United States v. Terry Adams
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 231
| 6th Cir. | 2014Background
- In 2010 Adams and Cooper were indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine/crack; both pleaded guilty under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Adams admitted responsibility for 91 g powder cocaine; Cooper for 75 g crack.
- Probation applied the Career Offender enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1) to both based on prior state felony convictions, increasing their guideline offense levels and ranges.
- Adams had prior Tennessee convictions including a 1999 aggravated-assault conviction; the district court found that conviction qualified as a "crime of violence" and sentenced Adams to 165 months.
- Cooper had two prior controlled-substance convictions; the court applied the career-offender guideline, initially sentenced him to 188 months, then reduced to 120 months on reconsideration with no government objection.
- On appeal Adams argued (a) the aggravated-assault conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence and (b) the Sixth Amendment required a jury to find prior convictions; Cooper argued the career-offender enhancement produced a substantively unreasonable sentence and raised the same Sixth Amendment claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Adams's Tennessee aggravated-assault conviction is a "crime of violence" for the career-offender guideline | Adams: § 39-13-102 is divisible and includes reckless offenses; thus it does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence | Government: Although statute is broader, Shepard documents show Adams pleaded to the Class C provision requiring intent/knowledge with a deadly weapon, which matches generic aggravated assault | Court: § 39-13-102 is not categorically a crime of violence, but Shepard documents show Adams pleaded to § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B) (knowing/intent + deadly weapon), so it qualifies under the enumerated-offense prong; enhancement upheld |
| Whether Cooper's sentence is substantively unreasonable because the career-offender guideline is unfair | Cooper: Application of the career-offender guideline yields an excessive sentence and courts should recognize a categorical rule against its use | Government: District court may weigh § 3553(a) factors and depart; no abuse of discretion here | Court: No abuse of discretion—district court considered facts, exercised sentencing discretion, and permissibly reduced sentence to 120 months; sentence affirmed |
| Whether Alleyne/Apprendi requires a jury to find prior convictions or factual predicates that trigger guideline increases | Defendants: Sixth Amendment requires jury proof beyond a reasonable doubt of facts that triggered career-offender enhancement | Government: Prior-conviction facts fit Almendarez-Torres exception; career-offender guideline only informs judicial discretion and does not implicate Alleyne | Court: Alleyne does not apply to guideline ranges; Almendarez-Torres still controls for prior convictions; no Sixth Amendment violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical-approach framework for comparing statutory offense to generic crime)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limited documents permissible to identify which statutory variant defendant admitted)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing statutory maximum must be found by jury, except prior convictions)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (judge-found facts that increase mandatory minimum violate Sixth Amendment)
- Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (prior-conviction exception to jury-proof rule)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (advisory Guidelines and abuse-of-discretion review)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (procedural and substantive reasonableness standards)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 664 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying enumerated-offense prong to aggravated-assault statute requiring at least knowing mens rea)
- United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2011) (statute including reckless aggravated assault does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence)
- United States v. McFalls, 592 F.3d 707 (6th Cir. 2010) (survey of generic aggravated assault and limits on enumerated-offense application)