Albert HOLLAND, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, Cross Appellee, v. State of FLORIDA, Respondent-Appellee, Cross Appellant.
No. 12-12404.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Dec. 29, 2014.
775 F.3d 1294
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, and MARCUS and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
A Florida court convicted Albert Holland of murder and sentenced him to death for the fatal shooting of police officer Scott Winters. The district court issued a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that Holland‘s right to represent himself was violated. To obtain a writ under
Holland appeals three other claims the district court rejected. We too find they lack merit. Holland argues that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied harmless error analysis to the admission of both an inaudible videotape and a mental health expert‘s opinion about whether a firearm had been hidden. We conclude that both errors were harmless because they did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury‘s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (quotation omitted). As the record amply reveals, the interrogating officer testified to the contents of the videotape and an investigating officer made similar comments about the gun‘s location. Holland also claims that he received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel failed to object to a number of improper statements made by the prosecution during closing arguments. The district court found federal relief was procedurally barred because Holland did not exhaust this claim in state court. While we conclude that exhaustion does not bar Holland‘s claim, we affirm because the Florida Supreme Court‘s determinations that counsel performed adequately and that Holland suffered no prejudice were reasonable. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Finally, Holland says that his custodial confession should have been suppressed because he talked to police after he asked for a lawyer. In denying relief because Holland initiated the conversation with the detective, the Florida Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).
Accordingly, we remand to the district court with instructions to reinstate Holland‘s conviction and sentence.
I.
A.
The facts relevant for this appeal begin with the observation that Holland suffered a serious brain injury in October 1979, when another inmate in a federal prison knocked him unconscious. The beating left Holland with a slowly resolving concussion, facial fractures, and three weeks of post-traumatic amnesia. In the early 1980s, Holland was arrested and charged with robbery in Washington, D.C. Holland‘s attorney described him as “clearly a homeless individual, and disheveled, and incoherent, and not able to interact with me in any way, shape, or meaningful form, at all.” “In the early meetings, . . . he would have nothing to say, but would rock in a chair with his hands folded. I remember, distinctly, that he would drool.” The United States prosecutor agreed with defense counsel that Holland was not legally culpable because he had been insane. The court found Holland was not guilty of the
Four years later, after smoking a rock of crack cocaine, Holland attacked and brutally beat Thelma Johnson in Pompano Beach, Florida, on July 29, 1990. Holland ran off when a witness intervened, leaving the victim semi-conscious and with severe head injuries. Police searched for the assailant and K-9 patrol officer Scott Winters of the Pompano Beach Police Department found Holland. Witnesses saw the two struggling. Holland grabbed Winters‘s gun and fatally shot him in the groin and lower stomach. See Holland v. State (Holland II), 773 So.2d 1065, 1068 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
Holland was first tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in 1991. During that trial, Holland‘s disruptive behavior led to his removal from the courtroom. On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed his conviction because admission of testimony about a psychiatric examination of Holland violated his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination. See Holland v. State (Holland I), 636 So.2d 1289 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam).
On remand, the trial court appointed Kenneth Delegal to represent Holland in the second trial. After about a year, this representation terminated when Delegal was confined to a mental health facility. Delegal eventually was arrested on drug and domestic violence charges and died of a drug overdose during Holland‘s retrial. The trial court then appointed James Lewis, who shared office space with Delegal, to assume representation of Holland because Lewis had some familiarity with the case. Evan Baron, appointed alongside Delegal to serve as penalty phase counsel, continued to represent Holland as well.
Before the second trial began, at a September 15, 1995, hearing, Lewis told the court Holland had refused to see or speak to him. Holland expressed severe suspicion of Lewis, his lawyer: “it‘s like he‘s sneaking around like a little mouse.” Holland in turn informed the court that he believed Lewis and jail authorities had taped a visit between Holland and his father through a sprinkler head. Indeed, Holland thought Lewis was using his father to convince him to keep Lewis as his attorney. Holland did not believe that his father‘s trip was cut short by an approaching hurricane, and “if [Lewis] will lie about something, little petty like that, he‘s going to do some other things on the bigger issue.” Holland told the court that, when he tried to call his father, “the lady
Holland‘s paranoid suspicions went deeper. Holland also told the trial court, “They‘re trying to get something on me. . . . Seems like I‘m always being taped.” “I got microphones in my cell, too. But if I‘m going to try to find them, I got to tear the light off the wall.” Holland worried about surveillance because “I talk to invisible people . . . [b]ut it may be dealing with my case.” When assured by the court that he was not being taped in his cell or during visits with his father or attorney, Holland responded, “betrayal will lurk.” He continued, “everybody at the bar where all the lawyers drink at know about my case. Everybody knows everything. My strategy, anything that‘s going to be going on.”
Also before the second trial began, Holland‘s counsel, Lewis, filed a motion alleging Holland was incompetent to stand trial. At a hearing conducted on October 9, 1995, Lewis explained that Holland had indicated he was having suicidal tendencies and had asked to see a psychiatrist or “possibly be prescribed some type of psychotropic medication.” The trial court authorized three mental health experts to examine Holland for competence to stand trial and directed that a psychiatrist evaluate Holland to determine whether he needed psychotropic medication.
On December 14, 1995, the trial court followed up with a hearing to determine Holland‘s competency to stand trial. Two mental health experts who interviewed Holland testified that he was competent, while a third said he met the criteria for competency but believed the ultimate conclusion was for the finder of fact. One psychologist specializing in clinical neuropsychology, Dr. Lee Bukstel, told the trial court about Holland‘s treatment for schizophrenia at Saint Elizabeth‘s Hospital. Bukstel also said that a jail psychiatrist had recently diagnosed Holland with an unspecified psychotic disorder and antisocial personality disorder. That psychiatrist prescribed Haldol, an anti-psychotic, though Bukstel said Holland had refused to take it. Another mental health expert testified at the competency hearing that Haldol calms patients with emotional problems, but that people often act out when they stop taking medication. According to Bukstel, Holland appeared psychologically stable, though he noted that Holland‘s statements to the court about secret tape-recording showed unrealistic suspicions and paranoia. Bukstel explained that Holland complained of “pain and tension” in his head and “burning in [his] mind.” Holland reported depression, anxiety, nervousness, crying, agitation, decreased initiative, social avoidance of people, and increased dependency on others, as well as difficulties with concentration, decisionmaking, and memory. Bukstel concluded that Holland‘s symptoms were consistent with one or more mental disorders. Still, Bukstel joined the other mental health experts in opining that Holland‘s mental problems did not prevent him from meeting Florida‘s statutory criteria for competence to stand trial: Holland‘s psychological disorders did not keep him from understanding the legal proceedings and possible penalties, from communicating with his attorney, from testifying relevantly, or from manifesting appropriate courtroom behavior.
After hearing testimony from the mental health experts, the trial court found Holland competent to stand trial based on the statutory standards. Still, the trial court noted that it had “heard Mr. Holland raise some concerns that gave the Court some question as to his mental status.” The court also observed that Holland‘s behavior during his first trial led to his removal,
At another pretrial hearing (on March 22, 1996) Holland again complained at length about his attorneys and asked to “go through this procedure of self-representation.” The trial court said it would conduct a Faretta inquiry, whereupon it asked Holland about his educational experience—“a GED“—and his legal training. Holland replied, “Well, from what I‘ve seen in the evidence, Ray Charles could come in here and represent himself and Stevie Wonder, so I don‘t need too much legal training to do all that.” The trial court questioned Holland about his ability to select a jury, make legal objections, and examine witnesses. Holland exhibited little familiarity with the process and said he had no training. Holland offered that he wouldn‘t violate any rules but admitted he did not know the rules he could violate. At this point, the trial court stopped the inquiry and ruled that “Holland does not have any specific legal training, is not familiar with the rules of evidence, nor trial procedures, is not familiar with how a trial is conducted, even though he‘s sat through them in the past.” In a written order, the court denied the defendant‘s motion to represent himself, finding that Holland was incapable of doing so.
At still another pretrial hearing (conducted on August 2, 1996) on a defense motion to authorize an MRI of Holland to scan for brain damage, Holland again asked the trial court either to remove his attorneys or to allow him to represent himself. The court conducted still another Faretta inquiry, discussing with Holland his education, training, and knowledge of legal rules and procedures. Holland repeatedly interrupted the trial court as it ruled that Holland was “not able to adequately appropriately represent himself . . . [n]or to comply with the Court‘s order, nor with applicable rules of evidence, rules of criminal procedure, as well as case law.”
On August 26, 1996, Holland‘s counsel moved to withdraw on the ground that Holland thought he would be better off handling the case on his own. This time, at considerable length, the trial court explained its past refusal to allow Holland to represent himself. The court recounted that “Holland has suffered an injury to the head and was hospitalized at Saint Elizabeth‘s in Washington D.C. while he was incarcerated approximately . . . ten, twelve years ago.” Holland “obtained a GED since he‘s been incarcerated.” He “obviously sat through his prior first degree murder trial, but that is not exactly correct, because due to Mr. Holland‘s behavior Mr. Holland was removed from that courtroom and watched that proceeding on closed-circuit television.” Therefore, Holland had “previously demonstrated . . . his inability to follow the Court‘s orders and decorum required to be in a courtroom.” Holland also failed to demonstrate the legal knowledge and skills required to present his own case. Finally, Holland‘s lawyer had filed a notice of intent to rely on the defense of insanity, which “touches upon his mental condition and ability to understand the nature as well as the complexity of this case.” With this background, the trial court stated that it would conduct a dual Nelson1 and Faretta inquiry to determine whether Holland‘s counsel
Reading from notes, Holland began by asking the court “how much time am I going to have, because you always rush me, because I feel you‘re biased against me and you never give me enough time to talk.” Holland said the judge was working in collusion with his attorneys and the prosecution. “[E]verything [that] has been going on with you, Your Honor, and my attorneys shows there is impropriety. There is some monkey business going on here. Underhandedness.” “[A]ny reasonable person can tell that I‘m not going to get a fair trial. If they knew all of the facts, everything that you‘re doing. It‘s all a money thing and all a convicting thing. You made up your mind. You want to be the only judge to send somebody to the electric chair with [the prosecutor].” Holland complained about one of his attorneys, Baron, stating that “[i]t‘s just a sham because he‘s supposed to be giving me effective assistance of counsel when he‘s trying to help the prosecution.” He accused his lawyer Lewis of “trying to provoke me, looking real crazy at me, trying to get me to respond to him.” He said that, because of their previous connection to Delegal, he knew Lewis and Baron were smoking crack. “All they did was make a good hustle. . . . They made a little extra in the pocket helping a friend cover up and helping the prosecution at the same time, and everybody is happy.” At one point, Holland asked the judge, “Are you listening . . . or are you drinking coffee?” Holland‘s soliloquy focused almost exclusively on his suspicions about his attorneys and the court, not on a desire to represent himself or an explanation of why he knowingly and voluntarily sought to give up the right to counsel.
Wrapping up, Holland referred to the outline of notes he had read, saying “I used to hide them . . . I know they look at them, shake them. . . . I know they have bugs. . . . I used to carry these to work out, check out, I have all of my papers in my pocket.” When asked about his first trial, Holland said that officials had not turned on the monitor to allow him to watch the closed-circuit feed after he was removed from the courtroom—“[i]t was a bunch of show.” The trial court concluded that Lewis and Baron were qualified and able to represent Holland effectively. The court refused to allow Holland to represent himself, citing “his lack of formal legal training, lack of understanding of both the criminal law as well as procedures, his alleged defense or defense actually, of insanity and the complexity of this case,” with “approximately 180 witnesses listed.” Holland‘s response: “All of you working together. . . . Bald-faced liars.”
On September 18, 1996, on the eve of retrial, Holland still again complained about his attorneys and sought to represent himself. The court replied, “these are issues the Court previously addressed, previously ruled on. There is nothing new.” Holland responded that “I wasn‘t found competent then, I was found competent now, and I‘m literate and I‘m understanding and I would like to voluntarily do my own defense.” The court responded that it had “found you competent several months ago and entered it‘s [sic] order. . . . Motion to represent yourself is denied.”
Holland asked yet again to represent himself before voir dire of the jury on the first day of retrial. Again the court refused, referencing its earlier rulings. Not dissuaded in any way, Holland made the same request on October 1, 1996, during jury selection, with the same results, and again on October 3 and October 8. The court said, “Mr. Holland, even my patience at some point ends. . . . I‘m tired, candidly,
The jury convicted Holland of first-degree murder, armed robbery, attempted sexual battery, and attempted first-degree murder. Before the penalty phase began, Holland once more asked for his attorneys to be replaced. When this request was denied, Holland refused to speak with counsel or the court, choosing instead to read a book during all court proceedings outside the presence of the jury. Holland did not testify in the penalty phase or at the Spencer hearing.2
The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eight to four. The trial court found three statutory aggravating circumstances: Holland was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person,
In its sentencing memorandum, the court recognized Holland‘s history of mental illness, but gave it little weight as a mitigating factor because he “correctly argued caselaw and factual issues to the Court. . . . The defendant‘s active participation during his trial and volitional decision at times not to respond to the Court outside the presence of the jury, clearly establish his ability to participate, manipulate and engineer his actions.” After weighing the evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court sentenced Holland to death.
B.
Holland appealed his conviction and sentence to the Florida Supreme Court, which affirmed. Holland II, 773 So.2d 1065. As for Holland‘s Faretta claim, the Florida Supreme Court identified Faretta and the principles relevant to the right of self-representation and concluded that the trial
In issue one, Holland claims that the trial court erred in denying him the opportunity to represent himself. The trial court conducted Faretta inquiries on at least two separate occasions to determine whether Holland was competent to represent himself. At the conclusion of the inquiries, the trial court denied Holland‘s request for self-representation.
As Holland points out, “a person need not be schooled in the law in order to competently elect to represent himself.” Crystal v. State, 616 So.2d 150, 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). See also
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(d)(3) (“Regardless of the defendant‘s legal skills or the complexity of the case, the court shall not deny a defendant‘s unequivocal request to represent him or herself, if the court makes a determination of record that the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.“). However, in Johnston v. State, 497 So.2d 863, 868 (Fla. 1986), this Court stated that “[i]n determining whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, a trial court should inquire into, among other things: defendant‘s age, mental status, and lack of knowledge and experience in criminal proceedings.” In Johnston, this Court concluded that “[t]he trial judge made the proper inquiry . . . and correctly concluded that the desired waiver of counsel was neither knowing nor intelligent, in part, because of Johnston‘s mental condition.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Visage v. State, 664 So.2d 1101, 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).A trial court‘s decision as to self-representation is reviewable for abuse of discretion. See id. at 1101. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holland the right to represent himself. The record contains numerous instances of Holland‘s unstable mental condition, particularly his previous hospitalization at St. Elizabeth‘s. Additionally, the trial court was aware of the potential that Holland was going to rely on the insanity defense. Moreover, it is clear from Holland‘s responses to the trial court‘s inquiries that Holland lacked sufficient knowledge of criminal proceedings[.]
. . .
Finally, [the detailed explanation of the trial court on August 26, 1996,] best describes the trial court‘s reasons for denying Holland‘s requests to represent himself[.]
. . .
Based on this [explanation], it is clear that the trial court properly applied the Johnston factors in denying Holland the right to represent himself. Hence, we find no merit to Holland‘s first claim of error.
Id. at 1069-70 (footnote omitted). The Florida Supreme Court also ruled that the trial court committed harmless error when it admitted an inaudible videotape and opinion testimony from a psychologist about whether Holland hid the murder weapon, id. at 1072-73, 1075-76, and it ruled that statements admitted at trial were not taken in violation of Holland‘s right to counsel, id. at 1073-74. The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Holland v. Florida, 534 U.S. 834, 122 S.Ct. 83, 151 L.Ed.2d 46 (2001) (mem.).
Holland unsuccessfully filed a Rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief in state trial court. Holland appealed to the Florida Supreme Court and also filed a state habeas petition in that court. The Florida Supreme Court denied all relief, concluding in relevant part that Holland failed to
Holland then filed a pro se federal habeas petition in January 2006 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The district court dismissed the petition as barred by the statute of limitations and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the
On remand, Holland, now counseled, filed an amended federal habeas petition that contained eight claims. The district court granted a writ of habeas corpus on his Faretta claim pursuant to
II.
We review de novo the district court‘s disposition of Holland‘s federal habeas petition. Peterka v. McNeil, 532 F.3d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008). Plainly, AEDPA applies to Holland‘s claims. Under AEDPA, if a petitioner‘s habeas claim “was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
The Supreme Court has interpreted
III.
We turn first to the state‘s cross-appeal challenging the grant of habeas relief on Holland‘s Faretta claim. In Faretta, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right of self-representation in a criminal trial. 422 U.S. at 821, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Because of the dangers of proceeding pro se, however, the Court imposed a substantial check: “the accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo” the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. “Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation,” the Court explained, “he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.‘” Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). The Supreme Court held that the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel when the record showed he “was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will.” Id. The defendant need not have “mastered the intricacies of the hearsay rule and the California code provisions that govern challenges of potential jurors on voir dire” because “his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” Id. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525.
After thorough review of the entire record, we are satisfied that the Florida Supreme Court‘s Faretta determination was the final merits adjudication of Hol-
We begin by observing that the Florida Supreme Court cited to and applied controlling Supreme Court law as explicated in Faretta. The Florida Supreme Court cited to both Faretta and state law similar to Faretta in rejecting Holland‘s self-representation claim. The court observed that “a person need not be schooled in the law in order to competently elect to represent himself,” quoting a Florida case premised on the holding in Faretta. Holland II, 773 So.2d at 1069 (quoting Crystal v. State, 616 So.2d 150, 153 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993)). It also cited to a Florida rule of criminal procedure: “Regardless of the defendant‘s legal skills or the complexity of the case, the court shall not deny a defendant‘s unequivocal request to represent him or herself, if the court makes a determination of record that the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. at 1069 (quoting
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Holland to represent himself. According to the court, “[t]he record contains numerous instances of Holland‘s unstable mental condition, particularly his previous hospitalization at St. Elizabeth‘s.” Id. “[T]he trial court was aware of the potential that Holland was going to rely on the insanity defense.” Id. And “it is clear from Holland‘s responses to the trial court‘s inquiries that Holland lacked sufficient knowledge of criminal proceedings.” Id. The Florida Supreme Court also quoted from the trial court‘s March 22, 1996, Faretta inquiry, in which Holland admitted he had little legal knowledge and no training, and from the trial court‘s August 26 explanation of its reasons for denying Holland‘s requests to represent himself, which mentioned his head injury, his hospitalization at Saint Elizabeth‘s, his removal from the courtroom during his previous trial, and his reliance on the insanity defense. Id. at 1069-70. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holland‘s attempts at self-representation, because “it is clear that the trial court properly applied the Johnston factors in denying Holland the right to represent himself.” Id. at 1070.
Though the Florida Supreme Court examined the Faretta question through the lens of abuse-of-discretion review, we remain satisfied that the federal constitutional claim “was adjudicated on the merits” for purposes of
In addition, we review the Florida Supreme Court‘s decision, rather than the decision of the trial court. As a rule, we review “the highest state court decision reaching the merits of a habeas petitioner‘s claim.” Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1231 (11th Cir. 2014). In Hittson, we held that the Georgia Supreme Court‘s denial of a certificate of probable cause for an appeal constituted an adjudication of the petitioner‘s claims on the merits because the court reviewed the record and concluded that his claims lacked arguable merit. Id. at 1231-32. Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court‘s rejection of Holland‘s Faretta claim based on the substantial body of evidence reflecting his mental condition plainly constituted an adjudication of that claim on the merits. Moreover, we have also held that “when a state appellate court applies plain-error review and in the course of doing so, reaches the merits of a federal claim . . . that decision is an adjudication ‘on the merits.‘” Lee v. Comm‘r, Ala. Dep‘t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1172, 1210 (11th Cir. 2013). Although the Florida Supreme Court‘s use of an abuse-of-discretion standard “might have made it more difficult for [Holland] to succeed on direct appeal,” the Florida Supreme Court‘s decision remains the relevant adjudication for the purposes of our review. Id.; see also Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 772-73, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (applying AEDPA deference to a state supreme court decision using an abuse-of-discretion standard); Troy v. Sec‘y, Fla. Dep‘t of Corr., 763 F.3d 1305, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2014) (same). Even now Holland does not dispute that the Florida Supreme Court‘s decision was the last state court adjudication of his federal Faretta claim on the merits, and it is that decision that we must afford deference under AEDPA.
Nor was it contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law for the Florida Supreme Court to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing Holland‘s Faretta claim. The Supreme Court has never held that state appellate courts must review a defendant‘s Faretta claim de novo, rather than under an abuse-of-discretion standard, even if we would normally apply de novo review to such claims on direct appeal. See Woodall, 134 S.Ct. at 1702 & n. 2 (stating that only Supreme Court holdings, and not dicta or holdings of lower courts, constitute clearly established law). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that a state appellate court‘s use of an abuse-of-discretion standard to review the denial of a defendant‘s post-waiver request for counsel is not contrary to clearly established law. Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1450, 185 L.Ed.2d 540 (2013) (per curiam). Under
Reading the Florida Supreme Court‘s decision as a whole, we conclude that it was not contrary to clearly established Su-
This conclusion is confirmed by the Supreme Court itself in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), which held that a state may deny a defendant the right to represent himself when he is not mentally competent to conduct a trial himself, even if he is competent to stand trial. 554 U.S. at 178, 128 S.Ct. 2379. Indiana v. Edwards provides an authoritative statement from the Supreme Court about what its earlier cases did and did not clearly establish. Indiana v. Edwards concluded that the Court‘s prior cases had not clearly established whether “the Constitution permits a State to limit [a] defendant‘s self-representation right . . . on the ground that the defendant lacks the mental capacity to conduct his trial defense unless represented.” Id. at 174, 128 S.Ct. 2379. The Court observed that nothing in Faretta or Godinez provided a definitive answer to that question, id. at 170-74, 128 S.Ct. 2379, although those cases did “point [ ] slightly” in favor of the Court‘s ultimate holding, id. at 174, 128 S.Ct. 2379. Accordingly, whether a state could limit a defendant‘s self-representation right because of concerns about his mental condition was an open question at the time the Florida Supreme Court decided Holland‘s direct appeal. We can hardly fault the Florida Supreme Court for being prescient and reaching the very same answer reached by the Supreme Court eight years later.
However, the district court found that the Florida Supreme Court‘s decision was contrary to Faretta because the facts were materially indistinguishable. Not so. Voluminous record evidence calling Holland‘s mental health into serious question makes the facts in this case substantially and meaningfully different from Faretta, where the Court made no mention of any concerns about the defendant‘s psychologi-
Nor, as we see it, did the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably apply Faretta when it determined that, considering his mental condition, Holland failed to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. As we have recounted, the trial court and the Florida Supreme Court knew Holland was diagnosed with and treated for schizophrenia for a number of years at a psychiatric hospital in Washington, D.C., in the decade before the murder of Officer Winters. Indeed, he was housed at the hospital because a judge had found him not guilty of a robbery charge on account of insanity. Doctors treating Holland were not sure whether his symptoms were also tied to organic psychosis from a severe brain injury he suffered during earlier imprisonment. After fleeing from the hospital, he was forced to return after being found insane by another judge on another robbery charge. When he absconded a second time he moved to Florida, where he killed Officer Winters. During his first trial for that murder he pled insanity. In fact, at the time Holland asked to represent himself his lawyer had filed notice of his intent to again raise an insanity defense.
Moreover, as we‘ve noted, at a hearing on Holland‘s competency to stand trial for murder, the trial court heard that a jail psychiatrist recently had diagnosed Holland with an unspecified psychotic disorder and with anti-social personality disorder. The doctor prescribed Haldol, an antipsychotic, which Holland said he was not taking. The court heard that failure to take antipsychotic medication could cause Holland‘s condition to deteriorate. Holland also complained to one mental health expert about “burning” in his mind that affected his thoughts and actions. Though Holland had not been disruptive during pretrial hearings, his unstable behavior had forced his removal from the initial trial. And, indeed, the trial court saw Holland‘s apparent paranoia firsthand. Time and again he complained to the court that he was being taped by his own attorney and others. Holland worried they had installed listening devices in his cell to eavesdrop on his conversations with invisible people. He was convinced that attorneys on both sides were colluding with the judge to sentence him to death.
This record evidence suggests that Holland‘s troubled mental condition kept him from fully grasping “the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. In other words, a court could reasonably determine—as the Florida Supreme Court did—that he did not make a choice to waive his right to counsel “with eyes open.” Id. (quotation omitted). Far from containing mere relics of a past history of mental illness, the substantial record sheds light on Holland‘s condition at the time he attempted to waive the right to counsel. Holland‘s mental disorder diagnoses were consistent with his persistent troubled behavior. And while pleading insanity standing alone does not disqualify a defendant from representing himself, a reasonable court could look to Holland‘s previous insanity adjudications, alongside his intention to plead insanity for a crime that occurred a decade later, as strong signals of an ongoing mental condition directly affecting his current ability to waive the right to counsel knowingly and voluntarily.
The district court erred in placing disproportionate emphasis on the trial court‘s determination that Holland was competent to stand trial. The Florida Supreme Court did not base its denial of Holland‘s
Nevertheless, Holland places great emphasis on the fact that the trial court did not discuss Holland‘s mental condition when it refused to allow him to represent himself on March 22 and August 2, 1996. Holland argues that the refusal of the right to self-representation on these dates amounted to separate and discrete Faretta violations, and that the trial court‘s failure to discuss his mental condition in its earlier rulings revealed that his psychological state was used as a post hoc justification. We remain unpersuaded. Holland does not identify any clearly established Supreme Court rule that prohibited the Florida Supreme Court from conducting a consolidated waiver analysis that examined the entire record, including the trial court‘s August 26 discussion of Holland‘s mental state along with the number of other occasions on which he requested to represent himself.
Nor, reading the Florida Supreme Court‘s opinion as a whole (as we must), do we believe the court impermissibly relied on Holland‘s lack of “technical legal knowledge, as such,” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525, in rejecting his Faretta claim. We do not read state court opinions as if we were “grading papers,” and must apply AEDPA deference absent a “conspicuous misapplication of Supreme Court precedent.” Parker v. Sec‘y for Dep‘t of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 785-86 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). A careful reading of the Florida Supreme Court‘s decision reveals that Holland‘s mental condition was the primary basis for its ruling. As we have recounted, the Florida Supreme Court began its analysis by agreeing that a defendant need not possess any legal skills to choose self-representation, and cited to a Florida case and a Florida rule of criminal procedure making that essential point. The court then cited to still another of its cases, Johnston, 497 So.2d at 868, holding that a defendant could not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel given his mental condition—a phrase which the Florida Supreme Court notably emphasized.3 The court observed that the
Though the Florida Supreme Court also concluded that Holland lacked “sufficient knowledge of criminal proceedings,” id. at 1069, we do not read this to mean that the court required Holland to show any technical legal knowledge in order to represent himself. Instead, we take this to mean that Holland could not fully appreciate “the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525; see Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1065-67. In some ways, the Florida Supreme Court‘s analysis resembles Johnson v. Zerbst, where the Supreme Court long ago instructed that the waiver inquiry turns “upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019. Reading the Florida Supreme Court‘s opinion as a whole, including its observation at the outset that the defendant‘s legal skills are irrelevant to the Faretta inquiry, we construe its comments about Holland‘s lack of legal knowledge as going to its conclusion that Holland could not comprehend the daunting task of self-representation, and, therefore, could not “knowingly and intelligently” waive his right to counsel “with eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quotation omitted).
Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has said time and again that it does not consider the defendant‘s technical legal knowledge in making the Faretta determination. See, e.g., Weaver v. State, 894 So.2d 178, 193 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam) (“The focus of a Faretta hearing under rule 3.111 is whether a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel, not whether he is competent to provide an adequate defense.“); Bell v. State, 699 So.2d 674, 677 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam) (“Technical legal knowledge is not the criterion for assessing the knowing exercise of a defendant‘s right to defend himself.“); Hill v. State, 688 So.2d 901, 905 (Fla. 1996) (“We emphasize that a defendant does not need to possess the technical legal knowledge of an attorney before being permitted to proceed pro se.“). And when the Florida Supreme Court has evaluated the defendant‘s legal experience, it has done so for the purpose of ascertaining whether he appreciates the palpable dangers surrounding self-representation. See, e.g., Potts v. State, 718 So.2d 757, 760 (Fla. 1998) (“Competent substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Potts had a general understanding of his rights and that his decision to proceed without counsel was made with eyes open.“); Rogers v. Singletary, 698 So.2d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 1996) (“We find that the Faretta standards were met in the instant case because the record establishes that Rogers knew what he was doing and his choice was made with eyes open.“).
In sum, we cannot say that it was contrary to clearly established law for the Florida Supreme Court to uphold the trial court‘s determination that Holland‘s serious psychological issues kept him from making a knowing and voluntary waiver.
We also cannot agree with the district court that Indiana v. Edwards has no application to Holland‘s claim. The Supreme Court‘s decision in Indiana v. Edwards provides an alternative basis for the denial of Holland‘s habeas petition. 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379. Under the plain language of
Relief is therefore only available to a petitioner whose constitutional claim has not been rendered nugatory by subsequent Supreme Court precedent, as a number of our sister circuits have concluded. See, e.g., Desai v. Booker, 538 F.3d 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a habeas petitioner may not “obtain relief on the basis of a state court‘s allegedly unreasonable application of a Supreme Court precedent . . . that no longer is good law“); Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he purpose of the Teague [v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)] non-retroactivity rule is to protect state interests.“); Moore v. Anderson, 222 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he principle of non-retroactivity favors only the state. . . .“); Flamer v. State of Del., 68 F.3d 710, 725 n. 15 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that a case could be applied retroactively because it “did not work a change in the law favoring criminal defendants“). As we have held in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Holland “must show not only that he could have successfully challenged” the trial court‘s rejection of his request to represent himself in 2000, “but also that the basis of the challenge would be recognized as valid under current law.” Allen v. Sec‘y, Fla. Dep‘t of Corr., 611 F.3d 740, 753-54 (11th Cir. 2010); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).
The current law includes Indiana v. Edwards, where the Supreme Court unambiguously held that courts may consider a defendant‘s mental condition in evaluating whether he should be permitted to proceed to trial without counsel. 554 U.S. at 167, 128 S.Ct. 2379. The Supreme Court discussed at length the risk that allowing a mentally ill defendant to represent himself could lead to an unfair and humiliating spectacle of a trial, and concluded that a state may insist that a defendant who “suffer[s] from severe mental illness” be represented by counsel. Id. at 176-78, 128 S.Ct. 2379. Indiana v. Edwards also instructs us that the trial judge “will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions.” Id. at 177, 128 S.Ct. 2379.
The simple fact is that, in the light of Indiana v. Edwards, Holland is not being
IV.
Holland appeals the district court‘s denial of habeas relief on three other claims. We affirm as to each.
A.
First, Holland says that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law when it concluded that the admission of an inaudible video and improper expert testimony had been harmless errors. A state court can find a federal constitutional error harmless only by concluding “it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Holland does not dispute that the Florida Supreme Court properly identified the Chapman rule. Instead, he argues that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably determined that the State showed harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt when it rejected two of his constitutional claims.
However, on federal habeas review, a federal constitutional error is harmless unless there is “actual prejudice,” meaning that the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury‘s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (quotation omitted). Harmlessness under the Brecht standard is a question of law that we review de novo. Vining v. Sec‘y, Dep‘t of Corr., 610 F.3d 568, 571 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Prevatte v. French, 547 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2008). “[I]n
1.
During the guilt phase, the State showed the jury a videotape of Holland‘s interrogation. The jury could hear most of the questions asked by the interrogating detective, but the tape‘s poor audio quality prevented jurors from hearing most if not all of Holland‘s answers. The Florida Supreme Court on direct appeal agreed that the tape should not have been admitted because it “allowed the jury to speculate what the defendant‘s answers were to these questions, a result which was prejudicial to the defendant.” Holland II, 773 So.2d at 1072. But the Florida Supreme Court “conclude[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in admitting the tape did not affect the jury verdict” because “the interrogating detective properly testified regarding what Holland said to him during the interrogation.” Id. at 1073.
Though Holland concedes that the detective fully testified to what Holland said on the videotape, he argues that the inaudible tape could have led the jury to speculate about how Holland delivered his responses. This is far too slender a reed for Holland to show the Florida Supreme Court‘s harmlessness determination was unreasonable. In his testimony, Detective Butler guided jurors through the tape, reporting Holland‘s responses answer-by-answer. Later, Holland himself explained the inaudible statements to jurors. Holland offers no reason to think that the jury speculated about how he delivered the words when he and the officer testified to his statements. And he points to nothing that suggests any such speculation affected the outcome.
Holland also complains that the prosecutor emphasized the importance of the videotape during closing arguments when he told jurors to review the video carefully and to look for Holland‘s demeanor. But the interrogation itself and Holland‘s statements to detectives were not unfairly prejudicial. Again, the only potential prejudice Holland alleges came from the threat that jurors might speculate about the content of his inaudible responses. Because the officer‘s fulsome testimony defused that risk, discussion of the video in closing argument was not prejudicial. Thus, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the Florida Supreme Court to determine that admission of the videotape alongside the trial testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, let alone that the admission of this evidence amounted to “actual prejudice“—that is, that the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury‘s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (quotation omitted).
2.
Police found Officer Winters‘s weapon between rocks in a field near the murder scene. Holland II, 773 So.2d at 1075. Psychologist Dr. Daniel Martell, a
Holland argues that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied Chapman because Holland‘s mental state was sharply contested and improper opinion testimony from a psychologist could have influenced the jury on the issues of sanity or the degree of the offense. But Dr. Martell‘s improper opinion simply repeated the testimony of the officer who found the gun. The officer said he believed the gun was placed between the rocks where it was found rather than dropped. Holland II, 773 So.2d at 1075-76. The officer illustrated his account with crime scene photos that allowed the jury to decide for itself whether the gun had been hidden. While it is theoretically possible that the mental health expert‘s opinion about the gun spoke to Holland‘s psychological condition, a court could reasonably conclude that it had at most a slight and attenuated impact. As a result, we are compelled to conclude not only that it was not objectively unreasonable for the Florida Supreme Court to conclude that the admission of this opinion testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, but also that the error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury‘s verdict, Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (quotation omitted).
B.
Holland also argues that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland when it rejected his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to comments by the prosecutor during guilt-phase closing arguments. The state postconviction court summarily denied Holland‘s claim. Instead of appealing the merits of the state habeas trial court‘s rejection of his ineffectiveness claim, Holland invoked Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 in challenging that court‘s failure to attach to its summary denial portions of the record refuting the allegations. Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court went to the merits and refused relief on the ground that Holland established neither deficient performance nor prejudice. Holland III, 916 So.2d at 758-59.
The district court held that Holland failed to exhaust his claim in state court because his state appeal did not pursue the merits of his claim. We disagree. For a number of reasons, exhaustion is not a bar to Holland‘s claim. Foremost, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if a claim is “fairly presented” to the state court that had “an opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon [it].” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 277, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (quotation omitted). The Florida Supreme Court had “an opportunity to address [Holland‘s] claims in the first instance” when it rejected the merits of his Strickland claim. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009) (quotation omitted). The district court‘s exhaustion decision also is in tension with our precedent recognizing that a
Nevertheless, we affirm the district court‘s denial of relief on the alternative ground that Holland cannot satisfy
Strickland requires that Holland establish “both that his counsel provided deficient assistance and that there was prejudice as a result.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787. “To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction must show that ‘counsel‘s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.‘” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Prejudice requires showing “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 792. “The standards created by Strickland and
In his amended federal habeas petition and his appellate brief, Holland alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to six prosecution statements made during closing arguments. As we have recognized, “[a]n objectively reasonable trial lawyer could” believe that “cases must be won at trial, not on appeal, and prefer [] not to make objections during closing argument unless the objection is a strong one.” Zakrzewski v. McDonough, 455 F.3d 1254, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). It was not unreasonable for the Florida Supreme Court to find no performance violations and no resulting prejudice.
1.
During the State‘s closing argument, the prosecutor said that Officer Winters had radioed, “I‘ve been shot. He‘s got my gun. Running west.” In fact, Winters stated, “He‘s westbound. I‘ve been shot.” Holland argues that the misstatement was more favorable to the State‘s theory that Holland robbed Winters of the weapon.
Immediately after misquoting Winters, the prosecutor told jurors to examine the evidence themselves: “Listen to [the video tape], it‘s fifty seconds. . . . Just by listening to the tape you can hear Officer Winters is obviously in a struggle.” Three eyewitnesses had already testified that Holland did indeed take Winters‘s gun and shoot him with it. And the judge specifically instructed jurors that the attorneys’
2.
During his closing argument, Holland‘s trial counsel asserted that the only reason Holland was charged with a robbery was to create a predicate offense for first-degree murder. The State responded, “[t]he reason the robbery is in the indictment is because the robbery occurred; he took the gun away by force, violence, and assault.” Holland claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge this response as improperly professing the prosecutor‘s personal belief in Holland‘s guilt.
In context, the prosecutor‘s comment amounted to an assertion that the State had no improper motives for charging the robbery. A court could reasonably find no performance violation because the remark fell within the “doctrine of fair reply,” which recognizes that a “prosecutor, as an advocate, is entitled to make a fair response to the arguments of defense counsel.” United States v. Hiett, 581 F.2d 1199, 1204 (5th Cir. 1978).5 Holland also fails to show prejudice because a court could reasonably find no effect on the trial‘s outcome.
3.
Holland next claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the State improperly shifted the burden of proof on the insanity defense in its guilt-phase closing argument that “[t]here has been no person to ever say in this courtroom or anyone that testified out of this courtroom, who ever said that the defendant, Albert Holland, didn‘t know the difference or the consequences of his actions, except for Doctor Love.” The Florida Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland in rejecting this claim on both performance and prejudice grounds because the prosecutor‘s comment did not purport to establish who bore the burden of proof. It merely summarized the evidence on Holland‘s mental state.
Holland also suggests that the prosecutor shifted the burden to the defense to prove his innocence and vouched for the truthfulness of the police by saying “I‘d like to know what police officer wasn‘t objective and what police officer did you hear that came in to testify that did anything wrong? . . . And where is this big lie? What is the lie? I still haven‘t heard it.” The prosecutor also said, “You haven‘t heard anything other than Pompano [police] or anyone else being fair in the presentation of this case.” Notably, these comments came in response to defense arguments that police officers had lied in their testimony and that their investigation and methods could not be trusted. Holland comes nowhere close to meeting our doubly deferential standard for assessing deficient performance. A court reasonably could conclude that a reasonable attorney would have declined to object because the comments were a fair reply. Holland also fails to demonstrate that the Florida Supreme Court acted unreasonably in determining that Holland suffered no prejudice from counsel‘s decision not to object.
4.
Holland also faults his trial counsel for failing to object to comments from the
5.
Next, Holland argues his trial counsel should have objected when the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for the credibility of an eyewitness (Abraham Bell) by saying his testimony “was almost like a videotape. He didn‘t see parts of it like some of the other witnesses, he saw the entirety of the transaction.” The prosecutor then described the witness‘s testimony: “he said from the very get go, after Albert Holland swung his fists at Officer Winters’ [sic] head, he continually struggled with him and went for that gun and snatched at it and held it, and even brought it around to the front of him and pulled it out and just fired into his body.”
Holland‘s argument does not meet the doubly deferential standard. A court reasonably could conclude that a reasonable attorney would have chosen not to object to this statement because it amounted to no more than fair comment about testimony received in evidence. After all, the statement reasonably can be read not to personally vouch for the witness but to argue that the testimony was particularly probative because it captured all of the key events of the crime. See, e.g., United States v. Fuentes, 877 F.2d 895, 901 (11th Cir. 1989) (“A review of the contested language in context reveals that the government‘s attorney was properly arguing the credibility of the witness based on the evidence in the record.“). The prosecutor suggested that the nature and scope of Bell‘s testimony established its credibility. He did not profess a personal opinion about its truth. Again, the determination was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland.
6.
Finally, Holland claims that his attorneys were ineffective because they did not object to the State‘s comments on Holland‘s post-arrest silence. Describing Holland‘s interrogation, the prosecutor said,
A reasonable court could recognize that the prosecutor‘s argument did not concern Holland‘s constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination. After all, the prosecutor was commenting on the statement Holland did make to police. The prosecutor argued that the story Holland told to police could not be believed because it was inconsistent with other evidence that showed Holland beat Thelma Johnson. The prosecutor took Holland to task for what he told police, not for exercising his right to remain silent. Again, Holland has not established that the state court determination was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law.
C.
Holland also claims that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent when it found no error in the suppression of his custodial statements. At the suppression hearing,7 Officer Wesolowski testified that, when arrested on July 29, 1990, Holland spoke Spanish to police and identified himself as “Antonio Rivera.” After a Spanish-speaking officer translated Miranda warnings to him, Holland invoked his right to counsel and questioning ceased.
Detective Kevin Butler testified that on July 30, 1990, at 1:00 a.m., he contacted Holland in his cell at the Pompano Beach jail “to find out his name” because “[t]he name he had given we believed was false” after it didn‘t match up with any computer checks the police had run. Butler said he went into Holland‘s cell, identified himself, and “told him it was important . . . for him to tell the truth and just give us his real name so we know who he is.” Butler explained that “I can‘t talk to you about what happened . . . you‘ve already asked for an attorney.” Butler said he was only there to establish Holland‘s “true identity.” The petitioner stated that his name was Albert Holland. Butler said “okay, fine, I appreciate you being honest with me.” According to Butler, he gave Holland his card and said “if you ever want to talk to me, you can call me.” Then he left.
Detective Butler testified that another officer requested the jail to provide additional fingerprints and photographs under Holland‘s true name and that at 2:30 a.m. Detective Butler went to the booking room to pick up the fingerprints and photographs. Butler said that, while Holland was being booked, “[h]e looked over to me and he made eye contact with me, he nodded and he asked, he said, ‘Can I talk to you?‘” Butler replied, “Do you want to talk to me,” to which Holland again said, “Yes, can I talk to you?” At that point, Butler took Holland to an interview room in the detective bureau. Butler said the first thing he told Holland was “Albert, you asked for an attorney and I can‘t speak to you.” When Holland pressed on, Butler reiterated, “[t]he only reason I asked you to come in here was the fact that you wanted to talk to me. . . . If you still want to talk to me prior to doing that,
The Florida Supreme Court rejected Holland‘s claim and found no Miranda violation because “[t]he record is clear that it was Holland, not Detective Butler, who initiated the conversation which ultimately resulted in the confession.” Holland II, 773 So.2d at 1074. We agree with the district court that Holland does not satisfy
Under
Instead of challenging the fact finding, Holland argues that the Florida Supreme Court acted contrary to or unreasonably applied Edwards v. Arizona, which held that “when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880. “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Nevertheless, “[v]olunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Holland attacks the voluntariness of his interrogation statements from a number of unconvincing angles. He argues that Detective Butler‘s actions were designed to undermine Holland‘s right to counsel because establishing that Holland spoke English was incriminating. Holland highlights Butler‘s admonitions that it was important to tell the truth about his identity. According to Holland, Butler intended to
The Florida Supreme Court reasonably found no Miranda violation when it concluded that Holland initiated the 2:30 a.m. dialogue with Detective Butler that drew out his incriminating statements. Holland‘s own testimony at trial shows his claim lacks merit: he said he had wanted to talk to Butler because he was the only person that Holland felt gave him “a chance to get out of the precinct,” to “finesse my way out of there. That‘s what that whole thing is, me trying to talk to him, to hope that he gets me out of there.” A court also could reasonably decide that the earlier act of handing over a business card was not something Butler should have known was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, nor did the act apply undue pressure calculated to convince Holland to waive his rights.
V.
In sum, the district court erred in ordering habeas relief on Holland‘s Faretta claim because the Florida Supreme Court reasonably concluded that his mental condition kept him from making a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. Therefore, we reverse the grant of the writ of habeas corpus and remand with instructions for the district court to reinstate Holland‘s conviction and sentence. However, we affirm the district court‘s denial of a habeas writ on Holland‘s three other appellate claims.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with instructions.