*1 P. A. ASSOCIATES, SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC INSURANCE CO. ALLSTATE Argued 08-1008. 2009 Decided March No. November *3 ALIA, J., judgment announced of the Court and opin- delivered & respect II-A, the Court with I of to Parts and in which ion Roberts, JJ., joined, and opinion Stevens, C. and an J., Thomas, Sotomayor, with II-D, respect J., and in which C. to Parts II-B Roberts, and Thomas and JJ., joined, opinion respect II-C, and an with to Part in which Sotomayor, J, J, J, joined. C. and filed opinion Stevens, an con- Roberts, Thomas, curring judgment, in in the part concurring post, p. and 416. Ginsburg, dissenting in J, opinion, which and JJ, filed Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, joined, post, p. 436. L. Nelson
Scott cause for him argued petitioner. With Spadaro. the briefs were Brian man and John S. on Wolf Christopher Landau the cause for argued respondent. Hahn, Andrew T Sr.* him on the brief was
With announced the of the Court judgment and Justice Scalia the Court delivered with to Parts I opinion respect an II-B with to Parts and II-A, opinion respect II-D, and * Frost, Brueckner, Leslie Bryant Amanda A. and Arthur H. filed a Justice, C., urging P. for Public as amicus curiae reversal. J, brief Dunham, Quackenbos, Stein, Allan Douglas Ellen P. S. W. Robin Conrad, Partnership D. a brief for the and Amar Sarwal filed for New Inc., City, urging et al. as amici curiae affirmance. York
which Chief Thomas, Justice Justice Justice, Sotomayor to Part join, and an opinion respect II-C, and Justice join. which The Chief Thomas Justice law York class actions suits prohibits pen
New seeking or We consider alties minimum damages.1 statutory this precludes a federal court di sitting district from under a class Federal Rule action versity entertaining Procedure of Civil 23.2 (West 2006) §901 provides: York Civ. Prac. Law Ann. 1 New
“(a) may representa- more One or of a class or be sued members sue parties tive on behalf of all if: members, joinder
“1. the class is so all whether other- numerous that or required permitted, impracticable; wise questions pre- “2. there are fact to the class law or common which members; questions affecting only over dominate individual representative parties typical “3. the claims or are defenses of the class; the claims or of the defenses fairly protect
“4. representative parties adequately will in- class; terests of the
“5. a class action for the superior to other available methods fair and adjudication controversy. efficient
“(b) or creating imposing penalty, Unless a or a minimum statute recovery recovery thereof specifically measure of in a class authorizes the action, recovery an action to penalty, or minimum measure recover imposed may created not be as a class statute maintained action.” 23(a)provides: “(a) sue Prerequisites. more of class One or members sued *4 if: all representative parties on behalf of members “(1) of all joinder that members class is so numerous the impracticable;
“(2) class; fact to the questions are of law or common there “(3) representative parties are typical the claims or defenses class; the the claims or defenses of
“(4) adequately protect the representative parties fairly will interests of the class.” (b) 23(a) if says action be maintained Rule class “[a]
Subsection that categories into three described and if” suit falls one of satisfied (irrelevant present purposes). for
I The petitioner’s complaint alleged following: Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, A., P. medical provided care to Sonia E. for Galvez she in an injuries suffered automobile accident. As for partial that payment care, Galvez assigned Grove her Shady insurance benefits rights under a pol- issued in New York Allstate icy Insurance Co. Shady Grove tendered claim for the benefits assigned to Allstate, which under New York law had 30 days pay claim it. deny 5106(a) § See N. Y. (West Ins. Law Ann. 2009). Allstate but not on apparently paid, time, and it refused to interest pay statutory accrued on the overdue bene- (at see ibid. fits two percent per month), Grove filed suit
Shady this in the diversity Eastern Dis- trict New York recover the unpaid statutory interest. that Allstate
Alleging routinely refuses pay interest on benefits, overdue relief on Shady sought Grove behalf of it- self class of all others to whom Allstate owes interest.
The District Court the suit for lack dismissed of jurisdiction. (2006).
466 F. 2d It Supp. reasoned Y.N. Civ. Prac. § Law Ann. 901(b), which a suit to precludes recover a “pen- from alty” action, as a class proceeding applies diversity court, suits in federal despite Civil Proce- dure 23. Concluding statutory interest is a “penalty” under York law, New it held prohibited pro- class action. since posed And, Shady Grove conceded that (worth $500) its individual claim fell far short of roughly for individual amount-in-controversy requirement suits under 28 U. suit did not 1332(a), S. C. belong court.3 Shady jurisdiction 1332(d)(2), asserted under 28 U. S. C. Grove had relaxes, million, least seeking against
which actions the rule $5 class separate of the amount aggregating controversy. claims for calculation Services, Inc., Corp. Allapattah Mobil Exxon S. (2005).
398 (2008). The F. 3d 137 Circuit affirmed. Second
The
compli-
not
a Federal
dispute
adopted
did
court
§
would
28 U. C.
Act,
the Rules
S.
ance
901(b). But
no
there was
con-
if it conflicted with
control
below)
(as
we
in more
will describe
detail
flict because
901(b)
address
Circuit concluded that Rule
Second
Court
issues.
no Federаl Rule on
Finding
point,
different
held
within the
is “substantive”
Appeals
Tompkins,
of Erie R.
Co.
(1938),
v.
A The question dispute is whether Grove’s suit Shady may as a class answer. action. Rule an It provides proceed action if states that class be maintained” two condi- “[a] are suit tions must criteria set forth in satisfy met: (i. e., (a) subdivision numerosity, commonality, typicality, and it also into must fit one of adequacy representation), (b). the three described subdivision Fed. Rule categories 23(b). its Proc. terms this creates a By Civ. rule categorical meets whose suit criteria entitling specified plaintiff (The aas action. his claim class pursue Rules to confer categorical use regularly “may” permission, see, g., e. 8(d)(2)-(3), Civ. 14(a)(1), Fed. Proc. 18(a)-(b), Rules 27(a)(1), as do federal statutes 30(a)(1), 20(a)(l)-(2), es- *6 g., see, e. tablish entitlements, 29 U. S. C.
§ 626(c)(1); 2000e-5(f)(l).) § U.S.C. Thus, Rule 23 pro- vides a one-size-fits-all formula for deciding class-action 901(b) Because question. to answer attempts same question e., it states that Grove’s suit Shady “may be —i. maintained as a added) class action” because (emphasis relief it seeks —it cannot diversity suits unless Rule 23 is ultra vires.
The Second Circuit believed that and Rule 23 do not conflict because address they different issues. Rule 23, it said, concerns the criteria for only determining whether a class can and given should be on certified; 901(b), the other hand, addresses an antecedent question: partic- ular of claim is type for eligible class treatment in the first on place question which Rule 23 is silent. See 549 F. 3d, —a at 143-144. Allstate embraces this analysis. Brief for Re- spondent 12-13.
We To line disagree. with, the between begin eligibility is certifiability artificial. Both entirely are precondi- tions for a class action. Allstate maintaining suggests must on the eligibility cause of depend action” “particular asserted, instead of some other attribute the suit, id., at 12. But that is not so. for could, Congress example, pro- vide that only claims more than a certain involving number are treatment plaintiffs “eligible” class in federal 23(a)’s court. other words, Rule relabeling prerequisites criteria” would obviate Allstate’s “eligibility objection— a sure its distinction sign eligibility-certifiabihty made-to-order.
There is no read Rule as reason, event, ad- whether claims made for class treat- dressing eligible some other law should be certified ment class actions. Allstate asserts that 23 neither nor explicitly implicitly Rule court in each a federal “to class empowers certify Id., are met. case” where the Rule’s criteria 13-14. every exactly if does: It says But what Rule 23 may action are class preconditions satisfied “[a] prescribed action added) maintained” “a class be (emphasis —not permitted.” do. actions; litigants Courts not maintain do is discretion suggested by The discretion 23’s “may” in a He his claim class residing plaintiff: may bring action if he wishes. And like the the Federal Rules rest of automatically “in Civil Rule 23 all civil Procedure, applies actions and in the district courts,” United States proceedings Yamasaki, Fed. Rule Civ. 1. See S. Proc. Califano (1979). 699-700 Allstate carved out some fed- points out that has Congress *7 g., e. eral claims from 8 reach, see, Rule 23’s U. S. C. 1252(e)(1)(B) § contends, Allstate that shows, Rule —which claims, does not authorize actions for but rather class all 901(b). § leaves room for laws like But unlike Congress, has York, the Federal Rules of authority New ultimate over Procedure; Civil it an individual rule can create exceptions sees rule as it fit —either the by directly amending a it in certain instances. statute enacting separate overriding States, Cf. Henderson v. United (1996). 654, 668 517 U. S. The fact that has created exceptions Congress specific Rule 23 that the Rule does not hardly proves apply generally. it If 23 did the Rule author- fact, proves opposite. board, statutory actions the the ize class across exceptions be unnecessary. would §901 the shows
Allstate next that structure suggests 901(a), Section it only that Rule 23 addresses certifiability. criteria analo- roughly establishes class-certification notes, that (wherefore it subsection agrees to those Rule gous 901(b)’s class § rule actions for barring But pre-empted). subsection, own and where it off as its certain claims is set 901(a) according Allstate, not. This shows, § does applies, it 901(b) Perhaps does separate subject. § that concerns 901(a). § But from subject concern subject separate it a subject us is whether concerns sepa- before question of Rule 23~and of an- purposes from the rate subject that York has swering question New structured its way statute is immaterial. Rule 23 all class actions that permits its and a meet cannot limit that requirements, State permis- sion one statute track by structuring part its Rule 23 and enacting part another additional imposes require- §901’s ments. Both of subsections answer undeniably same Rule a class question 23: whether action may pro- Burlington, for a suit. ceed Cf. given S.,U. 7-8.
The dissent 901(b) has to do argues nothing Grove its suit as a class Shady may maintain action, remedy affects only but obtain if it wins. See post, J.). 443-451 (opinion Whereas “Rule Ginsburg, of class governs aspects litigation” by “pre- scribing] considerations relevant class certification 901(b) and postcertifieation addresses proceedings,” “the size of a a class monetary plaintiff may pursue.” award Post, 446-447. dissent Accordingly, says, New York’s law may coexist in peace. need not whether a state law that
We decide limits the remedies available an class action would existing conflict 23; with Rule is not what does. itsBy terms, from provision precludes plaintiff “maintain[ing]” action a law class Unlike statutory seeking penalties. *8 (or a
sets on other remedies out of ceiling damages puts reach) 901(b) § filed actions, class says properly nothing the what a award; about remedies court class may prevents at it covers into existence all.4 actions from Conse- coming 4Contrary implication, post, 448, express to the at we no view dissent’s ceiling damages on that recoverable in as to state laws set a a are suit, pre-empted. A to for App. Respondent, see Brief Whether single 901(b) § conflict with Rule does conflict because it or not those laws a remedy, right but maintain class procedural addresses not the the note, and the several federal statutes also action. As dissent Allstate See, e.g., U. S. recovery the available in actions. C. limit class 1854(c)(1). § § 1640(a)(2)(B); U. S. C. But Con 2605(f)(2)(B); § 15 U. S. C. Rules, enactments, plenary power has the Federal so its gress override States, case of a conflict. prevail those of the even in unlike 901(b) a class not certify § court could bound quently, by remedies both and other seeking action statutory penalties to award if it it will refuse even announces in advance to do so the plaintiffs prevail; event penalties on “maintain- violate the would clear prohibition statute’s such suits as class actions. [ing]” 901(b)’s bar- § can avoid asserts dissent that a plaintiff (or from omitting request
rier his by removing) complaint assum- Even statutory for at 449-450. penalties. post, the fact that a com- are statutory penalties waivable,5 all ing would as a class action them could be omitting brought plaint 901(b) remedies. § at addressed only all prove for fraud claims, actions If the law instead banned class the fraud counts could drop would-be class-action plaintiff remainder a class his from complaint proceed no rem- the law provides action. Yet that not mean would affect fraud; procedural ban would edy short, al- be means which the remedy may pursued. Allstate’s eligibility- dissent abandons correctly though it offers fares no the alternative distinction, certifiability better. 901(b) § terms of the literal all but
The dissent
admits
e., whether
class
as Rule 23 —i
subject
address
same
the provision’s pur
insists
action
maintained —but
447-448;
remedies.
See post,
is to restrict only
pose
to the question
(“[W]hile
at 450
responsive
post,
phrased
unmis
may begin,
whether certain class actions
end”).
must
those actions
how
controlling
takably aimed
fairness
further
Unlike Rule 23, designed
dif
told)
to an entirely
901(b) (we are
“responds
efficiency,
damages
allowing statutory
fear
ferent
concern”:
overkill.”
“produce
basis would
on a classwide
be awarded
omitted). The
marks
(internal
Post,
quotation
Labs.,
Abbott
g., e. Asher
Div. 2d
737 N. Y. S.
App.
see,
But
340(5)
Law Ann.
are
Y.
Bus.
(2002) (treble
under N. Gen.
damages
42d
*9
barred).
under
law are
that
nonwaivable,
class actions
wherefore
(1)
on the
dissent reaches this conclusion
basis of
constituent
(2)
jacket;
commentary
concern recorded
the law’s bill
a
suggesting
legislature “apparently fear[ed]”
the
combining
statutory penalties
class actions and
“could result
annihilating punishment
defendant,”
V. Alexander,
reprinted
McKinney’s
Commentaries, C901:ll,
Practice
in 7B
(2006)(internal
p.
Consolidated Laws of New York Ann.,
(3)
omitted);
quotation
by
marks
a remark
the Governor in
§901(b)
signing
“'provides
his
statement
a controlled
remedy,”' post,
(quoting
at 444
Approving
on
Memorandum
reprinted
p.
1975,
207,
L.
Laws,
Ch.
1975 N. Y.
1748; em
(4)
deleted);
phasis
a state
court’s statement
that the
“
901(b)
final
compromise
text of
'was the result of a
among
”
competing
post,
(quoting Sperry Cromp
interests,’
at 444
Corp.,
(2007)).
ton
8 Y. 3d 204, 211, 863
N.
E.
1012, 1015
N.
2d
Legislature’s
This
purpose
evidence
the New York
is
pretty sparse.
accepting
But even
the dissent’s account of
legislature’s objective
value,
at face
it cannot override
the statute’s clear text. Even if its aim is to restrict
remedy
plaintiff
can
by
obtain,
achieves that end
limiting
plaintiff’s power
maintain
class action. The
manner in which the law
post,
“eould have been written,”
bearing;
457, has no
legislature
what
is
matters
law
did enact.
perception
We cannot rewrite that to reflect our
legislative purpose,
see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
(1998).6
Services,
Inc.,
75, 79-80
U. S.
The dissent’s con-
6Our
decision Walker v. Armco
Corp.,
Steel
cern conflict when by potential state laws revising thered be would Federal Rule arises; state-friendly approach of the Fed- the validity law as written and test accept to Rule. eral state determining dissent’s of approach of intentions rules on the
federal conflict based subjective to produce an destined the state legislature enterprise Co., & Wilson Sibbach confounded,’’ “confusion worse (1941). with, that one mean, begin It to would U. S. (and accordingly statute could survive pre-emption State’s court) another State’s in federal while affect procedures dif- its had would because authors not, identical law merely courts It also mean that district would aspirations. ferent case, diversity would have discern, every purpose rule, state procedural behind any pre-empted putatively law. That if its text with federal even conflicts squarely further more often laws task will arduous. prove Many impossible than one of others may and the aim aim, purpose- to the extent the dissent’s Moreover, discern. 901(b)’s §of on its characterization driven approach depends os- rules substantive, many would state aims as for standards, Pleading tensibly addressed procedure. about types often embody preferences example, policy governing summary do rules claims should succeed —as certain admissibility and the pretrial discovery, judgment, It is not even clear cases will abound. Hard evidence. of the law’s purpose court’s a state supreme pronouncement of the factual issue, predi- since existence would settle the The texts were therefore 750. displace.” “purpor[t] State's that the actual-service opinion not in our observed conflict. While (in policies of the several part judgment) “integral an rule was State's id., 751, nothing our decision limitations,” by served the statute conflict an obvious between may resolve court suggested that a federal to the state law’s ostensi- resorting rules federal the texts state and objectives. ble
cate federal a federal avoiding pre-emption ultimately federal question. Predictably, judges would be condemned history to poring may be through legislative —which obtained, lеss less less than easily familiar its thorough, & Dunn, see R. D. Mersky Fundamen- counterpart, (8th & Research 233 2002); tals ed. Torres Legal Windsor, Select, State Histories: A Legislative Annotated Bibliogra- (1993). 85 L. Lib. J. phy,
But while the dissent does indeed narrow the artificially 901(b) §of that scope pursues only substantive finding that is not central dissent’s policies, difficulty posi tion. central is that even difficulty artificial narrowing 901(b) 23. Whatever § render with Rule cannot compatible contradict policies they flatly each pursue, they other. post, (and the dissent Allstate asserts see implies, 438, interpret 446) (and must) can Rule we 23 in a manner that avoids If its statute.7 overstepping authorizing were of two meanings Rule that would susceptible vio —one “ 7The dissent suggests also read the Federal Rules we should 'with sensitivity to “‘to important state and avoid conflict with im interests’” Post, portant regulatory policies.’” Gasperini at 442 (quoting state v. Humanities, Inc,, 415, (1996)). 427, 7, 438, n. Center 518 U. S. n. 22 just policies “important” The search for interests that are state is as rejected “important or criterion standardless as the substantial” we Co., (1941), 1, v. Wilson & 312 U. S. 13-14 to Sibbach define state- rights abridge. Rule created Federal an ambiguous
If all the read dissent means is that we should Federal to avoid outcomes] Rule “substantial variations between state and fed [in Martin U. litigation,” Corp., 497, Int’l Inc. S. eral Semtek v. Lockheed (2001) (internal omitted), entirely we agree. quotation marks We validity so to the Rule’s should do not to avoid doubt as —since ipso invalid, is not forum-shopping Rule fails test see Erie’s facto (1965) Plumer, 460, 469-472 S. it is Hanna U. because reason —but to concerned we have been to “Congress just assume that is as able adjudicat federal courts in significant avoid differences between state 22, 37-38 Organization, Corp., ing claims,” Inc. v. Ricoh S. Stewart (1988) here, assumption irrelevant how (Scaua, J., dissenting). The reading of ever, Rule 23. one reasonable because there would 2072(b) not —we agree. and another that would late Corp., v. Fibreboard 842, 845 (1999); Ortiz U. S. Corp., Int’l Martin Inc. v. Lockheed 531 U. S. cf. Semtek au (2001). 23 unambiguously But it is not. 503-504 any to civil proceeding, plaintiff, thorizes are met. action if the Rule’s prerequisites a class maintain a collision with avert text, contort its even We cannot v. Armco it invalid. See Walker law might render Corp., (1980).8 Steel the dis n. 9 What 740, 750, 446 U. S. of a “conflict be sent’s is not avoiding achieves approach post, in tween Rule 23 but rather 901(b),” of the Rules validation Rule 23 (pursuant Act) with the that it conflicts substan the extent §of is no other reach the way tive 901. There policies confront head-on must therefore dissent’s destination. We authorization. statutory whether Rule 23 falls within
B Erie involved the of federal courts constitutional power context, In that rules. state law with supplant judge-made *12 one the rule was technically it made no difference was whether it the touchstone of substance or procedure; Guaranty result of litigation.” affect[s] “significantly York, (1945). That Trust not the Co. is 99, 109 v. 326 S. U. or the statutory validity constitutionality test for either the has undoubted Procedure. Congress Rule of Federal and undoubted law, power pre- state power supplant as those created, long it has so courts scribe rules for the of classification” “rationally capable rules matters regulate Hanna, En- In the Rules at 472. S., 380 U. as procedure. 8 post, 439-443, at dissent, each involved by see eases chronicled fairly read not to “control the concluded could a Federal Rule that we avoiding law, a “direct colli thus pertinent by the issue” addressed Walker, supra, at (internal quota 749 law, sion” federal and state between Hanna, supra, at a collision omitted). here, as in But tion marks is “unavoidable.” authorized this Court Act,
abling promulgate Congress review, to its U. S. subject 2072(a), C. procedure rules rules “shall not with the limitation that those but abridge, §2072(b). substantive right,” enlarge modify limitation We have held this means that Rule long for judicial must “really regulat[e] procedure, process —the duties law enforcing substantive by rights recognized and redress for disre- justly remedy administering Sibbach, at them,” S., 14; or infraction see gard supra, Burlington, Hanna, 464; at 8. The test Rule is not whether affects a litigant’s rights; Mississippi Publishing Corp. rules do. most procedural v. Murphree, (1946). 326 U. S. What matters what regulates: If the Rule itself it “the manner governs the means” which the are it by litigants’ rights “enforced,” if “the valid; rules of which alters decision court [the] Id., (internal will it is not. adjudicate rights,” [those] omitted). marks quotation test, we every have
Applying statutory rejected chal- ato Rule lenge come before We has us. have found to be compliance Rules prescribing id., (Fed. methods for serving at 445-446 process, see Rule supra, 4(f)); Hanna, (Fed. Proc. Civ. at 463-465 Rule Civ. Proc. whose 4(d)(1)), and mental or requiring litigants physi- Sib- to examinations, cal condition is to submit see dispute supra, Schlagenhauf bach, (Fed. 14-16 Rule Proc. 35); Civ. Holder, (1964) (same).
v. U. S. 113-114 Likewise, have imposition we Rules upheld authorizing sanctions Burlington, supra, those who see file frivolous upon appeals, (Fed. 8at Proc. or who App. 38), sign court papers a reasonable without the facts inquiry asserted, into see Guides, Business Inc. Chromatic Communications Enter- *13 prises, Inc., (1991) (Fed. S. 551-554 Rule Civ. 11). some effect Proc. Each of these Rules had on practical but each parties’ only the undeniably regulated rights, for thosе none enforcing altered rights; rights process of decision the rules remedies, the available
themselves, adjudicated either. the court by which it that Rules think obvious we Applying criterion, (and multiple by against multiple allowing claims claims e.g., together See, litigated are also valid. to be parties) claims), (joinder (joinder of of Civ. Proc. 18 Rules Fed. (consolidation actions). 42(a) neither Rules parties), Such abridge separate plaintiffs’ to relief nor change entitlements pro- rights; they are how the claims alter defendants’ as it 23—at least insofar For same reason, cessed. against willing join separate plaintiffs claims their allows 2072(b)’s in a class action—falls the same defendants within join- no less than traditional action, authorization. A class (of merely species), a it enables federal court der which is a adjudicate multiple parties once, instead claims joinder, separate like leaves the suits. And traditional parties’ legal rights intact and the rules of deci- and duties unchanged. sion of class actions contends that the authorization
Allstate Shady substantively Allowing Grove to sue on not neutral: dispute [the] “transform^] over a five hun- behalf of a class penalty dispute a a five million dollar over dred dollar into aggregate Respondent penalty.” for Allstate’s lia- Brief 1. pro- bility, depend not on whether the suit does however, 1,000-plus ceeds action. Each members class (as acknowledges) bring putative could Allstate class freestanding asserting It suit his individual claim. is un- doubtedly plaintiffs bring who would true that some indi- relatively sums involved will vidual suits small choose join bearing, however, has no on All- class action. That legal rights. plaintiffs’ state’s or the likelihood (even plaintiffs many) will be induced to sue some just availability action is sort “incidental of a class long 2072(b), effec[t]” not violate Missis- held does we have supra, sippi Publishing, at 445. argues 23 violates because the
Allstate that Rule §901(b), right displaces, creates state law it Fed- *14 eral Rule a abridges namely, “substantive . right. . not to — be class-action in subjected aggregated a liability” single suit. Brief for 31. To Respondent begin with, we doubt 901(b) (which is so. in the text of Nothing is to code) in be found New York’s confines it to procedural claims under New York and course York law; New has no power to alter substantive created rights duties by other sover- As we have eigns. said, consequence cer- excluding tain class actions bemay defendant cap damages can face in single suit, but the law itself alters only procedure. 901(b)
In that respect, is no different from a state lаw for- bidding simple joinder. As fallback argument, Allstate ar- that even if gues is a procedural provision, was id., enacted “for reasons,” at 24 (emphasis added). Its end was not to “the conduct improve of the liti- itself” but to gation process alter “the outcome of that proc- Id., ess.” 26.
The fundamental with both these difficulty arguments is the substantive nature of New York’s law, or its sub- makes no stantive A purpose, Federal Rule of difference. Procedure is not in valid some jurisdictions invalid in others —or valid in cases some and invalid in others —de- its pending upon whether effect is to frustrate a state sub- (or stantive law a state law enacted for substan- tive Sibbach: That could not clearer in purposes).
“The petitioner says phrase ['substantive rights’ the Rules connotes more; Act] its use by intended that Congress this regulating procedure should not Court deal with important substantial theretofore rights recognized. where and Recognized whom? The courts are divided to the by power in the absence statute a physical to order examina- tion. a number an order authorized such stat- ute or rule.... more moreover,
“The asserted no right, important many than others District enjoyed by litigants Courts several the Federal states, before Rules sitting old
of Civil and abolished rights Procedure altered new in connection and created ones privileges conduct ... If we were to litigation. adopt sug- gested importance alleged right criterion of we should invite endless and confusion worse litigation confounded. must rule The test be whether really *15 (foot- .” at procedure S., . . . 13-14 regulates omitted). note
Hanna that the same understanding unmistakably expressed of a with Act is to Enabling Federal Rule the be compliance not and its effects in itself, assessed the Rule by consulting applications: individual the court to apply has been instructed Federal
“[T]he Rule, and if only can refuse to do so the Com- Advisory this and in their mittee, erred Court, Congress prima facie Rule judgment that in question transgresses Act nor neither terms constitutional restrictions.” at S.,U. 471. it is sum, not the or nature or substantive procedural matters, of the law but affected state that the sub-
purpose or nature of the Federal Rule. We have stantive procedural held since reaffirmed the valid- Sibbach, and repeatedly, of a whether it upon Federal Rule ity entirely regu- depends Hanna, Sibbach, at supra, 14; lates supra, procedure. does, at at 8. If it it is authorized 464; Burlington, § all 2072 and is in all with jurisdictions, respect valid incidental state-created claims, of its effect regardless upon rights.
C to the A few concurrence. We under- response words in stand it to the framework we apply requires accept —which and state rules can first, whether determining (because answer and reconciled different they questions), if second, cannot, determining they 2072(b). Post, 421-422 Rule runs afoul at (Stevens, J., The concur- concurring part judgment). concurring with conflict, rence us that Rule 23 agrees post, from 429-431, us departs respect second of the i. e., whether test, Federal Rule part application Like us, violates it 2072(b), 422-428. answers post, no, but a reason different from Post, ours. 431-436. case on basis,
The concurrence would decide this not but the state law it procedural, displaces the sense that it not as a does “function procedural, part of the State’s definition of rights substantive and remedies.” Post, at 416-417. A state rule is not pre-empted, to the as it is “so according concurrence, long so bound up with,” or “sufficiently with,” intertwined a substantive state-law defines remedy “that of that right scope at 420,428. right remedy,” post,
This Sibbach, conflicts with analysis which squarely the rule we established The concurrence contends apply. did rule
that Sibbach out but is not its so. approach, *16 the a test on Recognizing that turns the impracticability law, idiosyncrasies adopted state Sibbach and applied a rule with criterion: whether the Federal Rule single S.,U. at That the “really regulates 14.9 procedure.” 9The Sibbach Court... no “[t]he concurrence claims that had occasion particular the Federal Rules application to consider the Post, at 427. Had Sibbach been Enabling would Act.” question offend the theory, the true —which quite concurrence’s that is demonstrates applying For with Sibbach. theory conformity is with the inconsistent that how very issue Sibbach Enabling petitioner’s Act decided: The the Rules was that the was 35 and 37 Act’s authoriza position Rules exceeded id., rejected S., 9, 13; argument, at that the Court faced tion, failing 13-16, court to proceeded apply to for at reverse the lower id., be a rejection not clearer correctly, at 16. There could the Rule theory that the now concurrence advocates. question of obligation concurrence “the ‘the responds specific
The not of a state’” was the law before of federal courts to substantive 9). Sibbach, at It is clear from post, supra, Court, (quoting at 427 Erie prohibition to the context, however, passage this referred Tompkins, See Erie R. Co. displace state rules that law. court-created same result yielded would have approach concurrence’s the rule wе did matters what nothing; in Sibbach proves exemptions room special rule leaves no apply, of a state rule.10 or particular the function on purpose based an into Sibbach excep- read an attempt have rejected We S., see Schlagenhauf, no basis in the tion with opinion, an to find such at and we see reason 113-114, implied no limitation today. Sibbach, but seeks not to apply concurrence reality, it). rewrite Its (or, same, ap- overrule it what short to the shrift stat- insists, concurrence
proach, gives from text Rules utory “abridging], the Federal prohibiting 2072(b). or substantive right,” enlarging], modify[ing] It is There is to that. post, 424-425. something pos- sible how it can be determined whether Fed- understand eral without rights Rule “enlarges” consulting state law: If the a substantive even one right, Rule creates it rights, some state-created establishes duplicates new But how it is hard understand it can right. determined whether a Federal Rule “mod- “abridges” ifies” substantive without what rights state-created knowing would obtain if exist. Sib- the Federal did not rights (1938). opinion unquestionably U. S. 64 dealt with compliance 2072(b), adopted Rules’ and it the standard we apply depend question, here to on whether resolve the which does individual abridge applications modify rights. S., of the Rule state-law See 312 U. extent Sibbach 13-14. To not address the Federal Rules’ did valid- ity law, surely did, S., Hanna contrary vis-á-vis see 380 U. controls, and made clear that Sibbach’s test still see 380 U. at 464- 465, 470-471. *17 Sibbach, insists surely concurrence that we have misread since procedure “in most regulates Federal Rule cases” does not do so displaces when it one of those “rare” state substantive laws are dis Post, as guised 428, at n. 13. procedure. rules mistakes This what the regulates for its Federal Rule incidental As we have explained, effects. supra, at 406-408, litigants’ most Rules have some effect on rights remedy, or their to obtain a but that ability does not mean the Rule regulates or rights itself those remedies.
413 back’s exclusive focus on Federal challenged Rule— driven real concern very that Federal Rules which vary from State to would chaos, State see 312 U. S., at §2072(b)'s 13-14 —is hard to square terms.11 Sibbach has been law, settled however, nearly seven decades.12 aside any Setting precedent requires “special a bare belief that it was Pat justification” beyond wrong.
terson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. (1989) (internal omitted). marks quotation And party seeking however, approach, The concurrence’s is itself unfaithful to the stat terms. ute’s Section bans abridgment or modification only of “substantive rights,” prohibit but concurrence would pre-emption of “procedural intimately up rules that are scope bound of a substan post, right remedy,” tive at 433. This allow would States to force a array parochial procedures wide they on federal long courts so as are Post, “sufficiently intertwined right remedy.” with a state at 428. 12The implies Sibbach concurrence has slipped desuetude, into ap post, parently for lack of 428-429, sufficient at citations. n. 14. We any are unaware rule to the effect that a holding expires of ours if the setting it forth periodically case is not event, revalidated. In concurrence’s account of our Sibbach shunning greatly exaggerated.
Hanna did not
merely
case,
recognized
dte the
but
it as establishing the
S.,
governing
464-465,
rule.
at
470-471. Mississippi Publishing
Corp. Murphree,
(1946),
v.
326 U. S.
445-446
likewise cited Sibbach
applied
test, examining
Rule,
same
the Federal
not the state law
displaced. True, Burlington
Woods,
R.
Northern
Co.
it
v.
appear the U. S. its rule —and in its analysis focus on the Federal unit of alive proper Rule as and well. —is obiter dictum that a court contrast, Hanna’s obscure “need not wholly outcome, blind itself” effect on a case’s to a Rule’s post, twice, atS., U. invokes 428-429, 473—which the concurrence opinions years n. 14—has in the since its never resurfaced our first Sibbach’s straightfor- it east doubt on unfortunate utterance. Nor does cited Sibbach for that notes, Hanna ward As test: the concurrence state- ment, 473, showing inconsistency no between the saw two.
414 statutory bur an even bears greater
overturn precedent us, ibid., free to Congress since remains correct den, Finley g., e. to our so, see, enables it do adhering precedent States, v. United 28 (1989); 1367; U. S. 545, 490 U. S. C. Corp. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S. Exxon Mobil v. (2005). no service by presenting We
546, do Congress Allstate has not even moving target. events, it a In all Sibbach, its us to overrule let alone carried burden asked IBP, Alvarez, Inc. us to do S. so. Cf. persuading (2005). our de cast aside decades-old 21, 32 we should Why (as ex the concurrence us, cision since escapes especially that would not affect the result.13 plains) Sibbach that The concurrence also contends applying whether substance Federal Rule regulates assessing post, at n. Un- 426, is not 10. easy. procedure always have man- we some hard will doubtedly (though cases arise since years to muddle well enough aged thrоugh correct, 9, our post, 425, disposition n. that under The is at concurrence Sibbach, 14, “really will any regulates procedure,” that rule with rule, up” the latter is pre-empt conflicting however “bound however, that wrong, law. The is result concurrence 2072(b) post, 425-426, n. 9. implausible, §of proves interpretation our only rights” is if one the term “substantive troubling The result stretches themselves, also rights but to mean not state-law Neither the text nor our closely to them. procedures connected state-law examples The con- expansive precedent supports interpretation. limitations, proof, standards burdens currence offers —statutes its definition damages make broad appellate awards —do review They merely illustrate persuasive. more rights of substantive regu- “really a rule determine may rare difficult cases latter, there is no concludes If one procedure or substance. lates” rule; itself invalid. Federal pre-emption of the state many more if sense would make The concern concurrence’s up procedures” rights “bound alter state-law effectively Rules concedes, post, at concurrence But as the Sibbach. would survive under of a few outlier possible existence very would do so. n. few interpretation Congress is absurd. prove Sibbach’s instances does not system of a price uniform anomalies accepted such well have procedure. of decided). was But as the
Sibbach concurrence acknowl- post, difficulty edges, basic unavoidable: The right[s],” 2072(b), itself refers “substantive statute so *19 escaping substance-procedure there no the distinction. approach nothing the more, What concurrence’s does to difficulty, magnifies many diminish the but rather it times single question a over. Instead of a hard whether Federal regulates procedure, approach substance or Rule that will present questions, forcing of hundreds hard federal courts to procedural the or assess character of countless may single rules that a state conflict with Federal Rule.14 sidestep problem it still does And the seeks to avoid. day, of At the end the one face must come to face with the (with policy pu- decision or not the state which a tatively may pertains up”) state rule be “bound right remedy,” post, to “substantive a at 433—that is, procedure.15 whether it is substance or The more one ex- plores the alternatives rule, Sibbach’s the more its wisdom apparent. becomes
D reality acknowledge keeping must the that We the open proceed door federal-court actions that class cannot produce shopping. court state will forum That is unae- argues “taxing” The that is no approach concurrence its more than if any “facially few Federal are ours because Rules that valid” under the Post, fail 426, Act will the n. 10. concurrence’s test. But conclusion will be reached federal courts that after have considered applying of state rules the concurrence’s inscrutable hundreds standard. concurrence if can insists the task will easier courts “con post, law,” 10, of regard the nature and functions the n. state sider e., post, i. what “form,” (emphasis deleted), of the law’s at 419 the less actually says. amorphous inquiry think into “nature We law increase, will decrease, of state law rather than functions” tend procedural. difficulty classifying Federal as substantive Rides 901(b), post, of its test Walking through application the concurrence's lighten will 431-436, approach little reason to its gives hope for lower courts. burden when it of judge-made the consequence comes as
ceptable rules created fill law. “gaps” positive supposed Hanna, 380 where neither at 471-472. For rule Constitution, a statute nor deci- treaty, provides court “state law one, sion or authorizes a federal to supply Ibid.; can see must because there be no other law.” govern Erie’s 95 Cal. L. Rev. Clark, Constitutional Source, (2007). law, from with the divergence But attendant forum is the inevitable consequence shopping, intended) (indeed, result a uniform might sys- one say itself has created the procedure. tem of federal Congress case follow different course same possibility if in federal of state court. Cf. Hanna, filed instead is that S.,U. at 472-473. The short matter or not it is valid whether alters governing procedure *20 the outcome of in a that induces forum way the case shop- to “disembowel either the To hold would be otherwise ping. over federal procedure” Constitution’s grant power at 473-474. Id., exercise of it. Congress’s [*] [*] [*] reversed, is The of the Court of judgment Appeals case is remanded for further proceedings.
It so ordered. in Stevens, Justice concurring part concurring the judgment. Law Ann. at N. Y. Prac. issue, New York law Civ.
(CPLR) that is not (West 2006), is rule procedural I Accordingly, agree York’s substantive law. New part of Civil Procedure that Federal Rule with Justice Scalia II-A case and Parts I and of the join 23 must in this apply Ginsburg I also with Justice But agree Court’s opinion. rules state federal there are some function they cases because diversity courts must as a рart State’s definition of substantive rights remedies.
I
It is
long-recognized
federal courts
principle
sitting
diversity “apply
substantive law and federal proce-
law.” Hanna
Plumer,
dural
(1965).1
aspects Article III managed by *21 Hanna, at S., 380 U. But while judges. 473-474. Con- Humanities, Inc., Gasperini v. Center 415, 1 See also 518 U. S. 427 for (5th (1996); 2007) E. Chemerinsky, 5.3, § p. Federal Jurisdiction ed. (hereinafter Chemerinsky); al., J. Moore et Moore’s Federal 17A Practice (3d 2009) (hereinafter Moore). § ed. 124.01[1] S, Tompkins, The choice in Erie R. Co. v. (1938), 304 U. requires court consider “the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement that forum-shopping and inequitable avoidance of administration of the laws.” Plumer, Gasperini, Hanna 460, (1965); S., v. 380 U. S. see also 518 U. Erie (describing inquiry).
at 427-428 have proce- power prescribe constitutional gress rules that substantive law dural interfere with state In- has respects, number is not what done. that Congress it has that stead, provided Enabling in the Act although rules of Supreme Court” may “prescribe general prac- “[t]he tice those rules 2072(a), “shall not procedure,” abridge, 2072(b). There- or enlarge modify any right,” substantive fore, one the Federal “[w]hen situation covered Rules,... court has instructed to apply been Rule” unless would violate the Act or the Constitu- so doing Id., tion. 471. Act and the Rules of Decision
Although Act Enabling that are to state “say, federal courts ‘substan- roughly, apply tive’ law law,” federal are not inquiries ‘procedural’ Ibid.; id., The the same. see 469-470. Act also Enabling not invite does federal courts to in the engage “relatively Erie id., 471, but instead instructs unguided choice,” only or federal cannot “abridge, rules enlarge modify any 2072(b). Act’s limitation right,” does mean rules cannot that federal state displace policy that federal rules cannot judgments; means only displаce See Sib- remedies. State’s definition of its own rights Co., bach Wilson & (1941) U. S. 13-14 (reasoning ” “the ‘substantive embraces those phrase rights’ are to be enforced the judicial rights sought proceedings). “ has thus struck balance: rules Congress [Housekeeping diversity cases, for federal courts” will generally dif- inevitably some federal rules “will notwithstanding Hanna, at 473. But not fer” from state rules. §2072(a), will every federal practice “rul[e] procedure,” rules To must contrary, state law. displace of “sensitivity important degree with some interpreted Gasperini v. Center regulatory policies,” state interests and Inc., Humanities, (1996), n. 7 518 U. S. ap- Congress’ cases background against plied diversity
419 rights not command that such rules alter substantive degree with consideration “the to which the Rule makes litigation the character stray and result of the federal from the course it would follow Hanna, 380 courts,” U. S., in.state tricky implement.3 This 473. can be a balance important Congress
It is to observe that the balance has part, struck turns, on the nature the state law that being displaced by my is a federal And in rule. view, the application necessarily of that balance does not turn on the state law at issue takes the of what form traditionally procedural. described as substantive or actually part Rather, turns on whether the state law rights a State's framework of remedies. See §2072(b); (“The cf. Hanna, 380 U. 471 line S., at between ‘procedure’ legal ‘substance’ and shifts as context changes”); Guaranty Trust York, Co. v. U. S. 99, 108 (1945) (noting “‘proce- the words “‘substance’” and impl[y] “[e]ach depending upon dure’” different variables used”). particular problem [they] for which are Applying requires this interpre balance, careful therefore, provisions tation of the state and federal issue. “The line procedural hazy,” between and substantive law is Erie R. (1938) Tompkins, (Reed,
v.Co. concurring U. S. J., result), procedure and matters and matters of substance “mutually categories easily are not exclusive ascertain (Frankfurter, able Sibbach, 312 at 17 contents,” S., J., dis senting). lawyers procedural “[r]ules Rather, which call do always procedure,” by regulating exhaust their effect Corp., Cohen v. 541, 555 Industrial Loan U. S. Beneficial (1949), “procedure and in some situations, substance are well-nigh separation so interwoven that becomes rational im possible,” dissenting). (Rutledge, pro id., at 559 A J., “state though ordinary undeniably ‘procedural’ in the rule, cedural Chemerinsky 5.3.5, (observing “have struggled at 321 that courts approach permits ap rules to be develop an uniform allowing govern”). in federal court still substantive law to pliеd while *23 term,” of the “to influence out- sense exist substantive may Healy Metropolitan comes,” A.S. Co. Sewer- v. Milwaukee age Disk, 1995) (CA7 60 F. (Posner, J.), 3d and may 310 in some instances become with the state-created so bound up or right that it defines the of that substantive remedy scope or remedy. may Such for be right laws, example, seemingly rules that it difficult procedural make more significantly or to to limit the of bring claim, scope a thus prove serving g., Cohen, e. (state that See, S., at 555 “proce- claim. 337 bond required dure” that before post suing); plaintiffs Guaranty Trust Co., (state of statute limita- U. S. tions).4 also amount Such define the “procedural may rules” g., Gasperini, e. (state 518 U. at 427 See, of recovery. as verdicts means of procedure examining jury capping available Moore remedy); (listing examples 124.07[3][a] of that affect the amount federal courts’ state laws applying of a judgment).
In our has mandated that federalist system, Congress federal the form their courts dictate state legislatures were courts substantive law must And federal ig- take. nore those of state law that operate substantive portions limit the devices, it instances many could in procedural ways their and remedies. sovereign rights States define vehi- When a State chooses to a use traditionally a cle as substantive rights means defining scope or federal courts must remedies, recognize respect Ragan Co., & Warehouse v. Merchants Transfer choice. Cf. (1949) (“Since of action is cre- cause th[e] S. Co., (CA7 Auto. Ins. Cf. Milam Farm Mut. 166, 170 State F. 2d 1992) J.) its (holding that state furtherance of sub (Posner, “where a particular type more of state- prove difficult to policy stantive makes this, if a rule of claim, which it even denominated by law the rule does evidentiary given diversity be in a terms, -will effect cast in evidence (list policy”); 124.09[2] state Moore suit as an expression evidentiary rules to courts diver ing examples federal suits). proof. state-imposed sity examples burdens include Other ated local of it law, the measure is to found qualifies abridges local law. . . . Where local law it, suit”). federal court must follow
II appear govern When a federal both and state rule law question sitting diversity, before federal court our precedents two-step have set out a framework for federal negotiate thorny steps courts to this area. At both of the inquiry, question there ais critical about what the state law rule mean. scope
The court must first determine whether the *24 “‘sufficiently federal rule is broad’” to “‘control the issue’” “thereby leaving operation” before the court, no rоom for the conflicting seemingly Burlington of state law. See North (1987); ern R. Woods, Co. v. 480 1, 4-5 S. Walker U. v. Armco (1980). Corp., 446 Steel U. S. 9 740, 749-750, n. If the operate alongside federal not rule does can or state the Congress” “Ac[t] governing par then is rule, there no question, engage ticular 1652, 28 court U. S. C. and the must inquiry the Rules of Decision Act traditional under Erie progeny. “plain meaning” and its instances, some the “ ” not a federal rule will come into ‘direct collision’ the operate. 446 Walker, S., state and both can law, 750, at U. fairly n. In other the rule “when con 9, instances, 749. Burlington R. U. at with strued,” Co., S., Northern 480 4, “sensitivity important regulatory poli interests and state Gasperini, 518 not cies,” 7, at n. will collide with S., state law.5 Ginsbubg, post, opin 5 I at agree (dissenting thus with Justice 438-442 ion), rule, interpreted light that a must be law, federal like federal “sensitivity many considerations, important including different state (internal omitted), interests,” marks post, quotation “regulatory at Organization, v. Corp., 437. Inc. Ricoh policies,” post, at See Stewart (“We (1988) when 22, 37-38 J., dissenting) assume ... U. S. should (Scalia, just as have so, as concerned we been Congress fair it is do adjudicat- significant between state and federal courts avoid differences “sufficiently broad rule other the federal hand, on If, is a there such that Court,” the issue before control court 749-750, S., 446 U. collision,” Walker, “direct “repre- federal rule application of the decide whether must authority “rulemaking be- ... a valid exercise” sents Burling- Enabling Act,” this on Court Rules stowed Gasperini, see also S., 5; Co., R. 480 U. ton Northern S., at 471-474. Hanna, 380 U. 7; n. “not rules requires, alia, that federal inter Act right.” modify any enlarge abridge, substantive added). (emphasis Unlike JUSTICE U. S. C. Scalia, effectively application rule that I that an believe right rem- abridges, enlarges, state-created or modifies Congress have the edy consti- violates this command. power supplant rules that are law” with “to tutional procedure,” “rationally capable ante, at as of classification (internal omitted), gener- quotation we should but marks Wyeth ally presume Levine, not done so. Cf. has (2009) (observing “we with the start 555 U. S. displace assumption” does not that a federal statute State’s purpose clear manifest “unless that Con- law was omitted)). (internal gress” quotation Indeed, marks abridge, enlarge or that federal rules “shall mandate opposite right” modify any intent, evinces *25 delegate Congress’ rules to to the creation of does decision Wright, political branch, see 19 than to a C. this Court rather Cooper, Practice and Procedure Federal Miller, A. & E. 1996) (hereinafter (2d Wright). p. ed. §4509, 265 may inquiry step well bleed back Thus, the second appears abridge, rule en- a federal into the When first. Thus, federal. .. Rule of deciding in whether a Procedure ing claims. .. . issue, reading that signifi- a would create encompasses particular broad courts should be state and federal avoided if disuniformity cant between Ginsburg, however, disagree with Justice about permits”). I the text meaning contorted, rules be degree of federal absent to which the so, policy state goals. to do to accommodate congressional authorization
423 or a substantive federal courts large, modify right, must con- sider the rule be can reasonably interpreted avoid that See, result. e. Semtek Int’l impermissible g., Inc. (2001)
v. Lockheed Martin U. S. 503 531 Corp., (avoiding an 41(b) Rule of interpretation Civil Procedure that “would violate the arguably limitation jurisdictional 2072(b)).6 Rules Act” in contained And Enabling when such a not “saving” construction is and the rule possible would courts Act, violate federal cannot Enabling 28 rule. (mandating See U. S. C. federal rules “shall not” alter “any right” substantive (emphasis (“[A] Hanna, court, U. in added)); S., measuring a Federal Rule the standards contained En- against need not Act..., blind itself abling wholly degree which makes the Rule the character and result the federal from litigation stray the course it would follow in state (not- see also courts”); Inc., Semtek Int’l 531U. 503-504 if state law ing that “the federal granted particular right, court's . . would of that seem vio- extinguishment right.
late cf. 2072(b)]”); Statement of Justices Black and Doug- [§ (1963) federal las, U. S. (observing rules “as have to in- situations declared applied might given valid”). A federal cannot rule, therefore, govern particu- lar a state case in which the would law that is rule displace the term but in the use of is so inter- ordinary twined it functions to de- with a right remedy And right. fine the the state-created absent scope gov- must rule, engage federal a federal court erning Act under Erie line traditional Decision inquiry, Rules (1999) Corp., v. Fibreboard 815, 842, 845 (adopt Ortiz also 527 U. S. that, ing Rule of Civil Procedure 23 “limiting of Federal construction” Act”); alia, inter Enabling the Rules “minimizes conflict with potential (1997) (observ Products, Windsor, Inc. S. 612-613 Amchem keeping with the Rules interpreted rules ing that “must be abridge, ‘shall procedure Act, rules of instructs which ”). right’ enlarge modify *26 424
of cases. This Act shows of the “sensi- Enabling application (internal at 442 tivity important interests,” state post, at marks post, and quotation omitted), “regulatory policies,” but does that 437, authorized, it so by as Congress ensuring federal rules that rules of prac- ordinarily “prescribe general § tice and do “not 2072(a), abridge, procedure,” enlarge 2072(b). § modify any substantive right,” Act Enabling believes the sole ques Justice Scalia is whether tion the federal rule “really regulates procedure,” (internal ante, 410, at 407, 414, opinion) n. 411, (plurality marks omitted), which quotation means, apparently, it “the the manner and the means which regulates litigants’ (internal are at 407 rights enforced,” ante, quotation marks omitted). I interpretation This respectfully disagree.7 Act Enabling Act’s first limitation consonant 2072(a). rules “general But practice procedure,” it rules “not ignores second limitation that such also enlarge abridge, modify any right,” and in balance that (emphasis added),8 doing so ignores subject Enabling This of the Act has been of sub understanding criticism, See, g., Wright 4509, rightfully stantial academic so. e. 269-270, 272; Erie, Ely, Irrepressible Myth 87 Harv. L. Rev. (1974) (hereinafter Fallon, see J. Ely); Manning, also R. Meltzer, D.
D. & Shapiro, Hart Wechsler’sThe Federal Courts and (6th 2009) System 593, Ely). (discussing n. 6 ed. much, 412-413, ante, argues as but concedes see Scalia Justice I possibility might a that insofar allow for the federal rule violate procedural rule, my a displaces seemingly Act when terms,” is itself which cover approach “unfaithful the statute’s “substan (internal rules,” ante, rights” “procedural quota tive but not n. omitted). objection my interpretation marks tion This not an look a rule Enabling Act—that courts must to whether alters sub rights way it, I would given simply to the stantive a case—but something for the that a tra allowing possibility regulates state rule that might actually define substantive ditionally considered to be key objection, moreover, point: misses right. Justice Scalia's really is not. instances, appears procedural A rule some state rule really be a appeal may on damages damages cap. reviewed about how are can bring A rule Gasperini, plaintiff at 427. claim *27 Congress struck between uniform rules of federal procedure a for respect construction its own State’s of rights remedies. It also ignores separation-of-powers pre see at sumption, §4509, 265, and Wright federalism presump Wyeth, tion, see at S.,U. that counsel 565, against judi w.9 created rules cially state substantive displacing la only may years really three a on the right be limit existence to seek proved beyond redress. A rule that a claim must be a reasonable may really doubt scope be a definition of the of the claim. These are the sorts of might “procedural,” they rules that one describe as but nonethe- Thus, rights. less define if a displaced substantive federal rule such a rule, state the federal rule would have altered the State’s “substantive rights.” plurality’s The interpretation Enabling appears Act that mean up no matter a prоvision how bound state the State’s rights with own or remedies, any contrary happens regulate rule federal “the man- litigants’ rights ante, ner and enforced,” the means which the are at (internal omitted), quotation govern. many marks must There are ways seemingly procedural may displace in which a rules State’s formula- example, limitations, tion of although its substantive law. For statutes a procedural rules, temporal some sense can also be understood limi- legally rights; tation promulgate on created this Court if were a federal still, instances, in some period, limitations federal courts would be re- quired Similarly, if periods. state limitations federal rules case, eviscerate a altered the burden of this could critical as- proof a pect right a how is enforced —of a one deals with State’s —albeit if a federal rule rights appel- framework of and remedies. Or about damages are displaced late review rule about how reviewed on state a state appeal, pre-empting damages cap. rule be might federal S.,U. Gasperini, Cf. 427. at might some of federal rules responds
Justice
Scalia
these
they
Enabling
may
“really
Act because
invalid under his view of the
(internal quotation
Ante,
414,
marks omit-
regulat[e] procedure.”
at
n. 13
ted).
empty the
test
course, highlights
plurality’s
how
response,
This
limited to
really
10,
response is also
those rules
is. See
n.
infra.
substance, ante,
407;
at
it does not
that can be
“regulatfing]”
described as
issue in
right
litigation,
alter
those
rules that
address
federal
(1941),
they
when
Co.,&
S.
13-14
see Sibbach v. Wilson
speculates that “Con-
Scalia
displace particular
state laws.
Justice
alteration of substantive
the occasional
accepted”
well have
gress
Ante,
procedure.”
system of federal
rights
price of uniform
“as the
that Con-
speculate about
balance
n. 13.
we forced to
Were
much of my
Although
plurality
agree
appears
ante,
§ it nonetheless
412-413,
interpretation
see
of which are mis-
reasons,
both
approach for two
rejects
that if federal courts
First,
taken.
worries
Justice
Scalia
law,
into the
on state
will
effect of
rules
inquire
federal
about
enmesh
courts
difficult determinations
rule would
application
displace
given
ante, at 409,
determination about
rights.
in-
414-415, and nn.
I
see
an
Act
14,15.
why
do not
*28
that looks to
is more
than
quiry
necessarily
taxing
state law
is
event,
But in
that
what
inquiry
Justice
Scalia’s.10
Act
it
to decide
may not be
Enabling
requires:
easy
While
what is
“the
sub-
designations
“substantive
actually
right,”
stantive and
for the Enabling
become
important,
Act has
723;
§4509,
made them so.”
see also
Ely
Wright
rule we think
266. The
is not what
therefore,
question,
is
would be
on
courts. The
what
easiest
federal
question
rule
Congress
Although
established.
Scalia
Justice
administrable,
rules, his
generally prefer easily
bright-line
second-best
does not
license
adopt
us
preference
give
of the
Act.
cannot
interpretation
ignore
Courts
Enabling
in the
simplicity.
text
context
service of
necessary
struck,
very
is
gress
well
But no
might
agree.
speculation
I
Congress
not” alter
explicitly
us that federal
rules “shall
because
told
2072(b).
“any”
right.
facially
that
under 28 U. C.
It will be
federal rule
is
valid
S.
rare that
rights.
§2072
displace
definition of its own substantive
will
a State’s
occasionally
§4509,
might
Wright
(observing that “unusual cases
at 272
law, application of
of an unorthodox state rule of
arise which... because
rights”).
upon
intrude
state substantive
a Civil
... would
Justice
than
moreover,
much more determinate
is not
interpretation,
Scaxia’s
law,
it
having to evaluate
tasks
Although
avoids courts’
mine.
really
is
It
“procedural.”
whether a federal rule
them with
out
figuring
hard to
question
especially
resolve
hard to
that
is
know the answer
of the state law
functions
that
considering the nature and
it without
“‘test’
no test at all —in a
plurality’s
federal rule
displace.
will
is procedural
if,
the statement
that a matter
sense, it
little more than
Id.,
by revelation,
at 264.
procedural.”
it is
Second, plurality argues
its
interpretation
Act is dictated
this
Court’s decision in Sibbach,
which
Federal Rule
applied
about when
must
parties
sub-
mit
to medical examinations.
But
the plurality misreads
As Justice
opinion.
Harlan observed
Hanna, “short-
hand
which
formulations
have
in earlier
appeared
opinions
are
prone
untoward
carry
results
frequently arise
from oversimplification.”
at 475
(concurring opin-
ion). To understand Sibbach, it is first
necessary
under-
stand the issue that was before the Court. The petitioner
raised
the facial
only
question
“Rules 35 and 37 [of
the Federal Rules of Civil
are . . .
Procedure]
within the
mandate
to this court”
Congress
the specific ques-
tion of “the
of federal courts to
obligation
the substan-
tive law of a state.”11
11The rules could not validly subjects address questions involving “important of policy,” Supp. Petitioner, 7; Brief for T. p. O. see Reply No. also to Brief for *29 Respondent, 28, p. O. T. 2 (summarizing No. that the petitioner ar only gued right compelled “[t]he not to be submit to a physical examination” is “а ‘substantive’ right by Congress” forbidden to be ad by the Procedure, though dressed Federal Rules of Civil “even in theory right the is not of the character determinative of litigation”). peti the words, tioner’s own . . . in “[t]his contention not itself [did] involve the ibid., [applicable] Illinois,” petitioner law of and the her briefing refer enced the applicable only otherwise state law “to show that [she] was in a ibid., contention,” is, the position make to show that the federal applying not, court rule the was federal under Rules of Decision id., Act, law, state applying see at 3. plurality by including long quote The defends its view from two Ante, Sibbach. paragraphs quoted at But passage 409-410.
Sibbach only may a facial into whether federal inquiry describes rules particular subject S., plurality’s “deal at The with” matter. 312 U. 13. moreover, quote, quoted half of one of paragraphs, block omits which explained rights” Enabling the term in the Court “substantive “certainly rights” “rights by Act embraces as conferred law to be such enforced,” injured protected right per- such as “the not to be in one’s necessary analysis to the any Sibbach, further Nor, was requiring issue, at matter of the resolution ease because pertain litigants, to “substantive exams for not medical did Although rules rights” Enabling most state under the Act. policy adopted bearing for some litigation process on the are scope of “procedural” seemingly rules define reason, few right remedy. in Sib- matter at issue a substantive or judgments about competing and state bach reflected may been privacy privacy have concerns interests. Those they per- weighty not but did substantive; some sense remedy scope right in the or at issue tain state to the petitioner’s argument litigation. response to the Thus, in “rights only rights” not include in Sibbach that “substantive litigants” “general adjudicated sought by but also to be legisla- policy “question[s] public principiéis]” that the pass “the upon,” we held that 2-3, id., ture is able to ” rights, state phrase rights’ such embraces ‘substantive sought to enforced case, the tort in that that are law judicial proceedings, If the at 13-14. id., in the sufficiently displaced that was in fact a state rule Rule had remedy, perhaps right then intertwined with a state analysis different.13 Our been Act have would contrary.14 subsequent not to the cases are Ibid. infraction.” negligence” [such] son another’s and “to redress right “to redress rule, enlarges for example, But whether a federal displaces. that it on the state law depend infraction” will [an] regulates cases “really if rule in most even a federal way, Put another “really regulatfe] proce Sibbach, it does S., procedure,” that, although rules “procedural” those dure” rare displaces when rights to define the and reme term, operate ordinary in the sense what in one is so because available in case. This dies Hanna, 471; in another. context be substantive (1945). York, 99, 108 Guaranty 326 U. S. Trust Co. Sibbach, in Hanna cited of little decision Court’s Although this *30 seemingly federal hold that significance. Hanna did nor, right; state substantive even when alters always govern, rule will the In Sibbach, now make before Court. that I argument as in the was pro- the Act Enabling that deed, in Hanna we cited Sibbach’s statement III Ginsburg views the basic in issue this case as Justice how to federal rule that dictates an (whether answer to a traditionally procedural question join plaintiffs together class), as a when a law that “de- the fines dimensions” claim of a state-created the dictates Post, at opposite answer. 447. As I above, explained that if federal rule readily a state acknowledge displaces “ rule that sense in the ‘procedural’ ordinary term,” Healy Co., S. A. 60 F. but 3d, interwoven sufficiently with the of a there would scope right remedy, be an Enabling Act and the rule would have problem, is not give way. my view, however, this such a case. Rule 23 Controls Class Certification
When the in the District Court us case before was asked action, class Federal Rule of Civil certify Procedure the squarely determination whether the governed court rights adjudicated by hibits federal rules that alter litigants, to be S., 13-14, court, for the proposition that “a Fed- measuring a eral Rule against contained in the standards Act. . . need not wholly degree blind itself to the to which the Rule makes the character stray litigation result of the federal from the course it would follow state courts,” S.,U. And subsequent at 473. most of our decisions squarely that applying have addressed the framework for federal rules in Hanna. diversity mentioned Sibbach at all only cases have not but cited Woods, (1987). g., Burlington e. R. Co. See, Northern 480 U. S. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Mur- Justice Scalia that in *31 23. Rule of Rule the function do so. explicit should That is would its unless therefore, application 23, must or remedies. York rights New enlarge, modify abridge, I under- 23, of Rule language Notwithstanding plain does not govern Rule 23 the dissent find that stand New this matter because in of class certification question that a class such York has made a judgment of proscribing damages. a means certified, not be should 432-435,1 accept do as discussed infra, Although, how the dissent’s not see I also do 901(b), § dissent’s view I agree that view.15 from of Rule 23 follows interpretation Ginsburg immod- “avoi[d] that courts should with Justice trench that would Federal Rules erate interpretations in- should in some and 439, on state post, prerogatives,” conflict with to avoid the federal rules stances “interpret] (internal at 441 post, important policies,” state regulatory not what the dissent omitted). But that is marks quotation premises that class I from the dissent’s Nor do see how it follows 901(b) damages § is a “limi cannot be certified. The dissent contends 447, post, at 2,444, 447, “proscription,” tation,” post, at n. remedy particular that a 6, 456, not command n. whereas Rule 23 “does capacity,” post, a representative in party be available when a sues if Yet even the dissent’s provisions apply. can consequently and that both correct, question still control premises were Rule 23 would 901(b) only to deter would be relevant may certify class, petitioner lawsuit, may class-action of a at the conclusion petitioner, mine whether statutory damages. collect correct, were may interpretation It if the dissent’s be that not) damages for (or alleged sufficient this class could not has 1332(d)(6). was C. But that issue see 28 U. S. jurisdiction, court have (from which the case comes motion to respondent’s in dismiss not raised presented to the Court. Court), squarely it was not this “acknowledged its individual event, plaintiff has although the lead controversy, F. see 549 3d required amount claim” less than (CA2 damages the entire class actual 137,140 2008), do not know what we adopt all of the dissent’s Court were to Thus, if the allege. can even vacate and remand disposition be to would premises, I the correct believe controversy required amount whether the for further consideration has or can be met. done.
has a rule should be Simply because read light federalism concerns, it does not follow courts re- write rule. bottom,
At dissent’s of Rule 23 interpretation seems to be Rule 23 covers those cases which its appli- cation would create no Erie The dissent problem. would *32 the Rules of Decision Act under Erie inquiry even to in cases which is a there federal rule, and thus the governing Act, by terms, its own does not But a situa- apply. “[w]hen is tion covered one of Rules, the Federal question the court a far facing is from the cry typical, relatively un- Erie at Hanna, S., choice.” guided 471. ques- tion only whether Act is satisfied. Enabling Although it reflects a laudable concern to “state protect regulatory pol- (internal at 441 icies,” marks post, omitted), quotation Jus- Ginsburg’s work an would, my view, end approach tice run around uniform system of federal see Congress’ rules, 28 U. S. C. 2072, and our decision Hanna.
courts can and should federal rules interpret with sensitivity to “state 439; at but even prerogatives,” post, when “state . . interests . warrant our consideration,” at respectful post, federal 443, courts cannot rewrite the rules. my If dissent- 901(b) is feel that and ing colleagues strongly that class then denied, they certification should be should within the Act’s framework. argue Otherwise, Enabling “the Federal of contrary Rule state law.” applies regardless S., accord, 7; Hanna, n. U. Gasperini, 471. Act Not 23 Does Violate Enabling Applying I considering As have whether a certify explained, court inquire class action such this a federal must one, or New modify would doing enlarge, so abridge, violate the remedies, thereby York’s and rights Enabling one This is not a because simple “[i]t Act. always inquiry have of rule that cannot difficult to conceive procedure a case,” effect on the outcome a significant Wright . 232-233, and have . . almost rule can be said “any ‘substantive risks distribution of society’s affecting effects/ rewards,” a rule 170. federal Ely n. Faced that dictates an answer to a traditionally procedural question often and that a can displaces rule, argue state one really state rule was definition some of the State’s part its rights remedies. view, an Act however, my finding bar law is is a mere fact
problem one. The high aas rule it reflects a procedural judgment designed suggests about how state courts operate judgment ought And about the of state-created and remedies. scope rights there for the a federal court system, purposes operating nature are costs involved to discover true attempting a rule to a state rule operate such allowing rule the same govern federal alongside appears rule would The mere question. possibility alter a must be state-created sufficient. There is not *33 right little doubt. 901(b)
The of § text expressly unambiguously CPLR York also not to on New law but claims based applies only to or the law of other claims based on law State. York courts And there is from New no interpretation 901(b) § It therefore how could is hard see contrary. serves form, that, as rule procedural understood though or remedies. function York’s defining rights New lawsuits under New because This is all the more apparent actions well before York in federal class joined law could be done 901(b) York had § and New New York passed out, the dissent true, that. It is points nothing prevent can that history amount legislative that there is limited York who that the officials supported be read to New suggest “stat- on New York’s 901(b) create a “limitation” § wished Post, as Justice But, at 443. damages.” utory Scalia is not the law that New York notes, that adopted.16 ante, Court). at 402-403 (opinion
The not moreover, does legislative history, clearly describe 901(b) that would as a limitation on judgment operate In New York’s statutory damages. evaluating legisla it is tive between history, necessary distinguish proce for some rules adopted dural reason and policy seemingly rules that are bound in the intimately up scope of a substantive right remedy. Although almost every rule is some reason and has adopted some effect on the outcome of state rule litigation, every “defines the di Erie analysis, its sovereigns dissent observes that when create laws, enacting legislatures sometimes assume those laws will apply only See post, at 453-454. territory. within their fact, That is a true but very much position. it does not do work for the thing, dissent’s For one this Erie observes, analysis as the dissent only is relevant if there is no §901(b), conflict between Rule and the court can thus apply both. Post, because, at 451. But in my view, Rule 23 applies, only question Hanna, it is whether would violate the Act. See S., inquiry is 471. And different from Erie, Act, the Rules of Decision inquiry. See 380 U. at 469-471. citations, moreover, simply dissent’s highlight that when interpret statutes,
ing Thus, context matters. presume we sometimes laws only not, cover domestic depending conduct sometimes do upon, inter alia, it makes sense a given situation to assume that “the character of act an as lawful or unlawful must be wholly by determined [place] the law the American Banana Co. where act done,” Co., United Fruit (1909). 347, 356 S. But the context 901(b), presumption against extraterritoriality makes little sense. That pre sumption applies almost governing to laws people what can or cannot 901(b), however, do. Section persons not directed to conduct of but is instead Thus, is, directed to New York courts. by its own terms, not extraterritorial insofar as it New York governs states *34 possible courts. It is Legislature the New York simply did not real ize that York New courts hear claims under other sources of law and that law, other courts hear claims under New York and therefore mistakenly they believed that had written a limit on York New remedies. But be 901(b) up § cause general New York set rule a about how its courts operate, my strong contrary. to the presumption is [a] clearly- post, York
mensions claim at 447. New itself,” 901(b) only certain crafted with lawsuits— the intent that statutory penalties those for which not there were —could joined decision in courts. That class actions in New York pro policy judgment should refleсts a lawsuits about which form and which should ceed New York in a class courts carefully post, As see outlines, not. Ginsburg Justice 901(b) adopted response “apparently” 443-445, was statutory applied procedure, fears that the class-action “annihilating punishment penalties, of the de would lead Commentaries, C901:ll, fendant.” V. Practice Alexander, reprinted McKinney’s Laws of New York in 7B Consolidated (2006) (internal omitted); p. quotation see marks Ann., Sperry Corp., Crompton N. E. 204, 211, 863 also 8 Y. 3d N. (2007). are 1012, 1015 2d such as these not But statements particularly strong to define serves evidence certifying statutory penalty such who can obtain a or that Any remedy. enlarge device that York’s class would New litigation plaintiffs to makes for re easier makes it easier damages. cover oppo- some recoveries, addition fear of excessive “argued that there was
nents of a class-action device broad encourage permit order to need to no class actions statutory provided ag- litigation penalties an . . . . . . when pursue grieved party incentive to economic sufficient added). (emphasis at 1015 Id., 211,863 2d, claim.” E.N. merely num- opponents that, felt But those have conduct trials not York courts should ber New reasons, unnecessary to motivate that format the class format when litigation.17 that this could asserts Ginsburg Justice story, legislature that a imagine the converse sure, To be could one penalties apply that such but dictate penalties statutory would create lawsuit, filing a inconvenience the costs and necessary when to overcome it is hard to see how action. But necessary in class are not and thus penalty provi York’s York, given that New New applies that narrative individual, they class or plaintiffs, be sions, face, apply to all on their *35 are damages because seeking statutory argua- be true “suits individual device because proof suited to the class best bly Post, 445. But at unnecessary.” actual is some damages of are inefficient or at actions believe class least people disparate claims slightly insofar as unfair, they join together It not courts to lawsuits. is adjudicate unwieldy or force York us to dismiss New shared legislators possibility the class in those beliefs and thus wanted to exclude vehicle to be when it unnecessary. appeared a §901 of thus reveals
The legislative history classically it easier to calibration claims procedural making litigate law) (under York courts any in New source when it is not so, and it too when necessary easy do making is not This is the sort of class tool same calcula- required.
tion that into fees or deadlines for might go setting filing There is a difference briefs. of course of degree between certification, those not difference examples and class but kind; the class vehicle have a greater effect on may practical fees, who lawsuits than do low but that brings filing does not it into transform at “proscription,” 6,n. post, damages at “limitation,” 2, 444, n. 447, 459.18 post, The difference of relevant to the forum degree shopping of the Rules of considerations are Decision Act or part Erie If did federal rule not inquiry. applicable govern (or question at issue could be read particular fairly not so), matter, to do then those considerations would for pre- the reasons dissent. cisely given by post, 452-458. penalties that are addresses created under source of state law. or federal Ginsburg Justice that class certification in this asserts matter would Post, a $500 “transform case into a million award.” $5 436. But in 10,000 fact, class certification would $500 cases into one mil $5 transform certification, lion It class not all of the poten case. that without plaintiffs tial of any procedural would their cases. But that is true bring fee, vehicle; conveniently courthouse, filing without lower located easy-to-use rules, many federal features of the other courts, many plaintiffs would not sue. Hanna, explained in As Court
But that this case. assumption Erie R. Co. that the rule it is an “incorrect applica- Tompkins appropriate of... test constitutes bility of a Procedure.” Civil *36 the Act and “It is that both the 469-470. true say, roughly, are to state Erie rule that federal courts ‘procedural’ law,” but the tests law ‘substantive’ and federal “they designed fact were are different and reflect very Id., at of decisions.” 471. to control sorts different governs certification, the deci- class Because Rule 23 diversity certifying case a class in would sion is whether this enlarge modify” rights “abridge, New York’s substantive or 2072(b). § argue Although remedies. can that class one or enlarge damages “limited” certification New York’s would remedy, post, argu- 2, 444, 447, see and n. such speculation ments rest on what the New extensive about 901(b). § Legislature But York had in mind when it created given plausible competing narratives, there are two respect plain seems obvious me that we textual should § reading 901(b), of a rule in York’s code New brought certify when to class actions under source about respect Congress’ governs decision that Rule law, of displace class certification in fеderal In order courts. just possibility rule, federal there must be more than appears. the state rule is than it different part Accordingly, judgment. in I concur and concur Ginsburg, with whom Jus- Kennedy, Justice Justice Alito Breyer, tice dissenting. Justice join, Shady attempt today approves The Court to trans- Grove’s although award, form a million $5 case into State $500 creating proscribed alchemy. right to recover has this Shady suit in state If Grove filed New York court, had by payment interest authorized York Ins. 2% New Law Ann. 5106(a)(West 2009) penalty as a for overdue benefits would, by Shady own to no measure, amount more than Grove’s filing By parties’ court based on the instead $500. citizenship requesting Shady class certification, diverse statutory hopes damages class, recover, for the Grove Legislature York more than million. The New has $5 remedy, instructing specifically per- that, unless barred this penalty, to recover a mitted, “an action minimum measure imposed recovery statute created not main- (CPLR) Prac. Law as class action.” N. Y. Civ. Ann. tained 2006). 901(b) (West The Court nevertheless holds that prescribes proce- Procedure which Rule of Civil pre- for the class federal courts, conduct actions dures empts application diversity suits. relentlessly
The Court Rule 23 to override reads New availability statutory damages. on York’s restriction ask, decisions, however, Our caution us before under- mining legislation: really necessary? *37 Is this conflict Traynor, Really Necessary? Cf. Is This Conflict 37 Texas (1959). engaged Rev. Had inquiry, L. 657 the in that Court it would not 23 collide with have read Rule New York’s legitimate keeping monetary interest certain awards rea- sonably interpret I bounded. would continue sensitivity important of, to, Rules with awareness state policies. judgment today's radically regulatory Because de- parts I course, from that dissent.
I A long “Under the Erie doctrine,” settled, “federal sitting diversity apply state courts substantive law and Gasperini v. Center federal law.” Humani- (1996); Tomp- ties, Inc., see Erie 415, 518 427 B. v. U. S. Co. (1938). aptly conveyed kins, 304 S. 64 Justice Harlan U.
importance of the he Erie doctrine; described as “one of the policies expressing federalism, of our modern cornerstones judicial profoundly power of the allocation be- touch systems.” the state and federal Hanna v. Plumer, tween 438 we 460, (1965) 474 (concurring Although
380 U. S. opinion). found Erie’s a challeng- be] “sometimes [to have application Gasperini, endeavor,” 427, two federal stat- S.,U. ing mark our utes way. first, Act,1
The of federal Rules Decision prohibits law in diversity courts from actions. generating Erie, as U. enacted at 78. of part Sеe Originally of Act 1789, this restraint serves Judiciary policy prime to our have therefore system. federal We ap- importance Act “with alert . . avoiding an . eye disregard plied Guaranty York, Trust Co. v. 99, law.” S. State (1945). second, au Act, 1934, the Rules enacted Enabling thorizes us “prescribe practice rules general proce for the a crucial courts, but restriction: dure” with rules shall not substan abridge, modify any “Such enlarge this U. S. 2072. we right.” statute, tive C. Pursuant have Federal Rules of Procedure. In in adopted Civil of the Rules, terpreting scope including, particular, our Rule we have mindful limits on been authority. g., Corp., e. Ortiz Fibreboard 815, 845 (1999) 527 U. S. See, v. (The Act Rules counsels “adventurous against ap Act “is 23; any tension with the best kept plication” Windor, Inc. Products, Amchem tolerable v. limits.”); within also Semtek Int’l Inc. (1997). U. S. 612-613 Corp., Lockheed Martin (2001). S. 503-504 If a controls an conflicts directly Federal Rule issue law, Rule, so it is consonant with the long *38 Hanna, Act, in suits. See Enabling applies diversity Rules no Federal Rule or S., If, 469-474. stat- however, 380 U. Decision inter- ute the the Rules of as issue, Act, governs 1 states, the Act directs that laws of several “[t]he Rules of Decision the treaties of the United States or Acts of except where Constitution regarded Congress require provide, shall be rules of deci otherwise States, the in they the United cases where in civil actions in courts sion apply.” 28 U. S. 1652. C. Erie, controls. That Act
preted directs courts, when cases, state law failure diversity do so would invite forum shopping yield markedly dispar- Gasperini, ate litigation S., outcomes. 518 U. 428; Hanna, 380 U. at 468. that the S., Rules of De- Recognising Act cision Act and the Rules simultaneously frame Erie the analysis, and inform we have endeavored in diver- to remain within suits the bounds of sity safely both congres- directives. sional
B In our decisions in many of them not prior point, men tioned in Court’s have we avoided opinion, immoderate of the Federal Rules trench interpretations would on state prerogatives without serving fed countervailing of the Hanna eral interest. we analysis,” have “Application “is on a ‘direct between said, collision’ the Federal premised Corp., v. Armco state law.” Walker Steel and the Rule Hanna, (1980) 472). U. S. 749-750 380 U. (quoting To law, state Federal “when Rule, con displace fairly strued,” must so as “to “‘sufficiently broad’” ‘control the no room issue’ before the court, leaving for thereby oper Burlington Northern R. Woods, Co. ation v. law.” Walker, (1987) 1, 4-5 S. atS., 749-750, U. U. (quoting Organization, cf. Stewart Inc. v. n. 9; added); emphasis Corp., Ricoh (1988) S. 37-38 dissent J., (Scalia, (“[I]n federal... Rule of Procedure ing) deciding issue, a broad encompasses particular would reading state between and federal disuniformity create significant if the courts should be avoided text permits.”). pre-Hanna read decisions,
In Fed- vigilantly Court Palmer conflict eral Rules to avoid laws. Court Hoffman, (1943), example, S. defenses, which lists affirmative 8(c), read listed defenses manner of pleading control only cases, such proof as to burden cases; diversity Palmer held, state law controls. *39 Ragan years & Ware- in Merchants later,
Six
Transfer
(1949),
state law
Co.,
the Court ruled
In all of stated in “the cases, these the Court losing party of the Federal Rule not as broad as the was urged, being no therefore, there Federal Rule which cov- point dispute, ered the Erie commanded the enforcement of state 470. itself, law.” 380 Hanna Court ibid.) petitioner “unavoidable,” found the clash had ef- process prescribed by fected Federal Rule service 4(d)(1), satisfy special but “how-to” did method applicable to service on an Massachusetts law executor or rejected pre- as it Even Massachusetts administrator. procedure, scription “[t]he however, favor recognized... majority in Hanna federal rules must ... *40 them, the interpreted be courts and that applying reflect and should an interpretation can aware- process Fallon, ness of state interests.” R. J. legitimate Manning, Meltzer, & D. D. Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Shapiro, (6th (herein- ed. 2009) the Federal Courts System Wechsler). after Hart & Hanna, we
Following “interpre[t] continued the federal rules to conflict avoid with state important regulatory poli- Walker, cies.” Hart & Wechsler 593. In Court took up Ragan should be question overruled; held, we not once that Federal 3 does again, Rule conflict directly state rules the time when an action com- governing mences for a limitations purposes tolling period.
atS.,U. 749-752. Rule we addresses said, “the date from which requirements various timing id., not run,”
Rules begin does “purpor[t] id., state at 750-751. displace rules,” tolling Significant we frustrated, were interests would be policy observed, 3 as the state re- rule, we read Rule which superseding defendant actual service on the clock on quired stop Id., the statute of 750-752. limitations.
We were to a State’s regulatory attentive similarly policy Gasperini. That case concerned the standard diversity of a war- when the size verdict jury for determining large courts alike had a new trial. Federal and state gener- rants jury a “shock conscience” test ally reviewing employed S., at See 518 U. 422. Federal awards for excessiveness. 59(a) which, as so to Federal Rule pursuant
courts did Gasperini, court instructed a trial worded at the time of of the reasons for which new could trial “for new grant in the in actions law trials have heretofore been granted 59(a) Rule Proc. Fed. Civ. courts of the United States.” 1995). New (West control, an effort to provide greater which verdicts would jury under York prescribed procedures materi- they “deviate[d] examined to determine whether compensation.” from would be reasonable ally what Gasperini, 5501(c)). CPLR S., at 423-425 (quoting 59(a) held inhibit federal-court This Court Rule did test. accommodation York’s New invigorated Semtek, claim- Most we addressed recently, di- effect of dismissing preclusive judgment federal-court limita- statute of action on the a California basis of versity renewed tions. The case us after the same came to plaintiff Maryland in a fray same defendant against the same (Plaintiff because that State’s state court. chose Maryland run.) held that Federal limitations had not We period yet an dismissal involuntary “op- which 41(b), provided main- did not adjudication merits,” as an on the bar erate[d] To hold Maryland. tenance action renewed *41 courts from entertaining the precluded Maryland we violate case, said, jurisdictional “would arguably 503, and S., of the at Enabling Act,” limitation Rules [Erie’s] federalism “would in cases violate many principle,” id., at 504. Hanna, the above-described sum, both before and аfter this been cautioned show, federal courts have
decisions .. . with sensitivity Court to the Federal Rules “interpre[t] Gasperini, at 427, to 518 U. state interests,” important with state regula- n. a will “to avoid conflict important and id., (internal marks 438, n. quotation tory policies,” omitted).2 from The Court veers away approach —and point: on this Justice Stevens ground “[FJederal stakes out common ‘sensitivity degree with some of rules,” observes, interpreted “must be he . . . applied and regulatory policies,’ important and state interests such Congress’ background of command diversity against cases degree to ‘the consideration of rights and with rules not alter substantive litigation character and result which the Rule makes Plumer], courts,' Hanna [v. it in state stray course would follow from the (1965)].” Ante, concurring part in (opinion at 418-419 [460, 380 U. S. (“A ante, proce 419-420 ‘state judgment). See also concurring ordinary of the in the sense undeniably procedural rule, though dural may in some outcomes,’... term,’ may exist ‘to influence remedy that right the state-created up so bound become instances Gasperini, most recent ante, its reiteration conspicuously, n. 7—in favor of mechanical reading Federal Rules, insensitive to state interests and productive of discord.
C decisions instruct Our over and over again that, in the ad- judication diversity cases, interests —whether ad- g., e. g., Cohen, vanced in e. or a statute, procedural rule, our Gasperini consideration. respectful Yet — warrant the Court today, no gives New York’s quarter limitation on statutory. damages lower requires courts thwart the regulatory at stake: To policy prevent excessive New York’s damages, law controls the penalty which a defendant in a suit. The exposed single be- story 901(b)’s hind enactment deserves telling.
In 1975, the Judicial Conference State New York a new proposed class-action statute “to set designed up flexible, functional scheme” that would “an provide effective, but controlled Judicial Conference group remedy.” Report on CPLR, (Mc- 1975 N. Y. Laws reprinted pp. Kinney). As originally drafted, legislation addressed actions; class aspects specified, for five example, certification, prerequisites codi- eventually at § 901(a), fied tracked those closely listed Rule 23. 901(a)
See CPLR for class numer- (requiring, certification, *42 (some scope right remedy.” defines internal omitted)); ante, (“When marks quotation at 420 a State chooses to use a traditionally procedural defining vehicle as a means of the scope of sub- rights remedies, recognize stantive courts must respect choice.”). Stevens Justice Nevertheless, sees no reason to read case; Rule 23 restraint in this Federal particular preempts 901(b) view, damages limitation, proce- New York’s in his because is “a Ante, dural rule that not part York's substantive law.” 416. New 901(b) mirror I reality, explain. This- characterization of later does infra, Court, this majority at 452-458. it bears emphasis, But agrees diversity Rules be read with moderation should to concerns. important suits accommodate of representation, adequacy typicality,
osity, predominance, superiority). in the New was proposal While Judicial Conference for the advocated “various groups York Legislature’s hopper, class action plain that would provision prohibit addition . . . penalty tiffs from statutorily-created awarded being in the statute.” when authorized except pertinent expressly E. 2d 211, 863 N. 204, 8 N. 3d Sperry Crompton Corp., Y. recover “feared that (2007). These constituents 1012, 1015 harsh excessively lead ies actual could beyond damages no Ibid. that there was need also argued results.” “They .. . statutory penalties class actions ... [because] permit economic in with a sufficient an aggrieved party provided Ibid. Such penalties, constit centive a claim.” pursue actual damages. often far exceed a observed, uents plaintiff’s and class “penalties together,” they argued, “When lumped to Letter from overkill.” Attachment G. actions produce Merchants, of Retail York Council Perkinson, New State (June 1975) 4, (Legis Executive Chamber Inc., Gribetz, J. Bill L. 207. 1975, lative Ch. Jacket, Report), of the defend- Aiming “annihilating punishment avoid stat- amended proposed New York ant,” Legislature in class actions. damages ute the recovery statutory to bar Commentaries, C901:ll, reprinted Alexander, Y. Practice York Ann., of New p. Laws 7B Consolidated McKinney's omitted). In his (internal (2006) signing marks quotation the new stat- stated Carey Governor statement, Hugh action abuse class court to prevent ute “empowers ” lied on remedy. a contro Memorandum device provides Laws, in 1975 N. Y. Ch. reprinted L. Approving added). 1748 (emphasis a compromise among the result of was final bill...
“[T]he N. Y. E. 3d, 8 N. Sperry, interests.” competing 901(a) leeway deciding courts allows 2d, at 1015. Section the use of rejects but class, to certify of statu- remedy to pursue particular class mechanism *43 damages. tory designed The limitation was not with the efficiency litigation fair conduct or Indeed, mind. suits arguably seeking statutory damages are best suited to the proof damages individual class device because of actual unneсessary. York’s decision New instead block class- proceedings statutory damages action therefore makes except manifestly sense, scant a means to a limiting liability single a end: defendant’s in a lawsuit in prevent penalties order exorbitant inflation of —reme- Legislature York dies New created with individual suits in mind.3
D Shady today agrees Grove contends—and Court —that unavoidably preempts prohibition York’s New on the recovery statutory damages in class actions. The Federal emphasizes, Shady Rule, Court states that Grove’s suit “may be” maintained aas class which action, conflicts with 901(b)’s “may proceed. instruction that it not” so Ante, at (internal quotation deleted). emphasis marks omitted; Accordingly, insists, the Court “cannot in di- versity suits unless Rule 23 is ultra vires.” Ibid. Conclud- ing that Rule 23 does not the Rules violate Act, provision Shady the Court holds that the federal controls ability statutory pen- Grove’s on behalf of seek, class, alty (plurality opinion); of over Ante, million. 406-410 $5 case, Even the mine-run action can class result in “potentially liability.” Advisory ruinous Committee’s on Fed. Rule *44 concur- in and part
ante, concurring 431-436 J., (Stevens, in judgment). ring is none where I conflict Court, am finds convinced,
The 901(b)’s § enact- behind Mindful of the history necessary. substantive-rights and the thrust of ment, the our precedent, did the conclude, I as Act, in limitation Rules have considered Court District Second Circuit every not collide with 23 in that Rule does any detail,4 the question 23 Rule understood, 901(b). As the well § Second Circuit class certification relevant the considerations prescribes not command does proceedings and postcertification —but a sues in when party available a particular remedy (2008).5 137, F. 3d 143 549 a representative capacity. on latter issue. 901(b), in trains Sensi- contrast, Section of class litiga- 23 read, aspects Rule bly governs procedural 4 Refinishing Litigation, Antitrust See, In Paint g., e. re Automotive (ED 2007); Ralfe, Supp. 544, Pa. Leider F. Supp. F. 2d 549-551 Co., (SDNY Metropolitan 2005); Dornberger v. Ins. 283, 2d 289-292 Life (SDNY 1999). Sterling S. R. See also v. U. Securi 72, 84 182 F. D. Weber (§ (2007) 901(b) Inc., 722, 738-739, ties, 282 Conn. 924 A. 2d 827-828 governed by York sub in to action New Connecticut state court applied law). stantive dispensation in favor of would Shady projects Grove that a Allstate look state rules and diversity [to] class ... require “courts all actions making their certification Rule 23 ... in class decisional law rather than to projection This slippery-slope Petitioner 55. decisions.” Brief for (1990) Bork, America 169 Tempting both familiar false. Cf. R. slope analogies; not lawyers slippery they are (“Judges live on the 901(a) bottom.”). § case, In this CPLR lists the supposed ski it to the certification, does con for but Allstate prеrequisites state-law class (“There 901(a) for Respondent § Rule Brief tend that overrides 23. under do dispute criteria class certification state law not no that the for 23.”). court; ground squarely occupied by is the Rule diversity routinely applied have Rule 23’scertifi sitting Federal courts provisions. See, standards, comparable e.g., rather than cation Litigation, 522 Export Canadian Antitrust In re Vehicles New Motor (CA1 2008); in In Order and Reasons re Katrina F. Canal 3d 18-24 (ED La., Aug. Civ. Action No. 05-4182 Litigation, Breaches Consol. 2009).
tion, but allows size of a state law control monetary a award class plaintiff may pursue. other describes method of words, enforcing 901(b) relief,
claim defines while the dimensions of the claim itself. In this it is immaterial regard, 901(b) statutory wholesale, bars rather than penalties retail, fashion. The Legislature New York could have embedded the limitation in every cause action provision creating for which a is authorized; penalty operates short- hand to the It is same effect. as much of the delinea- part *45 tion of the claim for relief it would be were it included by claim claim in the York Code. New
The Court focuses a on whether single-mindedly suit be “may” “may not” maintained as a class action. See ante, at 398-401. the the Putting way, question Court why. does not home in on reason the Rule authorizes class treatment for its suits because satisfying prerequisites the class a mechanism affords fair efficient generally way 901(b) to claims adjudication. for Section re- aggregate to concern; an not different it does allow sponds entirely class members to recover because the statutory damages of the Legislature New York considered result adjudicating fair such en The and effi- claims masse to be exorbitant.6 conduct of is the concern legitimate cient class of litigation remedy the of 23; law, Rule an infraction however, for lawmakers and concern not of is the of State's legitimate The Ely, Myth the federal rulemakers. Cf. of Irrepressible Erie, (It (1974) is relevant “whether 693,722 87 Harv. L. Rev. a policy repre-
the state embodies provision legislative intent, disputes strength the evidence of Court of §901(b)’s ante, purpose. account of but no alternative see offers very hard it would be ascribe how Perhaps this silence indicates efficiency process fairness and any purpose with the up bound remedies, e., i. is concerned face, On ing proscription its eases. history Legislative availability statutory damages in a lawsuit. revealing it. objective, but is not essential this confirms rule- the federal disagreement with only procedural sents way con- efficient respecting most fairest and makers ducting litigation.”). damages wishing cap example, State,
Suppose, providing that enacted statute actions million, in class $1 may not be main- million than $1 to recover more “a suit reasoning— the Court’s a class Under tained as action.” “may the words dispositive significance to which attributes provision, preempt this 23 would be maintained” —Rule authorizing promulgation Congress, never mind surely procedure not intend did courts, for federal of rules damages.7 ceilings The Court displace on state-created “lim- analysis might suggests differ if the statute existing it[ed] action,” class in an the remedies available might ante, with state not conflict 401, such that Rule prescribing million more than that “no $1 statute no real difference in in a action.” There recovered class hypothetical purpose of these two and intended effect directly impinges on 23's The notion that one statutes. fundamentally misper- not, while the other does domain, the office Rule 23.8 ceives *46 is, “justly administering rem course, [a] of a difference There between (1941), Co., 1, prescribing & 312 U. S. 14
edy,” v. Wilson Sibbach plaintiff’s increase a remedy; if Rule 23 can be read to of that content amount, arguably recovery greater to some Rule has $1 from million right” in violation of the Rules “enlarge[d] ... [a] 2072(b). plurality appears acknowledge § The to this Act. 28 U. C.S. in compliance we have found to be point, stating the Federal Rules Ante, remedies.” at 407-408. “altered ... available with the have not Act today exactly of Rule 23 that: reading does But the Court’s relentless recovery statutory authorizes the of Rule, says, The Federal class-size provision penal York instructs that such damages though even New shall be ties not available. 8 [a law] cannot rewrite to reflect our “[w]e The Court states that Ante, can, course, purpose.” at 408. But we of perception legislative light regulatory policy a interpret Rules of State’s to decide preempts supra, extent a Rule state law. See whether and what v. Armco Corp., read Federal Rule 3 Walker Steel 439-442. Just as we
449 The of an absence inevitable collision between Rule 23 and 901(b) it is becomes evident once a fed comprehended eral can court accord due sitting diversity to both respect state and federal Plaintiffs prescriptions. to vindi seeking cate claims for the State which has provided statutory pen relief alty may action if pursue through class they forgo damages and instead statutory seek actual or in damages or declaratory relief; junctive class any putative member who out objects can actual opt if avail pursue damages, able, and an statutory penalty individual action. See, g., Corp., The Mendez v. Rodee (WDNY e. D. 38, 260 F. 55 R. Brzychnalski Unesco, Inc., 2009); v. F. 35 351, 2d 353 Supp. 1999).9 (SDNY See also Practice Alexander, Commentaries, (“Even at 105 if a minimum penalty recovery is statutory involved, most courts hold that it can waived, be thus confin the class recovery actual ing eliminating damages 901(b).”). bar this CPLR In Second manner, Circuit (1980), 740, govern pur- S. 751 not to when a suit commences for poses tolling (although indisput- a state statute of limitations the Rule an ably controls for purposes), when action commences too we so could read Rule 23 direct when action class purposes recovering statutoiy damages by maintained for prescribed 23, reading state law. On this of Rule no rewriting necessary avoid a conflict. anticipated Legislature York to have this appears New result. 901(b), discussing sponsor the remedial bar the bill’s ex effected damages “statutory plained action actual would still be class 2, Pink, Memorandum, Jacket, L. permissible.” [Sponsor’s] p. 1975, Bill S. (May 207. See State Protection Board Ch. also Consumer Memorandum Jacket, 1975, understanding, L. On 29, 1975), Bill Ch. 207. this New York right class routinely authorize class when the waives its courts actions g., Corp., Cox v. e. statutory penalties. See, App. Div. receive Microsoft Servs., Inc., Boyle Env. Pesantez (2004); v. Y. 3d 778 N. S. 2d (1998); Ridge Homeowners’ Meadows App. Div. 2d 673 N. Y. S. 2d 659 Co., Assn., Development 2d Y. S. Inc. Tara App. Div. 665 N. 2d *47 System, Inc., Corp. Rent A Super Glue v. Avis Car (1997); App. 132 361 (1987); Weinberg v. Hertz Corp., Y. 116 604, 2d S. 2d 764 Div. 517 N. (1986). 1, Div. N. Y. S. 2d App. 2d 499 693
450 ac- requirements for class “Rule 23’s
explained, requirement applied along with the substantive be can tions 901(b).” phrased sum, at while 3d, F. 144. of CPLR actions question certain class to whether responsive as 901(b) § controlling unmistakably how at may begin, aimed is23 Rule issue, must end. On that remedial those actions silent.
Any control doubt whether Rule leaves dispelled be issue this ease should remedial at the core by jurisprudence, including Hanna, which counsels our Erie against moderately us and cautions read Federal Rules conceivably stretching every a Rule situation could to cover “[tjhere is no reach.10 The Court that reason ... states eligi- addressing only claims read Rule as made should certified ble for treatment some other law be class contrary, Palmer, Ante, class actions.” at 399. To Ragan, Gasperini, provide good Cohen, Walker, and Semtek right look reason to the law creates recover. supra, plainly on so accurate See 439-442. That more statemеnt what is at stake: Is there reason read authorizing 23 as a claim when the Rule for relief State remedy pursuit its on created the behalf of class? disallows system give. is the None at all answer our federal should Notably, pen effort York is not alone in its to contain New by disallowing and minimum relief; alties recoveries class Congress, precluded too, has class treatment for certain seeking statutorily recovery. designated claims minimum 1640(a)(2)(B)(Truth Act) g., Lending See, e. U. S. C. (“[I]n action no the case of a class ... minimum recov (Electronic 1693m(a)(2)(B) ery applicable.”); shall Fund rejected, every statutory challenge have plurality notes that “we Ante, come before us.” to Federal 407. But it Rule has omits restraint, due interpreted including we Rules with have thus Ortiz success of such diminishing prospects challenges. for the v. Products, Amchem Corp., (1999); Fibreboard Inc. 527 U. S. Windsor, supra, (1997); 439-443. 521 U. S. 612-613 *48 451 Act) §4010(a)(2)(B)(i) Transfer 12 U. (same); S. C. (Expedited Act) (same). Funds Availability Today’s denies judgment to full the States the has to Congress certain power keep mone awards tary within reasonable bounds. Cf. Beard v. Kin (2009) (“In dler, 558 62 53, U. S. of . . . light federalism and it comity concerns ... would seem to particularly strange disregard state . . . rules that are similar substantially those to which we full force in our give courts.”). own States may hesitate to create determinate statutory penal ties in the if are future they impotent prevent federal- court distortion of the have remedy they shaped.11 a conflict without
By finding considering Rule 23 rationally should be to avoid read any collision, Court unwisely retreats from unnecessarily the federalism Erie. Had the Court principles undergirding reflected on for state respect interests regulatory endorsed in our it decisions, would have found no cause to interpret Rule 23
so not to woodenly reason every do so. Cf. Traynor, —and (“It Texas L. 669 Rev., bad enough courts to about unintelligibly choice of but prattle law, unforgiveable when have inquiry revealed that there might was no real conflict.”). adopted variety have States of formulations to limit the use of class gain
actions to certain claims, remedies certain pursue as illustrated by the examples Apps. listed brief. Allstate’s Brief for Respond ante, ent. The reading Court’s "one-size-fits-all” of Rule likely of all of these statutes prevents the enforcement in diversity actions— including provisions § the numerous statutory that, 901(b), like at tempt recovery to curb the of statutory damages. See, g., e. Cal. Civ. 2988.5(a)(2) (West §
Code Ann. 1993); § 12-14.5-235(d) Rev. Stat. Ann. Colo. (2009); 36a~683(a) § (2009); Conn. Stat. 489-7.5(b)(l) § Gen. Haw. Rev. Stat.
(2008); 24-4.5-5-203(a)(2) (West § 2004); Ind. Code Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 367.983(l)(c) (West 2006); 20(a)(2)(B) § Laws, 167B, (West § Mass. Gen. ch. 2008); §493.112(3)(c) (West Comp. 2005); Mich. Lаws Ann. N. M. Stat. Ann. 58-16-15(B) (2007); 1351.08(A) (Lexis Rev. Ohio Code Ann. 2006); Okla. §5-203(1) (West Stat., 14A, Wyo. Tit. Supp.); §40-19- Stat. Ann. (2009). 119(a)(iii)
II I Because no conflict perceive unavoidable between I 901(b), this case by inquiring would decide “whether have so rule would impor- application [state] tant an or both of the effect of one litigants fortunes upon failure to cause likely plaintiff would be [apply] Hanna, 9. to choose the federal n. court.” *49 Gasperini, See 518 S.,U. at 428. Grove Shady urges pretermit inquiry,
Seeking 901(b) § regarded the class-action bar in must be as “proce- CPLR, it is dural” because contained in which “govern[s] procedure in courts all in civil judicial proceedings of state.” Brief § for 101; Petitioner CPLR empha- 34 (quoting in sis in the is hardly disposi- Placement CPLR original). for Erie tive. The held in “substantive” provision purposes Gasperini (§ as 5501(e)), also are is contained the CPLR seq., et §201 limitations “sub- prescriptions plainly periods, stantive” for Erie be character- they may however purposes York, ized for see 109-112. other See purposes, g., e. (Second) also, 1 of Laws Restatement Conflict (hereinafter Restatement) (1969) Note, 369 Reporter’s p. (“Under courts the rule of the federal have classified Erie... contributory the burden of as a negligence as to persuasion rule matter law that is governed by sit the courts of that State State even they though which choice-of-law have their rule as characterized for in the Con- Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” purposes.”); (1933). L. J. flict 42 Yale Laws, 901(b) because ranks as “procedural” Grove also Shady it is limited to rights statute] “nothing suggests [the to federal law, action York opposed on New based it to actions states”; instead “applies law or the of other law any for Petitioner Brief under statute.” seeking penalties ante, J., concurring 35-36. See also (Stevens, (Section 901(b) cannot “be in judgment) part concurring understood as rule that... serves the function of defining New York’s or remedies” its rights because “text ex- ... pressly only not applies claims based unambiguously on New York law but also to claims on based law or State.”). the law of other limited to claims
It is true specifically ex- New York under law. But arising neither expressly tended claims under law The arising rule foreign pre- scribes, without either that “an elaboration action way, recover . . . not be penalty maintained as class ac- tion.” recognized We have often that “general words” ap- in a statute in fact, pearing may, have limited application; “[t]he words 'any person “are persons,’” example, broad human But enough comprehend every bеing. gen- eral words must not limited to within cases ju- of the state, risdiction also to those but to which objects them.” United States intended to legislature Palmer, (1818) for the Wheat. Court (opinion States, J.). also Small v. United Marshall, C. U. S. *50 (“In (2005) 388 385, that uses the law, legislature statutory . to not mean include phrase 'any may may person’ 'persons’ (some outside state.” internal jurisdiction quota- States, Flora v. United tion 362 marks omitted)); 145, U. S. (1960) (The 149 term sum’ is catchall . . . ‘"any [phrase,] catches.”). but to this is not what it say to define the most Moreover, Grove overlooks Shady likely explana- New York tion for the absence of limiting language: legisla- and defendants tors make law with York in New plaintiffs e., i. Baxter, if were the universe. See mind, as New York 16 1, Choice of Stan. L. Rev. System, Law and the Federal (1963) in (“[L]awmakers 11 universal terms but often speak to their constit- to with reference must be understood speak States, uents.”); ef. Smith v. United 197, U. S. n. 5 507 in (1993) rooted extraterritoriality part against (presumption generally legis- in “the commonsense notion Congress mind”). in lates with domestic concerns in his seminal was
The well Brainerd Currie point by put on in confliet-of-laws article interest governmental analysis The Massachusetts cases. article centers on now-archaic law that from themselves binding women prevented married contract for their husbands. Discussing sureties transac- Massachusetts applied prescription (a forum, tions factors involving foreign place foreign foreign observed: Currie contracting, foreign parties), addresses itself “When the Massachusetts legislature the undevel- sureties, women as problem married that Massachusetts married in mind image its oped women, transactions, courts, husbands, creditors, law the judgments. history Anglo-American domestic case the conflict-of-laws case normal, has been A Study Married Contracts: marginal.” Women’s L. Rev. Method, Conflict-of-Laws 25 U. Chi.
(1958) added). (emphasis limit Grove’s must Shady specifically States suggestion en- their if their they laws to domestic of action wish rights misses the litigation actments federal diversity focus on an do not obvious point: legislators generally State interstate when statutes.12 drafting setting Shady possi based on its argument Grove’s our Erie decisions, claims foreign sync application ble is also out of similarly unqualified scope. many involving of them state statutes of Corp., Loan Industrial Cohen Beneficial Jersey New law issue required post bond as (1949), example, plaintiffs U. S. 541 for Id., “any action.” security [stockholder’s derivative] costs g., e. added)). also, (emphasis ch. 131 (quoting n. J. Laws N. Walker, (Oklahoma deemed 742-743, “[a]n and n. 4 statute *51 upon limitations service purpоses action” the statute commenced for (1971)). 12, § Our Stat., 97 character Okla. Tit. (quoting of the summons Erie purposes has never for ization as substantive state statute causes of action. To only domestic applied law hinged on whether of state variety laws that contrary, ranked as substantive we have claims, including statutes out-of-state apply to federal and the state courts infra, at prescriptions. 455-456. burden-of-proof of limitations and
455 also York Shady Grove observes that New court has ap- plied to a claim relief federal for under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 1991 47 (TCPA), U. S. §227, C. Rudgayzer Cape Gratt v. & Canaveral Tour & Travel, see Inc., 148, 22 799 Div. 3d N. Y. S. 795 App. 2d (2005), thus §901(b)’s revealing Brief “procedural” cast. for Petitioner 36. We note first that TCPA itself calls for the applica- Rudgayzer, tion of 22 state law. See Div. App. 3d, 149- 2d, (federal 799 N. Y. at 796-797 S. action authorized in state court “if otherwise the laws permitted by or rules of the court of State” 227(b)(3))). 47 U. S. C. [the] (quoting Corp., Gottlieb Carnival (CA2 See also v. 3d 335, F. 2006) J.) (Sotomayor, (“Congress sought, via the TCPA, to law.”). enact the functional of a state equivalent The TCPA, of Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized, thus “carves out an rule” exception general th[e] that “when Erie ... . . . a court , reversed state hearing case is federal substantive normally required law”: apply 227(b)(3)... “Under it is state law that deter- as a mines, a federal preliminary matter, action court.” Weber U.S. under the act state brought Sterling Securities, Inc., 722, 736, 282 Conn. 2d A. (in (2007) TCPA action York governed by New substan- § 901(b)
tive even was law, claim applied though pursued court). in Connecticut state Erie
Moreover, statutes “substantive” as qualify pur even when have thrusts as well. poses they “procedural” g., Cohen, e. cf. Woods v. Interstate See, S., 555; Realty Co., (1949) and n. 535, 536-538, 337 U. (holding S. on state statute
diversity that, ease must be based dismissed court). in state its terms, governed proceedings of limitations are, exemplary. They supply Statutes again, York, see suits, law “substantive” diversity 109-112, even acknowledges, Grove though, Shady as a the forum’s limitations “proce often period courts State, the law another bar to dural” claims under arising 16-17. See 16; Brief n. Tr. of also Reply Arg. see Oral *52 456 §§ a cause (when
Restatement foreign 142-143 adjudicating State action, juris foreign use either its own may shorter). statute of Simi limitations, diction’s whichever effect to state larly, federal in diversity give courts sitting laws negli contributory governing the burden proving Palmer Hoffman, 109, (1943), yet 117 gence, see 318 U. S. v. state action courts causes of often foreign adjudicating their law own local Restatement 133 to this issue. See Reporter’s Note.
In short, Shady effort tо characterize Grove’s elide this fundamen- cannot successfully simply “procedural” of an tal no law rule is dispositive norm: When in sense issue, and state affective statute outcome cases on Erie Rules our and post-Hanna) develop, (pre- Act law Decision commands State’s application Gasperini, 428; Hanna, 380 518 at S., suits. U. diversity 9; York, at 109. As this case S., S., at n. U. diversity starkly demonstrates, exercising if federal courts are Rule 23 to award jurisdiction statutory by compelled York courts are bound class actions while penalties New §901(b)’s “substantial variations between by proscription, state and federal judgments] expected.” [money Gasperini, Hanna, 380 U. S., 518 U. at 430 S., (quoting omitted)). (internal marks The “varia- 467-468 quotation tion” here is Grove seeks class Shady indeed “substantial.” times is ten thousand than individual relief that greater ac- in state court. As to it plurality available remedy ante, forum undoubtedly will shopping knowledges, file of state in federal instead result if a need only plaintiff award barred monetary explicitly court to a massive seek (“Erie Gasperini, 518 U. atS., precludes law. state See the re- than significantly larger in federal court recovery court.”).13 tolerated that would have been covery ostensibly procedure,” addressed contrast, many “state rules ante, pleading standards and rules (majority opinion) including — discovery, admissibility and the pretrial summary governing judgment, of citizenship,” Klaxon Co. Sten- diversity The “accident Mfg. Co., tor Elec. (1941), 313 U. S. should sub- Hanna, augmented to such liability. defendant ject (“The Erie rule is rooted in at 467 part reali- *53 be the character or unfair for zation that would result of the differ because suit had been materially a litigation court.”). in a federal brought is that “a on beyond
It statutory debate cap damages Gasper- Erie law for would substantive supply purposes.” id., ini, also S., at 428. See at 439-440 (Stevens, J., (“A state-law on allowable dissenting) ceiling damages ... of
a substantive rule decision that federal courts must apply id., York in cases New diversity governed by law.”); at 464 (“State J., dissenting) law controls what (Scalia, Gasper- amount.”). in are what injuries compensable ini, we determined New York’s standard for measuring excessiveness a verdict alleged the was jury designed to Id., a control a analogous damages provide cap. 429. as The statute was framed “a procedural we instruction,” noted, “but State’s objective [wa]s substan- manifestly Ibid. tive.”
Gasperini’s with full observations in force this case. a in barring recovery By statutory damages class ac- a maximum tion, controls defendant’s in a liability such a remedial remedy. suit seeking provision could as an “In cap: have been written class explicit action is limited to the seeking damages, relief statutory amount named would have recovered an plaintiff individual That York’s suit.” New used other words to ex- Legislature be same should very meaning inconsequential. press have long recognized impropriety We displacing, on limitations diversity action, a state-law state-created rem- impact hugely evidence —would so forum It certain choices. is diffi- imagine promote a shopping scenario would more forum than cult which the difference filing one in between and federal court is the potential of $5 difference between a award of one million. $500 Woods, (in a case, edies. See diversity 337 U. S., “barred in the state court... should from plaintiff recovery York, 326 U. court”); likewise be barred S., in the federal (federal at 108-109 diversity court “cannot afford sitting if recovery is made unavailable right recover State nor the enforcement of the can it substantively affect as Erie State”). fed- precludes right given by Just when a eral court from State entering deficiency judgment has cannot “authoritatively judgments [such] announced Angel Bullington, 330 U. S. borders,” secured within its too Erie should prevent (1947), so a federal court from statutory aggregated through awarding penalties class action when recovery. New York this prohibits Ragan, (“Where also local law qualifies claim], the follow suit. Other- abridges [a federal court must wise there a different measure the cause action in *54 Erie ... court in one than other, and principle sum, In York substantive transgressed.”). because “New law for governs relief, guide[s] claim New York law... [this] Gasperini, 518 437.14 S., allowable damages.”
III Erie’s federalism erosion impels Court’s grounding me in large today’s to out the point irony judgment. Shady in federal Grove is able to its claim court pursue virtue of enactment Class Action Fairness the recent 1332(d). CAFA, Act (CAFA), of 2005 U. C. Con S. class doors to state-law-based ac federal-court gress opened diversity, tions so there minimal at least class long “give can question that federal courts effect to sub There is no 901(b)] without untoward alteration of [§ stantive thrust of Gasperini, decision of cases.” 518 IX at for civil scheme the trial seeking statutory penalties plaintiffs 426. There is risk that individual no managed claims that could more will flood with state-law federal courts basis; amount-in-controversy diversity statute’s efficiently on a class in disputes small remain state court. requirement state-law ensures controversy. By in least million Ibid. $5 and at members, Congrеss sought providing forum, check a federal what it of some state to be the overreadiness considered courts Rep. e.g., certify p. S. No. See, 109-14, class actions.
(2005) (CAFA lawyers “gam[ing] proce prevents from keep [to] nationwide or multi-state dural rules class actions judges reputations readily in state courts have for whose (internal certifying quotation omitted)); classes.” marks id., (disapproving at 22 “the 'I never met a class I action didn’t approach prevalent like’ class certification” that “is localities”). Congress state courts in some In other words, envisioned fewer —not more—class actions overall. Con surely anticipated gress never that CAFA would make fed Shady mecca eral courts a for suits of the kind Grove has seeking penalties launched: class actions state-created arising under state claims law—claims that would be barred from class treatment the State’s own courts. Woods, Cf. (“[T]he policy precluded] S.,U. at 537 of Erie ... mainte nance . . . federal court ... of suits which the State courts.”).15 ha[s] closed its
[*] [*] [*] approach questions I would continue to Erie a manner purposes underlying mindful of the the Rules of Decision precedent, and the Rules Act, Act faithful important respectful of state interests. I would therefore Legislature’s that the New York limitation hold on the recov- ery statutory damages applies in this case, and af- would *55 judgment. the Second Circuit’s firm course, open Congress, It to exclude remains from federal-court CAFA, 1332(d), C. claims
jurisdiction under
28 U. S.
could not
maintained as
class action in
court.
notes
phree,
Notes
Notes Civ. App., p. Proc. 28 U. S. C. 143. A court’s decision to certify a class accordingly places pressure on the defendant settle even unmeritorious See, g., Coopers Lybrand Livesay, e. & 463, 476 claims. (1978). 437 U. S. representative plaintiffs statutory damages, pressure When seek to settle heightened poses because a class liability action the risk of massive g., e. Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York injury. See, unmoored actual Co., Trust (SDNY 1972) 54 F. R. D. (exercising “considerable dis a pragmatic certify cretion of nature” to refuse to class because the negligible damages sought plaintiffs statutory suffered actual but damages million). $13