2020 CO 58
Colo.2020Background
- Sullivan committed a lengthy crime spree (car thefts, carjackings, burglary, armed assaults) and was charged with 42 offenses; he pled guilty to 40 counts pursuant to a plea agreement.
- The plea agreement stipulated an aggregate sentencing range of 70–85 years; the district court sentenced Sullivan to 77 years (within the agreed range).
- At sentencing the court misstated the statutory range for count 15 (aggravated motor vehicle theft) as a class 3 felony range (3–12 years) instead of the correct class 4 range (2–6 years); nobody caught the error.
- Sullivan appealed, arguing the court’s misstatement produced a higher term on count 15 (4 years) than the court would have imposed had it known the correct range.
- The Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal under the plea proviso (§ 18-1-409(1)) as barring challenges to a sentence within a stipulated range; the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, remanding for merits consideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sullivan) | Defendant's Argument (People) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the plea proviso in § 18-1-409(1) bars nonconstitutional challenges to the manner in which a sentence was imposed when the sentence falls within the plea-agreement range | The phrase "propriety of the sentence" does not include the manner in which the sentence was imposed; appeals challenging sentencing procedure, accuracy, or sufficiency of information are allowed even when the sentence is within the stipulated range | "Propriety of the sentence" should be read broadly to include both the substantive sentence and the sentencing proceeding; the proviso therefore bars such nonconstitutional procedural challenges when the sentence is within the agreed range | Reversed court of appeals: plea proviso does not bar appeals challenging the manner in which a sentence was imposed (including sufficiency/accuracy of information); Malacara controls; Bloom and Lassek are overruled |
| Whether the defendant must instead pursue postconviction relief (Crim. P. 35) rather than direct appeal for sentencing-proceeding errors after a stipulated-range plea | Direct appeal is available for nonconstitutional sentencing-proceeding errors that affected the imposed sentence | The appropriate remedy for such errors is postconviction relief (e.g., Rule 35), not direct appeal | Majority: direct appeal is available; remand to court of appeals to consider merits. Dissent: Rule 35(b)/(c)(2) would be the proper path and the statute bars the appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Malacara, 606 P.2d 1300 (Colo. 1980) (interprets § 18-1-409(1) to distinguish the propriety of the sentence from the propriety of the sentencing proceeding)
- Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897 (2018) (U.S. Supreme Court emphasizes need to correct obvious sentencing errors post-plea to preserve legitimacy and fairness)
- Juhl v. People, 172 P.3d 896 (Colo. 2007) (interprets plea proviso and borrows Malacara’s distinction in assessing what falls outside the proviso)
- People v. Lassek, 122 P.3d 1029 (Colo. App. 2005) (held plea proviso bars most sentencing-proceeding challenges; court of appeals decision later overruled)
- People v. Bloom, 251 P.3d 482 (Colo. App. 2010) (followed Lassek in treating sentencing-proceeding claims as barred by the proviso; overruled)
- People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723 (Colo. 1999) (addressed a different statutory scheme for death sentences; Supreme Court here distinguishes Dunlap as inapposite)