United States v. Wehunt
230 F. Supp. 3d 838
E.D. Tenn.2017Background
- Defendant indicted for armed bank robbery; parties entered a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement calling for a 188‑month sentence predicated on career‑offender treatment.
- USPO’s initial PSR concluded Reckless Aggravated Assault did not categorically qualify as a "crime of violence," yielding an 84–105 month Guidelines range; defendant moved to withdraw his plea.
- Government objected to the PSR, relying on Voisine to argue Tennessee Reckless Aggravated Assault qualifies as a predicate offense; USPO issued a Revised PSR treating defendant as a career offender with a 188–235 month range.
- The legal question presented: whether Tennessee Reckless Aggravated Assault (a crime with a mens rea of recklessness) categorically qualifies under the Guidelines’ "use‑of‑force" definition of "crime of violence" (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)).
- The Sixth Circuit had precedent (McMurray and related cases) holding that crimes requiring only recklessness are not "use of physical force" predicate offenses; the Supreme Court in Voisine held recklessness suffices for 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (the misdemeanor‑domestic‑violence firearms ban) but cautioned its holding need not extend to differently‑purposed statutes.
- The district court declined to extend Voisine to the career‑offender guideline, held Sixth Circuit precedent controlling, ruled Reckless Aggravated Assault is not a predicate crime of violence for § 4B1.2(a)(1), and therefore REJECTED the parties’ plea agreement (making defendant’s motion to withdraw moot).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tennessee Reckless Aggravated Assault is a categorical "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (the "use‑of‑force" clause) | Voisine shows "use" includes reckless conduct; similar language and purposes mean Reckless Aggravated Assault qualifies as a predicate offense | Recklessness does not satisfy the "use‑of‑force" requirement under Sixth Circuit precedent (McMurray); Voisine is limited to § 921(a)(33)(A) and its context/purpose | Court held Sixth Circuit precedent controls: recklessness alone does not qualify; Reckless Aggravated Assault is not a predicate offense under § 4B1.2(a)(1) |
| Whether Voisine overruled Sixth Circuit cases (e.g., McMurray/Cooper) so as to change career‑offender analysis | Government: Voisine effectively overruled prior circuit precedent and should be extended to the Guidelines/ACCA context | Defendant: Voisine is context‑specific to the firearms statute; differences in purpose and consequences counsel against extension | Court declined to find McMurray overruled; Voisine does not implicitly compel overruling in this context |
| Whether the court may accept the parties’ Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea fixing sentence at 188 months despite concluding defendant is not a career offender | Government: parties’ stipulation that 188 months satisfies § 3553(a) is an independent ground to accept the plea | Defendant: plea was predicated on career‑offender calculation; cannot be accepted if that premise fails | Court refused to accept the plea because it was explicitly premised on career‑offender status; plea agreement rejected |
| Remedy / procedural outcome | N/A | N/A | Plea agreement rejected; defendant’s motion to withdraw plea rendered moot; parties to appear for further Rule 11(c)(5) proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (Supreme Court held reckless misdemeanor assaults fall within "use ... of physical force" for § 921(a)(33)(A), but limited scope to statute's context and purpose)
- McMurray v. United States, 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir.) (reckless conduct insufficient for ACCA/"use‑of‑force" predicate under Sixth Circuit precedent)
- Cooper v. United States, 739 F.3d 873 (6th Cir.) (Tennessee aggravated assault statutes criminalizing recklessness do not categorically qualify as crimes of violence)
- McFalls v. United States, 592 F.3d 707 (6th Cir.) (reaffirming that crimes requiring only recklessness do not qualify as crimes of violence under materially similar Guidelines language)
- Portela v. United States, 469 F.3d 496 (6th Cir.) (holding reckless vehicular assault is not a "crime of violence" under identical language)
- United States v. Howell, 838 F.3d 489 (5th Cir.) (extended Voisine's reasoning to the Guidelines' "use‑of‑force" clause)
- United States v. Fogg, 836 F.3d 951 (8th Cir.) (applied Voisine to the ACCA's use‑of‑force clause)