Walter Burnley was convicted after a jury trial on four counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and was sentenced to a total of 262 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Burnley argues that the Government failed to prove that either he or his accomplice used force or intimidation to obtain the stolen money, and thus that three of his convictions should be overturned. We conclude that the jury was entitled to find intimidation under the .сircumstances of this case and affirm.
I
On April 25, 2006, Burnley entered a branch of Associated Bank in Beloit, Wisconsin, clad in a baseball cap pulled low over his eyes, with safety goggles placed over a pair of sunglasses. At the time, Burnley was 33 years old, 5'8" tall, and approximately 220 pounds. After waiting his turn in line, Burnley reached the lone teller and pulled out a purse. According to the teller, Burnley then leaned towаrd her and said, “Fill the bag and do not give me the dye pack.” The frightened teller put $4,661 in the purse and, as Burnley had instructed, omitted the dye paсk. Burnley then fled.
Two weeks later, on May 9, Burnley (again using his safety goggles) visited a different branch of Associated Bank in Be-loit. This time when he reached the teller, he told her not to “do anything stupid” and warned that he would kill her if she gave him a dye pack or bait bills. He then pushed a black bag toward her, and she filled the bag with $1,514 in unmarked bills.
That evening Burnley met Lisa Harding, a 20-yearold crack addict, through a mutual friend. Two days later, on May 12, Burnley enlisted Harding to rob a branch of AnehorBank in Janesville, Wisconsin. Harding, who also was charged but wound up testifying for the government, entered the bank at Burnley’s direction and ordered a teller to “put all of your money in this bag but no dye pack.” When the teller appeared сonfused, Harding, a woman of slight build, repeated the demand louder and “a little more forcefully.” This teller also complied, giving her $2,069 without a dyе pack. Harding then departed.
Four days after that, on May 16, Burn-ley and Harding arranged for another robbery, which was to be their last. The target was a branch of the First National Bank in Beloit. This time, both of them entered the bank. Burnley, whose face was concealed by a pаinter’s mask, stood back near the door while Harding approached the teller’s window and said, “I need you to do me a favor, I neеd you to put all the money in the bag.” After the bag was full, Harding confirmed with the teller that there was no dye pack in the bag and apologized for making her “so nervous.” Burnley and Harding left the bank with $2,472.
II
The statute under which Burnley was convicted defines “bank robbery” as
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using “force and violencе, or intimidation” to take bank funds from an employee. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Burnley does not dispute that he did all of these things during the second robbery, but now hе argues that during the other three holdups he and Harding did not use force or do or say anything that amounted to “intimidation.” Instead, he points out thаt either he or Harding simply demanded money, got it, and left. Under no objective standard, he claims, could one say that the government demonstrated that the tellers were put in fear. Our consideration of this argument is heavily influenced by the procedural posture in which it reaches us. Burnley did not move for a judgment of acquittal on this or any other basis. See Fed.R.CRImP. 29. Furthermore, he did not raise this argument in any other way beforе the district court. Our review of the jury’s verdict is thus only for plain error. We will reverse only if the convictions “amounted to a manifest miscarriage of justice,”
United States v. Rock,
These were not violent robberies, and so the government did not rely on the “force” or “violence” options provided by § 2113(a). Instead, it recognized that it had to prove that Burnley and Harding used “intimidation” to take the banks’ money. We have defined intimidation under § 2113(a) as “saying or doing something in such a way as would place a reasonable person in fear.”
United States v. Clark,
Our recent cases illustrate the point. In
Clark
the defendant entered the bank and slid a note to the teller instructing her to “remain calm and place all of your twenties, fifties, аnd hundred dollar bills on the counter and act normal for the next fifteen minutes.” When the confused teller did not respond, the defendant clarified, “Yes, Ma’am, this is a holdup.”
This case is no different. Newly appointed appellate counsel criticizes the government for failing to elicit more evidence about how the tellers reacted to the demands received from Burnley and Harding, but the record is undеrdeveloped because her predecessor, during opening and closing arguments, conceded that robberies had been committed. Had these arguments been preserved, we would have a better record on which to decide where the objective linе lies between intimidating conduct that violates § 2113(a) and statements that fall short of intimidation, because of their sheer implausibility or other rеasons why the listener would not be frightened. But, assuming generously that counsel’s statements conceding the robberies did not amount to waiver (which would preclude review altogether), see
United States v. Rusan,
AFFIRMED.