United States v. Raymon Marquell Harris, 941 F.3d 1048

Harris pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); the district court applied the ACCA based on three prior convictions (two drug convictions and a 2011 attempted first-degree assault under Ala. Code § 13A-6-20(a)).
The government introduced a transcript of the Alabama plea colloquy that described a shooting incident; Harris was not asked at the plea whether the factual proffer was accurate and did not expressly assent to it.
The conviction record did not identify which of § 13A-6-20(a)’s five subsections Harris pleaded to; some subsections criminalize reckless conduct, which may not qualify as an ACCA violent felony.
Harris argued on appeal that (1) the plea transcript was not a proper Shepard document and (2) the plea colloquy did not establish whether he pled to an intentional or reckless variant of first-degree assault.
The Eleventh Circuit held Harris waived objection to the factual proffer (and invited any error), and—critically—under Alabama law one cannot attempt a reckless offense, so only subsections (a)(1) or (a)(2) (which require intent) could underlie an attempted first-degree-assault conviction.
The court concluded that attempted first-degree assault under (a)(1) and (a)(2) qualify as ACCA violent felonies under the elements clause and affirmed the ACCA enhancement and sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility / effect of plea colloquy transcript (Shepard issue)	Transcript is not a proper Shepard document and Harris never assented to the factual proffer, so it cannot be used to identify the statutory subsection.	The plea transcript (and PSI) is properly considered; Harris did not timely object and effectively admitted the facts; any error was invited.	Harris waived and invited error; the district court could rely on the proffered facts for sentencing.
Whether the § 13A-6-20(a) conviction can be an ACCA predicate given divisible subsections including reckless variants	Because § 13A-6-20(a) includes a reckless prong, the conviction might be based on recklessness and thus fail the ACCA elements clause.	Alabama law forbids attempting reckless offenses; an attempt requires specific intent, so the conviction must rest on intentional-subsection(s) which qualify as violent felonies.	Under Alabama law an attempt requires intent, so only (a)(1) or (a)(2) could apply; both are violent felonies under the ACCA elements clause; ACCA enhancement affirmed.

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (Shepard limits the documents a sentencing court may consult under the categorical/modified categorical approach)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (defines "physical force" as violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (explains the modified categorical approach for divisible statutes)
Hylor v. United States, 896 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2018) (attempted use of force can satisfy ACCA elements clause; outlines "physical/violent/use" elements)
In re Welch, 884 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2018) (completed first-degree assault under Ala. § 13A-6-20(a)(1) is a violent felony)
United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. en banc 2017) (statutes requiring permanent disfigurement/disablement satisfy the elements-clause test)
United States v. Palomino-Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2010) (a conviction predicated on recklessness may not satisfy a Guideline "use of physical force" definition)
Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (Supreme Court 2016) (addressed whether reckless application of force satisfies a federal "use of physical force" statutory requirement)