United States v. Nazario Gonzalez-Medina, 757 F.3d 425

Background

Gonzalez-Medina, a Mexican citizen, pleaded no contest in Wisconsin (2005) to having sexual intercourse with a child aged 16 (Wis. Stat. § 948.09); later deported, he reentered the U.S. and failed to update his sex-offender registration.
Indicted federally for failure to register under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and illegal reentry; pleaded guilty to illegal reentry and contested the SORNA count.
SORNA defines “sex offense” broadly (42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)) but excludes certain consensual conduct when the victim is ≥13 and the offender is ≤4 years older (§ 16911(5)(C)).
Gonzalez-Medina argued the categorical approach applies to the § 16911(5)(C) age-differential, so his Wisconsin statute—lacking a 4-year element—does not qualify as a SORNA "sex offense."
The district court rejected the categorical approach for the § 16911(5)(C) age-differential, found the government proved Gonzalez‑Medina was more than four years older than the victim, and convicted him under § 2250(a).
On appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding the age-differential in § 16911(5)(C) is a circumstance-specific inquiry (non-categorical); Gonzalez‑Medina’s Commerce Clause challenge was foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the categorical approach applies to the § 16911(5)(C) four-year age-differential exception	Gonzalez‑Medina: categorical approach required; Wisconsin statute lacks the 4-year element so his conviction is not a SORNA "sex offense"	Government: statutory text, structure, and purpose permit fact-specific inquiry into victim/offender ages; categorical approach would unduly limit SORNA	Held: non-categorical (circumstance-specific) approach applies; age differential need not be an element of the predicate offense
Whether the categorical approach is required by Sixth Amendment jury-trial principles (Apprendi)	Gonzalez‑Medina: categorical approach protects jury right to decide facts increasing penalty	Government: Apprendi satisfied because prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that exception criteria are not met; factual inquiry is compatible with jury determination	Held: Sixth Amendment concerns addressed by proving exception factors beyond a reasonable doubt; no categorical-rule requirement imposed
Whether the rule of lenity requires resolving ambiguity in favor of defendant	Gonzalez‑Medina: ambiguity in § 16911(5)(C) triggers lenity	Government: text, structure, and purpose resolve the issue; no grievous ambiguity	Held: Rule of lenity inapplicable—court reads statute as permitting circumstance-specific inquiry
Whether SORNA exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority	Gonzalez‑Medina: SORNA’s registration and criminal penalty exceed Commerce power	Government: circuit precedent (Whaley) upholds SORNA under Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses	Held: Challenge foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent in Whaley; SORNA upheld on Commerce Clause grounds

Key Cases Cited

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (discusses categorical approach and meaning of "conviction")
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (permits circumstance-specific inquiry where statutory language and practical consequences warrant it)
United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (allows fact-based determination of victim–offender relationship despite "convicted" wording)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits use of facts when statute is indivisible; discusses categorical approach)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) ("conviction" as statutory hook; categorical-approach principles)
Nijhawan-related Fifth Circuit application: Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2014) (analyzes limits of circumstance-specific approach)
United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholds SORNA under Commerce Clause; binding circuit precedent)
United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2010) (interprets SORNA’s broad purpose to sweep widely in offenses against children)