Von Kohorn v. Von Kohorn, 132 Conn. App. 709

The parties married in 1979 and raised four children who are now adults.
The plaintiff operates a successful investment advisory firm; the defendant did not work outside the home.
A dissolution judgment in May 2010 included a lifetime alimony award: 25% of gross income up to $1 million, and 20% of gross income from $1 million to $2 million, with any income over $2 million free from alimony.
On June 15, 2010, plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion to reargue and for clarification, arguing the alimony termination provisions upon cohabitation or remarriage were omitted and should be clarified; he did not seek a change in duration.
By July 13, 2010, the court issued an order clarifying cohabitation/remarriage termination but also added that alimony would terminate eight years from the judgment, effectively modifying the duration.
The defendant appealed, contending the court abused its discretion by sua sponte modifying the alimony term and that the record did not support an eight-year limit.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the court abuse its discretion by sua sponte modifying alimony duration?	Von Kohorn argues no change in duration was requested; modification was beyond the motion's scope.	Von Kohorn contends the court correctly clarified and inadvertently omitted standard termination events, implying a permissible modification.	Yes; the modification to eight years was an abuse of discretion.
Was the record adequate to support an eight-year alimony term?	Record supports standard clarifications and termination upon cohabitation/remarriage; duration issue was not raised.	Eight-year term was appropriate or at least adequately supported by the record as clarified.	Not reached; court reversed for sua sponte modification, rendering this consideration moot.

Clark v. Clark, 13 A.3d 682 (Conn. App. 2011) (deference to trial court in domestic relations; abuse of discretion standard)
Richards v. Richards, 829 A.2d 60 (2003) (opening or setting aside judgments; four-month limit)
Mickey v. Mickey, 974 A.2d 641 (2009) (clarification vs. modification; proper scope of motions)
Jaser v. Jaser, 655 A.2d 790 (1995) (mosaic doctrine; remand when multiple financial orders are altered)
Standish v. Standish, 670 A.2d 1330 (1996) (mosaic doctrine; remand when financial orders are interdependent)
Casey v. Casey, 844 A.2d 250 (2004) (severability of financial orders; remand for reconsideration where appropriate)
Smith v. Smith, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999) (severability of orders; interdependence of financial awards)