Hummel v. Marten Transports, Ltd.

DEBRA HUMMEL v. MARTEN TRANSPORT,

LTD., ET AL.

(SC 17494) (SC 17496) Vertefeuille, Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Bishop, and Js.1 Zarella argued April 12, panel originally before of this case on This Borden, Norcott, Katz, consisting Palmer and Vertefeuille. of Justices court Thereafter, July 13, 2006, court, pursuant to Practice Book 70-7 ordered, Accordingly, sponte, (b), case en banc. sua that the be considered panel, they Bishop Judge have Zarella were added to the Justice record, transcript argument. briefs and of the oral read

Argued April 12, officially May 22, released 200 6 E. Desrosiers, Albert with whom, on the brief, was Michael Feola, appellant for the case, appel- the first lee in the second case (plaintiff). W. were Erica whom Gallagher, F. with

William D. Hugh Trotta and brief, Joseph F. Todd, and, on the case, appellants first appellees for Hughes, (defendants). the second case the Connecticut filed a for Dewey brief Andrew M. amicus curiae. Association as Lawyers Defense filed brief Robert F. Carter Moran and James Lawyers Association et al. Trial Connecticut amici curiae.

Opinion two principal raises PALMER, appeal This certified J. of rule whether, plain meaning under the (1) issues: 1-2z,2 are recently § enacted General Statutes a final precedent importing judg obliged overrule lb,3 requirement § into General Statutes 31-30 ment compensation from review governs appeals the Court, 31- Appellate because (board) § board if requirement; does to such a and (2) 301b not refer not, whether we nevertheless should reconsider and lb interpretation abandon our 31-30 long-standing § plain judgment requirement. containing pursuant benefits tiff, Hummel, sought Debra survivor’s 31-306 the of her following to General Statutes death Hummel, named husband, Henry employee an provides: meaning shall, of a in the General Statutes 1-2z “The statute instance, first from text of the statute itself and its be ascertained relationship If, examining considering statutes. after such text and other relationship, meaning unambiguous such of such text is yield results, does not absurd or unworkable extratextual evidence of meaning of the not be statute shall considered.” Section 1-2z effective on October 2003. See Public Acts became 03-154, § 1. No. provides: “Any party aggrieved General the decision Statutes 31-301b questions Compensation upon any question Board or of law Review may appeal Compensation arising proceedings in the the decision Appellate Review Board to the Court.”

defendant, Marten Transport, Ltd. The work (Marten). compensation ers’ commissioner for the fifth district found (commissioner) plaintiff that the was entitled to survivor’s benefits but did not determine the amount of benefits to which she was entitled. Marten and its insurer, the defendant Crawford and Company,4 appealed from the decision of the commissioner to the board, which affirmed the commissioner’s finding compensability. The defendants appealed from the board’s Appellate decision to the Court, which dis missed appeal on the ground that the decision of the board was not a final judgment because the board had not determined the amount of paid. benefits to be Hummel Marten Transport, Ltd., v. App. 9, 14, 15, 875 A.2d 575 We granted parties’ petitions for appeal,5 certification to limited to the issue Appellate whether the properly Court had dismissed Hummel Marten Transport, appeal. defendants’ Ltd., 275 Conn. 913, 882 A.2d 671 (2005). On this court, claim that the Court improperly concluded that the decision of the board is appealable not an final judgment purposes of 31- 301b. The parties also claim that, Appellate if the Court correctly concluded that the decision of the board is not a final judgment, the legislature effectively has over ruled our precedent incorporating judgment requirement into 31-30 1b virtue of its enactment of 1-2z because the language 31-30lb does not contain requirement. such a The further contend that, even if the legislature has not overruled precedent importing a final judgment requirement into 31-301b, we should do so because there is no indication that the legislature impose intended to Company collectively We hereinafter refer to Marten and Crawford and as the defendants. plaintiff We sought granted note that the and the defendants and were Appellate certification to dismissing from the of the Court appeal. the defendants’ compensation requirement on workers’ jurisdictional and, therefore, reject parties’ claims We appeals. Court. Appellate of the affirm history are set procedural and following facts “The com- Court. opinion in the forth with facts connection following found the missioner [in The plain- claim for survivor’s plaintiffs benefits]. cross-country was Henry Hummel, husband, tiffs wheel trailer Marten. eighteen tractor driver an his cab of truck on sleeper was dead in the He found had home from cross- 25,1997. He returned November early of November country trip in the afternoon He had a heated dirty, tired and looking agitated. telephone about dispute with a Marten official over an paid following appar- whether he entitled had submitted problem paperwork with the that he ent plaintiff] she had known her [According earlier. years had thirty for more than and never late husband he would seen him in such an state. She feared agitated rest, have a heart attack. a shower and some Following p.m. parked He p.m. he left home between 10 and Waterbury his he drop point near off so that could early next sleep drop morning. and then off his load sleeper morning. He died in the cab before “The commissioner also found that Marten had urged Henry possible. [Henry as Hummel drive much falsified his books to hide from trans- log Hummel] of hours he drove. On portation authorities number trip shortly death, his completed the three week before day, it per he had driven an of 569 miles average in a week. was not unusual for him to drive 5000 miles day never slept only He two or three hours a exer- diet, not did eat proper He did eat a nor he cised. He regular lifelong on a schedule. was a smoker up burning used to wake himself cigars sometimes when fell while He was fingers asleep driving. his he his sixty-four years old at the time of death.

“The commissioner concluded that stress of ‘[t]he [Henry job and its limitations on his time Hummel’s] for other activities . . . substantial [were] factorfs] the chain of events which led to fatal ischemic [his] heart disease.’ The commissioner accordingly ordered payment pursuant benefits to ... 31-306, provides for the manner in which benefits are paid dependents following death resulting from an occupational accident or disease. The commissioner did not determine the amount of benefits to paid. be

“The defendants appealed to board, that claiming plaintiff prove failed to within a [had] reasonable degree of medical probability [Henry Hummel’s] employment was a substantial factor in the cause of his death. The board reviewed all of the testimony, that of including two medical experts, and concluded adequate that an evidentiary basis existed for the com- missioner’s finding of compensability. The board did not issue a remand order from its decision despite the failure to determine the amount of [commissioner’s] the award. Thereafter, the defendants appealed to [the Appellate Court], raising sufficiency same evidence claim.” Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., supra, App. 10-12.

Following defendants’ appeal Court, it came to the attention of that court that, after upheld the board the commissioner’s of com- finding pensability and did not issue a remand order to deter- specific mine the amount of benefits, plaintiff “the . . . brought separate proceeding the commis- [a] [before determine, other among things, the sioner] amount of benefits to paid. In addition to the calculation benefits, plaintiff sought an order [survivor’s] pursuant to General Statutes 31-301 (f)6 the defen- (f) provides: “During pendency General Statutes 31-301 pursuant chapter, anof award made to this the claimant shall receive compensation payable all and medical treatment under the terms of the compensation award to the extent the being and medical treatment are not

483 this pendency the [during her pay benefits of] dants penalties under imposition appeal the sought and commis 31-303. The 31-300 and General Statutes §§ open the and held (f) 31-301 order sioner entered the by responded raising The defendants penalties. issue of Statutes to whether, under General the issue of [Rev. ,7 plaintiff which the any benefits to 31-307 (e) 1997] security age old by offset social would be entitled plain the claim the benefits that defendants insurance his deci the commissioner issued tiff receives. After appeal the issues board another sion, the heard issued penalties offsets, and award, to the related final of benefits.” order for a calculation remand Id., 12-13. separate proceeding, benefits light sua raised Appellate Court, sponte,

was ongoing, the had from appealed the defendants the issue of whether plaintiff and Thereafter, the the judgment. both appeared Appellate Court for defendants before the argued oral on the defendants’ argument which the defendants board’s decision from the final under appealable was an appealing were Conn. Naugatuck, v. 273 this court’s decision Hunt disagreed Appellate A.2d 54 Court (2005).8 any paid any by employer by has health or or who been insurer insurer (a) section, pay pursuant provisions ordered, to of subsection compensation portion shall and medical treatment of the award. The paid employer insurer.” or its provides: (Rev. 1997) (e) “Notwithstanding Statutes 31-307 General contrary, paid any provision general compensation statutes to employee’s incapacity employee shall while an for an total be reduced age pursuant employee old benefits is entitled to receive insurance Security compensa reduced The amount of each workers’ federal Social Act. equal excess, any, compensation payment tion if of the workers’ shall payment age over the old insurance benefits.” Naugatuck, supra, 273 board determined that In Hunt namely, hyper compensable injury, had the claimant suffered a work-related tension, which the was entitled did not the benefits to claimant but determine yet financial a result his he had not suffered actual loss as because injury. id., employer’s appeal from 101. See We concluded that the board to the Court constituted a decision of and, dismissed accordingly, appeal.9 the defendants’ Ltd., Hummel v. Marten Transport, supra, App. 14, 15. parties’

We for granted petitions certification to appeal, Appellate limited to issue: “Did the following properly Court dismiss for this lack of a final judgment?” Transport, Hummel v. Ltd., Marten supra, 275 Conn. 913. The case originally argued before panel a justices. time, plaintiff of five At that both the and the Appellate defendants maintained that the Court incorrectly had concluded that the decision the board does not a constitute final judgment. Thereafter, court, sponte, sua case ordered that the be considered addition, en banc. In we parties, ordered the and invited curiae,10 the amici to file supplemental briefs on the issue of whether we should our overrule holding Hall v. Mfg. Co., Gilbert & Bennett 241 Conn. 282, 297-98, 695 A.2d 1051 in which (1997), prior we reaffirmed our importing requirement case law a final judgment into particular, 31-301b. In we sought § views of the as to amici whether the meaning rule requires embodied in 1-2z us to overrule our § case law lb a interpreting 31-30 as final containing requirement. reject now parties’ We claim that the board’s is an appealable decision final judgment. We reject also parties’ contention 1-2z overrules prior precedent require 31-301b to construing § purposes Id., that, of 31-301b. 105. We reasoned because the claimant solely brought protect against running applicable had his claim of the statute of limitations and before he had economic suffered loss due to hypertension, his a remand the board to the commissioner for further proceedings unnecessary. been would have Id. noted, requirement As the Court of a final “[b]ecause implicates subject jurisdiction par matter . . . the court’s] [the willingness proceed ties’ insufficient.” Hummel Marten Trans v. [was] port, Ltd., supra, App. 90 Conn. 13. Lawyers Association, Compensation The Connecticut Trial Workers’ Section of the Bar Connecticut Association and Connecticut Defense Lawyers appeared Association have as amici curiae. parties’ invitation decline the Finally, judgment. final of §31- our construction reconsider abandon judgment requirement. final containing 301b

I decision parties’ claim that the We first consider the Before is an appealable judgment. the board we set claim, however, the merits of this addressing recently principles, which we the governing legal forth Naugatuck, supra, Hunt summarized party 31-301b, [a]ny General Statutes 97. “[U]nder any ques upon by the decision aggrieved [board] may in the arising proceedings questions tion or law Appellate the the decision of the appeal [board] Court. that the Court’s stated, however, Appellate have

“We ordinarily law disputed and fact review of claims by final the judgment the of a rendering must await 556, 573 v. Fairfield, Szudora [board]. case to the When the board remands a A.2d 1 in connection proceedings for further commissioner finality the of the board’s challenged award, with the .... cir- question Id. In such decision is called into determines whether such cumstances, test that [t]he on scope is a final turns the judgment decision if further are proceedings on remand: such proceedings an final merely ministerial, appealable decision is the require if the proceedings but further will judgment, the independent or discretion and judgment exercise of appeal the evidence, premature of additional taking Finally, Id. because the exis- and must dismissed. jurisdictional prerequisite is a tence of may court dismiss a case appeal, reviewing to an even if the issue not raised ground on that marks Hunt parties.” quotation omitted.) (Internal 104-105. supra, 273 Conn. Naugatuck, We conclude that Appellate properly Court applied principles these that the decision concluding of the board in present appealable case is not an final As judgment. aptly explained: Court separate two “Although were proceedings brought, first to determine compensability and the second to award, determine the the board’s ruling compensa- bility merely was a step along the road to a final judg- Essentially, ment. the two proceedings plaintiff has will result brought one judgment. Following on the issue of compensability, the board impliedly remanded the matter for proceedings to deter- mine the amount of the award. the award Following proceeding, explicitly the board remanded the matter to the commissioner with directions. Because the matter currently is on remand to the commissioner, court [the Szudora test applies] to determine whether appeal may proceed despite the remand order. It can- not. The proceedings require on remand will the com- independent missioner to exercise to de- question termine the of law of whether the social secu- rity offset of Statutes (Rev. 1997)] 31-307 [General (e) applies plaintiff in this case. Furthermore, order to determine whether and to what extent the plaintiff security receives social age old insurance bene- Hummel v. Mar- fits, further will required.” evidence Transport, ten Ltd., supra, App. 90 Conn. 14. claim, they Appellate did in the Court, that Hunt v. Naugatuck, supra, 97, supports 273 Conn. their appealed contention that the defendants have from Hunt, a final of the board. In the plaintiff, Hunt, employed Ronald was police as a officer the defendant, of borough Naugatuck Id., (Naugatuck). 98. Hunt filed a notice of claim for heart and hyperten sion benefits after discovering hypertension that he had but before he had suffered compensable loss. See id., 99-101, 105. The commissioner determined that General Statutes was to benefits under Hunt entitled the commissioner’s 7-433c, board affirmed and the appealed from the Naugatuck Id., 100-102. decision. Court, sua which, the Appellate board to decision if reasons, and appear give “to sponte, ordered counsel lack why should not be dismissed for any, appeal . . . decision because the proceedings further appears contemplate that board to the calculation involving before the trial commissioner may require the will that of benefits for occur [Hunt] exercise discre- evidence and the taking additional Id., 102. Fol- omitted.) marks (Internal quotation tion.” Court dismissed hearing, Appellate lowing lack Id. judgment. for of a Naugatuck’s appeal for Thereafter, petition filed a certification Naugatuck court, limited to granted which we properly Court had the issue of whether appeal. Naugatuck, Hunt dismissed See Naugatuck’s A.2d 742 certified in the question negative, We answered the “It decision stating: affirming is clear that board’s judgment. the commissioner’s award was a final conclusion, we that was not reaching our note [Hunt] specific monetary an award of benefits when seeking . . . hypertension he filed his because his had [notice] disability. ripened partial Rather, not into a or total when did filing motivation he [Hunt’s] [notice] was to his claim within the statute of limitations bring period employer his he had developed to alert that spawn monetary a condition . . . could a claim for benefits the future. The commissioner’s finding award, therefore, merely involved determination . . . entitled receive benefits should he [Hunt] compensable later sustain a loss. The board’s decision affirming the commissioner’s award resolved that issue therefore, of conclusively [Hunt], and, in favor it was not necessary to remand case to the commissioner

for further proceedings. Thus, under the principles v. Fairfield, supra, Szudora announced in 556, the board’s decision was a final judgment that was sufficient jurisdiction invoke the Appellate Court.” Hunt v. Naugatuck, supra, 273 Conn. 105.

We agree with the Court that the factual procedural Hunt is presented scenario materially presented different from that In particular, this case. Hunt did not seek an award benefits; rather, he merely a determination sought that he was entitled to such an award at some unspecified time in the future if actually and when he compensable realized a loss hypertension. due to his words, only other issue in Hunt was whether Hunt before the commissioner would be entitled to benefits “should he later sustain compensable a loss.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 105. In present case, by contrast, plaintiff a seeking determination that she is entitled to survivor’s benefits and a determination regarding the amount of those benefits. parties

The also claim that when, present as in the case, the board affirms a finding compensability with- expressly out remanding case for a determination of benefits, the decision should be deemed a final judg- purposes ment for because, unlike an award benefits, compensability subject decision on is not to later reevaluation. Although plain- we with the agree tiff that a decision regarding compensability is final in ways that an award not; see, of benefits is e.g., id., 106 (“a always subject claimant’s benefits are to modifica- tion as his or her condition changes”); we see no reason to retreat from the functional, case-by-case test that in Szudora adopted finality of a evaluating decision of the board. See id., 107. further contend that it is unreasonable require party to determine whether a decision of when the deci- appeal of purposes is final for board

the Specifically, remand order. contains no sion itself to party expect unfair maintains that it is plaintiff remanded a case has been ascertain whether be able to difficulty with the party and that a confronted impliedly, been whether a case has in determining inherent likely compelled to feel by implication is remanded not contain virtually any decision does appeal her solely to his or safeguard express language remand it preferable We acknowledge appeal rights. when, explicit language use remand board to board, proceedings the decision of the further light Nevertheless, necessary. are before the commissioner ordinarily will have little parties confident that we are such are difficulty proceedings when ascertaining is silent contemplated even if the board decision that regard.

Finally, parties that, compensabil- assert although was the sole issue addressed the commissioner ity board, must permitted and the defendants board appeal take an immediate from decision of the because, la,11 under General Statutes 31-30 such expiration twenty after “decision” becomes final days from the issuance of notice of decision. We disagree. govern 31-301a and 31-301b

“General Statutes §§ finality compensation awards, which of workers’ if the fail to become final when and ” statutory Waterbury, period. time Marone within Statutes 1, 13, 707 A.2d 725 General that, appeal, in the absence of an provides 31-301a final after the decision” of the board shall become “[a]ny of notice of twenty days from the issuance expiration “Any Compensation provides: General Statutes 31-30la decision Board, appeal therefrom, in the of an shall become Review absence twenty period days expired from of notice of has the issuance after a the rendition of the or decision.”

the decision. As we have explained, however, under 31-301b, appeal may an only be taken from a final the board. Conetta v. E.g., Stamford, 246 281, Conn. 290, 715 A.2d 756 (1998). Whether a final judgment exists, turn, by in is application determined of the test set forth in Szudora. When 31-301a is § read together 1b, with 31-30 therefore, only § it is clear that qualifies board decision that aas judgment subject twenty day to the period limitation of 31-301a. § words, other purposes both 31-301a and § 31- § 301b, “[a]ny decision” of the only board includes those decisions that constitute a final judgment as we have defined that term Szudora. So construed, the two statutory provisions fully are consistent with one another.

II parties’ We turn next to the claim that the legislature, by virtue of its 1-2z, effectively enactment of has § over precedent ruled our a final importing judgment require Specifically, ment into 31-30lb. § contend that, because 31-30lb contains no language suggest § only a board decision that constitutes a final judg may appealed ment Appellate Court, plain rule of 1-2z bars us meaning from 31- construing § § 301b in such a manner. Thus, under the view advanced by parties, interpretation of 31-30 1b is gov erned its and unambiguous language, which permits appeal an from a decision of “upon the board any question questions or law arising proceed in the reject . . . .”12 ings parties’ We claim. place parties’

To proper contention in context, we commence our consideration of their claim awith 12 amici; opinion; urged We note that see 10 footnote of this also have adopt interpretation dispenses us to an 31-301b that with the final requirement. judgment

491 31-30 lb interpreting of the law case brief overview a final appeal an from requiring require- impose case board. The first Timothy Upjohn Co., 3 ment 31-301b under case, In that App. 162, Conn. A.2d decision that, held because the Appellate Court compensation now division, review compensation the court had board, judgment, was not a final review jurisdiction to hear an from no matter subject Repasi years Id., later, Several that decision.13 164. 123-24, 546 A.2d Bros., v. Jenkins App. 121, cert, denied, (1988), 550 A.2d Timothy, Court, its following holding compensation review divi- appeal dismissed an from judgment.14 sion for lack of a final require imported judgment This first court Dember, Matey Estate v. ment 31-301b in 210 into § of Matey, In Conn. 556 A.2d 599 second injury compensation assurance fund (fund) 13 history Timothy, language, Court did not consider the Timothy Co., purpose Upjohn supra, generally or 31-301b. v. of See Rather, judgment App. Conn. based its decision that a final 163-65. the court jurisdictional appellate subject jurisdiction prerequisite was a for matter on namely, Book, provisions appellate rules, 1978-97, three of the Practice Co., Timothy Upjohn supra, Although v. 163-64. §§ 2021and 3000. See may time, subsequently clear it has become clear it not have been at that impose subject practice that our do and can not or limit matter rules of not jurisdiction. See, e.g., Batte-Holmgren Health, v. Commissioner Public of jurisdiction 277, 286, (2007) (“subject is, 281 Conn. 914 A.2d 996 matter with exceptions statute, judicial ... a matter not rule certain constitutional of Lawrence, 147,155,913 (2007) (“Prac making”); A.2d 428 State subject jurisdiction. ordinarily tice Book rules do not define matter General Superior judges promulgate Statutes 51-14 authorizes the Court [a] pleading, practice procedure judicial regulating proceedings rules in modify any abridge, enlarge right .... not or substantive Such rules shall any jurisdiction quotation nor the of the courts.” marks [Internal omitted.]). lb; Repasi analysis simply engage it did in of 31-30 court not Repasi Bros., applied Timothy a matter See v. Jenkins of stare decisis. supra, App. 122-24.

appealed from a decision of the compensation review division, which affirmed the finding of the commis- sioner as to the liability fund’s to the claimant but remanded the case for further proceedings before the commissioner with respect to the amount of the award. Id., 627. the claimant Although had not challenged the appealability of the board’s decision, we followed the Repasi holding in concluding, first, only appealable lb,15 under 31-30 and, second, that the appeal fund’s was premature in light board’s remand order directing the commissioner evidentiary conduct a further for hearing purpose determining correct amount of Id., the award. 629-31. We therefore dismissed the fund’s lack of a final judgment. Id., 631.

Approximately in Szudora v. Fairfield, year later, one supra, 214 Conn. 556, expressly reaffirmed our hold- ing Matey, stating that is axiomatic appellate “[i]t disputed review of claims of law ordinarily and fact must await the of a final rendering on our reasoning Matey, we also Relying [board].” explained that whether a decision of the board is a final judgment depends on scope “the proceedings remand . . . .” Id. The board’s appeal- decision is an able final only when a judgment ministerial proceeding necessary is on remand, whereas the board’s decision is not a final judgment when the proceeding remand requires independent the exercise of judgment taking by additional evidence the commissioner. Id. The Cleveland v. in Printing U.S. following year, Ink, Inc., 218 Conn. 181, 184, 588 A.2d 194 we (1991), 15 reaching Matey only appeal In our conclusion in that an from a final judgment permitted Repasi lb, simply given § is under 31-30 we took as a that governing requiring judgment appellate had established the law a final subject jurisdiction compensation appeals. Matey matter in workers’ See of Dember, supra, Estate 210 Conn. 629-30. ... that, 31-30lb § the claim “because considered from must appealed that the decision nowhere states required a order for final, be final decision not [is] party] appeal decision of the We [a] [board].” [a final “is rejected claim, that a concluding jurisdictional prerequisite appeal” to an under 31-§ a 301b.Id. years Co., in Hall v. & Bennett later, Mfg.

Six Gilbert we were asked to “overrule supra, again previous require 31-301b to interpreting § [cases] by may the board such a decision final decision before claim that overrule those appealed.” we should cases, injury fund, raised second prior by which was 31-301b, fact text of predicated § on the that the 52-263,17 4-18316and unlike that of General Statutes §§ Id., prerequisite. does not contain such a 294-95. prior We the fund’s invitation to overrule our declined requiring judg- law 31-30 as interpreting § case lb “the text of doing so, acknowledged ment. requiring not contain language 31-301b does § party in order for a to the Id., observed, however, Court.” 295. We legisla- history tive of 31-30lb contained evidence indicating by appeals an intent to allow under 31- legislature 4-183, governs appeals which under General Statutes the Uniform person Act, provides part: “(a) A in relevant who Administrative Procedure agency within the has exhausted all administrative remedies available Court, Superior aggrieved by may appeal who is a final decision provided in ...” this section. 52-263, governs appeals from General Statutes decisions of Court, any Superior provides: “Upon matters of fact cause the trial of all jury, Court, any Superior in the court or or or action whether to the before proceeding jurisdiction judge thereof when the action or is vested court, him, party judge aggrieved if decision of the or either any question trial, upon questions arising including of law in the or verdict, may appeal having of a motion to set aside a he court denial judge, jurisdiction judgment of or of such from from the final the court or granting verdict, except to set aside the decision the court motion appeals cases, appealable, provided not be in small claims which shall in sections 8-8 and 8-9.” only

301b from final judgments Id., of the board. 295-96. In resolving legislative posed by issue of intent injury second claim, primarily fund’s we relied on two separate but principles, namely, related the doctrine of stare statutory decisis and the tenet of interpretation that counsels against overruling case law our involving reasonably construction of a statute if the legislature may acquiesced be deemed to have in that construction. id., See 296-97. Specifically, explained: we “The doc- trine of stare decisis counsels that a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent inescapable require reasons and . . . logic it. Stare justified decisis is because it allows predictability conduct, promotes it ordering necessary perception relatively that the law is it unchanging, saves judicial resources and promotes efficiency. it ... It is important application theory most of a of deci- consistency in our sionmaking legal culture and it is an. obvious manifestation of the notion that decisionmak- consistency ing itself has normative value. . . . “In the force of stare evaluating decisis, our case law especially dictates that we should be wary of overturn- ing a decision that involves the construction of a statute. . . . When we a statute, plenary construe we act not as lawgivers but as for another surrogates policy maker, legislature. our role as surrogates, [that is] only responsibility is to determine what the legislature, within limits, constitutional intended Sometimes, to do. when we determination, have made such a the legisla- ture instructs us that we have misconstrued its inten- tions. We are bound provided. instructions so . . . often, however, More the legislature takes no fur- clarify ther action to its intentions. Time and again, have characterized the failure of the to take legislature corrective action as manifesting legislature’s acqui- escence in our construction of a statute. . . . an Once appropriate permit interval to legislative reconsidera-

495 action, passed legislative has without corrective tion places signifi- a acquiescence inference of legislative authority to limitation on our own jurisprudential cant . . . of our earlier decision. the merits reconsider construing 31-301b § “The first of our decisions from a decision party appealing that a require Matey decision; from a final must board [see] 631; supra, was rendered of Dember, v. Estate 210 year years Matey and one In two after in 1989. Fairfield, [552], supra, after Szudora comprehensive reform of the a enacted legislature non- Act, only yet Compensation Workers’ [effected Public Acts to 31-301b. See change § substantive 91-339, (P.A. 91-339) (substituting No. § [term] legisla division). board for review review [term] interpre our following failure amend 31-30 1b ture’s which both Matey Szudora, predated of it and tation ade 91-339, provides of P.A. consideration legislative support our disinclination to overrule control quate thereby an amendment precedent and effect ling judicial interpretation. . . . The legislature process presumed interpretation to be aware [that] placed one legislative courts have of its enactments [on] nonaction, may own thereafter, and of the effect that its fund short, presented cogent have. ... has not inescapable logic compel and us to over reasons prior (Cita 31-301b.” interpreting § rule decisions Hall quotation omitted.) tions internal marks omitted; Mfg. Co., supra, v. Gilbert & Conn. 296-98. Bennett have since our years elapsed Almost ten refusal prior precedent importing Hall to overrule our 31-301b, into requirement legisla- statutory ture has taken no action to amend that section. Indeed, the has not amended 31-30lb legislature since court eighteen years passed have require first 31-30lb judgment. construed § legislature In 2003,however, the enacted 1-2z;see opinion; prohibits footnote of this the use of meaning extratextual evidence of the of a statute if the statutory unambiguous text is and does not yield parties absurd or unworkable results. The contend requires § § that 1-2z us to construe 31-30 inlb accor plain unambiguous language. dance with its § further contend that, because 31-30lb does expressly judgment requirement, § not refer to a final 1- prohibits continuing § 2z us from to construe 31-30lb containing requirement. as such a words, other under by parties, § the view advanced 1-2zoverrules our prior precedent importing judgment requirement a final § into 31-301b. acknowledge writing

We that, if we were on a clean might § reading slate, 1-2z foreclose us from judgment requirement § into 31-30lb because the text § requirement. of 31-30lb contains no such For the rea § sons that follow, however, we conclude that 1-2zdoes parties urge. not dictate the result that the previously § As this court has observed, 1-2z was response enacted in to our decision in v. State Courch (2003), esne, 262 537, 577, Conn. 816 A.2d 562 in which “explained part judicial we that, task of statu tory interpretation, we would not follow the so-called plain meaning operates preclude rule, considering court, certain cases, from sources in statutory addition to the text in order to determine its meaning.” quotation (Internal omitted.) marks Com Rights Opportunities mission on Human & v. Board Education, n.20, 686-87 855A.2d 212 of (2005). Specifically, legislatively § 1-2z “has overruled part of Courchesne in which we stated that require showing linguistic would not a threshold of ambiguity precondition as a to consideration [extra- meaning legislative language textual] sources of the (Internal quotation omitted.) Kinsey . . . .” marks Co., n.7, Ins. Employers Pacific by The issue raised A.2d 959 also 1-2z, legislature enactment whether, § its or, 31-30 interpreting § law our case overruled lb— we deter statutory provision matter, any other — if differs interpretation §of 31-301b prior our mine that under the provision of that interpretation from therefore, we must essence, 1-2z.18In § rule of meaning we are lb, 1-2z to 31-30 whether, applying § decide prior construction considering our barred from 31-301b. meaning on the depends issue Our resolution of this course, meaning in ascertaining of 1-2z itself. Of case, present we must applies 1-2z as it we just of 1-2z as we would if were § follow the dictates to any statute. We therefore turn the construing other 1-2z, which, purposes ascertaining of for of language § itself, us first to consider of 1-2z directs meaning § We relationship and to other statutes.” its “text” “its may meaning of the of look no further for evidence if, considering 1-2z its text and its examining after § of relationship statutes, meaning to other such text not or plain unambiguous yield is and does absurd § results. General Statutes 1-2z. unworkable term in 1- to the of the “text” § respect With meaning question is whether “text” means the 2z,19the essential prior to our con- regard words of the statute without words, or whether “text” includes struction of those statutory judicial interpretation of the lan- prior that meaning generally applied plain Although rule court before arguably though Courchesne, not so even the rule we sometimes did do fact, statutory provision applicable at issue. In we did not to the any construing expressly apply prior It § 31-301b. the rule in of cases therefore, interpretation particular surprising, of a is not that this court’s might yield prior statutory provision a one result to Courchesne and different § result under 1-2z. any statutory provisions § is We to which 1-2z related are not aware of present meaning purposes light §of 1-2zfor of case. that shed on the guage. if, Of course, purposes of 1-2z, the term § only “text” refers to the words statute present case, construed —in the § 31-301b—without prior to our construction regard statutory provi of the sion, then we prohibited are from considering such prior provision construction of the in ascertaining its meaning. explained, As we have case, that language may of 31-30lb dictate a result that is con trary prior to our interpretation provision requires 31-301b a precondition however, an from the board’s If, decision. term “text” refers to the words the statute as we previously have them, construed then 1-2z does not purport to overrule our law case 31-30lb. construing §

Because the word “text” is not defined statutorily, turn to General Statutes 1-1 (a), provides part: in relevant “In the construction statutes, of the words phrases shall be construed according commonly approved . . .” usage language . To commonly ascertain that approved we look usage, dictionary Stone-Krete definition term. E.g., Construction, v. Eder, Inc. 280 Conn. 672, 678, 911 A.2d The word “text” defined as “the generally body main printed or written matter . . . .” page Dictionary. Webster’s Third New International The defi nition of the term “text” question does not answer the of whether, purposes 1-2z, of that term means § of previously words the statute as construed or whether statutory it means the wording any without reliance on prior judicial of construction that In other language. words, plain the term “text” not unambiguous is and respect statutory with to the issue of construction by appeal. Consequently, raised may we consult extratextual sources to ascertain the of 1- meaning § 2z, its history. It is including legislative evident from that history by that the legislature, virtue of its enactment of prior interpretation to overrule our 1-2z,did not intend including 31-301b. statutory provision, other passed response was in indicated, 1-2z As we have major Courchesne, in which a in to this court’s decision in favor meaning rule ity rejected of this court all courts, “in that directs interpretive of an framework bearing evidence cases, all of the relevant to consider without statute],” language of the meaning [of ambigu of linguistic the threshold having first cross Courchesne, supra, ity. in State (Emphasis original.) release of our decision Shortly 262 Conn. 575. after the Representatives however, in the House Courchesne, “An unanimously House Bill No. entitled passed Statutory which subse Interpretation,” Concerning Act Representa 1-2z. quently at was enacted codified on the Stone, Jr., who introduced the bill tive John E. relatively simple House, as “a floor of the described it decision response Supreme ... in Court proposal . common rejected in . . ... which the [the] [c]ourt . . rule . .” 46 H.R. principle plain meaning law of the Sess., p. Representative 3325. Robert Proc., Pt. in bill, spoke Farr, proponents one of the chief “to explained purpose favor of the bill and that its it to what was before restore the law Connecticut Court Supreme the recent Courchesne].” [decision p. Representative Ward, Robert M. another Id., 3326. bill, bill that is before proponent added: “[T]his law, say I would us, hope becomes a [the] instance, in the first read the must, language courtfs] it mean apply regular we wrote with its normal . . art, apply If words . the usual there are ing. instance, art, to those words of but the first meaning what ... have as long words said [the mean] it or language ambiguous. isn’t contradicted other clearly responsibility it ambiguous, When it is interpret that and often the court ambiguity the court to . legislative . . a review of what said as resort[s]

history, what was said on the floor of this House of Representatives, what’s said on the of floor the Senate times, at . . . even what was said in committee.

“That won’t change bill, put under this but it will us back standard that . . .” Id., before . [existed] pp. 3332—33.

Senator Andrew J. McDonald introduced the bill on the floor the explained of Senate and its purpose as “Historically, follows: the courts of Con [s]tate interpreted [pursuant necticut have our statutes sev to] statutory eral rules of construction. . . . [O]ne prime rules [among something [p]lain called the them] [m]eaning [r]ule.

“And going great without into detail [p]lain about the essentially it if [m]eaning [r]ule, says that a statute is face, on its clear and unambiguous, and interpreting it in light of that clear and unambiguous language [it] yield would not absurd or results, unworkable permitted beyond courts are not to look the language purposes the statute itself for of determining what our legislative intent was . . adopting . legislation. “In . the Courchesne . . decision, Supreme Court in a five ruling to two retrenched from that tradi- statutory tional rule in doing so, construction and essentially every the court indicated that in instance, it was obligation ... of a court ... to look to adoption broader context surrounding particular Proc., S. legislation.” Pt. Sess., pp. 3190-91. Senator McDonald further stated: “[I]n actually pass case this bill does ... very let me be purposes intent, clear if legislative bill it is passes, legislature] the intent to overrule [of portion or recanted [Courchesne] [p]lain retrenched from the [m]eaning under the [r]ule statutory Id., rules of construction.” p. 3193. Senator McKinney John that, by observed adopting House Bill

501 plain is back the “saying bring No. the legislature Id., p. . . .” rule . 3222. meaning history legislative It clear from this that perfectly is 1-2z enacting § purpose legislature the sole existed was to restore rule that had meaning to Courchesne. legislative There in the prior nothing is also intended to history to that the suggest legislature prior to courts, other case in which our every overrule in a interpreted had a statute passage 1-2z, of § rule, plain meaning with the manner inconsistent to unwilling is articulated in 1-2z. We are § that rule impute sweeping purpose such a legislature purpose. evidence of that convincing the absence of history nor the language legislative Because neither we conclude that provides evidence, of 1-2z such § law prior importing 1-2z does not overrule our case § requirement a final into 31-301b. judgment §

III finally that, claim even if 1-2z does not parties precedent judgment a final importing overrule 1b, into nevertheless should do requirement § 31-30 we require parties so. The contend the final 31-301b, support language ment finds no requirement apply it a difficult and that frequently is reasons militate in favor of its abandonm policy sound parties’ invitation to revisit our ent.20 We decline the requirement incorporating case law into 31-301b. consistently explained, court has

As we have cases, declined to overrule our which date back example, permitting contend that an immediate For dispute, compensability, key is the issue in on the issue often goal Compensation Act “to facilitate most consistent with the of the Workers’ inexpensive disposition speedy, of matters covered efficient [the] quotation Stamford, (Internal omitted.) act marks Del Toro 532, 541, A.2d 95 that have require construed 31-30 1b to a final judg Moreover, ment. in Hall v. Gilbert & Mfg. Co., Bennett supra, 297-98, expressly relied that, despite ample fact do opportunity so, legisla ture had taken no action to interpretation correct our sure, have, ques §of 31-301b. To be “we occasion, tioned the use of the as a legislative acquiescence rule by tool which to divine ... legislative intent in cases which, particular in our following issue, decision on a the has legislature had insufficient time to respond again before we are called to consider the same or [on] sufficiently a related (Citation omitted; issue.” internal quotation marks Desena v. 249 omitted.) Waterbury, n.22, 731 733 case, A.2d This how ever, is not such a case. We find highly significant it the has failed to in legislature act the eighteen years since this court first concluded that 31-30lb judgment requirement. that, contains The in fact Hall, expressly we relied on the legislative acquiescence in rejecting rule a claim identical the claim in the present case also is highly significant. Indeed, in view on the acquiescence reliance legislative rule and approximately Hall the fact that ten years more passed any have since our decision in Hall without by corrective action do how legislature, we not see reasonably we could today, decline follow that rule any sum, if it is to retain force all. In it at is the legisla ture, court, and not this that is best suited to entertain argument of the and appeals amici that under 31-301b not should be limited to final judgments board.21 that, acknowledge part opinion, We for the set forth in II of reasons this finality requirement imposed by 31-301b, that has been under first by court, fairly may resting then Court and be described as interpretative underpinnings. Nonetheless, on dubious this court’s consistent long-standing application requirement, specific of the in the even face of it, requests history legislative to abandon has been followed silence. This compellingly legislative acquiescence. counsels in favor of an inference of cannot, however, say legislature We with confidence that has also impose requirement aware we been of how came to the final is affirmed. Appellate Court justices concurred. the other opinion

In this KATZ,J., joins, concurring. whom BORDEN, J., with majority opinion. join well reasoned with and agree I briefly points. two to underscore separately write I notes, General opinion aptly First, majority as to over by the legislature 1-2z was enacted Statutes § Courch decision State part rule that of this court’s 567-78, (2003), 816 A.2d esne, judicial task that, part which we stated follow the statutory interpretation, would not showing threshold rule, required meaning to consideration precondition as a ambiguity linguistic legislative meaning sources of the of extratextual 1-2z, barred this legislature the language. enacting § sources, such as leg consulting from extratextual court that the history, and until determine islative unless and related language based on its ambiguous statute is statutory language. 1-2z, in felt legislature, enacting §

It is that the ironic history the of that necessary put legislative it to into in it to overrule our decision section that intended majority notes, Andrew J. As the Senator Courchesne. very pur me for the McDonald stated: clear “[L]et intent, ... is the intent poses it legislative [of portion the of State legislature] the to overrule which recanted [supra, Courchesne 262 567-78] [p]lain under [m]eaning or retrenched from the [r]ule statutory Proc., 10, 46 S. Pt. construction”; rules of plain statutory language 31-301b, in and based under contradiction practice. Furthermore, originally nonjurisdictional appellate all rules of parties case, represent amici in all facets of the workers’ of the and who reject compensation spectnim, urged the final have us to reconsider plain judgment requirement language favor of the of 31-301b. Under in circumstances, however, legislature to we are constrained defer proper by parties arguments advanced and amici. as the forum Sess., p. 3193; John McKinney and Senator stated that the legislature bring back the saying plain meaning “[is] . .” Id., p. rule . . also 3222; Proc., 10, see 46 H.R. Pt. Sess., p. Representative remarks of John E. Stone, Jr. Bill House No. entitled (introducing “An Act Concerning Statutory Interpretation,” describing relatively it as “a simple proposal response ... in to a Supreme Court ... decision in the . . . rejected law plain common of the principle [c]ourt [the] rule”); Proc., meaning supra, p. 3326, H.R. remarks of Representative Farr purpose Robert (explaining of bill “to law restore the Connecticut what Supreme it was before the recent Court [decision Courchesne]”). irony An additional is that we have been 1-2z forced to conclude that itself ambiguous order history to consult its legislative so as to determine meaning applied present its case.1 point wish second that I is that, underscore majority as the aptly notes, also all the case, amici curiae in the present represent parts who all compensation the workers’ spectrum, have urged us to return to the language General SI- Statutes § SO Furthermore, majority opinion lb. makes clear how jurisprudentially fragile underpinning rule compensation is in workers’ respectfully context. I therefore, that now is urge, time for the interested groups legislature question revisit the of whether a final should subject jurisdictional be a matter requisite an appeal from the workers’ compensation review board. only way definitively Indeed, the know that 1-2z was intended by consulting history. legislative to overrule Courchesne is its

Case Details

Case Name: Hummel v. Marten Transports, Ltd.

Court Name: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Date Published: May 22, 2007

Citation: 923 A.2d 657

Docket Number: 17494, 17496

Court Abbreviation: Conn.