EDENILSON MISAEL ALFARO, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MARIN COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE et al., Real Parties in Interest.
A159577 (Marin
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE
Filed 12/9/20
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this
Petitioner Edenilson Misael Alfaro (Defendant), a defendant in a capital murder case filed in Marin County (the County), sought discovery in connection with his claim that juries in the County were not selected from a fair cross-section of the community. The records he sought included the County‘s master list of prospective jurors. Defendant relied on Pantos v. City and County of San Francisco (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 258 (Pantos), which held a court‘s “master list of qualified jurors . . . is a judicial record subject to public inspection and copying.” (Id. at pp. 260–261.) The trial court denied the request, finding that Pantos was no longer good law in light of subsequent statutory developments, and that Defendant failed to make the showing required for discovery related to a fair cross-section challenge.
We consider subsequent statutory developments and countervailing privacy interests, and conclude Pantos is still good law, at least as to the names and zip codes appearing on master jury lists. Accordingly, we will issue a writ directing the trial court to reverse its order denying Defendant‘s request for these records.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedure for Compiling Lists of Prospective Jurors
Jury selection in California is governed by the Trial Jury Selection and Management Act (hereafter, the Act;
Jurors “shall be selected at random, from a source or sources inclusive of a representative cross section of the population of the area served by the court.” (
Marin County Local Rules, rule 8.17 sets forth jury selection procedures for the County. A list of jurors is generated from “the list of registered voters and the Department of Motor Vehicle‘s list of licensed drivers and identification card holders. [¶] These two source lists are combined for use in the computer; using predetermined matching criteria, the computer then compares the names on the two lists and eliminates any duplicates which results in a single merged file list.” (Id., subd. (B).) “After the source lists are combined, duplicates eliminated, and disqualified individuals purged, as set forth in this rule, a master list will be produced by using the complete randomization technique and shall be generated at least once each year.” (Id., subd. (B)(3).)
B. Fair Cross-Section Challenge
“A criminal defendant has a ‘right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a petit jury selected from a fair cross section of the community.’ [Citations.] ‘In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group
Whether a defendant is entitled to “the discovery of information necessary to make such a case” requires a different analysis. (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1194 (Jackson).) “A defendant who seeks access to this information is obviously not required to justify that request by making a prima facie case of underrepresentation. Rather, upon a particularized showing supporting a reasonable belief that underrepresentation in the jury pool or the venire exists as the result of practices of systematic exclusion, the court must make a reasonable effort to accommodate the defendant‘s relevant requests for information designed to verify the existence of such underrepresentation and document its nature and extent.” (Id. at p. 1194.) We consider below whether this particularized showing requirement applies to master jury lists, or whether such lists are disclosable as public records without the need for a particularized showing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2018, Defendant and a co-defendant were charged by information with murder and other crimes. The People filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty against Defendant.
Defendant filed a motion for discovery seeking, for purposes of pursuing a fair cross-section challenge, “the master jury wheel,” “the qualified jury wheel,” and “the actual computer program, operation manual and/or other documentation describing the method by which the voter record information list and the driver record information list is merged and purged of duplicate names.”3 Like the parties, we hereafter refer to records sought by the last request as the “merge/purge information.” Defendant also requested permission to conduct an anonymous survey of prospective jurors in the jury lounge to obtain their self-identification as to “race/ethnicity and gender.” Defendant then served a subpoena duces tecum on the County‘s jury commissioner (the
As to the master and qualified jury lists, Defendant argued these were public documents for which no particularized showing was required, citing, inter alia, Pantos, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d 258, and further argued any concerns about information such as home addresses or driver‘s license numbers could be resolved through redactions or a protective order. The Jury Commissioner argued the master and qualified lists were not public records, citing prospective jurors’ right to privacy and various statutes, enacted after Pantos, prohibiting the disclosure of certain information. As to the merge/purge information and jury survey, the parties disputed whether Defendant had established the requisite particularized showing. The trial court granted the Jury Commissioner‘s motion to quash, finding statutes enacted after Pantos constituted a compelling reason for withholding disclosure of the master list, Defendant was therefore required to make a “particularized showing” before receiving any of the requested records, and Defendant had failed to do so.5
Defendant subsequently filed a motion seeking to prohibit trial under the County‘s current jury selection system because it would violate his right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community.6 The motion further argued the trial court‘s denial of Defendant‘s discovery motion deprived him of the ability to adequately present this challenge. The Jury Commissioner opposed the motion.
Dr. John Weeks, qualified by the court as an expert in demography as it applies to jury composition challenges, testified at the evidentiary hearing on Defendant‘s motion, and a declaration Weeks prepared was received into evidence. Weeks used United States Census Bureau data to determine the “jury eligible population” of the County; i.e., County residents who were citizens, 18 years or older, and spoke English. His analysis determined that 7.9 percent of the jury eligible population of the County is Hispanic. He then analyzed approximately 1,800 prospective jurors in a 2013 County case (including prospective jurors in the jury pool and those summoned but excused for hardship). Because Weeks did not have data from the County
During the evidentiary hearing, Defendant renewed his discovery request with respect to the master and qualified lists, the merge/purge information, and the jury survey. The parties reiterated their arguments about whether the master list is a public record. The trial court denied the renewed motion and denied the fair cross-section challenge.
Following the court‘s ruling, Defendant sought writ relief in this court. We issued an order to show cause, and the People and the Jury Commissioner filed returns.8 California Attorneys for Criminal Justice filed an amicus brief on behalf of Defendant.
DISCUSSION
I. Propriety of Writ Review
Defendant seeks a writ directing the trial court to reverse its order denying Defendant‘s renewed discovery motion and to reopen Defendant‘s
Defendant‘s petition also seeks writ review with respect to other rulings: (1) certain evidentiary rulings made at the hearing on Defendant‘s fair cross-section challenge, and (2) the trial court‘s order, issued more than 60 days before Defendant‘s writ petition was filed, granting JSI‘s motion to quash Defendant‘s subpoena. As our order to show cause explained, writ review as to these rulings is not appropriate. (People v. Municipal Court (Ahnemann) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 658, 660 [“It is well settled that neither a writ of prohibition nor a writ of mandate will lie to resolve an issue as to the admissibility of evidence.“]; Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 695, 701 [” ‘An appellate court may consider a petition for an extraordinary writ at any time [citation], but has discretion to deny a petition filed after the 60-day period applicable to appeals, and should do so absent “extraordinary circumstances” justifying the delay.’ “].)9 Accordingly, we will deny the petition as to these issues.
The Jury Commissioner asserts various procedural arguments. The arguments are unavailing.
For the first time in his return, the Jury Commissioner claims Defendant‘s renewed discovery motion was not properly before the trial court because “the trial court did not hear petitioner‘s discovery motion in the first instance, only the motion to quash,” and because Defendant cannot move for discovery from the Jury Commissioner, a nonparty to the criminal proceedings. In the trial court, the Jury Commissioner opposed Defendant‘s renewed discovery motion on the merits and incorporated arguments made in the motion to quash briefing. In this court, the Jury Commissioner‘s informal response characterized the renewed discovery motion as a reprise of the motion to quash proceedings, referring to “defendant‘s renewed discovery motion (i.e. the motion to quash the defense subpoena).” Defendant could have easily cured any error below. Accordingly, the Jury Commissioner has forfeited this procedural objection. (NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236–1237 [“[Real parties in interest] concede they did not raise this issue in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Nor did they raise it in their preliminary response. . . . Thus, [they] have forfeited this argument.“].)
We also reject the Jury Commissioner‘s argument that Defendant may not raise certain issues which were raised during the motion to quash proceedings but were, according to the Jury Commissioner, insufficiently reraised during the renewed discovery proceedings. First, the Jury Commissioner contends Defendant is precluded from seeking the qualified jury list because “no specific request was made” during the renewed discovery proceedings, even though, as the Jury Commissioner concedes, Defendant‘s counsel referred to the qualified list during argument. Given that Defendant sought the qualified list during the previous discovery proceedings, counsel‘s reference to the list during argument was sufficient to include it in his renewed discovery motion. Second, the Jury Commissioner complains that, during the renewed discovery proceedings, Defendant did not restate that the master and qualified lists could be redacted or subject to a protective order. Dr. Weeks‘s declaration was clear that the information sought from the master and qualified lists was the jurors’ last names and zip codes. The Jury Commissioner cites no authority that it was Defendant‘s burden to raise the possibility of redactions or a protective order. To the contrary, “[i]f a judicial administrative record contains information that is exempt from disclosure and the exempt portions are reasonably segregable, a judicial branch entity must allow inspection and copying of the record after deletion of the portions that are exempt from disclosure.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.500(e)(1)(C).) Third, the Jury Commissioner contends Defendant is precluded from arguing that he is entitled to the master and qualified lists under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, and the Act. We need not decide this issue because, as discussed post, we resolve the matter on other grounds.
Finally, we reject the Jury Commissioner‘s contention that, to the extent Defendant seeks review of the trial court‘s order granting the Jury Commissioner‘s motion to quash Defendant‘s subpoena, the petition is untimely. The petition seeks review of the trial court‘s order denying Defendant‘s renewed discovery motion, and is timely.
III. Master and Qualified Jury Lists
We now turn to whether master and qualified jury lists are disclosable public records, or whether Defendant must satisfy the particularized showing requirement before obtaining them for purposes of his fair cross-section challenge.10 Although in general discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, where, as here, ” ’ “the propriety of a discovery order turns on . . . a question of law,” we “determine the issue de novo.” ’ ” (Jimenez v. Superior Court (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 824, 829.)
A. Presumption of Public Access to Judicial Records
Although the California Public Records Act (
“The common law right of access to judicial records is not absolute, but ‘must be reconciled with legitimate countervailing public or private interests . . . .’ [Citation.] However, the fundamental nature of the right gives rise to a ‘presumption’ in favor of public access.” (KNSD, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1203.) “California also recognizes the presumption of accessibility of judicial records in criminal cases and allows a trial court
This presumption of openness applies equally to jury selection. “[S]ince the development of trial by jury, the process of selection of jurors has presumptively been a public process with exceptions only for good cause shown.” (Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California (1984) 464 U.S. 501, 505 (Press-Enterprise).) For example, in determining whether “to close any portion of jury selection,” courts apply the following standard: ” ‘The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.’ ” (Bellas v. Superior Court (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 636, 643 (Bellas); see also id. at p. 645 [applying standard to prospective juror questionnaires].)
In addition to constitutional principles and the common law, California Rules of Court, rule 10.500(e)(1)(A)11 provides: “A judicial branch entity must allow inspection and copying of judicial administrative records unless the records are exempt from disclosure under this rule or by law.”12 By its own terms, the rule “clarifies and expands the public‘s right of access to judicial administrative records and must be broadly construed to further the public‘s right of access.” (Rule 10.500(a)(2).)13
Pantos relied on the presumption of public access to judicial records in concluding that a court‘s “master list of qualified jurors” was a public judicial record: “The master list of qualified jurors has the status of a judicial record, available to the public in general. There are no exemptions and no compelling reasons for nondisclosure. Courts do have the inherent power to control their own records to protect jurors’ privacy, litigants’ rights or to protect the public from injury. Nothing has been presented to justify nondisclosure. The law favors maximum public access to judicial proceedings and court records. [Citations.] Judicial records are historically and presumptively open to the public and there is an important right of access which should not be closed except for compelling countervailing reasons. [Citation.] No such reasons have been presented. Upon payment of reasonable costs, plaintiff [the operator of a commercial jury investigation service] is entitled to a copy of the master list of qualified jurors containing names and addresses.” (Pantos, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at pp. 262–263.)
The proposition that master jury lists are public records was restated by the Supreme Court in Jackson, albeit in dicta.14 (Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1194–1195 [“master lists of jury pools . . . are judicial records that are or should be available to the public“].) Jackson relied on Pantos for this proposition, as well as a second case which itself relied on Pantos. (Jackson, at pp. 1194–1195; People v. Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 541, 550.) Although Jackson established the “particularized showing” required for discovery related to a fair cross-section challenge, the court indicated no such showing is required for public records. (Jackson, at pp. 1194–1195; see Roddy v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1135 (Roddy) [“Regardless of a defendant‘s constitutional right to pretrial discovery, ‘some of the information sought, such as master lists of jury pools, . . . are judicial records that are or should be available to the public.’ “].)15
The Jury Commissioner contends that various statutes enacted after Pantos have effectively overruled the case by prohibiting the disclosure of information contained in the master and qualified lists. We disagree.
1. Section 197(c)
The primary statute relied on by the Jury Commissioner is section 197, subdivision (c) (hereafter, section 197(c)): “The Department of Motor Vehicles shall furnish the jury commissioner of each county with the current list of the names, addresses, and other identifying information of persons residing in the county who are age 18 years or older and who are holders of a current driver‘s license or identification card . . . . The jury commissioner shall not disclose the information furnished by the Department of Motor Vehicles pursuant to this section to any person, organization, or agency.” The Jury Commissioner argues section 197(c)‘s prohibition on the disclosure of information furnished by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) encompasses the master and qualified lists, which are created in part with that information.
” ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose.’ [Citation.] The well-established rules for performing this task require us to begin by examining the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory language in isolation; rather, we look to the statute‘s entire substance in order to determine its scope and purposes. [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question in context, keeping in mind the statute‘s nature and obvious purposes. [Citation.] We must harmonize the statute‘s various parts by considering it in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. [Citation.] If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.” (Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Alameda Produce Market, LLC (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1100, 1106–1107.)
The plain language of section 197(c), with its blanket prohibition on disclosure of information furnished by the DMV, could be construed to prohibit the disclosure of subsequent iterations of that information, such as the master and qualified juror lists. However, such a construction is not compelled by the language. Moreover, to so construe the statute would prohibit any disclosure of juror names furnished by the DMV, a construction in direct conflict with section 237, subdivision (a), which provides, “The
Accordingly, we turn to the legislative history of section 197(c) for assistance in construing the statute.16 Section 197 was enacted in 1988 as part of the then-new Act. (Stats. 1988, ch. 1245, § 2.) The Legislative Counsel‘s Digest characterized an early version of the bill as enacting “an extensive revision of the law with respect to juries, consolidating various provisions relative to juries in civil and criminal causes, and revising provisions relative to,” among other subjects, “juror‘s rights to privacy.” (Assem. Bill No. 2617 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 4, 1988, at pp. 1–2.) This early version of the bill included provisions stating, “It is the policy of the State of California that all persons selected for jury service have a right to personal privacy. The jury commissioner shall not release, disclose, or provide access to, any information gathered in connection with jury selection or service” except on a showing of good cause, and “All records and papers compiled and maintained by the jury commissioner in connection with the selection and service of jurors are confidential and shall not be subject to disclosure pursuant to the Public Records Act.” (Assem. Bill No. 2617 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 4, 1988, at pp. 9-10.) These provisions remained through two amendments; a third amendment retained the latter but replaced the former with provisions prohibiting jury commissioners from releasing information gathered in connection with jury selection absent a court order, and providing for courts to give access to the master list, upon written request, to parties, and to nonparties absent compelling reasons to deny access. (Assem. Bill No. 2617 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 21, 1988, at pp. 10–11; id., as amended Mar. 23, 1988, at pp. 10–11; id., as amended Jun. 15, 1988, at pp. 10–12.)
Legislative committee reports discussing these versions of the bill expressly refer to Pantos‘s holding that master lists of qualified jurors are subject to public inspection and note that Pantos “would therefore be overruled by” the bill. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill
Although the nondisclosure language of section 197(c) appeared in early versions of the bill, the provision was not referred to in any of these discussions. (Assem. Bill No. 2617 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 4, 1988, at p. 6; id., as amended Jan. 21, 1988, at p. 6; id., as amended Mar. 23, 1988, at p. 6; id., as amended Jun. 15, 1988, at p. 6.) Significantly, unlike the juror privacy provisions set forth above, the nondisclosure language of section 197(c) was already present, in substantial part, in then-section 204.7. (Former section 204.7, as amended by Stats. 1983, ch. 425, § 1 [“The jury commissioner shall not disclose the information furnished by the Department of Motor Vehicles pursuant to this section to any person, organization, or agency for any use other than the selection of trial jurors.“].) Former section 204.7 was repealed by the same bill that enacted section 197(c). (Stats. 1988, ch. 1245, § 1.)
In a late amendment, the controversial provisions limiting access to the master list and other jury selection records were removed, and they were not included in the enacted bill. (Assem. Bill No. 2617 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 2, 1988, at pp. 10–11; Stats. 1988, ch. 1245, § 2.) Section 197(c), of course, was included in the enacted bill. (Stats. 1988, ch.
The Governor‘s Office of Local Government Affairs commented about the enrolled bill, “The bill received widespread opposition in earlier versions, but recent amendments have removed this opposition.” (Off. of Local Government Affairs, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2617 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 16, 1988, p. 3.) The Legislative Counsel‘s Digest notes the bill “consolidat[ed] various provisions relative to juries in civil and criminal causes, and revis[ed] provisions relative to” a number of aspects of jury selection and service. (Legis. Counsel‘s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2617 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., pp. 415-416.) The list of revised provisions does not include “juror‘s rights to privacy,” which had appeared in the Digest to earlier versions of the bill. (Compare ibid.; with, e.g., Legis. Counsel‘s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2617 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 4, 1988, at pp. 1-2.)
This legislative history strongly indicates the Legislature did not understand
2. Additional Statutes
The Jury Commissioner also relies on a number of other statutes enacted after Pantos that prohibit the disclosure of specific information, to wit, “home address, telephone number, email address, precinct number, or other number specified by the Secretary of State for voter registration purposes” (
We need not decide whether any of these statutes prohibit disclosure of this information when it appears on the master or qualified jury lists, because none of the statutes prohibit disclosure of the only information sought by Defendant: names and zip codes. The Jury Commissioner‘s unsupported protest that redaction of other information from the master list database will require “additional cost” does not establish that redaction will be unduly burdensome and is not a basis to refuse disclosure of the names and zip codes on the list. “If a judicial administrative record contains information that is exempt from disclosure and the exempt portions are reasonably segregable, a judicial branch entity must allow inspection and copying of the record after deletion of the portions that are exempt from disclosure.” (
The Jury Commissioner also relies on the following statement in People v. Granish (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1117: ” ‘the Legislature was trying to close the door to access of juror addresses and telephone numbers to the extent that it could—not open it to information on demand.’ ” (Id. at p. 1126.) But both the facts of Granish and the statutes it construed involve postverdict access to information about criminal trial jurors. (Id. at p. 1122;
Indeed, while one part of section 237 (one of the statutes construed in Granish) provides that criminal trial jurors’ personal identifying information shall be sealed following the verdict (
Accordingly, none of the statutes relied upon by the Jury Commissioner preclude disclosure of master and qualified jury lists.18
D. Privacy Rights
The Jury Commissioner also points to the privacy rights of persons on the master and qualified jury lists. We find no basis to conclude that privacy rights preclude disclosure of the names and zip codes on those lists.
The Jury Commissioner points to the right to privacy appearing in the California Constitution. (
As an initial matter, such an approach has been found inappropriate. “[A]n individualized approach rather than a blanket one is appropriate in considering the privacy rights of prospective jurors. Not only does such an approach preserve the constitutional values of openness, it also enables the trial court to ‘ensure that there is in fact a valid basis for a belief that disclosure infringes a significant interest in privacy.’ ” (Copley Press, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 86 [considering access to written questionnaires].)
Here, the Jury Commissioner makes no attempt to explain why disclosure of the names and zip codes of prospective jurors would infringe a significant interest in privacy. Lehman v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 309, concluded a prospective juror‘s constitutional right of privacy did not bar disclosure of his identity because, in part, “his status as a prospective juror . . . . was not of personal nature” and his “appearance on the list of prospective jurors was not voluntary and revealed nothing about him since selection for jury duty is random.” (Id. at p. 313; accord, Pantos, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 262 [acknowledging courts’ “inherent power to control their own records to protect jurors’ privacy,” but finding no reason for nondisclosure of master jury list].) This analysis remains persuasive and the Jury Commissioner presents no contrary argument. (Cf. Press-Enterprise, supra, 464 U.S. at p. 511 [“The jury selection process may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public domain.“].)
E. Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that master and qualified jury lists—at least with respect to the names and zip codes on the lists—are disclosable as public records.20 We will direct the trial court to grant Defendant access to these records, and to reopen his fair cross-section challenge so that he may present any new evidence and argument following review of these records.
IV. Merge/Purge Information and Jury Survey
Defendant does not dispute that, to obtain the merge/purge information and permission to conduct a jury survey, he must make the particularized showing identified in Jackson. The parties dispute whether Defendant satisfied this burden. We need not and do not decide this issue.
In the trial court, Defendant argued that a reasonable approach would be to allow him to analyze the master list before determining whether additional discovery should be granted. Defense counsel argued, “If Dr. Weeks can run an analysis on the master list, he‘d have a large sample. And if there was under-representation in that list, the current list, then, I think, the next step would be for the Court to consider whether a jury survey . . . would be appropriate.” Counsel later continued, “if we can‘t show statistical under-representation after reviewing that large list [the master list], then the Court, I think, would be on solid grounds in saying, ‘There‘s no point in going forward at this stage given this record.’ ”
We see no reason not to follow the approach proposed by counsel. We have concluded Defendant is entitled to the master and qualified jury lists. After receiving and reviewing those lists, Defendant may choose to either withdraw the remainder of his renewed discovery request, or he may seek to establish entitlement to the remaining requests with the addition of data from the master and qualified lists.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent court to (1) set aside its order denying Defendant‘s renewed discovery motion as to the master and qualified jury lists, merge/purge information, and jury survey; (2) enter a new order granting Defendant‘s renewed discovery motion as to the master and qualified jury lists, and reserving decision on the motion as to the merge/purge information and jury survey pending Defendant‘s review of the master and qualified jury lists;21 (3) set aside its order denying Defendant‘s fair cross-section challenge; and (4) permit Defendant to present any new evidence and argument on his fair cross-section challenge following his receipt of the master and qualified jury lists and any other
SIMONS, Acting P.J.
We concur.
NEEDHAM, J.
REARDON, J.*
(A159577)
* Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
Superior Court of Marin County, No. SC197429E, Hon. Andrew E. Sweet, Judge.
Law Office of Michael N. Burt and Michael N. Burt; Law Office of John T. Philipsborn and John T. Philipsborn, for Petitioner.
Sanger Swysen & Dunkle, Stephen Kerr Dunkle, for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Amicus Curiae in support of Petitioner.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Alice B. Lustre and Sarah J. Farhat, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest the People.
Cummings, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Associates, Sarah L. Overton, for Real Party in Interest James M. Kim.
No appearance for Respondent Superior Court.