United States v. Zavian Jordan, 952 F.3d 160

Background

DEA investigated Jordan after cooperator Ricky Grant identified Jordan as his heroin supplier; agents recorded a monitored call from Grant to Jordan and obtained warrants to track Jordan’s phone and truck.
On May 11, 2016, a local detective (at DEA request) stopped Jordan for running a red light; during the stop officer found a rubber glove with cocaine, multiple phones, large cash amounts, and a handgun; a drug dog alerted and Jordan admitted possessing cocaine.
Subsequent searches of residences tied to Jordan recovered significant quantities of heroin and cocaine, drug packaging/scales, multiple firearms, and substantial cash.
Jordan was indicted on six counts: drug conspiracy; substantive drug offenses; two § 924(c) counts (one tied to the conspiracy, one to the substantive offense); and one § 922(g) felon-in-possession count.
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence from the traffic stop and to exclude the recorded informant call were denied; a jury convicted Jordan on all counts; district court sentenced him to 420 months (including consecutive mandatory 5-year and 25-year § 924(c) terms).
While appeal was pending Congress enacted the First Step Act, which reduced the mandatory minimum for a second § 924(c) conviction in the same proceeding; Jordan argued it should apply to his pending appeal but the court held it did not.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged in violation of the Fourth Amendment	Jordan: officer unlawfully extended stop ~11 minutes without reasonable suspicion	Government: collective knowledge and preexisting reasonable suspicion justified detention and wait for backup	Held: stop lawful — officer had reasonable suspicion at outset; 11-minute wait for backup reasonable
Whether admission of portions of informant Ricky Grant’s recorded call violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause	Jordan: Grant’s out-of-court statements are testimonial hearsay and Grant did not testify	Government: Grant’s statements were admitted only for context (not for truth) and thus do not implicate Crawford	Held: admission permissible for context; no Confrontation Clause violation
Whether two § 924(c) convictions must merge because they could rest on a single gun/use	Jordan: multiple consecutive § 924(c) sentences permitted only for distinct firearm uses	Government: convictions were tied to distinct predicate offenses (conspiracy and substantive offense)	Held: under Fourth Circuit precedent (Khan) separate § 924(c) sentences allowed where based on different, non-duplicative predicate offenses
Whether § 403 of the First Step Act applies retroactively to benefit Jordan’s second § 924(c) sentence	Jordan: sentence not "imposed" for § 403(b) purposes until it is final on direct review, so First Step Act should reduce his mandatory minimum	Government: sentence was "imposed" when the district court entered it, so § 403(b) does not apply	Held: sentence was imposed at district-court sentencing; First Step Act § 403(b) does not retroactively apply to Jordan’s case

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir.) (multiple § 924(c) sentences allowed when based on separate, non-duplicative predicate offenses)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial out-of-court statements absent prior cross-examination)
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) (traffic stop may not be prolonged beyond mission without reasonable suspicion)
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (reasonable suspicion is an objective, particularized basis for detention)
United States v. Wills, 346 F.3d 476 (4th Cir.) (informant statements admissible for context without violating Confrontation Clause)
United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480 (4th Cir.) (collective/constructive knowledge doctrine imputes investigating officers’ knowledge to the stopping officer)
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) (prior interpretation of § 924(c) requiring consecutive penalties for multiple convictions)
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (canon that differing statutory language implies differing congressional intent)