United States v. Terrance Tyrone Davis
875 F.3d 592
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Terrance Davis pleaded guilty in Alabama to first-degree sexual abuse (Ala. Code § 13A-6-66) as a lesser included offense after an indictment for rape; he later was convicted in federal court of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)).
- The presentence report treated Davis as an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) based in part on the Alabama sexual-abuse conviction, producing a 15-year mandatory minimum and an 188-month sentence.
- Davis objected, arguing his Alabama conviction does not qualify as an ACCA “violent felony” under the elements clause (§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i)); the district court rejected the objection and applied the enhancement.
- On appeal the Eleventh Circuit examined whether Alabama first-degree sexual abuse by forcible compulsion necessarily includes the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" (the ACCA elements clause).
- The court applied the categorical/modified-categorical approach, concluded Davis’s plea established conviction under the forcible-compulsion prong, and analyzed Alabama precedent (notably Powe and Higdon) interpreting forcible compulsion.
- Holding: Alabama law (as interpreted by the Alabama Supreme Court) permits convictions for sexual abuse by forcible compulsion based on implied nonviolent coercion (e.g., authority over a child), so the statute does not categorically require violent physical force; the ACCA enhancement was improper. Davis’s sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Alabama first-degree sexual abuse (forcible compulsion) is a violent felony under ACCA’s elements clause | Davis: Alabama statute does not necessarily require violent physical force; some convictions rest on nonviolent implied coercion | Government: forcible compulsion means physical force or threats of serious physical injury; Powe/Higdon are narrow and do not govern this case | Held: Not a violent felony — Alabama precedent can sustain convictions without violent force, so the statute does not categorically meet the elements clause |
| Whether § 13A-6-66(a) is divisible such that the modified categorical approach applies to identify the specific statutory phrase of conviction | Davis: statute lists alternatives but plea showed forcible-compulsion prong; argues further divisibility within forcible compulsion | Government: forcible compulsion should be read to require violent force; any nonviolent readings are dicta or narrow | Held: § 13A-6-66(a) is divisible between the two subsections; plea shows conviction under forcible compulsion, but forcible-compulsion itself is not divisible for ACCA purposes and must be analyzed categorically |
| Whether Alabama cases (Powe, Higdon) permit nonviolent forms of ‘‘forcible compulsion’’ that fall outside ACCA’s force requirement | Davis: Powe and Higdon allow implied coercion (authority over a child) that does not require threats/uses of violent force | Government: Powe is fact-bound or dicta and shouldn’t control; Higdon post-dates Davis and should not change meaning at conviction time | Held: Alabama Supreme Court interpretations (including Higdon) are authoritative and explain what the statute always meant; they allow nonviolent implied coercion, so forcible compulsion does not categorically require violent force |
| Standard of review and preservation of arguments on appeal | Government: Davis failed to cite Powe below, so portions relying on it are forfeited and review should be for plain error | Davis: He preserved the ACCA objection; failure to cite a particular case below does not forfeit the legal theory on appeal | Held: Issue was preserved by Davis’s objection; appellate consideration of Alabama precedent was proper (not forfeited) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (ACCA ‘violent force’ requires force capable of causing pain or injury)
- Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (categorical approach; presume conviction rests on least culpable conduct)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (distinguishing indivisible statutes from divisible ones; modified categorical approach)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (permissible documents under the modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Gundy, 842 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir.) (framework for divisibility and modified categorical approach)
- Powe v. State, 597 So.2d 721 (Ala. 1992) (Alabama Supreme Court: implied coercion from authority/relationship may satisfy forcible compulsion)
- Higdon v. State, 197 So.3d 1019 (Ala. 2015) (Alabama Supreme Court: reaffirmed and applied Powe to imply nonviolent coercion can establish forcible compulsion)
- United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. en banc) (discussed by concurrence; contrasted treatment of nonviolent hypotheticals under state law)