United States v. Rejon Taylor
814 F.3d 340
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Defendant Rejón Taylor was convicted by a jury of carjacking resulting in death, kidnapping resulting in death, and using a firearm to commit murder during those offenses; jury recommended death and district court imposed death.
- Facts: Taylor and co-defendants confronted Guy Luck at gunpoint, took cash and documents, forced Luck into his van, drove from Atlanta to Collegedale, TN; a confrontation in the van led to Luck being shot and later dying; defendants returned to Atlanta. Taylor later participated in a jail escape attempt.
- At sentencing, the Government introduced evidence (including jail calls, a letter by Taylor, and testimony about the escape attempt and alleged vandalism of a witness’s relatives) supporting a non‑statutory aggravator of future dangerousness.
- Defense offered expert witnesses (prison security consultant and psychologist) to rebut future dangerousness and to present mitigation; the district court excluded large portions of their testimony about general prison security and statistics as irrelevant or unreliable.
- Post‑verdict publicity alleged Taylor called jurors “racist rednecks”; the court privately interviewed jurors in camera at the parties’ consent, declined a fuller Remmer hearing/request to permit counsel to question jurors, and refused to replace Juror 1 or order a new sentencing hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Taylor) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juror bias from media report about Taylor’s out‑of‑court remark | District court should have conducted a full Remmer hearing and allowed counsel to question jurors (esp. Juror 1) or replace tainted juror; failure requires remand for resentencing | Court’s in‑camera, individual interviews (by consent) were sufficient; further questioning risked magnifying prejudice | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion; no showing of actual juror bias requiring remand |
| Exclusion of Aiken and Cunningham testimony (rebuttal and mitigation) | Experts could rebut Government’s future‑dangerousness evidence and present mitigating individualized evidence about how BOP would contain risk; exclusion violated FDPA/Skipper rights | Testimony was generalized about prisons/BOP, not individualized to Taylor; irrelevant, unreliable, and risked confusing jury; permissible to exclude | Affirmed: district court within discretion to exclude broad prison‑security/statistical testimony as not proper rebuttal or individualized mitigation |
| Admission of hearsay at sentencing (Agent Melia re: Marshall’s relatives) | Testimony was vague, unconfirmed, multi‑level hearsay lacking reliability and unfairly prejudicial | FDPA allows hearsay at sentencing; testimony was relevant to remorse and future dangerousness and corroborated by Taylor’s letter; probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion admitting the hearsay as relevant and sufficiently reliable |
| Jury instructions & responses to jury questions (deadlock consequences) | Court should have told jury consequences of failure to reach unanimity (that judge would impose life); responses were incomplete/coercive | Jones and precedent do not require informing jury of sentencing consequences; court’s answers were accurate and not coercive | Affirmed: instructions and answers appropriate; no coercion or misstatement of law |
| Sufficiency of evidence for aggravators (future dangerousness; planning/premeditation) | Evidence insufficient to show Taylor personally dangerous in prison or that he substantially planned to murder Luck | Evidence of escape conspiracy, threats, vandalism, lack of remorse, and the 2‑hour forced transport supported findings of vicarious future dangerousness and substantial planning/premeditation | Affirmed: jury had sufficient evidence to find both aggravators beyond reasonable doubt |
| Vagueness challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) after Johnson | § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague like ACCA residual clause (Johnson) | § 924(c)(3)(B) is materially narrower (focuses on physical force, "in the course of" language, no confusing enumerated examples), so Johnson does not control | Affirmed: § 924(c)(3)(B) not invalidated by Johnson; Taylor’s Johnson challenge fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (district court must investigate extraneous communications and determine impact on juror impartiality)
- Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (when prosecution emphasizes future dangerousness, defendant may need to inform jury of parole ineligibility in some contexts)
- Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (evidence that defendant would not be dangerous if incarcerated is potentially mitigating)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (U.S. 2015) (ACCA residual clause held void for vagueness; Court’s analysis of categorical/ordinary‑case problems)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (interpretation of statutory language requiring risk of force "in the course of" committing the offense)
- United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2013) (FDPA does not require reasonable doubt standard for weighing aggravating vs mitigating factors)
- United States v. Davis, 177 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1999) (Remmer/Remmer–hearing principles and when further inquiry is required)
- United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 1998) (district court must investigate and give opportunity to prove actual bias when juror exposed to extraneous influence)
- United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting admission of general prison‑security evidence as mitigation; relevant as rebuttal in narrow circumstances)