949 F.3d 168
4th Cir.2020Background
- In 2010 Terron Lamar Bryant pleaded guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) (assault on a postal employee with intent to rob, with an allegation that he put the victim’s life in jeopardy by using a dangerous weapon) and to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); he received concurrent sentences of 46 months (§ 2114) and 84 months (§ 924(c)).
- Bryant did not appeal; in 2016 he filed a § 2255 motion challenging his § 924(c) conviction in light of Supreme Court decisions invalidating § 924(c)’s residual clause.
- The central legal question on collateral review was whether Bryant’s § 2114(a) conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s force clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A)).
- Statutory issue: § 2114(a) contains a first clause listing simple offenses (assault with intent to rob; robbery; attempted robbery) and a second clause adding aggravated consequences (wounding or putting life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon). Parties disputed whether the aggravated second clause applies to assault-with-intent-to-rob.
- The Fourth Circuit applied the categorical/modified categorical framework, examined statute text and history, rejected Bryant’s narrow reading, and held that the aggravated § 2114(a) offense (life-in-jeopardy by dangerous weapon) is a categorical crime of violence under the force clause, affirming the denial of § 2255 relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bryant) | Defendant's Argument (U.S.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2114(a)’s aggravated second clause applies to "assault with intent to rob" or only to robbery/attempted robbery | Second clause’s phrase “in effecting or attempting to effect such robbery” limits the enhancement to robbery/attempted robbery; assault is separate and not subject to aggravated penalty | Historical context and plain meaning show an assault with intent to rob is an attempt to effect robbery; the second clause therefore can apply to assault | The court held the second clause can apply to assault with intent to rob, based on statutory history and ordinary meaning |
| Whether the aggravated § 2114(a) offense satisfies § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause) | Even with the aggravated allegation, assault convictions could encompass nonviolent contact; thus § 2114(a) is not categorically a crime of violence | Requiring that the life be put in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon ensures at minimum the threatened use of violent physical force, satisfying the force clause | The court held the aggravated element (wounding or putting life in jeopardy by dangerous weapon) transforms the offense into a categorical crime of violence under the force clause |
| Whether United States v. Sturgis (teeth/spitting/HIV context) shows the aggravated offense could be nonviolent and thus overbroad | Sturgis demonstrates dangerous-weapon findings can rest on unconventional means (e.g., spitting while HIV-positive), so § 2114(a) may be broader than violent-force requirement | Sturgis is fact-specific; the dangerous-weapon inquiry is functional and requires use or threatened use of force capable of causing physical injury, so it does not undermine categorical application here | The court rejected Bryant’s reliance on Sturgis and held it does not show categorical overbreadth of the aggravated § 2114(a) offense |
| Appropriate analytic approach (categorical vs. modified categorical) | Bryant emphasized indivisibility of the assault clause and sought to avoid treating the aggravated clause as creating a separate divisible offense | Government treated § 2114(a) as divisible between basic and aggravated variants and relied on categorical analysis of the aggravated variant’s elements | The court applied the categorical approach to the aggravated offense after concluding the second clause can reach assaults; divisibility of the first clause was not necessary to the holding |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathis v. United States, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2019) (describing categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (explaining modified categorical approach and divisibility rule)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidating § 924(c)’s residual clause)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defining "physical force" as "violent force")
- United States v. Evans, 848 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2017) (defining physical force as capable of causing pain or injury)
- Knight v. United States, 936 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding § 2114(a) aggravated element supplies threatened violent force)
- Spears v. United States, 449 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (historical interpretation: assault in statute intended to proscribe attempts to rob mail carriers)