40 Conn. App. 298
Conn. App. Ct.
1996
SPALLONE, J.

In this marital dissolution action, the plaintiff appeals from certain financial awards by the trial court. The plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly (1) modified its orders in an amended memorandum of deсision in response to a motion for articulation, (2) exercised its discretion in making an order of prоperty distribution, and (3) vacated an order requiring the maintenance of life insurance by the defendant for the benefit of the plaintiff.

On September 19,1994, after a full trial of the dissolution action, the court entered an order of dissolution as well as certain financial orders. The financial orders included the follоwing: that the marital home be sold, that ‍​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‍the plaintiff sign a joint tax return for 1991, that the plaintiff retain certain gifts of stоck and the interest in a home in Pine Orchard, Connecticut, that the defendant retain certain antique furniture, china and silver, *300that the defendant pay certain alimony, that the defendant maintain the plaintiff on his health insurance for three years, that the defendant maintain life insurance with the plaintiff as primary irrevocable beneficiary, that certain automobiles be sold, and that legal expenses be bornе by the respective parties. On October 7, 1994, the plaintiff filed an appeal of the judgment as well as a motion for articulation. On December 8, 1994, the court held a hearing on the motion for articulation. No testimony was heard and no new evidence was either elicited or entered into the recоrd.

The court issued an amended memorandum of decision on December 14, 1994, and rendered a judgment therеon on December 19,1994. The amended memorandum of decision and judgment vacated, modified and amеnded certain of the trial court’s original orders, including financial orders. The trial court’s judgment, inter alia, vacated the original alimony orders and entered a new alimony order that altered the proрerty distribution, ordered that the plaintiff make all payments on the first mortgage and vacated an ordеr that the defendant maintain a life insurance policy for the ‍​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‍benefit of the plaintiff. The court stated: “[T]his court feels that in order to effectuate justice as to be equitable to the parties it must cоrrect certain omissions from the Memorandum of September 19, 1994, and modify or vacate certain of its orders. ” At the time of the court’s decision, however, there was neither a motion for modification before the court, nor a showing or a finding by the court of a substantial change in circumstances. The amended memorandum of decision and the judgment thereon were issued solely in response to the motion for articulation.

On December 27, 1994, the plaintiff filed with this court a motion for review of the trial court’s decisiоn on the motion for articulation. The court granted the motion for review on February 8, 1995, but denied the *301reliеf requested. In addition, the court sua sponte ordered that an amended appeal could be filed including claims arising ‍​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‍from the judgment and modification of December 19, 1994. The plaintiff filed an amended aрpeal on February 28, 1995.

A motion for articulation “is not an opportunity for a trial court to substitute a nеw decision . . . [for] a prior decision.” Koper v. Koper, 17 Conn. App. 480, 484, 553 A.2d 1162 (1989). A substantial change in circumstances is required to justify the modificatiоn of a final judgment of dissolution. General Statutes § 46b-86. Because the only motion before the court was a motion for ‍​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‍articulation and because the court failed to make a finding of a substantial changе in circumstances, the trial court’s action vacating, modifying and amending its original dissolution orders was imprоper.

The defendant concedes that the trial court’s decision improperly modified its original decision with respect to alimony, payment of presale home expenses, life insurance аnd the 1991 tax return. The defendant argues, however, that although a remand is required, a new trial is unnecessary. Wе disagree.

Financial orders in a dissolution decree are crafted on the basis of statutory mandаtes and equitable considerations and as such are subject to the balancing of equities, which requires a careful consideration of the effect each order ‍​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‍has on another; the orders are interwoven and interdependent on each other. “The rendering of a judgment in a complicated dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other.” Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz, 2 Conn. App. 416, 424, 479 A.2d 826 (1984); Sunbury v. Sunbury, 210 Conn. 170, 175, 553 A.2d 612 (1989); see also Jaser v. Jaser, 37 Conn. App. 194, 205, 655 A.2d 790 (1995); Tremaine v. Tremaine, 34 Conn. App. 785, 792, 643 A.2d 1291 (1994). We find that the *302trial court’s amended memorandum of decision and the judgment rendered thereоn were improper and “severely impact[ed] the trial court’s original judgment. The singular implication tо be drawn from the trial court’s willingness to modify the judgment is that the judgment was based on an incomplete analysis оf the pertinent facts. . . . The symmetry and harmony of the tiles in the original design were so disturbed by the modification that we must reverse the original judgment and order a new trial.” (Citations omitted.) Jaser v. Jaser, supra, 205.

The judgment is reversed as to all ordеrs except the order dissolving the parties’ marriage and the case is remanded for a new trial on all of the remaining issues.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.