Ventura v. Town of E. Haven
199 A.3d 1
Conn.2019Background
- On Nov. 4, 2006 Officer Jeffrey R. Strand responded to a 911 call about a possible domestic disturbance involving Vladimir Trnka in a vehicle at a McDonald’s parking lot; Strand determined there was no probable cause to arrest.
- Trnka and his passenger could not produce licenses; dispatch could not confirm license status because the DMV system was down. Strand instructed Trnka to leave the truck parked and to take his keys, and drove Trnka home.
- About 56 minutes later Trnka returned, drove the truck and struck the plaintiff, causing severe injuries; subsequent investigation revealed the truck was unregistered, uninsured, and bore misused plates.
- The plaintiff sued the Town of East Haven alleging Strand negligently violated East Haven Police Department Tow Board Rules & Regulations (the “tow rules”) by failing to have the truck towed — claiming paragraph 7 made towing mandatory for motor vehicle violations — and invoked municipal liability under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a).
- The jury found Strand violated a ministerial duty and awarded large damages; the Appellate Court reversed, concluding the tow rules govern tow companies (not officers) and towing is discretionary; the Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification and affirmed the Appellate Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether existence of a ministerial duty under written tow rules is a question for jury or court | Ventura: jury should decide whether Strand’s acts were ministerial or discretionary | Town: interpretation of written rule and whether it creates a ministerial duty is a question of law for the court | Court: question of law; whether a statute/regulation creates a ministerial duty is for the court (plenary review) |
| Whether East Haven tow rules imposed a ministerial duty on officers to tow vehicles for all motor vehicle violations | Ventura: paragraph 7 requiring "all motor vehicle violations are to be towed" imposed a nondiscretionary duty | Town: tow rules are directed to towing companies and expressly reserve officer discretion (paragraph 6); do not bind officers | Court: tow rules regulate tow companies, not officers; paragraph 6 shows officer discretion; no ministerial duty existed |
| Whether testimony (Emerman and others) established an unwritten ministerial policy requiring towing of unregistered vehicles | Ventura: Emerman’s testimony about routine towing and practice supports finding of ministerial duty | Town: Emerman testified decision to tow is discretionary; routine practice does not create a nondiscretionary rule | Court: routine practice or training does not convert discretionary conduct into ministerial duty; testimony insufficient to establish a mandatory rule |
| Whether applying plaintiff’s construction would yield absurd or unworkable consequences | Ventura: rules should be read to protect the public by mandating towing of unregistered vehicles | Town: plaintiff’s reading would force officers to tow for trivial traffic infractions and render paragraph 6 meaningless | Court: plaintiff’s construction would produce absurd results and would nullify paragraph 6; avoid that reading |
Key Cases Cited
- Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623 (Conn. 2000) (background on past language about fact-vs.-law determinations; Court disavowed language suggesting ministerial/discretionary is normally factual)
- Strycharz v. Cady, 323 Conn. 548 (Conn. 2016) (explains that existence of duty is a question of law but factual disputes material to immunity may go to the trier)
- Coley v. Hartford, 312 Conn. 150 (Conn. 2014) (describes discretionary-act immunity and ministerial exception)
- Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161 (Conn. 1988) (affirmed practice of deciding governmental-immunity issues as matters of law)
- Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310 (Conn. 2006) (requires clear statutory or regulatory language to impose a ministerial duty)
- Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147 (Conn. 1982) (recognizes broad discretion in law enforcement and that officers owe no ministerial duty to enforce every motor-vehicle law)
- Bonington v. Westport, 297 Conn. 297 (Conn. 2010) (clarifies ministerial/discretionary analysis and requirement of clear directive)
- Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, 275 Conn. 38 (Conn. 2005) (discusses discretion in supervisory/operational decisions)
- Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607 (Conn. 2006) (reaffirms that governmental immunity is question of existence of duty, a legal determination)
- Kiewlen v. Meriden, 317 Conn. 139 (Conn. 2015) (applies statutory construction principles to municipal rules and regulations)
