148 Conn. App. 591
Conn. App. Ct.2014Background
- Plaintiff Delores Walker was injured on defendant Bridgeport Housing Authority property on Jan 15, 2009 and sued on Oct 7, 2010.
- General Statutes § 8-67 requires written notice of intent to sue to be filed with the housing authority’s chairman or secretary within six months of the cause of action.
- Walker mailed a Feb 12, 2009 letter addressed to "Bridgeport Housing Authority" and "To Whom It May Concern" describing the injury and intent to sue; she contended this satisfied § 8-67.
- Defendant produced affidavits stating the secretary (Calace) and chairperson (Vila) did not personally receive the letter, that policy required mail be specifically addressed to Vila for her to receive it, and that Chief of Security Villegas received the letter and forwarded it to HR/insurer.
- Walker argued (1) her counsel’s affidavit and Vila’s death created factual disputes, (2) Villegas had been delegated authority under § 8-41 to receive notice, and (3) Villegas’s confirmation letter showing the letter was filed satisfied § 8-67.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for defendant for failure to comply with § 8-67; plaintiff appealed and the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether genuine factual dispute existed precluding summary judgment | O’Rourke affidavit and Vila’s inability to testify create disputed material facts | Evidence shows letter was not addressed to or received by chair or secretary; plaintiff offered no contrary evidence | No genuine issue; summary judgment appropriate |
| Whether mailing to the authority "To Whom It May Concern" constituted filing with chairman or secretary under § 8-67 | Letter and Villegas’ acknowledgement/filing show notice was "filed" | § 8-67 requires personal receipt by chair or secretary; mere receipt by employee/insurer insufficient | As a matter of law, insufficient — strict compliance required |
| Whether authority may delegate receipt of § 8-67 notice under § 8-41 | § 8-41 allows delegation of powers/duties; internal policies and Villegas’ handling show delegation | § 8-67 prescribes who must receive notice and § 8-41 delegation is irrelevant to statutory filing requirement | Delegation under § 8-41 does not satisfy § 8-67; defendant could not delegate the statutory receipt requirement |
| Whether circumstantial evidence (Villegas’ letter, file entry) cures defect | Villegas’ acknowledgment and file entry demonstrate the notice reached authority and was filed | Villegas’ actions do not show chair or secretary personally received notice and his letter lacks required statutory detail | Not sufficient; Villegas’ receipt/filing does not substitute for statutory filing with chair/secretary |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 297 Conn. 710 (2010) (summary judgment standard and burden on movant)
- Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527 (2002) (opposing party must show genuine issue of material fact with evidence; conclusory affidavits insufficient)
- Vollemans v. Wallingford, 103 Conn. App. 188 (2007) (standard for material fact and summary judgment review)
- Tuccio Development, Inc. v. Neumann, 111 Conn. App. 588 (2008) (plenary review of summary judgment legal determinations)
- Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 282 Conn. 477 (2007) (use of prior statutory interpretations)
- Fields v. Housing Authority, 63 Conn. App. 617 (2001) (notice to employees or insurer, not chair/secretary, does not satisfy § 8-67)
- Pacelli Bros. Transportation, Inc. v. Pacelli, 189 Conn. 401 (1983) (strict compliance required for statutes prescribing notice)
- Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542 (1987) (modifying statutory notice/sovereign-immunity waivers is legislative, not judicial)
- Wooten v. Heisler, 82 Conn. App. 815 (2004) (courts should not consider hearsay in summary judgment filings)