William Battle, III v. J. Ledford, 912 F.3d 708

Background

William D. Battle, III alleged excessive force by two corrections officers during a transfer on December 6, 2013; he pursued the Virginia prison grievance process through the regional administrator, reaching "the last level of appeal" 83 days after the incident.
Battle filed a pro se § 1983 complaint (postage request) on January 11, 2016, two years and 36 days after the incident; the district court treated this as the filing date and granted summary judgment for defendants as time-barred under Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims.
Battle argued his filing was timely because the PLRA required administrative exhaustion before suit, and the 83 days spent exhausting should toll Virginia’s limitations period under (a) Va. Code § 8.01-229(K), (b) the VTCA tolling provision, and (c) federal equitable tolling.
The district court rejected tolling under Va. Code § 8.01-229(K) (prison disciplinary proceedings are not criminal prosecutions) and entered judgment for defendants as Battle conceded the district court properly denied that theory on appeal.
The Fourth Circuit (Motz, J.) addressed whether Virginia tolling rules (statutory or equitable) or federal equitable tolling must apply to preserve a prisoner’s full § 1983 limitations period when the PLRA requires exhaustion; it vacated and remanded, holding that the 83-day exhaustion period tolled the limitations under federal equitable tolling.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether VTCA tolling (Va. Code § 8.01-195.3(7)) can be borrowed to toll § 1983 limitations	Battle: VTCA tolling applies because VTCA tolls grievance periods for prisoners and could analogously extend the § 1983 period	Officers: VTCA does not apply to § 1983 claims; § 1983 is for officials, VTCA waives sovereign immunity for the Commonwealth	No — VTCA’s scheme is different (shorter deadlines) and VTCA governs suits against the Commonwealth, not suits against state officials under § 1983; cannot borrow VTCA tolling here
Whether Virginia common-law equitable doctrines permit tolling for PLRA exhaustion	Battle: state equitable tolling could suspend the limitations period during exhaustion	Officers: Virginia law rejects non‑statutory tolling except equitable estoppel, which Battle cannot show	No — Virginia’s equitable estoppel requires misleading conduct by defendants; Battle conceded he cannot meet that standard, so state common law affords no relief
Whether the PLRA or state no-tolling policy prevents tolling of § 1983 limitations during mandatory exhaustion	Officers: PLRA’s exhaustion requirement and Virginia’s no-tolling rule mean no tolling; Congress didn’t intend to alter limitations rules	Battle: PLRA does not speak to tolling and should not be read to undercut § 1983/§ 1988 policies	PLRA silence does not override § 1988’s command; applying Virginia’s no-tolling rule would conflict with § 1983’s goals and could create a catch-22, so PLRA/state policy do not bar tolling
Whether federal equitable tolling applies to pause § 1983 limitations during the PLRA exhaustion period	Battle: federal equitable tolling should suspend the limitations clock for the exhaustion period (83 days)	Officers: federal tolling unnecessary; state law controls or plaintiff must show extra extraordinary circumstances beyond mere exhaustion	Yes — Federal equitable tolling applies; mandatory, absolute exhaustion constitutes an extraordinary circumstance and Battle exercised reasonable diligence, so limitations tolled for the 83 days and his § 1983 claim is timely

Key Cases Cited

Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (determining state personal-injury statute of limitations governs § 1983 claims)
Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (state tolling rules apply to § 1983 unless inconsistent with federal law)
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (principles for borrowing state law to fill gaps in federal remedies)
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (federal interest controls when borrowing state law to enforce federal remedies)
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (warning that exhaustion requirements without tolling could effectively repeal § 1983)
Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318 (2d Cir. applying equitable tolling during PLRA exhaustion to avoid catch-22)
Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. applying tolling for administrative exhaustion periods)
Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. applying state equitable tolling to administrative exhaustion context)
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (equitable tolling requires diligence and extraordinary circumstances)
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (clarifying standard for extraordinary circumstances and reasonable diligence for equitable tolling)