KEITH DESHON ADAMS v. BRANDON DODRILL, et al.
Civil Action No. 2:24-00315
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA CHARLESTON DIVISION
July 3, 2025
Document 28
Omar J. Aboulhosn, United States Magistrate Judge
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 17), filed on February 3, 2025. The Court notified Plaintiff pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1975), that Plaintiff had the right to file a response to Defendants’ Motion and submit Affidavit(s) or statements and/or other legal or factual material supporting his claims as they are challenged by the Defendants in moving to dismiss. (Document No. 19.) After being granted an extension of time, Plaintiff filed his Response in Opposition on May 6, 2025. (Document No. 25.) On May 12, 2025, Defendants filed their Reply. (Document No. 27.) Having examined the record and considered the applicable law, the undersigned has concluded that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 17) should be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be (1) granted as to Defendant Hogan, (2) granted as to Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Dodrill, and (3) denied as to Plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Dodrill.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 26 2024, Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed his Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs and a Complaint claiming entitlement to relief under
On or about 9-27-22, I was a passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over. At that time, Officer Brandon Dodrill approached the vehicle and asked for license and registration without any real probable cause. Ofc. Dodrill then asked myself and the driver of the vehicle to step out. At that time, Officer Dodrill began to profile myself and the driver and showed direct deliberate indifference by utilizing a taser gun on me for 30 full seconds at up to 50,000 volts, which could have been fatal. After he tased me, he then put me in a chokehold and continued to choke me as I was struggling to verbally tell him “I couldn‘t breathe.” In which he kept on choking me. At that time is when I noticed Officer Tyler Hogan on the scene. The whole incident was captured on bodycam footage. This incident took place in Oak Hill, West Virginia, on Route 19 and Summerlee Road. Also, Officer Dodrill used other means of excessive use of force by pulling his steel extractable baton and hitting me with it with such force that it caused two (2) teeth to have to be surgically removed, which also gave me a broken jaw and placed me in CMC (Charleston Medical Center). I was charged a substantial medical bill . . . which I cannot afford to pay due to injuries from the excessive use of force by Officer Dodrill violating my 8th Amendment Rights and also the 4th Amendment.
(Id.) Plaintiff requests injunctive and monetary relief. (Id., pp. 5 6.) By Order entered on June 27, 2024, the undersigned found Petitioner‘s Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs to be deficient because the Application was unsigned by Plaintiff. (Document No. 4.)
On February 3, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support. (Document Nos. 17 - 18.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s claims should be dismissed based on the following: (1) “Plaintiff has failed to state facts or a legal claim upon which relief can be granted and the Complaint must be dismissed as to Tyler Hogan pursuant to Iqbal/Twombly” (Document No. 18, pp. 6 - 7); and (2) Defendants Dodrill and Hogan are entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiff‘s claims (Id., pp. 7 - 14). As Exhibits, Defendants attach the following: (1) A copy of the Criminal Complaint filed against Plaintiff in the Magistrate Court of Fayette County, West Virginia, on September 28, 2022 (22-MIOF-00220) (Document No. 17-1); (2) A copy of the United States’ Sentencing Memorandum as filed in United States v. Adams, Case No. 2:23-cr-00142 (S.D.W.Va. Oct. 15, 2024) (Document No. 17-2, pp. 2 - 5); (3) A copy of Plaintiff‘s Plea Agreement as filed in Case No. 2:23-cr-00142 (Id., pp. 6 14); (4) A copy of the Docket Sheet from Case No. 2:23-cr-00142 (Id., pp. 15 20); (5) A copy of the “District Judge Daybook Entry” concerning Plaintiff‘s sentencing hearing in Case No. 2:23-cr-00142 (Id., p. 21); and (6) A copy of Plaintiff‘s Indictment as filed in Case No. 2:23-cr-00142 on September 7, 2023 (Id., p. 22).4
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Information from Criminal Complaint filed in Magistrate Court of Fayette County:
According to the sworn Criminal Complaint prepared by Officer William Willis, Plaintiff was arrested on September 27, 2022 in Oak Hill, West Virginia (State v. Adams, Case No. 22-MIOF-00220(Mag. Ct. of Fayette Co.). (Document No. 17-1.) Defendant Dodrill, a Patrol Officer with the Oak Hill City Police Department, was on patrol when he observed a blue Buick with Arizona plates (HEA9D5A) leaving the residence of John Hancock (169 Crawford Street). (Id.) The Oak Hill City Police Department, the West Virginia State Police, and the Fayette County
B. Information from Federal Indictment, Suppression Hearing, the United States’ Sentencing Memorandum, and Plaintiff‘s Plea Agreement in Criminal Action No. 2:23-00142:
As a result of the traffic stop and arrest, Plaintiff was found to be in the possession of 17.8 grams of methamphetamine “ice,” 49.92 grams of methamphetamine mixture, 148.64 grams of fentanyl, and 1.05 grams of cocaine. (Document No. 17-2, p. 3.) Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff was charged by a single-count Indictment in United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia with possession with the intent to distribute 5 grams or more of
During the Suppression Hearing, Defendant Dodrill testified he was patrolling “Hell Holler” on the day of Plaintiff‘s arrest. (Document No. 25-1, pp. 8 - 9, 27.) Defendant Dodrill explained that the area was known as “Hell Holler” because it is “an extreme problem area” for drug activity. (Id., p. 9.) Defendant Dodrill stated he observed a vehicle with Arizona plates with extremely dark window tint parked at the residence of a suspected drug dealer. (Id., p. 12.) Defendant Dodrill explained that he initiated a traffic stop due to dark window tint and the vehicle delayed stopping by passing a couple of safe pull off areas before actually stopping. (Id., pp. 18 19.) Defendant Dodrill stated that he then requested Defendant Hogan “to swing in behind [him] just because of the delayed stop and coming from . . . a narcotics area.” (Id., pp. 19 - 20.) Defendant Dodrill explained he approached the vehicle, informed the driver he was stopped for dark window tint, and asked for “license, registration, and insurance.” (Id., p. 20.) Defendant Dodrill noted there were only two individuals in the vehicle and he immediately noticed the smell of marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. (Id.) Defendant Dodrill testified that both occupants produced identification cards, and at that time, he was not aware that Plaintiff‘s identification card did not match Plaintiff. (Id., p. 45.) Defendant Dodrill explained that due to the occupants appearing nervous and failing to produce the insurance and registration cards, he asked the occupants to exit the vehicle and stand in front of his cruiser. (Id., pp. 20 - 21.) Defendant Dodrill stated that both occupants delayed getting out of the vehicle and once Plaintiff exited the passenger side, Plaintiff “looks around a little bit,” and “then all of a sudden, he takes off running toward the front of the vehicle up the roadway.” (Id., p. 24.) Defendant Dodrill testified that he immediately began chasing after Plaintiff and deployed a single shot from his taser into Plaintiff’ back causing Plaintiff
Defendant Dodrill testified that initially Defendant Hogan was acting merely as a “backing officer” and she did not exit her cruiser when Defendant Dodrill made contact with occupants of the vehicle. (Id., pp. 26 - 27.) Defendant Dodrill stated that when Plaintiff “took off running, the driver of the vehicle then attempted to flee in the vehicle by making a U-turn across the roadway, at which time Corporal Hogan pulled her vehicle across the roadway to block him.”
The hospital failed to do a blood test. They did a urinalysis. Based off the expert that we consulted with [in State court proceedings], it takes approximately four hours for your body to break down fentanyl enough to be testified, or enough to be detected in a urinalysis test. Also, the test would have to be specific for fentanyl and not just opiates because fentanyl is a synthetic opiate.
(Id., p. 62.)
On June 10, 2024, Plaintiff pled guilty to the single-count Indictment. (Id., pp. 6 14, 19.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff‘s Plea Agreement contained a “Stipulation of Facts,” which was attached as Exhibit A. (Id., pp. 9, 13 - 14.) The “Stipulation of Facts” contain relevant conduct concerning the above incident. (Id.) The “Stipulation of Facts” stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
On September 27, 2022, I was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped in Oak Hill, Fayette County, West Virginia, within the Southern District of West Virginia. I was asked to exit the vehicle and stand at the front of an Oak Hill Police officer‘s cruiser. I ran the opposite direction and was tased while I fled from the officer. I was wearing a cross-body bag that contained controlled substances including methamphetamine, fentanyl, and tablets containing methamphetamine and ecstasy.
The controlled substances in my bag were collected and sent to the DEA laboratory for testing. The total amounts of each controlled substances recovered from my bag were as follows:
Methamphetamine (ice) 17.8 grams
Methamphetamine mixture - 49.92 grams
Fentanyl - 148.64 grams
Cocaine - 1.05 grams
The total amount of controlled substances I am responsible for possession with the intent to distribute was at least 700 kilograms but less than 1,000 kilograms of converted drug weight. I intended to distribute the methamphetamine and fentanyl that I possessed in and around the Southern District of West Virginia.
The parties stipulate and agree that the city of Oak Hill is in Fayette County, West Virginia, and within the Southern District of West Virginia. I further agree that Methamphetamine and Fentanyl are both Schedule II controlled substances.
This Stipulation of Facts does not contain each and every fact known to defendant and to the United States concerning his involvement and the involvement of others in the charges set forth in the Indictment.
(Id., pp. 13 - 14.)
THE STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
This Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents, holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1978). Liberal construction, however, “does not require courts to construct arguments or theories for a pro se plaintiff because this would place a court in the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Miller v. Jack, 2007 WL 2050409, at * 3 (N.D.W.Va. 2007)(citing Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.1978)). Further, liberal construction does not require the “courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). In other words, a court may not construct legal argument for a plaintiff. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.1993). Finally, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the
ANALYSIS
“[F]ederal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).
1. Bystander Liability:
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hogan is liable based upon bystander liability because Defendant Hogan knew Defendant Dodrill was using excessive force and she failed to intervene to protect Plaintiff from the use of unnecessary and excessive force by Defendant Dodrill. (Document No. 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dodrill initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle he was travelling in as a passenger. (Id.) Plaintiff states that Defendant Dodrill
In the Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support, Defendant Hogan argues that Plaintiff has failed to “state facts or a legal claim upon which relief can be granted” as to Defendant Hogan. (Document No. 17 and Document No. 18, p. 6 - 7.) Defendant Hogan notes that Plaintiff merely alleges that he “noticed Officer Tyler Hogan on the scene.” (Id., p. 6.) Defendant Hogan asserts that “beyond one sentence naming Hogan and vague assertions of showing signs of abusive actions, Plaintiff makes no reference to Officer Hogan nor alleges that Hogan performed any act that would support a claim of excessive force.” (Id.) Defendant Hogan claims that “Plaintiff has failed to even allege an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation” as to Defendant Hogan. (Id., p. 7.) Defendant Hogan contends that “Plaintiff has failed to allege any fact or corresponding legal theory which would demonstrate Hogan did anything to him or that the Plaintiff is entitled to relief.” (Id.) Therefore, Defendant Hogan asserts that the Complaint should be dismissed as to Defendant Hogan because “Plaintiff has failed to allege any legal or factual basis which would support a claim or entitle him to relief.” (Id.)
In Response, Plaintiff first requests that the Court “take judicial notice of the facts
In Reply, Defendant Hogan continues to argue that Plaintiff‘s Complaint must be dismissed as to Defendant Hogan. (Document No. 27, pp. 5 - 6.) Defendant Hogan argues that “[d]espite
Generally, “a law officer may incur § 1983 liability only through affirmative misconduct.” Randall v. Prince George‘s County, 302 F.3d 188, 202 (4th Cir. 2002). “An officer may be liable under a § 1983 theory of bystander liability ‘if he: (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual‘s constitution rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.‘” Simmons v. Whitaker, 106 F.4th 379, 384 (4th Cir. 2024)(citing Randall, 302 F.3d at 204). “The first step in assessing the constitutionally of [the officers‘] actions is to determine the relevant facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
As stated above, the Court may not dismiss a Complaint where a pro se Complaint can be
2. Excessive Force:
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dodrill used excessive force by tasing him, putting him in a chokehold, and hitting him with his baton. (Document No. 2.) Plaintiff alleges that after initiating the traffic stop and directing the occupants to exit the vehicle, “Officer Dodrill began to profile [Plaintiff] and the driver and showed direct deliberate indifference by utilizing a taser gun on [Plaintiff] for 30 full seconds at up to 50,000 volts, which could have been fatal.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that after Defendant Dodrill tased him, Defendant Dodrill “put [Plaintiff] in a chokehold and continued to choke [Plaintiff] as [Plaintiff] was struggling to verbally tell him ‘I couldn‘t breathe.‘” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dodrill continued to choke him. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dodrill “used other means of excessive use of force by pulling his steel extractable baton and hitting [Plaintiff] with it with such force that it caused two (2) teeth to have to be surgically removed, which also gave [Plaintiff] a broken jaw and placed [Plaintiff] in CMC (Charleston Medical Center).” (Id.)
In the Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support, Defendant Dodrill argues he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Document No. 17 and Document No. 18, pp. 7 - 14.) First,
In the alternative, Defendant Dodrill contends that “[e]ven if a constitutional right was violated, Plaintiff‘s asserted right was not clearly established.” (Id., pp. 13 - 14.) First, Defendant Dodrill contends “[i]t is not clear from applicable precedent that a suspect, who acts strangely, refuses to comply with police directives to exit a vehicle, flees from police, and then again refuses to comply with directives has a right not to be tased.” (Id.) Second, Defendant Dodrill asserts that “after all of the aforementioned occurrences, and after engaging in physical combat with Dodrill and Hogan, and after exposing officers to illegal substances, it is not clear that Plaintiff has a right not to be subdued by way of utilizing a baton.” (Id.) Defendant Dodrill concludes that “the Court must determine whether, as of September 27, 2022, that relevant precedent established an officer‘s use of a taser and baton were objectively unreasonable and therefore constitutionally excessive when used against a fleeing suspect who is believed to be armed, who then becomes physically resistant, attacks two police officers, given no indication that he will yield, and further utilized illegal narcotics to assist in his escape.” (Id., p. 14.)
In Response, Plaintiff again requests that the Court “take judicial notice of the facts contained in the public documents in the associated criminal action in federal Criminal No. 2:23-cr-00142 as it pertains to the instant claims of the Plaintiff . . . and both of the Defendants.” (Document No. 25, p. 1.) Plaintiff continues to claim that Defendant Dodrill used unnecessary and excessive force because “Plaintiff was tased and choked and also hit with a baton.” (Id., p. 2.)
In Reply, Defendant Dodrill contends that Plaintiff acknowledges that he fled the traffic stop, resisted efforts by Defendant Dodrill to conduct the traffic stop, and engaged in active combat with Defendants. (Document No. 27, p. 2.) Defendant Dodrill argues that Plaintiff‘s “attempts to provide justifications for his conduct . . . conflict with reality and the facts underlying this action.” (Id.) Defendant Dodrill contends that Plaintiff‘s assertion that the stop was predicated on an alleged impermissible profiling of the Plaintiff is without merit because Defendant “Dodrill‘s testimony makes clear [that] he was unable to see the occupants in the vehicle before making the traffic
A “claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of [a] person” is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment‘s objective reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, which includes the right to be free of “seizures effectuated by excessive force.” Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 476 (4th Cir. 2006). Courts analyze whether an officer has used excessive force under a standard of objective reasonableness. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007);
When a pro se Complaint can be remedied by an amendment, the District Court may not dismiss the Complaint with prejudice but must permit the amendment. Denton, 504 U.S. at 34, 112 S.Ct. at 1728; also see Goode, 807 F.3d at 619. The undersigned finds that viewing Plaintiff‘s Complaint liberally, and considering the additional facts contained in his Response and Exhibits, Plaintiff has made ample allegations of the use of unnecessary and excessive force by Defendant Dodrill in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff indicates that Defendant Dodrill had no grounds to arrest Plaintiff when Plaintiff exited the vehicle and attempted to flee the scene, but Defendant Dodrill used excessive force by tasing Plaintiff after Plaintiff took only seven steps and without giving Plaintiff any verbal commands to stop. At the time Plaintiff was initially tased, Plaintiff indicates he was not an immediate danger to Defendant Dodrill or the public making tasing a justifiable use for force to stop Plaintiff from leaving the scene. Smith, 781 F.3d at 102-03(holding that an officer punching and throwing an arrestee to the ground because she “took only a single step back off of the small stoop in front of the door” and “pulled her arm away” during an attempted handcuffing was excessive force); Estate of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 902 (4th Cir. 2016)(finding that deploying a taser is a “serious use of force” and “[o]ur precedent . . . makes clear that tasers are proportional force only when deployed in response to a situation in which a reasonable officer would perceive some immediate danger that could be mitigated by using the taser.“) Plaintiff alleges that after Defendant Dodrill tased him for 30 seconds, Defendant Dodrill put Plaintiff in a chokehold. Plaintiff states that Defendant Dodrill continued choking him even though Plaintiff informed Defendant Dodrill that Plaintiff “could not
To the extent Defendant Dodrill requests dismissal of Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment claim
PROPOSAL AND RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, it is therefore respectfully PROPOSED that the District Court confirm and accept the foregoing factual findings and legal conclusions and RECOMMENDED that the District Court GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 17). Specifically, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: (1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 17) be GRANTED as to Defendant Hogan; (2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 17) be GRANTED as to Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Dodrill; (3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 17) be DENIED as to Plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Dodrill; (4) GRANT Plaintiff permission to amend his Complaint to include the additional facts to support
The Plaintiff is hereby notified that this “Proposed Findings and Recommendation” is hereby FILED, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable United States District Judge Irene C. Berger. Pursuant to the provisions of
Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984). Copies of such objections shall be served on opposing parties, Judge Berger and this Magistrate Judge.
The Clerk is requested to send a copy of this Proposed Findings and Recommendation to Plaintiff, who is acting pro se, and transmit a copy to counsel of record.
Date: July 3, 2025.
Omar J. Aboulhosn
United States Magistrate Judge