United States v. Pauler, 857 F.3d 1073

Pauler was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) for possessing a firearm after a prior misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction (Wichita municipal ordinance, 2009); possession occurred in 2014.
§ 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession by anyone convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” defined in § 921(a)(33) as a misdemeanor under “Federal, State, or Tribal law” having as an element use of physical force or threatened use of a deadly weapon against a covered victim.
District court denied Pauler’s motion to dismiss, treating the municipal conviction as a qualifying “State” misdemeanor.
Pauler appealed, arguing that a municipal ordinance conviction is not a “misdemeanor under State law” for purposes of § 921(a)(33) and thus does not trigger § 922(g)(9).
The government urged a broad reading of “State” to include municipal (local) convictions, relying on the statute’s reference to convictions in “any court” and policy concerns about domestic-violence offenders possessing firearms.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and focused on textual and canons-based analysis of §§ 921–922 to determine whether “State” includes municipal ordinances.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a municipal misdemeanor qualifies as a “misdemeanor under State law” in § 921(a)(33) for § 922(g)(9)	Gov: "State" should be read to include local/municipal convictions so municipal domestic-violence misdemeanors trigger § 922(g)(9)	Pauler: "State" means the State itself; municipal ordinances are distinct and not covered by § 921(a)(33)	Court: "State" does not include municipal ordinances; municipal convictions do not qualify under § 921(a)(33), reverse conviction
Whether broad phrases like “any court” or policy considerations justify reading "State" to include local laws	Gov: “any court” and safety policy support expansive reading	Pauler: Text and statutory structure control; policy cannot override clear text	Court: “Any court” and policy do not overcome plain text and statutory structure
Whether inconsistent agency regulation or practice should affect statutory meaning	Gov: ATF regulation defines domestic-violence crime to include local offenses	Pauler: Agency misstatement cannot override statute	Court: Agency/regulatory misdefinition is not controlling when statute's text is clear
Whether statutory context and repeated use of "State and local" require reading "State" narrowly	Gov: N/A (relied on broad reading)	Pauler: Statutory structure repeatedly distinguishes State vs local; omission of "local" is intentional	Court: Adopted Pauler’s structural reading; omission of "local" presumed intentional

United States v. Duong, 848 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2017) (de novo review for legal questions on statutory interpretation)
Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 764 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2014) (principles on appellate review and statutory interpretation)
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) (avoidance of interpretations rendering statutory language superfluous)
Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012) (identical words in same Act normally share meaning)
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (expressions of inclusion/exclusion in statutes presumed intentional)
Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016) (courts should not supply omissions to statutes)
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (drawing meaning from statutory silence is inappropriate when Congress addressed issue expressly elsewhere)
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (courts cannot rewrite enacted law to reflect perceived legislative purpose)
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. 624 (2012) (the word “any” is expansive but does not change clear statutory meaning)
United States v. Lunsford, 725 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2013) (declining to adopt agency interpretation that conflicts with statutory text)