996 F.3d 176
4th Cir.2021Background
- Richard Green pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and the PSR designated him a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, treating the Hobbs Act conviction as a "crime of violence."
- That designation raised Green’s Guidelines range from 77–96 months to 151–188 months; the district court varied downward and imposed 144 months (above the parties’ 120‑month stipulation).
- Green objected at sentencing, arguing § 4B1.2 was vague; the district court overruled the objection, relying on the Guidelines’ force clause.
- The sole issue on appeal was whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (force clause and enumerated clause).
- The Fourth Circuit joined five other circuits in holding Hobbs Act robbery is not a Guidelines "crime of violence," because the statute reaches threats or force against property as well as persons. The court vacated Green’s sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Green's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery satisfies the force clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(1)) | Hobbs Act robbery should not count as a crime of violence | Hobbs Act robbery has elements of force/threat and thus qualifies under the force clause | No — Hobbs Act robbery reaches force/threats against property, but the force clause requires force against a person, so no categorical match |
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery matches generic "robbery" in the enumerated clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(2)) | Argues Hobbs Act robbery is robbery and thus enumerated | Hobbs Act robbery is an enumerated robbery offense | No — generic robbery requires force/threat to persons (immediate danger); Hobbs Act also covers threats to property (including future threats), so it is broader |
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as "extortion" in the enumerated clause | (implicit) Hobbs Act robbery can be treated as extortion under Guidelines definitions | Hobbs Act robbery aligns with extortion because it involves obtaining property by means of force or fear | No — Guidelines’ extortion references "physical injury" which naturally means bodily harm; extortion in Guidelines targets persons, not property threats |
| Standard of review and prejudice (preservation/plain error; effect on substantial rights) | Preserved objection to career‑offender designation; urges de novo review or, alternatively, plain‑error relief showing prejudice | Government argues Green preserved only a vagueness claim so review is plain error and any error was harmless because court would exceed the correct range anyway | Court: even if plain‑error review applies, error was plain and affected substantial rights under Molina‑Martinez; vacated and remanded for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (explains and confirms the categorical approach)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (definition of "generic" offenses used for enumerated‑offense comparison)
- United States v. O'Connor, 874 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2017) (Hobbs Act robbery not a Guidelines crime of violence)
- United States v. Camp, 903 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2018) (same)
- United States v. Eason, 953 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2020) (same)
- United States v. Edling, 895 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2018) (state robbery statute functionally identical to Hobbs Act robbery is broader than § 4B1.2)
- Molina‑Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (explains when an incorrect Guidelines range ordinarily shows a reasonable probability of a different sentence)
- Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain‑error framework)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (noting limits on vagueness challenges to the Guidelines)
- United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2013) (discusses standard of review for "crime of violence" determinations)