Valle Del Sol v. State of Arizona, 709 F.3d 808

SB1070 day-labor provisions criminalize recruitment and transportation of day laborers when traffic is impeded; challenged as First Amendment violation.
Section 5(A) targets occupant solicitation of day laborers; 5(B) targets day-laborers entering a vehicle to work at a different location; both tied to traffic-blocking conduct.
District court granted preliminary injunction; Ninth Circuit affirms.
Court reviews under Central Hudson commercial-speech framework; district court relied on Sorrell to demand stricter tailoring for content-based restrictions.
Arizona’s purpose clause and legislative history indicate a broader immigration/policy aim rather than solely traffic safety; court emphasizes risk of content-based suppression of speech.
Record shows less-restrictive alternatives exist to address traffic safety without restricting speech.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether day-labor provisions are content-based commercial-speech restrictions	Plaintiffs (Day laborers) argue restrictions target specific speech	Arizona contends restrictions advance traffic safety	Yes; they are content-based restrictions on commercial speech
Whether the government has a substantial interest in traffic safety	Traffic-safety interest is exaggerated to justify speech targeting	Traffic safety is a substantial government interest	Yes; substantial interest satisfied
Whether the restrictions directly advance traffic safety	Restrictions do not directly advance traffic safety; overbroad/underinclusive	Restrictions directly advance safety by curbing blocking/impeding behaviors	No; district court's direct-advancement finding affirmed only for likelihood of success, but analysis finds overbroad/underinclusive issues
Whether the restrictions are narrowly tailored and not more extensive than necessary	Provisions are overinclusive and underinclusive; less-restrictive options exist	Provisions are tailored to day-labor speech	No; plaintiffs likely to succeed on merits; injunction upheld for first amendment grounds
Whether the preliminary injunction was appropriate given First Amendment claims	Injunction protects ongoing speech interests	Injunction would undo traffic-safety measures	Affirmed; injunction maintained

Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Hum. Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (U.S. 1973) (legality requirement focuses on content of speech proposing a transaction)
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (U.S. 1980) (test for restrictions on commercial speech)
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (U.S. 1976) (commercial speech protected but with lesser scrutiny)
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (U.S. 1992) (categorical exclusions depend on content, not mere viewpoint)
World Wide Rush, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 606 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2010) (four-prong Central Hudson framework applied to in-street speech)
Redondo Beach v. Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011) (time/place/manner framework; overinclusivity with less-restrictive alternatives)
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (U.S. 1981) (recognizes traffic/safety as substantial interest; tailoring considerations)
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (U.S. 1994) (framework for time/place/manner/Narrow tailoring considerations)
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (U.S. 1986) (introductory discussion on regulation for secondary effects)
Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (U.S. 1989) (narrow tailoring for commercial speech)
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (U.S. 2000) (context of speech restrictions for public safety)