Virginia Caudill v. Janet Conover
881 F.3d 454
6th Cir.2018Background
- Virginia Caudill and Jonathon Goforth jointly robbed, beat to death, and burned Lonetta White; both convicted (murder, robbery, burglary, arson, tampering) and sentenced to death by a Kentucky jury.
- On direct appeal and state postconviction review, Kentucky courts affirmed convictions and rejected Batson and ineffective-assistance claims; Caudill then filed federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
- At voir dire the prosecution used peremptory strikes against eight white males; defense raised a Batson challenge late; prosecutor offered race-neutral reasons and the trial judge sustained the strikes with a brief on-the-record ruling.
- At the penalty phase defense presented seven witnesses (immediate family, a daughter, a prison minister, and Dr. Peter Schilling) who testified to childhood abuse, substance abuse, violent relationships, and psychological testing showing submissiveness and possible brain injury.
- Postconviction investigation produced additional potential witnesses and records (grandmother, neighbors, ex‑boyfriends, social worker, second expert Dr. Allen, mitigation specialist notes) that Caudill argues counsel failed to discover, prepare, or present; she claims prejudice from the omitted, corroborating evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Caudill) | Defendant's Argument (Warden) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court and state courts reasonably rejected Batson challenge to peremptory strikes of white males | Caudill: trial judge’s brief ruling failed Batson’s “sensitive inquiry” at step three; prosecutor’s explanations were pretextual | Warden: prosecutor gave race-neutral reasons (death-penalty views, education, bias, credibility); judge observed voir dire and could credit reasons | Court: Batson claim rejected — state court’s merits decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established law; judge had ample basis to credit prosecutor’s reasons and no Supreme Court rule required more detailed on-the-record findings in that context |
| Whether counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by not calling/locating additional lay witnesses (family, neighbors, ex‑boyfriends, social worker) | Caudill: omitted witnesses and records would have provided vivid, corroborative mitigation (severe childhood violence, weapons, attempts to kill mother, repeated adult abuse) and likely changed at least one juror’s sentence | Warden: existing mitigation testimony and expert covered these themes; additional witnesses would be cumulative; counsel reasonably prioritized family and retained expert testimony; some proposed evidence had potential harms | Court (majority): no Strickland deficiency — counsel’s presentation was reasonable and additional witnesses would have been largely cumulative given existing mitigation; no reasonable probability of different outcome; claim denied |
| Whether counsel was deficient for not calling second expert (Dr. Allen) | Caudill: Allen would have testified to probable cerebral damage supporting mitigation | Warden: Allen’s report contained potentially harmful statements (Caudill denied abuse) and provided little advantage; calling him risky | Court: calling Allen was a reasonable strategic decision not taken; majority finds no deficiency; concur/dissent divides on weight |
| Whether omitted mitigation evidence prejudiced sentencing (Strickland prejudice) | Caudill: the new evidence was substantially different, corroborative, and powerful (enhancing residual doubt and childhood‑abuse themes) creating reasonable probability at least one juror would choose life | Warden: state’s aggravation evidence (confessions, disposal/burning of body, jailhouse informants, indicia Caudill may be principal) was strong; additional mitigation unlikely to change outcome | Court (majority): no prejudice — even if some evidence was omitted, it would not have realistically changed the jury’s decision given the brutal facts and admissions; concurrence dissents on prejudice, arguing evidence was stronger and noncumulative |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (establishes three-step Batson framework for peremptory challenges)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (sets deficient performance and prejudice standards for ineffective assistance)
- Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (discusses deference under habeas review to trial court factfinding and flexible standards)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (explains AEDPA deference and standard that there must be no reasonable argument counsel satisfied Strickland)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (describes "doubly deferential" review on ineffective-assistance claims in habeas context)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (addresses counsel’s duty to investigate mitigation and prejudice analysis)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (counsel’s failure to investigate readily available mitigation materials can be unreasonable)
- Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4 (finding counsel not deficient where additional family witnesses would be cumulative)
- Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (corroborating, nonself-serving mitigation testimony has special weight)
- Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15 (reminds courts to weigh strength of aggravating evidence against totality of mitigating evidence)