Powers v. United StatesPowers v. United States
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Cox
Plaintiffs sued the United States for uninsured flood losses, alleging that the Government had negligently failed to publicize the availability of federally subsidized flood insurance. The district court dismissed the action as barred by
We affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing this action, but for reasons other than those used by the district court. Because we hold that the conduct challenged here is protected by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), we do not reach the more difficult question of whether the United States is immune under the provisions of
I.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL-BACKGROUND
Invoking the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act, plaintiffs filed this class action against the United States for uninsured losses suffered as a result of flash flooding in five Alabama counties in March 1990.1 Plaintiffs alleged in their complaints (1) that the National Flood Insurance Act placed a mandatory duty upon the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to publicize the availability of federally subsidized flood insurance; (2) that the Director “totally failed” to perform this duty; and (3) that, as a result, plaintiffs were unaware of the availability of such flood insurance and were uninsured when they suffered flood losses. The Government, pursuant to
The district court granted the - Government’s motion to dismiss, holding that
II. ISSUE ON APPEAL AND CONTENTIONS OF THE
PARTIES
We address one issue: whether the discretionary function exception to the ■ Federal Tort Claims Act bars suit against the United States for the alleged failure to publicize federally subsidized flood insurance.2 This is an issue of first impression in this circuit.
The statute in question authorizes the Director to “from time to time take such action as ‘may be necessary in order to make information and data available to the public.”
III. STANDARD OF -REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s interpretation and application of a statute. Williams v. Homestake Mortgage Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1139 (11th Cir.1992). We may affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground that appears in the record, whether or not that ground was relied upon or even
IV. DISCUSSION
We begin with this general principle: The United States cannot be sued except as it consents to be sued. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30, 73 S.Ct. 956, 965, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953). Congress through the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act has authorized suit against the United States
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
In Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953), the Supreme Court undertook for the first time to describe the contours of this discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The Court noted that Congress intended to protect “the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one’s judgment of the best course.” Id. at 34, 73 S.Ct. at 967. While declining to define precisely where discretion begins and ends, the Court stated: “Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.” Id. at 36, 73 S.Ct. at 968.
Since Dalehite, the Supreme Court has refined its discretionary function analysis. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991); Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988); United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984). This court, in Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir.1993), has recently summarized the Supreme Court’s analysis. To determine whether challenged government conduct falls within the discretionary function exception, a court must engage in a two-part inquiry. Id. at 1526.
First, the court must look to the nature of the challenged conduct and consider whether the conduct involves an element of judgment or choice. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1273; Autery, 992 F.2d at 1526. The exception does not apply where a federal statute or regulation “ ‘specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.’ ” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 1273 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. at 1958); Autery, 992 F.2d at 1526; see, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 956 F.2d 1071, 1074-77 (11th Cir.1992) (no discretion in Army Corps of Engineers’ implementation of mandatory safety responsibilities); Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577, 1581-82 (11th Cir.1989) (no discretion where EPA policies specifically prescribed course of action for waste removal). Or, as this circuit has stated the converse of this proposition, “ ‘if a government official in performing his statutory duties must act without reliance upon a fixed or readily ascertainable standard, the decision he makes is discretionary and within the discretionary function exception.’ ” Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 769 F.2d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir.1985). (quoting Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 663 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939, 104 S.Ct. 352, 78 L.Ed.2d 316 (1983)); see, e.g., Brackin v. United States, 913 F.2d 858, 860-61 (11th Cir.1990) (discretion where guidelines for reconstitution of farmland fixed no readily ascertainable standard); Hart v. United States, 894 F.2d 1539, 1546 n. 8 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990) (discretion where there were no specific mandatory guidelines for the government’s identification of the remains of servicemen). The
Second, the court must determine whether the judgment exercised “is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 1273 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. at 1959); Autery, 992 F.2d at 1526-27. By providing an exception from liability for discretionary functions, Congress sought to “ ‘prevent judicial “second-guessing” of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, ’ economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.’ ” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 1273 (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814, 104 S.Ct. at 2765). The court must decide, therefore, whether the challenged actions taken by a government agent are “ ‘susceptible to policy analysis.’ ” Autery, 992 F.2d at 1531 (quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at ——, 111 S.Ct. at 1275).
Applying these principles, we turn first to the allegations in this case and determine whether the plaintiffs challenge governmental conduct that involves the element of judgment or choice. Because we review here the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we accept the plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 1276; Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at 1960-61. Although a more fully developed factual record might be helpful, we find that one is not necessary. The relevant statutory language and the plaintiffs’ allegations clearly indicate that the plaintiffs here challenge “the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.”
The plaintiffs seek damages for- the alleged failure of the Director of FEMA “to take necessary actions to make information and data available to the public and to publicize widely the availability of the flood insurance program, its coverage and objectives.” (R. 1-1 at 4). .They invoke
The Director shall from time to time take such action‘as may be necessary in order to make information and data available- to ■ the public, and to any State or local agency •or official, with regard to—
(1) the flood insurance program, its coverage” and objectives, and
(2) estimated and chargeable flood insurance premium rates, including the basis for and differences between such rates in accordance with the provisions of section 4015 of this title.
However,
Plaintiffs make much of the fact that they allege a “total failure” of the Director to publicize the National Flood Insurance Program. As noted above, in reviewing a motion to dismiss we generally accept the plaintiffs’ allegations as true. However, we are not constrained to accept allegations clearly refuted by -that which we can judicially notice.3 The Code of Federal Regulations con
In their briefs, plaintiffs do not reach the second question of whether the discretion to be exercised by the Director in publicizing flood insurance is of the type that the discre-. tionary function was designed to protect. We hold that it is. By enacting the National Flood Insurance Program, Congress sought to alleviate the economic hardships caused by unforeseen flood disasters. See
V. CONCLUSION
We hold that the conduct challenged here falls within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. Congress has authorized the Director of FEMA to use discretion in making available information regarding federally subsidized flood insurance. Such discretion is‘of the type Congress sought to protect with the discretionary function exeeption to the FTCA. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The individual plaintiffs initially filed four separate, but virtually identical complaints. The district court consolidated the four cases. [(R.l-13). -For the purposes of this opinion, citations to the complaints are to the complaint found in volume one of the record. (R.l-1).]
. We do not address the Government‘s contentions (1) that
. By statute, “[t]he contents of the Federal Regis-fer shall be judicially noticed.”