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United States v. Khan
461 F.3d 477
4th Cir.
2006
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*1 America, States of United VI. Plaintiff-Appellant, affirm the foregoing, we light of the of motion v. denial Sudan’s court’s district jurisdic- subject matter for lack dismiss Abdur-Raheem, Hammad of Sudan’s the remainder and dismiss tion Defendant-Appellee. jurisdiction. appellate for lack of appeal 04- 04-4519 No. 04-4520 No. Nos. AND IN PART DIS- AFFIRMED No. No. 05-4818 05-4811 IN PART. MISSED No. 05-4893. of Appeals, States Court

Fourth Circuit. Argued: May 2006. Sept. Decided: America, STATES of UNITED

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. KHAN, Defendant-

Masoud Ahmad

Appellant. America,

United States

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. Chapman, Defendant-

Seifullah

Appellant. America,

United States

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. Abdur-Raheem, Defendant-

Hammad

Appellant. America,

United States

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. Khan, Ahmad Defendant-

Masoud

Appellant. America,

United States

Plaintiff-Appellee, Chapman, Defendant-

Seifullah

Appellant.

ARGUED: John Kenneth Zwerling, Zwerling, P.C., Leibig Moseley, & Alexan- dria, Virginia; Jonathan Shapiro, Alexan- dria, Virginia; Cummings, William B. Al- exandria, Virginia, for Appellants. Gordon Kromberg, Dean Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States At- Alexandria, torney, Virginia, Appellee. ON BRIEF: McNulty, Paul J. United Alexandria, and Virginia, procedural history scribe the facts Attorney, States applicable to all of defen- generally Appellee. Facts to each specific dants. defendant DUNCAN, and Before WIDENER in the will be set forth discussion of the R. Judges, and JOSEPH Circuit arguments of each. GOODWIN, Judge District United States Virginia, for the Southern District of West I. sitting by designation. 11, 2001, September and Between 1999 Khan, Chapman in and Hammad attended part; part in remanded Affirmed Judge Duncan wrote published opinion. Arqam al Islamic in Dar Center Falls Judge in majority opinion, (“Timi- which Church, Virginia where Ali Timimi Judge a joined. Goodwin wrote Widener mi”), lecturer, spoke of the ne- primary part in concurring separate opinion cessity jihad1 against engage violent part. dissenting of time” the enemies Islam and the “end Muslims and non-Muslims. battle between OPINION attendees, Chap- including of the Several DUNCAN, Judge: Circuit Hammad, organized group man and (“Khan”), ji- Khan Sei- engage Defendants Masoud preparation activities (“Chapman”), and Ham- Chapman fullah had. (“Hammad”) appeal mad Abdur-Raheem spring members a bench trial after their convictions through combat group began simulating conspiracy related

various counts firing at practices exercises2 paintball against conflict United wage armed summer, the ranges. By early group wage armed conspiracy to and a every Chapman, other weekend. meeting country with whom conflict Hammad, style brought AK-47 others peace. Khan States is prac- training and also paintball rifles to portions those appeal also marksmanship. were re- ticed Members multiple viola- sentences related their three rules: don’t tell quired to follow 924(c). The govern- tions of 18 U.S.C. *7 anyone, and invoke the anyone, bring don’t de- cross-appeals the district court’s ment self-in- right against Fifth Amendment significantly Hammad cision to sentence by police. questioned if the crimination by the Sen- range the recommended below tencing Guidelines. had Chapman Hammad and Because they assisted in military experience, prior below, we explained

For the reasons conducting and paintball the drills leading of defen- convictions all three affirm the eventually took training. Chapman and the as as sentences of Khan well dants intensity. However, Ham- the drills’ we reverse over increased Chapman. and and re- unreasonable mad’s sentence as that members Chapman group told the to district court for re-sentenc- mand to enforced fight; to learn he going were ing. physical training imposed Draconian and infractions rules for punishment complex lengthy of the

Because case, recreational initially de- were out-of-character we background of this military game is that simulates holy 2. Paintball undertaken as a sacred Jihad is “a war try players one team combat in which Unabridged duty by Webster’s Muslims.” players opposing team on the eliminate ed.2001). (2nd. Dictionary 1029 dye capsules shooting of water-soluble air rifles. powered them from paint-ball pastime. example, being purchase For over the internet a wireless video push in neutral made to a car was module and a in an control module for use punishment meted out tardiness. The (“UAV”). unmanned aerial Singh vehicle skills, group also learned combat such as an system selected video airborne with a attack, helicopter ap- how to avoid a camera and transmitter able to transmit pear pur- inconsistent with recreational images video from a UAV back to a receiv- suit. er from as far 15 miles away. had Lash- group Members ties to military video camera could be used in (“LET”), military wing kar-e-Taiba helping artillery reconnaissance and in aim organization initially Pakistani founded weaponry other across enemy lines. jihad against to conduct in Af- Russians placed Singh his from England, order but ghanistan. 2003, LET Between 1999 and vendor unable confirm the over- primarily focused on from expelling India Chapman seas credit card. and Khan as- through Kashmir. Both its website and Singh completing sisted purchases. through means, other LET proclaimed its 2002, In Singh the summer of visited Vir- in a number involvement ginia, staying first with and then acts, particularly against violent India. with Khan. addition, In LET that it provid- advertised jihad ed training camps free in Pakistan. 11, The terrorist attacks of September paintball One member of Mr. group, 2001, affected paint- both the focus of the Hamdi, openly go wanting discussed group relationship ball and the of its mem- fight ultimately in Kashmir and as a die Argam bers to the Dar al Islamic Center. martyr combat. Hamdi traveled night, argued That Timimi that the attacks in August Pakistan 2000 and was admitted should be condemned. He was there- camps. there, to the LET While he fired after not invited to lecture at al Dar Ar- positions on Indian in Kashmir. Upon his gam, and the tapes speeches return, rejoined paintball he group However, destroyed. on September informed others mission about LET’S paintball Timimi met group, India, Israel, destroy and the United including Hammad, Khan and at a mem- States. Chapman, ber’s house. still at LET FBI September agents visited camps, was not present. Timimi said Chapman and asked him paint- about the the September justified 11 attacks were ball interview, activities. After this mem- and that it obligatory religious was the group bers of the they discussed whether duty present of those to defend the Tali- light should continue in govern- *8 against ban the troops American that were knowledge They ment’s of their activities. expected Afghanistan to invade in pursuit so, decided to do heightened but with se- Al-Qaeda. of The discussion focused crecy. training at the camps necessary LET Seeking more and fight- intense realistic preparation fight with the Taliban ing experience 2001, in the summer of against the United of States. Several Chapman traveled to the LET camps in members, Khan, including expressed their there, Pakistan. While he participated in intent to train at LET camps and training and fired various hand- rifles and fight Afghanistan in after training their guns, including at least one automatic complete. purposes was For weapon. time, their trav- During that Chapman also el, they agreed met an LET official in Pakistan that Khan would their be 2002, Singh. name of In Singh “emir,” tried or leader. Caliph him. the FBI from told camps LET statement

Khan trained During jihad that training six paintball weeks. that was used approximately different time, through four he traveled that reason the trainees had ac- and training in commando and received camps AK-47-style they rifles quired was reconnaissance, tactics, hand-to-hand com- type weapon used overseas. were He in- bat, skills. received survival and admissions’, Hammad learned of the When including weapons, on and used structions colleague he called a with the “bad news” rifles, guns, machine automatic AK-47 Caliph had “cracked.” rocket-propelled gre- guns, anti-aircraft a investi- government’s As result sentry nades, performed and mines. He Hammad, Khan, and gation, Chapman, tasks for and routine maintenance duty Donald along eight Caliph, with others — time, Khan left During this LET. II, Kwon, Yong Surratt Ki Muhammed least once personal business at camps on Hasan, Khwaja Randall Todd Aatique, shortly thereafter. returned Al-Hamdi, and Royer, Ibrahim Ahmed Sa- a war troops began ground American bri Benkhala —were indicted in June 2003 the Taliban on or October against about concerning conspira- offenses various 2001, 20, mid-November Ameri- By cy military expeditions engage defeating troops were Tali- can and allied against India and the United States. Afghani- throughout northern ban forces 13, 2001, the Taliban stan. On November Surratt, Kwon, Aatique, Hasan all of Ka- Afghan capital withdrew from the cooperated pleaded guilty before trial and bul, with the United and forces allied government. with the As result their By city. No- took control of assistance, superseding indictment was had retreated to Taliban forces vember remaining seven de- against returned 2001, while at In November Kandahar. 2003.3 Because of September fendants through camp, Khan radio LET learned Taliban, attempts to with the fight quickly forces that American were reports charged conspiracy Khan was with defeating Afghanistan. the Taliban States, a con- levy war Further, that Pakistan had he learned to Al- spiracy to provide material Afghanistan and its border with closed Qaeda, conspiracy and a contribute ser- his travel LET not facilitate would Neither vices to the Taliban. Moreover, Pakistani authorities there. these con- charged nor Hammad foreigners aggressively removing spiracies. result, Khan left camps. As a from 2004, Royer and Hamdi January fall ever camps in the without sepa- was tried pleaded guilty. Benkhala Afghanistan. having reached government The rately acquitted. investigation into the government’s Ham- Caliph, Chapman, proceeded against Hammad, Khan, Chapman, activities Hammad mad, Chapman and and Khan. colleagues public their became Feb- trial from to have their severed moved a search warrant was ruary when Khan’s, that would that evidence arguing March at Timimi’s house. On executed *9 preju- against Khan would presented be approached Caliph Abdur the FBI to a trial. The district right dice their fair paintball of (“Caliph”), one Raheem severance. the motion for court denied in with who was tried defendants members Hammad, then moved and Khan Chapman, acquitted, and obtained case and this indictment, every of the in- against count government proceeded count 3. Because the thirty-two applied to each defendant. single dictment in a all seven defendants (18 trial, 960); for which Neutrality § a bench the district court late the Act U.S.C granted.4 (2) conspiracy one count of to contribute LET, support material to and knowing trial, government presented

At it intending that was to be used in prepa- by to the Caliph statements made FBI ration in carrying for and out a conspiracy paintball that the activities were intended training jihad, injure to and that the train- to kill persons foreign be or in a coun- style weapons ees had obtained AK-47 try with which the is at United States type weapon because that was the of used peace 2339A; § in violation of 18 U.S.C. govern- in After the combat overseas. (3) conspiracy and three counts of to use presentation against ment’s of evidence in relation firearms to a crime of violence him, Caliph pursu- for an acquittal moved § in of violation 924. Hammad U.S.C. ant Federal Rule of to Criminal Procedure counts, acquitted was on four but convicted granted 29. The district court mo- (1) following on the three counts: one result, testified, tion. As a Caliph never conspiracy count of to violate the Neutrali- opportunity and co-defendants had no (18 (2) ty 960); § Act U.S.C one of count to cross-examine him concerning his state- conspiracy to contribute material ments. LET, to knowing and intending that it was trial, At the conclusion of the bench to preparation be used in in carry- and court a comprehensive opin- district wrote ing out conspiracy injure per- to kill or detailing ion against the evidence the three foreign sons in a country with which the remaining referencing defendants and peace United is at in States violation of 18 of wealth cumulative evidence record. 2339A; (3) U.S.C. one count of con- Khan was on acquitted four counts and spiracy use in to firearms to a relation (1) following convicted on the eight counts: crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. one count of in conspiracy to enlist armed § 924. The district it court noted that against conflict the United in viola- opinion only included in its fraction 2390; (2) §§ tion U.S.C. one the facts supporting the convictions of conspiracy levy count to war have, time, that it could included four States in violation of 18 U.S.C. many times (3) opinion facts in its in 2384; sup- conspiracy one count of port of its conclusions. contribute services Taliban viola- (4) 1705; tion of 50 U.S.C. one count of appeals Before the initial con these conspiracy to contribute material support briefed, victions were the case re was LET, knowing and that it intending was manded for re-sentencing light of Unit in preparation be used in carry- Booker, 220, 125 ed States v. 543 U.S. S.Ct. ing conspiracy injure out a per- kill or (2005). 160 L.Ed.2d 621 At re-sen in a foreign country sons with which the tencing, the district court chose to sen peace United States is violation of 18 tence Hammad well below the rec range (5) § 2339A; U.S.C. four counts of Guidelines, Sentencing ommended conspiracy to use firearms in relation concluding that Hammad’s sentence should crime violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. be similar to the 924. sentence of Surrat be acquitted was on two counts, cause, but following convicted the district opinion, five court’s Sur- (1) counts: one of conspiracy count to vio- rat and Hammad similarly situated. Caliph denied, separately moved for severance of was but his for a trial motion bench and, alternative, his trial from Khan’s in the granted. for a bench trial. His motion for severance

487 engage or the Khan, Hammad now enlist within United States Chapman, and their and sen- timely appeal convictions subject any place jurisdiction or to the govern- grounds. tences various thereof, (3) with intent to serve armed cross-appeals Hammad’s timely ment hostility against the United States. sentence, arguing that it constitutes an 371, §§ 2390. The ele- U.S.C. essential the recom- variance from unreasonable (1) conspiracy ments of Count Two are Sentencing range. Guidelines mended (2) down, over-throw, put destroy to or to each defendant’s indi- We first address the of the by force Government that, respect to one argument vidual them, States, levy against to war or to or indictment, there or more counts thereof, by authority the or oppose force to his support was insufficient evidence hinder, by prevent, delay force to or the argu- address the conviction. We next States, any execution of law of the United apply that to defendants as ments seize, take, any or possess or force to validity concerning the of their group property contrary of the United States to We conclude and sentences. convictions by addressing government’s cross-ap- authority 2384. thereof. U.S.C. peal. Four are The essential elements of Count (1) (2) willfully or conspiracy to make

II. funds, or any goods, of receive contribution first chal Each of the defendants services, to or for the of the Tali- benefit convictions, they arguing lenges 1705(b); ban. 50 U.S.C. C.F.R. supported by sufficient evidence. § 545.201-545.208. sufficiency we evi When assess of a criminal conviction on direct dence sufficient evidence to There was review, jury must verdict be “[t]he [the] findings guilt court’s support the district evidence, if there is sustained substantial group on all these counts. When taking the view most favorable to Gov meeting discussing go members were ernment, it.” to Glasser v. United Afghanistan to aid the Taliban ing to States, 315 U.S. 62 S.Ct. States, against the United Khan exhorted (1942). argu L.Ed. 680 We address each Afghanistan to with him to go others in turn. ment weak heart- because “the cowards and the J.A,

A. Khan’s Convictions away.” 1013. are the first to run ed fact, did, in to Pakistan to Khan travel camps, and training in the LET engage in Khan that there was argues to that Khan intended there was evidence presented at trial sufficient evidence fight with the Taliban go Afghanistan (1) One, support his convictions for Count training. the United States after against conflict to enlist in armed conspiracy also as the leader of Khan was selected against in violation of 18 the United States All in Pakistan. group they when arrived (2) 371, 2390; Two, §§ Count con U.S.C. di members that Khan led group levy against the United spiracy war en rectly they intended to testified 2384 and violation of U.S.C. (3) Four, hostilities the Unit conspiracy gage contribute armed Count in violation of 50 services to Taliban found their The district court ed States. 1705(b). disagree. U.S.C. We indeed, credible; it was testimony to be evi conclude that this unrebutted. We One, of Count The essential elements (1) (2) Khan, supports finding conspiracy amply dence applied to are *11 One, Two, guilty Khan was of Counts before in training camps, its he cer- was Four.5 tainly it by aware of the time he returned

to them leaving after temporarily because 2. LET camps were full descriptions of Khan argues exploits. next there LET’S violent was con- We therefore insufficient to support evidence his convic clude sufficient evidence intro- Five, tion conspiracy under Count to con duced a rational trier of fact to find the LET, support knowing tribute material to necessary essential elements for Khan’s intending that it was to be in used conviction under Count Five.6 preparation carrying for and in out a con

spiracy injure to kill in persons or a for Chapman’s B. Convictions eign country with which the United States is peace, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1. § 2339A. While he concedes he pro The district court found LET, vided material support to Khan con One, guilty Count conspiracy to violate tests that there was sufficient to evidence Act, Neutrality which makes it a crime he demonstrate that knew that LET was to committing intent on acts of or murder

injury to others. We disagree. knowingly begin[] or on or set[] foot broadly

The evidence reflects that LET provide[] prepare[] or a means for or disseminated goals for, its the destruction money part furnish[ ] the or take[ ] India, America, in, and Israel on any military its web or expedition naval or site and personally elsewhere. Khan was enterprise be to carried from thence acquainted Singh, official, an LET against territory any or dominion of whom he in purchasing assisted paramili- foreign prince state, or any colony, or of tary equipment. district, Even if Khan remained people or with whom the United unaware the nature of LET’S activities is at peace. challenges

5. Khan also hostility, his conviction under Compare but Count did Eleven not. Count One ground, arguing on an additional 924(o). § § 18 U.S.C. 2390 with U.S.C that, him, applied Count Eleven and firearm, required Count Eleven use of a Count One were identical offenses. A defen Compare but Count One did not. 18 U.S.C. cannot, course, dant punished be two 924(o). § 2390 with 18 U.S.C Because crimes that constitute the "same offense." required proof each Count of a fact that the States, 292, 297, Rutledge v. United 517 U.S. not, offense, they did other are not the same (1996). 116 S.Ct. 134 L.Ed.2d 419 "If and the punishing district court did err 'the same act or transaction constitutes a vio separately Khan for each count. statutory provisions, lation of two distinct applied be test to to determine whether there challenges Khan also his convictions under one, only are two offenses or is whether each Eleven, Twenty-Four, Counts Twenty-Five, provision requires proof of a fact which " Twenty-Seven, conspiracy fire- use other does not.’ Id. (quoting Blockburger v. violence, arms in to a relation crime of States, 299, 304, 284 U.S. 52 S.Ct. violation of U.S.C. for each of the (1932)). case, 76 L.Ed. 306 In this Count One four counts discussed above. Khan acknowl- conspiracy entailed a violate U.S.C. edges that he used firearm in relation to by enlisting hostility serve armed Because, above, States, those counts. as discussed the United while Count Eleven there was 924(o), support involved a sufficient violation of 18 evidence U.S.C. counts, conspiracy possess conviction on those use there was suffi- firearms connection with a crime of violence. evidence to Count cient his conviction for required One engage that Khan in armed the related firearms counts. *12 naissance, targeting, and similar weapons court found § 960. The district U.S.C. military assuming furthered Even that “Chapman purposes. [Hammad] that training co-conspirators by conspiracy ongoing training the activities with Chapman’s paintball games through in combat skills as a paintball group qualify the did the weapons, with acquisition of and the 2339A, for conspiracy purposes co-conspirators had knowledge that some pro- that specifically court found district on to Kashmir and fired already traveled equipment to a known viding paramilitary expectation and with the positions, Indian did, agree. certainly LET official and we do the co-conspirators would that other Chapman same, training that using 3. 3212-18. provided.” J.A. and [Hammad] con that, assuming Chapman challenges even Chapman argues jihad training, Twenty possessing a form of paintball was under Count that viction any specific not reveal evidence does in furtherance of a crime of a firearm LET attacks in India. We join 924(c). intent to violence, in of 18 violation U.S.C. evi- The record contains agree. cannot statute, prove guilt In order to under this provide continued to Chapman that dence evi government present needs “to group who to two members support possession that of a indicating dence acknowledged going to Pakistan expressly advanced, furthered, for helped firearm or there. troops Indian while firing of violence. ward” a crime evidence, therefore, supports the Sufficient Cir.2002). Lomax, 293 F.3d and, ac- findings factual district court’s Chapman’s that The district court found conviction. cordingly, conspiracy in Saiga transfer of a .308 rifle to Hamdi 2000, knowing that Hamdi had December 2. fired on Indian camps traveled to LET challenges his con Chapman next engaging paintball in the troops and was conspiracy to Five for viction under Count jihad, “furthered training prepare LET, a terror support material provide Neutrality to violate the conspiracy in of 18 U.S.C. organization, violation ist Because the transfer Act.” J.A. 3229. Chapman’s chal The thrust of 2339A. conspiracy weapon furthered much of the regard is that lenge this Act, district Neutrality violate the upon to government relies evidence the concluded, Chapman’s possession court pre this count his conviction on support Id. conspiracy. furthered the weapon con criminalizing such dates the statute sup underpin- material Conspiracy provide disputes the factual Chapman duct. conclusion, not made a crime ar- to terrorists was port nings of the district court’s date, 26, 2001; until that until October unequivocal “the evidence is guing that only. crime a substantive 2339Awas that January until of 2002 that it was not he had fired on Chapman told Hamdi however, over- Chapman’s argument, Appellants’ in Kashmir.” positions Indian that, Khan, assisted fact like he looks the however, contrary, Br. at 54. To for a UAV with Singh purchasing parts Chapman told that he Hamdi testified designed pri- equipment video surveillance Sep- positions on Indian he had fired use. He marily military and scientific transfer of the prior to the tember of assistance after October this provided was sufficient weapon. This evidence con- equipment was Export 2001. of this court’s conclusion the district law; “Military by its uses as trolled a rifle in furtherance possessed recon- include Aerial Vehicle” Unmanned Act, Neutrality of a a crime he learned that LET engaged violation of the assertion, conflict violence. armed with India.7 This however, Ample is belied the record. *13 evidence demonstrates that Hammad con- tinued to train in people paintball his court found that district group after he learned that some members Chapman guilty Twenty- as to Count group going to work with LET because, again Two in violation fight in the against light India. In 924(c), he used he U.S.C. firearms while overwhelming contrary, evidence to the of, was at the LET in camp furtherance expressly the district court declined to violence, among conspira other crimes of testimony “credit paint- [Hammad’s] cy Neutrality to violate the Act and a strictly physi- ball was for recreation and conspiracy to material provide support to cal fitness.” J.A. 3207. We conclude that LET. Chapman challenges finding, this ar sufficient evidence supports Hammad’s guing that all he did was fire five bullets at knowingly conviction for providing materi- paper target at LET camp and that support al to LET in the form of trained the act nothing any did to further crimes personnel. of violence. There is no merit to this credit, argument. Even if we were to and short, we conclude that sufficient evi- not, theory

we do that firing “only” his five supported dence all convictions for all de- training conspiracy bullets as for the to fendants. Neutrality violate the Act does not consti tute use of a firearm for purposes of III. 924(c), ignores it testimony of Hamdi A. Denial of Motion to Sever and training others about the in and exten Chapman Ham- Defendants sive use of LET camps. firearms argue mad that the district court erred

This evidence amply supports finding denying their motions to their trials sever that Chapman used firearms at the LET They from Khan’s. contend that the evi camp furtherance of conspiracy against dence admitted Khan concerning commit a crime of violence. conspiracies Al-Qaeda to aid and the Taliban, which would not have been admit

C. Hammad’s Conviction against ted Chapman and Hammad in a Hammad was convicted under trial, separate prejudicial was so as conspiring Count Five of ma contribute deny right them their to a fair trial. We terial to LET in violation of 18 disagree. U.S.C. knowingly 2339A because he trained through paintball individuals grant “The or denial of a mo military exercises in techniques for use tion for severance ... is within the trial with LET. argues Hammad that he did court’s discretion and will not be over Instead, knowingly. not do so argues, he turned absent a clear abuse of that discre West, he trained group members of the for re tion.” United States v. 877 F.2d (4th Cir.1989). physical creation and fitness and did not “Generally, 287-88 in train group members of the for LET together after dividuals indicted should be tried challenges 7. Hammad also his conviction un- use firearms in relation to crime of violence 924(o). der Count Chap- One for the same as reasons in violation of 18 U.S.C. Because deny challenge man. We his for the same evidence engaged demonstrates that Hammad See, deny Chapman’s. supra, reasons we among Sec- sale and transfer of AK-47s Finally, challenges conspirators, tion II. B. 2. Hammad we find that sufficient evidence Eleven, conspiracy supports conviction under Count his conviction on this count. Strickland, Rights Trial Jury B. Waiver of together,” United Cir.2001) (internal quo- 368, 384 F.3d having motion Their severance omitted), defendant is “[a] tation denied, been Hammad merely sepa- because entitled to severance moved alternative for a waiver of likely in ac- more result rate trials would trial to Federal jury pursuant Rule the evidence quittal, or because joined Khan Criminal Procedure 23.8 this strong not as is one defendant motion, government agreed the re (internal quotation Id. against the other.” waiver, court the district ulti quested omitted). must “show A defendant instead not, mately granted court did it. The how ruling in order for court’s prejudice *14 ever, jury trial waiver signed obtain a from Con- an abuse of discretion.... constitute opposed the defendants as to their counsel. may it be be sustained if victions should any The court not conduct collo also did [fact the verdicts that inferred from with on the record quy defendants con meticulously sifted the evidence.” finder] cerning the waiver. Porter, 968, 972 v. 821 F.2d United States (4th Cir.1987). now argue The three defendants case, Chapman and Hammad fail In this jury that the trial waiver was invalid be from prejudice resulting to demonstrate cause the- court did not obtain their district ruling. in- court’s The record the district conduct col written waiver or otherwise factfinder, judge, that the shows stead on that loquy the record to determine their against “meticulously sifted evidence” voluntary, and knowing, waiver was intelli all defendants did not demon- See, States, gent. v. e.g., Adams United toward other defen- prejudice strate 269, 277-78, 63 S.Ct. U.S. on the admitted based evidence dants (1942) (noting L.Ed. 268 that a defendant’s with against Chapman charged Khan. was right must be jury compe waiver trial not guilty and found two seven counts this intelligent). tent and review claim We charged seven Hammad was them. Robertson, v. de novo. States United guilty of four of counts and found (10th Cir.1995). 1423, 1430 F.3d was en- Caliph acquitted Defendant them. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure findings, particularized These tirely. 23(a) states that can the fact defendants along with jury in in to a point no instances the record which If the is entitled defendant judge displays trial, to- prejudice by jury the district unless: trial must be defendants, indicate that the defen- ward (1) jury waives a trial defendant fair on received a trial based dants each writing; against properly the evidence admitted (2) consents; and government not on the evidence admitted them and (3) approves. the court co-defendants. therefore their We 23(a). rely Defendants Fed.R.Crim.P. court not abuse hold that the district did cases, notably heavily most United refusing to Chapman sever its discretion (10th Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423 trials from Khan’s. and Hammad’s jury motion, government consent to the waiv- must which filed provided likely joined, result in a Hammad er. A trial would bench and, that, certainly, much trial most [alternatively, request shorter [defendants] [] opportu- sever- [their] court denies renewed would the accused with if this afford motion, permit then the court [them] ance nity trial. a fair receive 23(a), by jury. Rule to waive trial Under J.A. 220-21. Fed.R.Crim.P., and the both accused Cir.1995), sug- in which other circuits have their choice of a non-severed bench trial 23(a) gested presented jury that a Rule waiver over a non-severed trial unknowing or involuntary. inadequate, counsel is absent some oth- showing satisfy er an appellate court short, In the record reflects that actually it knowing, voluntary, defendants’ Rule 23 waivers were know- intelligent. ing, voluntary, intelligent part of their however, In this circuit we have not strategy, trial uphold and we them as val- imposed requirement. such id. Hunt,

States v. 413 F.2d 983 Cir. Validity C. The of Counts 1969), that, we held while it would be Five and Eleven practice” judge “better for a district interrogate a defendant who claims All three defendants contend that through counsel he wants to waive his Counts Five and Eleven are invalid be jury right, trial nothing applicable they cause constitute “conspiracies to con 23(a) law, itself, case Rule or the Constitu spire.” Specifically, Count Five alleged a 984; requires tion it. Id. see also Unit conspiracy provide material *15 Alvarez, States v. U.S.App. ed 1998 LEXIS carrying 956, § out a violation of 18 U.S.C. (4th Cir.) (“We (unpublished) 8788 at *6 which conspiracy criminalizes to kill or have colloquy held that an in-court to injure de persons damage property or in a termine good voluntariness of the waiver is foreign country. alleged Count Eleven a practice, it required by but is not conspiracy to in use firearms connection 23(a).”). Constitution or Rule with a conspiracy to commit a crime of (cid:127) violence. “conspire Because one cannot to case, In find this we that the record conspire,” argue, defendants these Counts supports a conclusion that the waivers should disagree. be dismissed. We voluntary, knowing, were intelligent, even though signed by counsel and in the validity The facial of the statutes under colloquy. absence of a The motions for which the defendants charged pres were waiver here were made the alternative question ents a of law which we review de to the motions severance as a calculat- novo. Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. part ed of the defendants’ trial strategy to Quality Charlottesville Corp., Cable prevent “inflammatory prejudicial (4th 1113, 1123 Cir.1995). evi- F.3d jury. dence” from biasing J.A. 220. Five, Under Count defendants were con- Chapman Defendants and Hammad now to,” victed of “conspirpng] 18 U.S.C. claim that their waiver knowing 2339A(a), was not or § “provide[] support material voluntary aas back door attack on the ... intending that be used ... [it] car- district court’s denial of their motions to ... rying out ... violation of [18 U.S.C. words, sever. In other these defendants 956, turn, J.A. 3220. Section 956].” argue that when the district court denied kill, “[c]onspiracy criminalizes kidnap, sever, their motion to prospect maim, of hav- injure persons or damage or prop- ing jury potentially inflammatory hear erty in a foreign country.” 18 U.S.C. evidence Khan forced them to Eleven, re- 956. Under Count defendants linquish right jury their to a trial. This use, of conspiring carry, convicted argument unpersuasive. is Criminal de- or possess of, a firearm in furtherance frequently fendants must alia, choose from a conspiracy inter to violate the Neu- among less than desirable alternatives. trality Act conspiracy and a to provide The fact that defendants would have pre- services the Taliban. 18 U.S.C. jury 924(c),(o); ferred severed §§ trials does not make J.A. 3223. Both Count Five n Eleven, words, to no or other point ex- dants constitutional in other and Count why these statutes should be struck as reason one serve conspiracy allow pressly invalid, find down as and we none. conspiracy. for another predicate statutory framework is this Nothing about Multiple Firearm Sentences for D. unconstitutional, even unusu- improper, or Multiple Predicate Offenses al. argue Khan and next that one con recognized Courts have that it was error for the district court to an predicate serve spiracy can sepa them for each separately sentence “[overarching] conspiracy other when 924(c) rate offense 18 U.S.C. firearms conspiracy predicate conspiracy and the all to the because those offenses related entirely differ are distinct offenses with episode. prece same criminal Under our v. objectives.” Pungi United States ent dent, argument this fails. (3rd tore, Cir.1990); 910 F.2d Ruggiero, 726 see States v. also United held, previously This court has (2nd Cir.1984) (holding F.2d statute, plain language based on conspiracies predicate can acts serve as of vio separate convictions crimes v. conspiracy); for a RICO United States multiple can lead to under lence sentences Brooklier, 1208, 1216 685 F.2d Cir. 924(c). Luskin, United States 1982) Five, (same). (4th Cir.1991). the con Count F.2d 376-77 “There is 924(c). spiracy provide material no ambiguity section It states represents terrorism a distinct offense person whenever commits a crime of objectives predi from the different drug trafficking violence or crime and uses *16 person. to kill a conspiracy gun, cate or person carries a the shall be sen Eleven, the to or conspiracy prison Count use tenced to a term that runs consecu person’s a firearm a distinct of tive to sentence the under possess represents the drug trafficking or objectives lying crime violence fense with different from the to all other sen crime consecutive predicate conspiracy to violate the Neu long impo Id. at 376. As as the tences.” trality Tali provide Act or services the 924(c) multiple § sition of sentences does Therefore, underlying conspira the ban. Clause, not Jeopardy the Double violate may predicates cies properly serve as uphold we those sentences in accor will overarching alleged. conspiracies plain language of the statu dance with fundamentally, the statutes More te.9 Id. question expressly contemplate allowing predicate one as the In order determine whether conspiracy serve 924(c) § sentences violate the conspiracy. for another Defen- consecutive offense “[fjrom evidence, argues impossible applying it is to deter- "[i]n 9. The dissent that Luskin, firings separate objectives, if Khan's had Camps we must determine how mine conspiracy, effects on the or oc- many represented by different 'uses’ are the acts sufficiently proximate at times curred performed with firearms.” Dis defendant justify multiple does not sentences. Evidence senting Op. position may at 35. derive This (he firings to conclude exist in record Camps language “multiple, from con separate sen- and distinct 'uses' for constitute 924(c)(1) section are secutive sentences under Dissenting Op. tencing'purposes.” at 36-37. appropriate there have been multi whenever however, carriage, Here, ple, separate acts of use or firearm Khan was convicted of four violence, single predicate "single even when all of those acts relate not a crimes of offense,” predicate Camps, predicate States we need not offense.” United therefore Cir.1994). rapolati Camps, 32 at 106. 32 106 "uses.” See F.3d F.3d count Ext ng Though convic- Camps, Khan's four crime-of-violence from the dissent asserts 494 Clause, Jeopardy

Double “[t]he court must fendant shall given be additional sentences concern underlying itself with whether the each “second or subsequent convic- 924(c) supporting § crimes of violence 924(c)(1)(C); § tion.” U.S.C. see also charges duplicative are under a States, double Deal v. 129, 135, 508 U.S. jeopardy analysis. long underly- As as the (1993)(not- S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 44 ing crimes are not identical under ing that “utterly there is ambiguity” no Blockburger analysis,10 then consecutive meaning of the word “conviction” as 924(c) permissible.” sentences are 924(c)). Id. words, used in In other there is no housekeeping requirement under the

Defendants concede that each of the un- statute or Luskin obliging gov- either the derlying crimes of violence this case ernment or the district court to present 924(c) supporting charges “may abe the facts in such a align manner as to separate purposes offense for of a Block- particular use of a firearm particu- with a and, burger analysis,” accordingly, lar predicate offense. The fact that the they do not run afoul of the Double Jeop- district court present chose to the facts of ardy Appellants’ Reply Clause. Br. at 46. this case as one allegations list of factual however, They, attempt distinguish Lus- does not mean that the crimes that derived kin, arguing that both the indictment and from those factual allegations all opinion the district court listed all of the identical aas matter of law.11 predicate general counts on same fac- distinction, however, tual allegation. That 924(c) E. Section Sentence emphasizes irrelevancy. an plain lan- as Unconstitutional guage of the statute not speak does “general allegations” factual or a “course Citing United v. Angelos, Instead, of conduct.” it states that a de- (D.Utah, 2004), F.Supp.2d deten- may fenses, tions have arisen from his may activities dur- each a consecutive ing single month in 924(c) October this court requiring sentence without the court expressly consistently has rejected first to enumerate “uses” of firearms. notion that the convictions should therefore *17 single “episode” be purposes considered a 10. Blockburger analysis, Under the multiple 924(c) underpinning § violation. See statutory provisions describe identical of Luskin, 372, United States v. 926 F.2d 376 provision requires fenses unless “each proof (4th Cir.1991) (insisting 'epi- that “there is no of a fact which the other does not.” Block 924(c),” sode' referring test under section States, 299, burger 304, v. United 284 U.S. 52 requirement in some pre- circuits that the 180, (1932). S.Ct. 76 L.Ed. 306 requisite 924(e) supporting § convictions vi- time, olation be “distinct in rather than literal 11. point Defendants Cap to United States v. Towne, (quoting convictions” United States v. (7th Cir.1994) pas, 29 F.3d prop 1187 for the 880, (2d Cir.1989))). 870 F.2d 889 osition that descriptions conflated factual Instead, in this circuit the four crime-of- they mandate reversal because allow for mul violence separate convictions are considered 924(c) tiple sentences for the same offense. predicate provided they offenses that do not however, Cappas, relied on the fact that the Jeopardy violate the Double Clause. As we conflated impossible facts made it for the below, discuss the defendants concede that appellate jury court to ascertain whether the underlying those crimes of violence constitute properly actually followed the law and separate found implicate offenses and do not double during that a jeopardy firearm was used purposes concerns for each neces of Blockbur- ger. long sary predicate "As underlying as the offense. crimes are Id. at 1195. In this case, trial, Blockburger not identical analysis, under the with a bench we do not have to 924(c) then permis- consecutive sentences are worry that the fact finder did not understand Luskin, sible.” 926 F.2d at 377. simply spell the law because she did not it out Because Khan’s four crime-of-violence con- detail. separate predicate victions constitute of-

495 arguments under Defendants’ lengthy that sentences argue dants Due “count-stacking” provisions Equal Protection and Process by imposed 924(c) long as constitute unavailing. §of are so equally Defen Clauses are equal process, protection, 924(c) of due violation that acknowledge dants violates prohibition Amendment Eighth and the Due Equal Protection and Process punishment. and Unusual against Cruel only they clauses if can demonstrate that opined court In the district Angelos, Appel statute a rational basis. lacks 924(c) are mandate can sentences easily Br. The statute meets lants’ at 77. at Id. “the realm reason.” outside of Discouraging prevent this standard. Notwithstanding personal opin- ing the of firearms the commission use however, concluded ion, judge the district a legiti crimes constitutes of violence- him precedent compelled the relevant v. purpose. mate state See United States by the sentence mandated impose the (10th Cir.2006). 738, Angelos, F.3d 754 Angelos agree Id. We statute. addition, mandatory sentencing ration precedent that we are bound court purpose by ally legitimate relates to this 924(c) constitutionality uphold the incapacitating those who have demonstrat imposed in this case. sentences engage ed a in this behavior willingness (cid:127) argu Eighth Amendment Defendants’ may contemplate who deterring those “Severe, unavailing. man simply ment is Therefore, Id. engaging this behavior. cruel, may they be are datory penalties but 924(c) mandatory § we hold that the sen sense, in the constitutional not unusual imposed tences in this case violate neither forms employed been various having process.12 due equal protection nor Harme history.” Nation’s throughout our 957, 994, 111 Michigan, 501 U.S. lin v. Caliph’s F. The Use of (1991). “The L.Ed.2d 836 S.Ct. Trial Statements a sen has never held that Supreme Court argue that it was The defendants if it years, term of even specific to a tence Amendment’s Con violation of Sixth more than the reason turn out to be might frontation for the district court Clause defendant, con expectancy able life their co-defen admit statements punishment.” cruel and unusual stitutes dant, against them without allow Caliph, Beverly, 369 v. F.3d United States to cross-examine ing opportunity them the (6th Cir.2004). mandatory Even a sen life that the district court They him. contend passes tence constitutional muster. Unit Caliph’s statements improperly considered Kratsas, ed F.3d *18 agents paintball FBI activities that Cir.1995). Accordingly, we that the hold jihad training intended to be were imposed on defen mandatory sentences overseas, obtained the trainees and that case, not lengthy, while do dants in this that was AK-47-style weapons because punishment and unusual constitute cruel in combat type weapon used over- Eighth Amendment. pursuant to discretion.”); sentencing any Rum argue mandatory the courts that also 12. Defendants 263, 274, Estelle, 100 S.Ct. U.S. separation mel v. 445 case violate in this sentences ("[Ojne 1133, (1980) could by placing sentencing deci L.Ed.2d powers principles any by argue of contradiction legislature without fear in the hands of sions for crimes con- decision Court that argument of this been round judiciary. This has felonies, See, cededly and classifiable e.g., classified ly rejected. 467, 1919, actually 453, im States, length the sentence ... 111 S.Ct. 500 U.S. legislative prerog (1991)("Congress posed purely is a matter of power has the L.Ed.2d 524 ative.”). giving punishments define without criminal allowing opportuni- seas without them the testimony,” including er “at least three or ty Caliph on that point. cross-examine four other who essentially witnesses said Specifically, they that argue the district thing.” the same J.A. 3268. The court improperly Caliph’s court used statements expressly Caliph’s also noted that testimo- them, against they even though sup- ny piece was not the main of evidence on posed to be only against Caliph. admitted which it relied for its characterization of reasons, that, For the following we hold paintball group and that “[t]here the extent admission these tons of other evidence besides the state- error, statements was in the error was ment of Caliph.” J.A. 3269. The court harmless. Caliph’s concluded that the admission of statement was in light harmless

The Supreme recently Court has held that, “other evidence on Amendment, the same issue.” under the Sixth Id. “testi- statements, independent Our monial” out-of-court review of the such as record con- those during Caliph’s made firms that police interrogation, statements were dupli- are inadmissible un- cative defendant of a wealth of other evidence and less that defendant opportuni- has had the that the defendants’ convictions and sen- ty to cross-examine the declarant. Craw- tences would not have differed had Cal- v. Washington, 68-69, 541 U.S. iph’s See, statements not been admitted. ford (2004). 124 S.Ct. 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (statement e.g., J.A. 3178-80 of Yusuf argue Defendants that Caliph’s statements Wells, an outside paintball observer of the were testimonial they because were the activity expressly found credible and reli- police result of interrogation, and they court, able the district indicating that were admitted without the defendants hav- paintball was a means of training); Id. at ing opportunity previous cross-ex- (statements of other saying witnesses government amination. The responds that same). reject We therefore defendants’ defendants right waived their to cross- argument the admission of Caliph’s Caliph examine over these statements be- statements constitutes reversible error. they cause affirmatively did not ásk the court to retain Caliph for cross-examina- Chapman’s G. The Use of Statements tion acquitted. before he was against Him Purposes for the Impeachment.

We do not reach the question of Caliph’s whether statements were admit Chapman testified at trial that he ted in violation of the Sixth Amendment attended the LET camps and did not hide because, to the extent that any error oc his attendance because his motives were curred, it was harmless. Lilly See v. Vir innocent. government impeached this 116, 139-40, 119 ginia, 527 U.S. S.Ct. testimony by introducing un Mirandized (1999) 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (noting that Con statements that Chapman made to FBI frontation Clause subject errors are agents that he did not attend the LET harmless error analysis). Under harmless camps. Chapman contends that these analysis, error if government can dem statements, which he agents made to FBI *19 onstrate that alleged the error did not being after held in solitary near confine affect the rights, defendants’ substantial ment for weeks and which the district we will not overturn the conviction on the court found were obtained in violation of basis of that error. United States v. Rod Miranda, such, involuntary. were also As (4th riguez, 411, Cir.2006). 433 F.3d 416 Chapman argues, they were not useable

The district court expressly against found that him for any purpose. argu This Caliph’s statement was “cumulative of oth- ment fails.

497 confession, accept concerning the so we that state agree parties The (indicating See J.A. 244-80 as true. of Miranda them obtained violation ments attention witness, medical but received that to impeach used can be and interrogation FBI the involuntarily the before from that were made statements force or physical no of at all. indication providing against a defendant used cannot be him). 385, Arizona, physical of force 437 U.S. threats See, Mincey v. e.g., (1978) 2408, L.Ed.2d 98 S.Ct. limits the to be off For statements are involuntary that statements (noting “involuntary,” the to cross-examination prod the not made that were statements they have to that were facts would show will). The issue or rational free uct of of a rational intellect product not “the the statements us is whether before at Mincey, 437 U.S. a free will.” we Though involuntary. were question omitted) (re (internal quotation S.Ct. 2408 an determination independent make “must seriously interrogation the of garding voluntariness, the district the issue on suffering unbearable defendant wounded circum findings of fact on court’s coma, in a on his back lying almost pain, are to surrounding the confession stances care encumbered intensive unit an erroneous.” clearly accepted unless be needles, tubes, breathing apparatus). Cristobal, 293 F.3d will whether a defendant’s “To determine Cir.2002). for self capacity overborne or his has been case, found court the district In this critically impaired, [we] determination that: circum ‘totality of the consider must were statements

although Chapman’s stances,’ including the characteristics constitutional interview, in violation of his procured defendant, the setting Miranda, not they were under rights interrogation.” details of the and the There was involuntary Mincey. under case, Cristobal, F.3d 140. In this at agents government that no evidence indicates totality circumstances through Chapman’s coerced statements volun Chapman’s that statements were threats pressure or imminent physical freely answered some tary. Chapman Moreover, state- harm. physical others. to answer questions declined statements exculpatory were false ments told them joked agents, He admissions, suggests than which rather him, and rights not need his read he did to make Chapman’s, decision them. On this anxious talk with seemed one, and was a calculated statements record, to find district refusal court’s that his rational intellect thereby involuntary statements to be Chapman’s For had not overborne. free will been use of those Accordingly, correct. was reasons, not were statements these app was statements cross-examination impeachment. purposes excluded ropriate.13 3383. J.A. H. Selective Prosecution case in this review of the record

Our that the finally argue Defendants court did the district indicates dis- denying them erred in findings district court clearly making err its factual question Chapman’s credibil- many Chapman reasons to allow 13. Even if it error the false lack of basis of her ity, cross-examined on the and that conclusions about be issue, error was exculpatory solely even to credibility statements or "were not based only relevant harmless. statements degree particular false any significant on that Yet, credibility. Chapman's to undermine exculpatory statement.” J.A. judge specifically that she found district noted *20 1996) eovery on prosecution added). their selective claim. (emphasis Finally, “when Specifically, they contend that govern- we review a district discovery court’s order ment investigated has not and prosecuted claim, of a selective-prosecution alleged other organizations, terrorist such determining we are legal adequacy as the Fighters Cambodian Freedom or the evidence. We review the legal adequa Republican Army, aggressive- the Irish cy of evidence de novo.” Id. at 743. ly as it investigated prosecuted has case, In the present defendants do not them, leading to an unconstitutional denial make a showing that the other alleged right their to “equal protection under groups terrorist about which they com- the law.” plain “similarly are situated” to them for A selective-prosecution claim purposes prosecution. selective Defen- judicial asks a court to power exercise over dants contend that only “the distinguishing ‘special province’ and, of the “Executive” factor between other alleged [the terrorist accordingly, pass high must threshold in groups] and appellants, is that order to succeed. United States v. Arm appellants are Muslim in post-9/11 strong, 456, 464, 1480, U.S. 116 S.Ct. Appellant’s world.” atBr. 88. This conten- (1996). 134 L.Ed.2d 687 The Executive’s tion, however, very misses the obvious fact not, however, discretion is limitless. that defendants were support- accused of Equal protection demands that “the deci LET, ing group terrorist that supported prosecute may sion whether not be Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and which were in unjustifiable based on an standard such as direct conflict with the United States. The race, religion, arbitrary or other classifica Executive right branch has the to focus its (internal omitted). quotation tion.” Id. In prosecutorial energies alleged terrorists addition, may defendant “[a] demonstrate groups present the most direct threat that the administration of a criminal law is to the United States and its interests. Ac- directed so exclusively against a particular cordingly, we hold that the district court persons class of ... with a mind so un did not err in denying discovery on defen- equal oppressive system dants’ prosecution selective claim because prosecution practical amounts to a denial the available evidence demonstrates that of equal protection of the law.” Id. at 464- legitimate prosecutorial factors motivated (internal 116 S.Ct. quotation omit government’s prosecutorial decisions. ted). short, In we hold that all of the convic- In order to discovery obtain on a tions in this case were supported by sub- claim, prosecution selective a defendant stantial evidence and were obtained with- must make “a showing credible of different out material error. We also hold that treatment of similarly persons.” situated Chapman’s Khan’s and sentences were Id. at showing S.Ct. 1480. This correctly imposed. Accordingly, affirm we “should itself be a significant barrier to the all of the convictions for all three defen- litigation of insubstantial claims.” Id. at dants and the sentences Khan and 464, 116 S.Ct. deference to exec Chapman. discretion, utive we have held that “defen similarly dants are situated when their IV. present distinguishable circumstances no legitimate government prosecutorial cross-appeals might factors that sentence, justify making prosecutorial arguing different Hammad’s deci the dis respect sions with trict judge to them.” United erred in reducing Hammad’s Olvis, States v. 97 F.3d Cir. sentence below the recommended Sentenc-

499 weight” any relevant factor and must range. cross-appeal This ing Guidelines just at again to consider what a fair and result.” Id. causes once us “effectn “reasonable” af- makes federal sentence 457. Booker, 220, v. 543 States U.S.

ter United understanding enhanced this We later (2005) 264, 738, L.Ed.2d 621 160 125 S.Ct. v. More reasonableness United States (“The appeals sentencing review courts land, (4th Cir.2006), noting F.3d 424 437 unreasonableness.”). For the decisions for that, the district court does not need while below, that, un- we hold discussed reasons 3553(a) the factors checklist discuss Hammad’s sentence precedent, der our fashion, explain the court must reason the downward var- represents an unreasonable sentence, ing any sen particularly behind guideline iance from recommended vary range tences that from the recom and, result, remand for re- range we In by the Guidelines. Id. at 433. mended sentencing.14 particular, we held that farther the “[t]he Green, v. 436 F.3d advisory guideline court from diverges the (4th Cir.2006), held that 455-56 we range, more the compelling the reasons defendant, district courts to sentence at divergence must be.” Id. 434. (1) properly must calculate sentence mind, guidance in we turn With this now Sentencing range recommended parties the sentence this case. The (2) Guidelines; whether a determine agree district.judge cal- properly that and range within that within sentence range as 97- culated Hammad’s Guidelines set statutory limits serves factors imprisonment. The 52-month months 3553(a) and, not, if U.S.C.] forth in [18 him re- imposed sentence on therefore those select a sentence that does serve dis- significant reduction.15 The flected (3) factors; mandatory implement statu- as fol- explained trict court the reduction (4) limitations; tory articulate the and lows: selecting particular sen- reasons the Court is re- Among things why tence, a sen- especially explaining 3553(a) quired to look at under section Sentencing Guide- tence outside arise any disparities might [are] the relevant range line better serves similar records among defendants with forth sentencing purposes set of similar conduct. guilty and found 3553(a). Mr. [Hammad] Mr. and Both Surratt any emphasized Id. also variance We as I military experience, recall. had must range from be based the Guidelines rec- completely clean Both of them had 3553(a) indi- on the further factors ords, partic- I overall think their that, falling cated for sentences outside paintball in the activities ipation court must range, a district Guidelines roughly to their that led convictions adequate reasons provide an statement equivalent. rely permissible the variance which I have are some differences There making factors in the variance. Id. example, For into consideration. that a taken Finally, we noted reason- 456-57. during trial give there was evidence cannot “excessive able sentence prece- does not accord with those sentence that the district court sentenced 14. We note way as any criticism is not meant in July, dents without the bene Hammad on Green, court. district precedent States v. fit of our in United (4th Cir.2006), or United States F.3d Cir.2006). Moreland, was still within sentence Hammad’s F.3d range. statutory Accordingly, that Hammad’s our conclusion *22 heart, necessary independent about between this defen- the review of conversations Royer investiga- 3553(a) dant and about the Mr. all culminating of the factors in a recall, going you tion that on. As was was, instead, independent sentence. It an discussions the de- there about [were] 3553(a) all of review of the factors culmi- computer struction of files and that sort nating in the conclusion Hammad’s thing, suggests perhaps which to me sentence should be similar to Surratt’s. level but slightly higher culpability provided process weight,” This “excessive significantly so. Green, 436 F.3d at to “the need to sentence, I an appropriate think that avoid unwarranted disparities sentence this de- taking into consideration what among defendants with similar records did, background, the fendant and been guilty who have found of similar con- reflecting sentence the needs for the 3553(a)(6). duct.” U.S.C. The vari- the promote seriousness of offense to ance, by focusing exclusively almost also, however, respect for and to be law sentence, Surratt’s give proper did not just punishment, adequate to serve as 3553(a) and, the weight to other factors to those in public, deterrence accordingly, led to an unreasonable sen- protect from harm public further tence. defendant, from the that a sen- proper tence is much closer to that that was Moreover, the facts do not imposed on Mr. Surratt. district court’s conclusion Hammad reasons, And for those it is the sentence similarly and Surratt were situated. Sur- of the that' as to ... Court the three ratt was second of the eleven defen- ... counts conviction the defendant plead guilty, only day dants to one after custody be committed to the of the Bu- the first defendant to do so. Surratt ac- reau of for a period Prisons 52 cepted responsibility cooperated by months. providing information led to a su- J.A. 3448-^9. Surratt had been earlier perseding indictment his co-con- sentenced to 46 months. spirators, and then testifying as a witness

We first that the note variance this at gave trial. district court Surratt a case reduced Hammad’s sentence from his three-level sentence for reduction that ac- by recommended guidelines sentence al- ceptance of responsibility. Accordingly, princi- most half. under the contrast, gave Hammad false state- Moreland,- ples outlined in district investigators destroyed ments to evi- court must present compelling reasons trial, dence before to provid- addition judge the variance. The indicated that she ing testimony “incredible” at trial. As a considered result, judge the district enhanced Ham- did, what this defendant his background, sentencing mad’s two level for ob- and the for the reflecting needs sentence justice. words, In other struction to pro- seriousness offense difference between the also, however, mote recommended sen- respect for law and just tencing ranges to be punishment, to serve as ade- Surratt and Hammad quate public, deterrence to those reflect the fact that accepted Surratt re- protect public from harm further sponsibility provided valuable assis- from the defendant.... government, tance to while Hammad accepted never However, responsibility and ob- J.A. 3448-49. the sentence re- justice imposed duction focused structed both exclusively during almost before not, on Surratt’s It sentence. his trial. of 120 imposition of one sentence sen- significant

By Hammad giving gun for his three convictions. that he was months theory on the reduction tence Surratt, district “similarly situated” *23 ignored primary the impermissibly court I. dif- and had Hammad Surratt

reason in ranges charges Superseding Guidelines Indictment recommended ferent separate fact that the Guidelines violations of 18 U.S.C. first the sixteen place: the 924(c). and accept § Most of the counts responsibility J.A. 151-52. treat those who justice differently. multiple We include the charge defendants and those who obstruct conclu- in loca- the district court’s of different firearms different accept cannot use effect, shotgun- to which, provides no benefit dates. The in tions different sion gov- substantially assisting simply the lists the defen- style Indictment Surratt for dates, to involved, approximate the provides punishment no dants the ernment and obstructing used, general Such location for justice. firearms Hammad for page. determi- than one No ignores Congress’ count in less conclusion both each to the concerning attempt provide how treat obstruction is made to notice nation tied to acceptance responsibility, of as to which counts are justice and defendants of be- In- discourages underlying predicate beneficial offenses. potentially which al- stead, ties sixteen future defendants. the Indictment havior from 924(c) § violations all offenses leged instruc- accordingly remand with We 1-10, troubling which is outlined Counts in accor- Hammad tions re-sentence in the charged not all defendants because in Green principles dance with the outlined first charged each of the gun counts are and Moreland. 151. ten counts. J.A. V. under Khan three convictions received conclusion, all of the we hold that 924(c). con- count Khan was § For each supported case convictions in this were “Khan, of, Roy- lists Indictment victed with- and were obtained sufficient evidence er, as the Chapman, and Abdur-Raheem” con- We affirm those out material error. provide Rather than involved. defendants Khan and the sentences of victions and dates, gun other do most exact as Ham- further hold Chapman. We 24- counts, alleges Counts Indictment an vari- was unreasonable mad’s sentence 2001.” The loca- 27 occurred in “October guideline his recommended ance from rather lists but specific tion is re-sentencing. for range and remand only “Pakistan.” The country of entire PART; REMANDED IN type relates AFFIRMED made distinction charges 24 the use IN PART firearm used'—-Count rifle; 25 the AK-47 automatic Count an concurring GOODWIN, Judge, District gun; and Count of a 12mm antiaircraft use dissenting in part: in part and rocket-propelled grenade. use of a 27 the foot-note, explained court the district except In a majority opinion I concur in the these of Khan’s use of III.D, limited nature sentences which affirms Part evi- 924(c) the defendants’ weapons: accept “We § for Sei- 18 U.S.C. imposed under weapons these was firing Khan. dence Masoud fullah very little ammuni- in that Chap- highly limited affirm Though agree I we should According 8195. 924(c) provided.” J.A. sentences, merge tion was § I would man’s evidence, only fired one bullet Khan 924(c) and remand convictions Khan’s 502 Camps Luskin, weapon target.

with each at some form of States v. (4th Cir.1991). Id. F.2d 372 In Camps, the eight defendant received convictions under convictions, For these three Khan re- 924(c). Camps, F.3d at 105. For mandatory ceived consecutive sentences: however, sentencing purposes, these con- 924(c) months for the first convic- grouped, victions were which resulted tion, second, months and life 924(c) only three sentences. Id. The Judge prison the third. Brinkema ex- imposed first sentence was the use plained compelled that she to impose an AK-47 during December Id. at She sentences. stated serious, drug that these crimes “but ambush of a rival there boss. Id. at 103. *24 murderers get are who far less time than The second sentence was a imposed this, Al-Qaeda and I have sentenced mem- conviction for use of an AK-47 who planning bers were real attacks on conviction during for the use of an Uzi shores for far time ... these less and I January 7, another ambush on 1990. Id. you to tell sticking my have that this is at 103-04. The third im- sentence was Id. craw.” posed for carrying separate five semi-auto- matic weapons that were seized from a van II. using the defendant was to flee. Id. circuits,* most we multiple Unlike allow at 104. 924(c) § convictions for conduct in the Judge court, Luttig, writing for the ex- underlying same United offense. States v. plained that only, for that case the court (4th Cir.1994). 32 F.3d Camps, 107-08 accepted government’s concession that By allowing for multiple gun convictions multiple firearms carried at one can time uses, even if during the same underlying 924(c) § in only result one Id. sentence. conspiracy, comply congressional we at 109 n. 9. I apply would all this rule to to harshly punish intent the use of guns to cases where the different firearms relate felonies, commit punish subsequent and to objective, to the same have the same effect guns harshly. uses even more See id. at predicate crime, on the and are or used (1968)) 114 (citing Cong. 108 Rec. 22231 carried proximately time. (“We are also satisfied that this interpreta 924(c)(1)’s tion best achieves section un In Camps, though each grouped “use” objective mistakable ‘persuading the was tied to underlying drug conspira- man who is commit tempted to a federal cy, each “use” was directed toward a dif- ”). Felony to leave his at g-un home.’ If objective ferent of the conspiracy, occurred 924(c) § multiple per convictions were not at distinctly times, different and had dif- offense, for the underlying missible same ferent effects on the conspiracy. Crimi- no deterrent would exist criminals us nalizing only the December 1989 use would ing guns throughout an conspira extended not account for the fact that the defendant cy- made the criminal decision to use more justification guns Our rule’s is apparent from later to objectives further other examining 924(c) our § decisions in United v. the conspiracy. States Three sentences * Anderson, Cir.1992); Hamilton, United States v. 59 F.3d 1323 United States v. 953 (D.C.Cir.1995); (11th Cir.1992); v. Cappas, United States F.2d 1344 United v. States (7th Cir.1994); Privette, (5th F.3d 1187 Cir.1991); United States v. 947 F.2d 1259 United Lindsay, (2d Cir.1993); Fontanilla, (9th 985 F.2d 666 States v. 849 F.2d 1257 Cir. Sims, (6th 1988). Cir.1992); 975 F.2d 1225 Mabry, But see United States v. 3 F.3d Moore, (8th Cir.1993). United States v. F.2d ly merged to account for the defen- for conduct should be justified

were sentencing purposes. uses of firearms. multiple dant’s 924(c) majority’s reasoning, Under no § Multiple under were sentences 924(c) boundaries exist for Luskin, prosecutions. justifiable case also is, a drug conspirator pick That could aup majority relies. Luskin hired which gun, place it on the table to scratch his On three distinct someone kill wife. nose, pick up, it back and receive two occasions, attempted the mur- the hitman 924(c) An itchy sentences. nose could Luskin, (stating der. 926 F.2d at 373 him an years. cost additional fifteen Like- on March the second attempt first wise, carry three defendant could dan- May attempt the third attempt time, at gerous weapons one be convicted 27). imposed separate July The court 924(c) sentences, of three receive 924(c) attempt. sentence for each Id. Applying life sentence. this statute with- nearly attempts, each two ordinary out boundaries reason and sufficiently distinct apart, months meaning leads absurd results. (ex- at 375 justify multiple sentences. Id. plaining attempt, that before third *25 determining In how to the draw bound- bonus, $25,000 a stat- Luskin offered aries, a of courts examine number factors Luskin could have called off the hired ing primarily objectives, but focus on the the time). gun any effects, timing the of the defendant’s Finley, conduct. See United States v. Khan, however, multiple to respect With (2d Cir.2001); F.3d 206-08 924(c) justifiable. § are not sentences Wilson, v. F.3d Lucas, III. (D.C.Cir.1998); United States v. Cir.1991). F.2d 1222-23 Luskin, Camps applying we must “uses” of a Where the defendant have many represent- how “uses” are determine objective, substantially the same substan- performed ed a with acts defendant tially predicate similar effects on the of- (“Be- Camps, 32 F.3d at 109 firearms. See fense, proximate and are in time one to separate there were three uses cause another, justification sustaining our ....”) weapons carryings and/or 924(c) multiple not sentences does exist. added). (emphasis majority’s decision 924(c) to three Sustaining this case fails consider whether the sentences for sufficiently Khan’s creates a result underlying uses were distinct convictions Con- Instead, justify gress to did not intend. The evidence multiple surely sentences. objective only “there no one Khan had majority opines that is house- discloses weapons, which was to requirement firing under the statute or when keeping government training preparation either the or enhance his obliging Luskin Afghanistan. moving Judge into As present the district court to facts noted, align use a Brinkema the evidence on Khan’s such a manner particular predi- weapons highly limited. particular firing firearm with Op. Examining suggest at 494. J.A. 3195. No evidence exists to cate offense.” weapons “use” of the defendant’s conduct contains that each so-called whether sufficiently justify any effect on the distinct “uses” multi- had kind different 924(c) predicate There is no evi- ple conspiracy. is much more than a sentences accurately tempo- requirement. It is neces- dence to determine housekeeping firings. The Indict- sary proximity defendant receives ral ensure attempt punished separate- distinguish is does not even fair sentence and not ment use, timing merely of each but lists each in Octo- occurring of Khan’s uses as evidence,

ber From the it 2001. J.A. 152. firings if impossible

is to determine Khan’s separate objectives,

had different effects conspiracy,

on the or occurred at times not

sufficiently proximate justify multiple

sentences. Evidence does exist firings

record to conclude the constitute

separate sentencing and distinct “uses” for I would

purposes. Accordingly, merge 924(c) sentencing

three convictions for

purposes, and would remand instruc- impose

tions sentence 120 months

for these convictions.

Kay STALEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, *26 COUNTY, TEXAS,

HARRIS

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-20667. of Appeals,

United States Court

Fifth Circuit.

Aug.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Khan
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: Sep 7, 2006
Citation: 461 F.3d 477
Docket Number: 04-4519 04-4520 04-4521; 05-4811; 05-4818; 05-4893
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.