United States v. Williams
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13611
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- On Dec. 4, 2013, Justin Williams and Malcolm Carpenter robbed a Bank of America branch at gunpoint, took over $80,000, and were arrested the next day with the cash and firearms.
- Williams was charged with bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and with using a firearm in the course of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); he pleaded guilty preserving his right to appeal the § 924(c) count.
- § 2113(a) criminalizes bank robbery “by force and violence, or by intimidation.” § 924(c)(3)(A) defines a “crime of violence” (elements clause) as an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against person or property.
- Williams moved to dismiss the § 924(c) charge arguing that the “intimidation” means-of-commission can be satisfied without intent to threaten, so § 2113(a) is not categorically a crime of violence.
- The district court denied the motion; Williams appealed the § 924(c) conviction and sentence (total 120 months, including mandatory consecutive term for § 924(c)).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal bank robbery under § 2113(a) is categorically a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) | Williams: "Intimidation" can be satisfied without intent to threaten, so § 2113(a) lacks the intentional threatened-use-of-force element required by § 924(c)(3)(A). | Government: § 2113(a)’s intimidation element necessarily involves an intentional act that threatens violent physical force; intimidation means threatened force causing reasonable fear. | The court held § 2113(a) (including robbery “by intimidation”) is a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A). |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2016) (addressing vagueness of § 924(c) residual clause)
- United States v. Armour, 840 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2016) (held attempted bank robbery by intimidation is a crime of violence)
- United States v. Gordon, 642 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2011) (intimidation exists when words/actions cause reasonable fear that defiance will be met with force)
- United States v. Burnley, 533 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2008) (intimidation need not be an explicit threat; implied threats suffice)
- United States v. Jones, 932 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1991) ("intimidation means the threat of force")
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (categorical approach focuses on statutory elements, not actual conduct)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishes categorical approach for predicate offenses)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (must presume conviction rests on least serious conduct satisfying statute)
- Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015) (mens rea for threats may require awareness of the threatening nature of conduct)
- Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (negligent or accidental conduct cannot satisfy intentional-use-of-force requirement)
- Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001) (interpreting required mens rea in crime-of-violence context)