prosser v. Derickson,
Here, the associate circuit judge granted Fannie Mae’s motion for summary judgment, which fully disposed of the unlawful detainer action and denied Truong’s constitutional and procedural claims. Thus, the case was “tried” without a jury for purposes of section 512.180. Cf.S & P Properties, Inc. v. Bannister,
Conclusion
We acknowledge Truong has been dispossessed of his home and firmly believes he can demonstrate his legal right to possession is superior to that of Fannie Mae. In light of this assertion, this Court laments the harshness of this result. Un
Notes
. All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 as updated by RSMo Supp.2010.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Section 512.180.1
The merits are compelling. Truong was evicted from his home even though he entered into a loan modification agreement, his payments were deducted automatically from his bank account, he received no actual notice of default, and he received no actual notice of the foreclosure sale. This is the natural and expected result of a process that specifically prohibits the unlawful detainer defendant from contesting the dispositive issue of title. While there is value in expediency, the greater value lies in the truth. As this case illustrates, the statutorily mandated rush to a judgment in unlawful detainer actions sacrifices the truth underlying the case.
There are at least two fundamental flaws in the judgment that warrant reversal. First, section 534.210 violates due process by providing that the “merits of the title shall in nowise be inquired into....” In other words, the unlawful de-tainer defendant is prohibited from disputing the dispositive issue of title. A basic precept of due process is that one should have a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
Second, Truong was deprived of his constitutionally and statutorily guaranteed right to a trial by jury. Section 534.160 specifically requires that “[ejither party shall have the right to a jury trial” so long as the request is timely. Despite Truong’s request for a trial by jury, the court disposed of the case by a summary judgment. The unlawful detainer process is itself summary in nature. As this case illustrates, a summary judgment in an already summary procedure is apt to yield results largely divorced from the actual facts. The right to a trial by jury, or at the very least a full bench trial, appears to be the only mechanism by which a financially distressed homeowner, facing imminent eviction from his or her home, can be afforded any possibility of requiring the plaintiff to prove that the allegations are at least somewhat true.
I would hear the appeal on the merits and reverse the judgment.
. All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 as updated by RSMo Supp.2010.