v. Espinoza, 2020 CO 43

On March 4, 2014 Espinoza set a fire on his mother's apartment balcony; the blaze spread through the building and to a neighboring building. Ten people inside the building escaped but survived.
Espinoza was convicted of 10 counts of attempted first-degree murder (extreme indifference) — one count per identified victim — and received ten consecutive 16-year sentences (total 160 years).
At sentencing the trial court treated each attempted-murder conviction as a "crime of violence" and, relying on § 18-1.3-406(1)(a), imposed consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of the same incident.
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding the ten convictions were supported by identical evidence because they rested on a single act of fire-setting, and thus were not "separate crimes of violence" requiring mandatory consecutive sentences.
The People petitioned for certiorari; the Colorado Supreme Court granted review to decide whether convictions against different victims can be "supported by identical evidence" under § 18-1-408(3) and thus avoid the consecutive-sentence mandate of § 18-1.3-406(1)(a).
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that offenses defined by harm to another person and committed against different victims cannot be proved by identical evidence for purposes of § 18-1-408(3), so mandatory consecutive sentences applied.

Issue	People’s Argument	Espinoza’s Argument	Held
Whether attempted-murder convictions of multiple victims arising from the same incident are "separate crimes of violence" requiring mandatory consecutive sentences under § 18-1.3-406(1)(a) when the underlying act was a single fire-setting.	Crimes against different victims are not "supported by identical evidence" under § 18-1-408(3); thus they qualify as separate crimes of violence and § 18-1.3-406(1)(a) mandates consecutive sentences.	The ten attempted-murder convictions were premised on the same volitional act (single fire-setting) and thus were supported by identical evidence under § 18-1-408(3), so consecutive sentences were not mandated.	Reversed the court of appeals: convictions against different victims cannot be proved by identical evidence under § 18-1-408(3); mandatory consecutive sentences under § 18-1.3-406(1)(a) apply.

Marquez v. People, 311 P.3d 265 (Colo. 2013) (recognizes courts’ inherent sentencing discretion and explains § 18-1.3-406 consecutive-sentence mandate for separate crimes of violence arising from same incident)
Juhl v. People, 172 P.3d 896 (Colo. 2007) (held two convictions against the same victim could be supported by identical evidence where the same act and circumstances established both offenses)
Schneider v. People, 382 P.3d 835 (Colo. 2016) (clarified the identical-evidence inquiry in the context of multiple sexual-assault convictions)
Meads v. People, 78 P.3d 290 (Colo. 2003) (explained that the identical-evidence rule protects defendants from consecutive sentencing when multiple convictions rest on the same evidence)
Anderson v. People, 529 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1974) (interpreted concurrent-sentence provision and found evidence not identical where separate criminal acts were committed against different persons)
Qureshi v. Dist. Court, 727 P.2d 45 (Colo. 1986) (recognized sentencing courts’ inherent authority to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences)
People v. Muckle, 107 P.3d 380 (Colo. App. 2005) (addressed whether separate convictions were based on different acts requiring different evidence)
People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo. App. 2000) (held convictions involving different victims are not supported by identical evidence)